Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-005029
(PA/00091/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

30th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

TM (ZIMBABWE)
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Jagadesham, Counsel instructed by Thames Hill Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

At: Bradford on the 16 September 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Zimbabwe born in 1993. The Respondent intends to deport him because he is a serious criminal. The Appellant seeks to resist that deportation on human rights and protection grounds.

Case History and Matters in Issue
2. The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2003 when he was ten years old. He came here with his parents and siblings, and the whole family sought protection.
3. The parties before me were in agreement that the Respondent refused protection1, and that subsequent appeals were dismissed. The family were all however eventually granted indefinite leave to remain pursuant to a Home Office amnesty referred to as the ‘legacy’ provision2.
4. On 31 March 2008, when the Appellant was 15, he was convicted at Sheffield Juvenile Court for ‘Wounding / Inflicting grievous bodily harm’. He was sentenced to 3 months referral order and ordered to pay £40 compensation.
5. On 27 April 2009, he was convicted at Sheffield Juvenile Court for 4 counts of Theft and sentenced to 18 months supervision order with 3 months electronic tagging and ordered to pay costs of £100.
6. On 20 August 2009, he was convicted at Sheffield Juvenile Court for ‘Possession of controlled drug – Class B – Cannabis / Cannabis Resin’ and sentenced to £30 fine, £20 costs and victim surcharge of £15.
7. On 11 March 2010, the Appellant was convicted at Sheffield Crown Court for ‘Attempted robbery’ and sentenced to 1 year and 6 months.
8. On 06 June 2011, he was convicted at Sheffield Juvenile Court for ‘use disorderly behaviour or threatening/abusive/insulting words likely to cause harassment alarm or distress’ and ‘Failing to surrender to custody at appointed time’ and sentenced to 12 months conditional discharge.
9. On 31 January 2012, he was convicted at Sheffield Crown Court for ‘Burglary with intent to steal – dwelling’ and sentenced to 8 months in young offenders institution.
10. On 06 March 2012, he was convicted at Sheffield Magistrates Court for ‘Destroy or damage property (value of £5000 or less)’ and remanded in custody on 7th March 2012, Supervision requirement, community order, compensation £200.00, and alcohol treatment for 6 months.
11. On 16 July 2012, he was convicted at Rotherham Magistrates Court having been ‘found on enclosed premises for unlawful purpose’ and sentenced to community order, costs £85.00, and a 4 week curfew.
12. As will be observed, all of these convictions were committed when the Appellant was a teenager, likely why the Respondent took no action to deport him at that time. The ‘index’ offence which prompted the order that is the subject of this appeal was ‘Causing Death by Dangerous Driving’. The circumstances of that crime are described in the trial judge’s sentencing remarks like this:
“You killed your victim when her daughter was present and they were outside your victim’s mother’s home. Your victim had survived cancer; your victim was a “bright light” in the words of her mother and you killed her in that moment. You did not stop immediately after the accident. You carried on driving and collided with a second vehicle that was oncoming towards you, and your drunken behaviour after finally your vehicle stopped is grotesque in the extreme, smiling at people, saying it was not your fault and telling your deceased victim’s daughter that it was her mother’s fault. These are nothing short of repulsive factors.
...
And finally in terms of aggravating factors, you are a man with criminal convictions. It is right to observe that you have none since 2012 but you have convictions for violence, robbery and you have been deprived of your liberty more than once and you have been to this Crown Court and received a custodial sentence in 2010. You’ve not been to the courts for seven years, but you are a serious offender from the past.
‘Your barrister has eloquently and concisely said all that could be said on your behalf. He refers me to your letter of apology which is on the digital case system and to your reference which is also thereon. But I look at this case and I see that it concerns a man who was very, very drunk, very intoxicated through alcohol; told not to drive but determined he would drive; killed a person by reason of your driving, having crashed a red light causing another member of the public to phone the police; driving at speeds on that journey; failing to stop until you crashed into another car”.
13. On 21 November 2019 the Appellant was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, disqualified from driving and ordered to pay a victim surcharge of £170.
14. On 12 December 2023 the Respondent made an order for deportation.
15. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal on protection and human rights grounds. He submitted that his family were from Goromonzi in rural Zimbabwe, and that applying the still extant country guidance in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC) he could make out a real risk of persecution if returned there: he could not be expected to demonstrate loyalty to ZANU-PF in his home area, and his personal characteristics were such that it would be unreasonable, or unduly harsh, to expect him to relocate somewhere else like Bulawayo or Harare. He further submitted that he had poor mental health: there would be a serious, rapid and irreversible decline leading to inhuman and degrading treatment if he were to be returned to Zimbabwe, amounting to a breach of Article 3. Finally he submitted that in all the circumstances the deportation would amount to a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 rights: s117C(6) Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 applied.
16. The First-tier Tribunal allowed his appeal on all three grounds.
17. The Secretary of State appealed, and on 4 April 2025 the matter came before Upper Tribunal Judge Hanson and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Pickering. The Upper Tribunal found that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was, in some respects, flawed for error of law. In respect of each of the Appellant’s original grounds of appeal its findings were as follows.
18. In respect of his protection claim, it noted at the outset that the First-tier Tribunal had upheld the Respondent’s decision to certify this claim under s72 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. As a serious criminal the Appellant is to be regarded as being a danger to the community and he had failed to rebut that presumption. That said, it was accepted that the Appellant may be entitled to protection if he could demonstrate that there was a real risk that he would face serious harm if returned to Zimbabwe. The First-tier Tribunal found, applying the country guidance, that that the Appellant would be at risk of harm in his home area. That finding was unchallenged on appeal and was therefore preserved. The decision to allow the appeal on protection grounds was however set aside by the Upper Tribunal on the basis that in its analysis of the ‘internal flight alternative’ the Tribunal had failed to apply the country guidance, and/or sufficiently reason its findings.
19. In respect of the Article 3 ‘health claim’ the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal had provided no reasoning for its conclusion that the Appellant was a “seriously ill person” and its conclusions that his return to Zimbabwe would give rise to a violation of Article 3 were therefore vitiated in their entirety and would need to be remade.
20. In respect of Article 8, the length of sentence meant that the Appellant was defined by statute to be ‘serious criminal’ and would therefore need to show ‘very compelling reasons’ over and above the other exceptions set out in s33 Borders Act 2007 to make out his claim. Given its findings that the Appellant required protection, the First-tier Tribunal had allowed the appeal on this alternative basis. The Upper Tribunal having found errors in that approach, this conclusion too fell to be set aside.
21. The Upper Tribunal did expressly preserve certain of the First-tier Tribunal findings, a matter I shall return to below.
22. Pursuant to that decision of the Upper Tribunal, I am therefore tasked with re-determining the following outstanding matters:
i) Internal Flight
Would it be unreasonable, or unduly harsh, to expect the Appellant to relocate within Zimbabwe in order to avoid serious harm in his home area? The Secretary of State has identified either one of Zimbabwe’s major cities, Harare or Bulawayo, as being suitable destinations.
ii) Article 3 Health Claim
Would it be a violation of the United Kingdom’s obligations under Article 3 ECHR to deport the Appellant, given his medical conditions.
iii) Article 8
Are there very compelling circumstances in this case over and above the exceptions in s33 to render this deportation disproportionate and so unlawful?
23. At the hearing I heard brief oral evidence from the Appellant’s mother (‘M’) and sister (‘S’). I then heard detailed submissions from Mr McVeety and Mr Jagadesham, both of whom were extremely helpful in assisting me to navigate the large amount of written evidence before me. I reserved my decision, which I now give. Since it is pertinent to all of the outstanding issues, I begin by making my findings on the extent to which the Appellant suffers from mental ill health and/or any impaired cognitive function. I then address each of the outstanding legal issues in turn.

The Medical Evidence
24. I have before me the following evidence pertinent to the Appellant’s psychological health and mental capacity:
i) School records
ii) GP records
iii) Reports by Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Nuwan Galappathie dated 29 April 2024 and 7 May 2024
iv) Report by Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Aboyami Yusuff dated 25 June 2025, plus written questions posed by the Respondent, and Dr Yusuff’s response dated 14 July 2025
v) Report by Dr Sonia Teodoro, Clinical Psychologist and Neuropsychologist 22 September 2025
vi) Report by Redz Lenfield, Occupation Therapist, 14 October 2025
vii) The testimony of the Appellant and other family members
25. I confirm that I have had regard to all of that material, even where it is not expressly mentioned herein.
26. I start with the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal and expressly preserved by the Upper Tribunal (Judges Hanson and Pickering). Before me the parties agree that these are confined to the findings [at its §68] that the Appellant is currently prescribed 100mg daily of Sertraline, and the following passage:
“70. The appellant has provided evidence in the form of two psychiatric reports from Dr Galappathie. I accept that the appellant is afflicted by mental health conditions which started to manifest a number of years ago, requiring regular medication and treatment. He has been diagnosed with PTSD, GAD and is said to be suffering from a severe episode of depression…”
27. Although Mr McVeety made detailed and trenchant submissions criticising the report of Dr Galappathie, those are the findings. Given that they are preserved, I need not review Dr Galappathie’s evidence in any detail here, although I confirm that I have read his opinion. The nub of Mr McVeety’s argument in respect of the medical evidence more generally was that the Appellant had cynically sought to exaggerate his difficulties since he apprehended that he was facing deportation, and that I should therefore approach all of the expert opinion on this matter with caution, paying particular heed to the warnings of the Presidential panel in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC).
28. Having recorded those preserved findings, and the competing cases of the parties, I turn to evaluate those aspects of the evidence which go beyond Dr Galappathie’s diagnoses of PTSD, anxiety and depression.
29. The first area of departure concerns the suggestion that the Appellant also suffers from some form of learning disability or cognitive disfunction. This first arose, in the context of this appeal, when in June 2025 Dr Yusuff raised a question about these matters and made a recommendation that the Appellant be formally assessed. The Appellant had told Dr Yusuff, in their video consultation, that “all his grades were bad”, that he “struggled with academics and barely understood what was being thought in school” (sic). He also told Dr Yusuff that he still struggles with reading and comprehension to date, and that his understanding is limited to books appropriate for 10–13-year-olds. Dr Yusuff also records the following:
“[the Appellant] told me due to his limited intellectual capabilities, he cannot manage his finances nor complete his activities of daily living, including cooking, washing or using a pressing iron, he relies on his mum for them. His mum prepares his meals and bring them to him, and when she is not available, he relies on readymade foods. Although he is now employed in a warehouse since he was released from the prison, he said his job only involves pushing trollies, packing things and taking them out. His GP record stated that he drives a forklift, I double-checked this with him, and he told me he does not drive a forklift, and he was assertive with this. He reported that his mum also manages his finances, once he gets paid, his mum transfers the money and then uses it to pay his bills such as rent”.
30. Subsequently in his report, Dr Yusuff sets out the Appellant’s evidence on these matters as his own findings:
“He struggles with reading and comprehension, he relies heavily on his mother for daily activities such as cooking, washing, and managing his finances. His job in a warehouse involves simple tasks like pushing trolleys and packing items, which do not require significant cognitive or social skills”.
31. Although Dr Yusuff expressly states [at his §7.13] that he “did not solely rely on the content of [the Appellant’s] narrations and answers to questions” is seems to me that in this first report, this is precisely what he has done. There was absolutely no evidence before Dr Yusuff to support the Appellant’s assertion that he had “limited intellectual capacity” to the extent that he was heavily reliant on his mother. At the date that Dr Yusuff made his assessment, the Appellant had for some time lived independently in his own council flat. He had achieved numerous qualifications and had worked in several jobs. Dr Yusuff accepts uncritically the Appellant’s ‘correction’ of the GPs records to minimise the nature of his work at the warehouse in order to fit with the Appellant’s depiction of himself as having limited capacity.
32. Consequent to Mr McVeety putting a series of written questions to him, Dr Yusuff had an opportunity to reflect on his original report in light of other information provided to him. In his second report, dated 14 July 2025, Dr Yusuff confirmed that his tentative opinion that the Appellant may have a learning disability was indeed based on what the Appellant had told him. He was not however prepared to reconsider that opinion. Mr McVeety supplied Dr Yusuff with a copy of the OASys report, prepared by the Probation Service in November 2023. That records that prior to his incarceration for the index offence, the Appellant had worked as a driver for Domino’s Pizza, had worked in a warehouse for 2 years and had been a labourer in the building site, earning up to £500 per week. He also worked in prison, earning qualifications and experience as a welder and a painter/decorator. He told the officer that he had “good budgeting skills” and that he had been supporting himself prior to his sentence. The OASys assessment also records the Appellant as reporting “no problems” in respect of literacy, numeracy, employment skills or learning disabilities. It states that the Appellant has no mental health problems, psychiatric treatment or childhood behavioural problems in his past.
33. Dr Yusuff says of this new information: “while retrospective review of legal documents may deepen forensic context, their absence at the time of psychiatric formulation does not compromise clinical validity”. I find this response extremely hard to understand. Dr Yusuff is quite right to say that the OASys report was not designed to identify such issues, and that the probation officer was simply relying on the information supplied by the Appellant himself: to that extent, he is right to say that the OASys report only “reflects an absence of reported difficulties”. The problem is that this is precisely what Dr Yusuff did himself. Nowhere does he stop to analyse the fact that the Appellant has said one thing to the probation officer, and an entirely different thing to him. The Appellant told the probation officer that he had “good budgeting skills”, yet told Dr Yusuff that he was unable to manage his own finances and that he relied on his mum to pay his bills. Answering a series of questions about his personal skills and characteristics – some of which drew positive responses – he had told the probation officer that he “no” problems with learning, and yet in the context of his deportation appeal had told Dr Yusuff that he had only “limited intellectual capabilities”.
34. The discrepancies between what the Appellant said in his OASys assessment, and what he subsequently told medical experts, are in my view fairly stark, and lend weight to Mr McVeety’s submission that the Appellant is prepared to feign or exaggerate his difficulties in order to support the case that he would be unable to cope with return to Zimbabwe. That conclusion finds yet further support in the report of Dr Teodoro.
35. As I note above, Dr Yusuff recommended that the Appellant be formally tested for learning disability or cognitive disfunction. That was the background to Dr Teodoro being instructed. She saw the Appellant on the 5 September 2025 via video link. She began by taking a personal history, and almost immediately the Appellant began to supply information contrary to what was said elsewhere. He said that he had never had sex; Dr Teodoro notes that he told the OASys assessor that he had a number of children with various women; there was also reference in his GP notes to him being investigated for chlamydia. The Appellant told Dr Teodoro that he had never worked. When she put to him the information that he had worked for Domino’s, he responded “is that the place they make pizzas”?. Dr Teodoro then put to him the employment history set out in the OASys report, upon which the Appellant acknowledged that he was actually working 12 hour days in a warehouse. The Appellant told her that he was unable to perform basic household tasks like washing up, and that he just put the dishes in the sink so that his mother could do them when she came round. Dr Teodoro noted that this contrasted with the evidence given to Dr Galathappie, that the Appellant had lived independently since 2018 with only some support from his mother.
36. Dr Teodoro then moved on to administering a series of diagnostic tests. One of these was the Weschler Memory Scale. The Appellant’s performance was judged to be “very low” which, Dr Teodoro noted, could be an indicator of very low memory function, but it also be associated with “low investment in the tasks”. She then moved on to the Weschler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. This diagnostic tool contains four sub-tests, but it was not possible to administer all of them because the consultation with Dr Teodoro was taking place by video call and the Appellant only had his small telephone screen. She therefore only used two of the four sub-tests. One of these was the Verbal Comprehension Index. The results indicated that the Appellant’s ability fell below that expected for a six year old. Dr Teodoro writes:
“These results, in my opinion, denote a discrepancy with the observed language production (speech) during interview and assessment. I consider this probable deliberate underperformance, and the results are inconclusive”
37. Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Test is used to measure general intelligence. The Appellant’s score showed “very low intellectual capability” which can indicate real difficulties in facing novel situations or problems. However, as Dr Teodoro writes, there may be another explanation:
“However, this score can be indicative of poor effort or deliberate low performance. Attending this, the decay score was analyzed. The decay score in a non-malingering subject is expected to be higher than in malingering subjects. The decay increase is expected because performance decreases as the difficulty of the problem in the sets increase. The Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices Score is considered invalid if the rate of decay is below the cut off for the total score, in this case the total score was 9, so the cutoff of the decay score is 7. A low decay score (below 7) as the one that [the Appellant] presented (DS=3) indicates that the subject performed uniformly badly irrespective of the difficulty of the problems and that the test results are invalid”
38. Dr Teodoro then administered the Test of Memory Malingering, which as the name suggests, is a tool used primarily to detect malingering. It is structured in such a way as to make failure highly improbable unless the subject is deliberately underperforming. Those with genuine memory problems can still achieve a score of over 45; those falling below that standard are likely to be feigning difficulties. The Appellant scored 5.
39. Given these results and observations, Mr McVeety expressed some surprise at Dr Teodoro’s final conclusions, which were that the Appellant’s understanding of simple/normative language is about 3rd or 4th grade and that “he needs external support for full understanding”. She further found that he shows difficulties with cognitive control of understanding (like counting backwards) and that this may be related to drug use in his adolescence. She estimates that “he has difficulties in successfully engaging in day-to-day tasks like organizing a budget or making decisions” and reaches the overall conclusion that the Appellant has a “mild impairment to make decisions, and to manage daily tasks, needing current support to manage daily tasks”.
40. Whilst I understand Mr McVeety’s scepticism about these conclusions, I note that Dr Teodoro did administer a wide range of tests, and that she is obviously best placed to interpret them. Her acceptance that the Appellant may have a mild impairment is also carefully qualified: she acknowledges the Appellant’s malingering and his attempt to manipulate the results of her clinical tests.
41. Like Dr Teodoro, Specialised Occupational Therapist Redz Lenfield was specifically instructed to assess whether the Appellant had any cognitive difficulties in living alone. Like Dr Teodoro his assessment was conducted remotely and consisted of questions which the Appellant answered. As he was the last professional to assess the Appellant, Mr Lenfield had the benefit of all of the reports I have already mentioned, as well as the witness statements of the Appellant and his family members.
42. At the time of the assessment the Appellant was living with a family friend whom he refers to as ‘uncle’. His mother lives nearby and visits about twice a week. The Appellant told Mr Lenfield that he was working long hours in a warehouse, on a ‘4 on, 4 off’ shift pattern, but was apparently unable to articulate what the job consisted of or what hours he worked. The report records that the Appellant is “entirely dependent” upon his mother to manage his finances. M, who was present throughout the assessment, informed Mr Lenfield that this was necessary because the Appellant “has significant difficulties with money management”. The Appellant put it higher still, telling Mr Lenfield that he was “completely unable to manage any aspect of his life on his own”.
43. Mr Lenfield then records some of the matters set out in the earlier reports, including the Appellant’s claims to have attempted suicide. M told Mr Lenfield that her son has had “lifelong cognitive difficulties” and he finds this assertion to be corroborated by the Appellant’s educational history and other professional reports. In respect of education Mr Lenfield records that the Appellant was always in the bottom set at school, achieved no GCSEs and had to leave college after three months because he was unable to understand anything. Mr Lenfield records that the Appellant’s mental health and cognitive difficulties are having a “profound” impact on his ability to manage life independently and that he is “heavily reliant” on his family for support. He does not know how to cook and would forget to take his medication if his mother did not remind him. He does not wash or brush his teeth unless prompted to do so. He is unable to use the washing machine because he is “overwhelmed by the controls”. Based on all this information Mr Lenfield concludes that the Appellant is not capable of living independently.
44. I am unable to attach any weight at all to Mr Lenfield’s report. There is no attempt at all to interrogate what he was being told by the Appellant and his mother, which in many respects run contrary to the evidence that was before him. The Appellant told him that he works long hours but was unable to describe when he got there or what he did. Mr Lenfield does not enquire how the Appellant is able to undertake a task he cannot describe or get to work at the right time if he doesn’t know what his hours are. The claim that the Appellant is entirely unable to manage money is flatly contradicted by the evidence recorded in the OASys report that he had “good budgeting skills” and was able to live on his own for at least a year before he went to prison for the index offence. Nor does Mr Lenfield consider how the Appellant was able to hold down a number of different jobs since leaving school, and earn up to £500 per week. The notion that the Appellant is “overwhelmed” by the complexity of a washing machine does not sit well with his employment record, or the fact that he did for many years drive a car.
45. Mr Lenfield mentions having consulted the Appellant’s educational records to corroborate his claims, but does not explain what records he was looking at. I find his conclusions very difficult to reconcile with the material before me: I have been unable to find any reference to the Appellant always being in the bottom set or failing to achieve any qualifications. On the contrary his school records show numerous commendations for ‘excellent effort’, and positive commentary from his teachers about his contribution in lessons, the high quality of the work he has produced and his concentration. The documents supplied to the Respondent at the time of the ‘stage 1’ deportation notice includes evidence of the Appellant having obtained GCSEs in English language and Literature in June 2010, and AQA and OCR diplomas in mathematics and numeracy. There are other certificates from school, including one showing the second highest test result in the class in religious education. The claim that the Appellant left college after only three months is not supported by the many certificates showing the Appellant’s achievements in various vocational qualifications:
• Highfield level 1 award for Personal Development and Employability (July 2018)
• Highfield level 1 award in Customer Service (July 2018)
• NCFE level 1 award in Health and Safety Awareness (July 2018)
• City and Guilds certificate showing four modules passed in employability award
• NOCN_C skills award level 1 in Health and Safety in a Construction Environment (June 2018)
• City and Guilds certificates showing 10 modules passed in Streetworks Excavation (June 2015)
• City and Guilds level 1 certificate in Access to Building Services Engineering (June 2014)
• OCR entry level 3 ICT (August 2010)
• Chartered Institute of Environmental Health Level 2 Award Health and Safety in the Workplace (June 2010)
• Edexcel BTEC 1st Certificate in Sport (July 2010)
• Highfield certificates in food safety and catering (June 2010)
46. Drawing all of this together my overall conclusion is that the Appellant, and family members - particularly M - have fabricated or grossly exaggerated his ‘need’ for support. Whilst it may well be the case that M continues to look after her son, visiting him twice a week and cooking him food, I am not satisfied that this is because he is incapable of doing it himself. He may appear “overwhelmed” looking at a washing machine but this does not mean he would be unable to use it if he had to.
47. The information supplied to the various professionals in this matter has been entirely at odds with the Appellant’s actual life experiences. He may not have excelled academically but it not true that he left school and college with no qualifications. He was in and out of prison as a teenager and had extensive contact with probation and rehabilitation services because of the imposition of community orders. I am quite sure that had the Appellant the kind of profound cognitive difficulties that he now claims, they would have been identified then. When he was sentenced for the index offence the trial judge noted that his barrister had said all that could be said on his behalf: nothing is said in mitigation to the effect that the Appellant has limited cognitive function. Nor did the Appellant claim anything of the sort when he underwent the OASys assessment. On that occasion he admitted what is plainly the reality: that he was a functioning adult who lived on his own, earned his own money, paid his own bills and lived a life independently of his family.
48. I have seen two lengthy and detailed letters sent from the Appellant’s solicitors in response to notification that the Appellant may be deported. These are dated 16 October 2020 and 3 May 20233. It is clear that these letters were drafted upon instructions from the Appellant, and possibly his family. They make reference to the family’s situation in Zimbabwe prior to their departure, and to personal matters such as the Appellant having witnessed his father commit serious violence against his mother as a child. Despite containing comprehensive submissions under headings such as ‘Article 3’, ‘compassionate factors’ and ‘exceptional circumstances’, neither letter makes any mention of any mental health or learning difficulties. The closest they come is in the 2020 letter which says “he has been in the United Kingdom since the age of 10 and he relies on his parents and siblings for emotional support”.
49. It is clear to me that the Appellant sought to mislead the professionals who have prepared reports for this appeal. Dr Teodoro acknowledges as much. Mr Lenfield completely fails to consider the possibility, and as I explain above, I attach no weight to his report as a result. Dr Yusuff did at least consider the possibility of malingering, and whilst I respect his professional opinion, he ultimately based all of his conclusions on what he was being told by the Appellant, without analysing the obvious contradictions in that evidence. I must stand back and look at all of the evidence as a whole.
50. Having done so, I am left with this. The extensive school reports that have been produced make one reference to ‘moderate learning difficulties’ being identified in (I think – the writing is blurred) 2010. Dr Teodoro concluded that the Appellant does have a mild impairment. I am prepared to accept that this might be the case. I am unable to accept that this presents the Appellant with any additional challenges over and above his existing mental health issues. The evidence does not support the conclusion that he faces any significant obstacle to living a normal independent life as a 36-year-old man.
51. The second element of the evidence that goes beyond the preserved findings is that the Appellant’s PTSD, anxiety and depression are so bad that he may either kill himself or experience a significant worsening in his conditions should he be removed. In respect of the latter, Mr Jagadesham emphasised that the Appellant reports auditory and visual hallucinations that could leave him isolated and vulnerable in Zimbabwe. Dr Yusuff opines that the deportation could “potentially increase the risk of future suicide attempts”.
52. The evidence of the more extreme symptoms allegedly suffered by the Appellant again comes entirely from his own self reporting. As I note above, Dr Yusuff expressly states that he did not rely simply on the Appellant’s word, but assessed his narrative against the existing medical records. If Dr Yusuff did do that, it is not apparent that the obvious inconsistencies / omissions in the evidence led him to question anything that the Appellant was reporting. The Appellant told Dr Galappathie that he had been stabbed in 2011; he told Dr Yusuff that he had cut his own wrists in 2015/2016, that he smashed his head against a wall in 2017, and that he drove at speed into a wall in 2018 with the intention of ending his life. None of that appears in the GP notes, despite the Appellant making regular visits to the surgery for other issues, including auditory hallucinations, during that period. There was in fact no supporting medical evidence of any of these claims, which Dr Yusuff appears to accept at face value.
53. Dr Teodoro agrees only that the Appellant suffers from anxiety and depression, which she considers to be in the mild range . She attributes both of these to the “driving incident”, noting that they do not appear on his medical records prior to that. Whilst there are references pre-dating the incident to paranoia and hallucinations, in Dr Teodoro’s view these are pseudo-hallucinations connected to drug use rather than psychosis.
54. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that the Appellant suffers from PTSD, anxiety and depression. I proceed on the basis of those findings. I am unable to attach any weight to the Appellant’s claims of past self-harm and/or attempted suicide. I find that he has deliberately sought to deceive the medical professionals engaged for this appeal. There is no supporting medical evidence that he ever drove into a wall or slashed his own wrists. I find that had such incidents occurred, they would have been recorded by the Appellant’s GP, since it is evident from the GP’s notes that the Appellant regularly attended the surgery in the period in question and was not inhibited in raising issues relating to his mental health, viz his reports of auditory hallucination, symptoms subsequently attributed by professionals to drug use. I am unable to attach any weight to Dr Yusuff’s opinion that the deportation could “potentially increase” the risk of a suicide because this is based on his wholesale acceptance of the false narrative advanced by the Appellant.
55. In light of the First-tier Tribunal’s findings, and having regard to the guidance in AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, the IAC Practice Direction Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Witnesses and the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010, I accept that the Appellant is to be treated, for the purpose of this appeal, as a vulnerable witness. I note that this made no real difference in terms of the procedure adopted at the hearing, since the Appellant did not give evidence. No issues were raised by those representing him in respect of his ability to give instructions.

Internal Relocation
56. As I note above, the First-tier Tribunal found that there was a real risk that the Appellant would come to serious harm if he returned to his ‘home area’, as it is a ZANU-PF stronghold where as an incomer, he could face scrutiny and an expectation, that he would be unable to fulfil, that he show allegiance to that organisation. Although the Appellant is excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention because he is a serious criminal, he is entitled to the protection of Article 3 ECHR. It is not in issue that issues relating to internal relocation are also relevant to an Article 3 claim, or that the extant country guidance remains relevant to that assessment.
57. The applicable country guidance remains CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC), which in material part re-stated the guidance given in EM and Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC). Insofar as it is relevant, the headnote to CM reads:
“(8) Internal relocation from a rural area to Harare or (subject to what we have just said) Bulawayo is, in general, more realistic; but the socio-economic circumstances in which persons are reasonably likely to find themselves will need to be considered, in order to determine whether it would be unreasonable or unduly harsh to expect them to relocate.
(9) The economy of Zimbabwe has markedly improved since the period considered in RN. The replacement of the Zimbabwean currency by the US dollar and the South African rand has ended the recent hyperinflation. The availability of food and other goods in shops has likewise improved, as has the availability of utilities in Harare. Although these improvements are not being felt by everyone, with 15% of the population still requiring food aid, there has not been any deterioration in the humanitarian situation since late 2008. Zimbabwe has a large informal economy, ranging from street traders to home-based enterprises, which (depending on the circumstances) returnees may be expected to enter”.
58. In EM and Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC) the Tribunal stated in respect of internal relocation:
“223. Here, the social and economic position of the person in question will assume particular importance. In particular, whilst it might not be contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR to expect a person without family or friends to set themselves up in the informal sector as a street trader, bearing in mind the distinction identified in AH (Sudan) between Article 3 ill-treatment and reasonableness or undue harshness in the case of internal relocation, it might well, on the facts, be unreasonable or unduly harsh to expect such a person to relocate on that basis. The ultimate answer will, however, depend on the particular circumstances of the case.”
59. In the present appeal the First-tier Tribunal found, in findings that were expressly preserved by the Upper Tribunal, as follows:
“63. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I accept that the appellant has no family or support network remaining in Zimbabwe, I find it is highly unlikely that he will be able to rely on the support of his mother’s uncle, bearing in mind his mother has resided in the UK since 2003. I accept that the appellant has not returned to Zimbabwe since he left at the age of 10. I find that he cannot speak the language of his home area, which is Shona. There was no indication that he could do so, he gave evidence in English. I find that the appellant has no solidity, cultural or family ties with Zimbabwe given the length of time that he has resided in the UK”.
At the hearing I suggested, and the representatives accepted, that the word “solidity” in the last sentence may be a typographical error and in fact it should read “social”.
60. In his submissions Mr Jagadesham placed reliance on those findings, and further on more up to date country background evidence which demonstrated, in his submission, that the economic situation in Zimbabwe had worsened rather than improved in the 13 years since CM was promulgated. An El Niño-induced drought badly impacted the country’s ability to produce food in 2023. According to UNICEF, 7.6 million people (50% of the population) faced food insecurity in 2024. This challenge was exacerbated by simultaneous outbreaks of cholera and polio. The Upper Tribunal had accepted, in PS (Cessation principles) Zimbabwe [2021] UKUT 283 (IAC), that there was “cogent evidence of widespread hardship and price inflation in Harare”.
61. Mr Jagadesham also referred me to various reports detailing the hardship and discrimination faced by disabled people in Zimbabwe, but since I have not found the Appellant to be disabled, I have found these to be of only limited assistance. Insofar as depression and related illnesses might be termed a disability, I have had regard to the evidence of the stigmatisation of individuals with mental health issues, and have read that evidence mindful of the fact that the Appellant speaks with a stammer.
62. In this regard Mr Jagadesham relies on the report of Professor Aguilar, dated 16 June 2025. Mr McVeety asked me to place little weight on Prof. Aguilar’s expertise. He had found a number of cases where Prof. Aguilar had given evidence, purporting to be an expert. These had included other African nations such as Angola, Somalia and Nigeria, as well as India, China and Afghanistan. Mr McVeety asked me to view with scepticism the notion that Prof. Aguilar could possibly be an expert on all of these very varied countries.
63. I have no hesitation in accepting that Prof. Aguilar is an eminent anthropologist. The test for what constitutes ‘expert evidence’, in the context of these proceedings, does however require something more specific. In Kennedy and Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6 the Supreme Court held that there were four key considerations in establishing whether opinion evidence was ‘expert’.
64. The first is whether the opinion is of assistance to the court, not just in general terms, but specifically whether it is necessary for me to reach a decision on the contested matters in the case.
65. In the first section of his report Prof. Aguilar addresses the consolidation of dictatorial power by ZANU-PF. Here he draws on various sources including the CPIN and media reports. None of this has been relevant to my decision, given the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal. Next he considers the politicisation of food distribution. He draws on material already in the bundle, and other sources to confirm the uncontested facts there is considerable scarcity and hardship; inflation runs in triple digits and more than half of the population require food aid supplied by the government. He agrees that food aid is distributed within Zimbabwe along the lines of distribution of ZANU-PF. He highlights the 2023 drought. He is then asked to consider the ‘personal impact on the Appellant’ of return in these circumstances, given his personal characteristics. Here he makes his own assessment in light of the facts found by the First-tier Tribunal, applying the country guidance: strictly speaking, that is a matter for me. The section on mental health is framed around the conclusions of Dr Yusuff, which I have already rejected; this section is therefore of no assistance to me. Nor is his analysis of whether the Appellant could access medical care since it is based on his conclusion that the Appellant has “no prospects of employment” because of those mental health issues. He draws on material in the CPIN to say that the healthcare system is in general chronically underfunded.
66. There is only one paragraph in the decision that I can find that supplies information not available elsewhere in the bundle, and therefore might be described as “necessary” to my decision. That is paragraph 61 where Prof. Aguilar opines that a person with the Appellant’s mental health conditions “would find it extremely difficult to get a clear medical report that will allow him to work in unskilled situations such as supermarkets, security firms, warehouses and clerical jobs within business companies”. I am unsure as to where Prof. Aguilar sourced the information that the Appellant would need a medical report in order to get an “unskilled” job. He does not cite any evidence for this proposition, and given that he has not been in Zimbabwe since 1992, I am unable to assume that it is from his own direct knowledge. I am therefore unable to attach any weight to it.
67. Prof. Aguilar’s final conclusion, expressed at his paragraph 63, is entirely unhelpful, since it is contrary to the country guidance (not the case advanced by Mr Jagadesham), and is unsupported by any actual evidence:
“It is completely unsafe for the Appellant to return to any part of Zimbabwe on account of his three fears: ZANU-PF operates everywhere in Zimbabwe, the distribution of food requires his loyalty to ZANU-PF throughout Zimbabwe, and there are no medical facilities for treatment of his mental health throughout Zimbabwe. As he is on his own, he will be suspected of being a witch or an opponent of the state throughout Zimbabwe”.
68. I have not found the report necessary to my decision making. That is because it largely replicates evidence that is already before me, and where is departs from that evidence is unsourced. It follows that the report does not meet the first of the tests set out in Kennedy v Cordia; nor does it meet the second, which is that the witness must possess specialized, relevant expertise rather than simply relying on common sense or internet research. That being the case I am unable to treat this as an expert report, and it simply forms part of the general country background evidence before me.
69. Having taken all of the relevant country background evidence into account, I turn to assess the factors identified by Mr Jagadesham as being relevant to whether or not it would be ‘reasonable’ to expect the Appellant to move to either Harare or Bulawayo. These are:
• the difficulty that he may face in securing a steady supply of the medication that he takes for depression and anxiety;
• the possibility that his mental health conditions, stammer and/or mild impairment would present obstacles to integration;
• the dire socio-economic conditions prevailing generally in Zimbabwe
• the possibility that access to government food aid could be dependent upon political allegiance
• the background of politically motivated violence and human rights abuses
• the absence of social or family networks, per the finding of the First-tier Tribunal
• the possibility that as an ‘incomer’ the Appellant may be a soft target for criminals
• the Appellant’s inability to speak any language of Zimbabwe other than English
70. I have set these factors out in no particular order, and I fully appreciate Mr Jagadesham’s case that it is the cumulative effect of all these issues, taken in the round, which could render internal relocation unreasonable.
71. I start with the least controversial matters. It is not in doubt that the economic situation in Zimbabwe is absolutely awful. It was bad at the time of EM, had got worse by the time CM was handed down, and the evidence suggests that it has got no better since; if anything, the situation has deteriorated yet further. There is still evidence that government food aid is distributed along party lines, and although this is more pronounced in more remote rural areas, I accept that there are examples of it also happening in the cities. Life is tough for ordinary Zimbabweans, who must struggle against food scarcity, instability and rampant inflation.
72. In respect of health care I have had regard to the Country Policy and Information Note Zimbabwe: Medical treatment and healthcare Version 2.0 (April 2021). This sets out, in stark terms, the crisis faced by the Zimbabwean healthcare system. Although there are hospitals, staff, policies and a government run medical insurance scheme (Medical Aid) in place, their ability to actually deliver health care is severely compromised by a lack of consistent funds, with the result that people can wait years for even basic treatment in the public sector. There is however a functioning private sector, with hospitals, GPs and pharmacy facilities available to those who are able to pay. The Appellant is currently taking sertraline, a generic SSRI prescribed for depression and anxiety. At its [5.1.2] the CPIN states that this, and other generic anti-depressants, are available in private pharmacies in Harare. They are imported from South Africa and there can be, from time to time, an interruption in supply.
73. Mr Jagadesham was quite right to emphasise that these are very real challenges for ordinary Zimbabweans, and Mr McVeety was quite right to accept this. There are high levels of poverty and it can be very difficult to get medical treatment. The Appellant is not however an ordinary Zimbabwean. He is someone who has a distinct advantage, namely the presence of his mother, and other supportive family members in the United Kingdom. Much has been made in this appeal of the support that M gives her son. I am in no doubt at all that M would continue to offer that support to him should he be deported to Zimbabwe. She works full time, and would be in a position to remit him funds if he needed them, for instance to pay for a deposit on accommodation, or buy medication from a private pharmacy. This would go a long way to protecting the Appellant from the deficiencies of the public healthcare system, the politicisation of food distribution and the generally poor economic situation.
74. I do not accept that the Appellant is unable to work. He has held several jobs in this country, including earning a good wage as a labourer. I have not seen any evidence to the effect that his depression and related issues, or his stammer would prevent him from obtaining such work in Zimbabwe. Alternatively his mother would no doubt assist him with the modest expenses needed to set himself up as a street trader. The Appellant is a physically fit adult male and as such can be expected to work to support himself.
75. There is some evidence that people with disabilities, or with pronounced mental health issues, face fear and discrimination, in some cases - particularly in rural communities - being associated with witchcraft. Although I have carefully read all of the medical evidence relating to the Appellant, I have not seen any reliable evidence that he would be externally identifiable as someone with such issues. He is not psychotic, and although he claims to have heard voices in the past (a symptom attributed to the misuse of drugs rather than his depression) there is no credible evidence that this would be visible to an observer. There are no doubt many people in Zimbabwe suffering from depression, anxiety and PTSD symptoms: if they suffered significant social consequences as a result I would expect this to be reflected in the country background material. I have not therefore been able to attach very much weight to this element of the Appellant’s case.
76. I do accept that his conditions will make it more difficult for him to integrate into society. He has not been in Zimbabwe for many years and so will be unfamiliar with the street scene, with the ways in which people behave, and perhaps expect him to behave. I accept that this readjustment would be hard for anyone, and that for someone with a condition such as anxiety, there is an additional challenge. Being in a new, and no doubt intimidating, environment is however something that the Appellant has already experienced in being sent to prison, and as the OASys report makes clear, he was able to cope effectively with that. His PTSD, anxiety and depression will, I accept, likely make acclimatisation more difficult, as will his stammer and his mild learning impairment. He is not however, incapable of integrating. He has been able to function as an adult in this country – working, studying, building friendships – and I see no real reason why he cannot do so in Zimbabwe. He speaks a recognised language of Zimbabwe, English. Any queries about his inability to speak Shona or Ndebele can simply be answered with the truth: that he has been in England a long time.
77. I recognise that political violence sadly remains a feature of life in Zimbabwe, but the evidence falls far short of establishing that a civilian, simply by virtue of being there, might find himself at risk. In his skeleton argument Mr Jagadesham makes reference to evidence that was before the Tribunal in the reported case of PS (cessation principles) Zimbabwe [2021] UKUT 283 (IAC) to the effect that the appellant in that case might be seen as a “soft target” for criminals in Harare. Although I do not discount the risk that this may also be true of the Appellant – simply by virtue of him being a newcomer - his situation is not the same as that of PS, who was a vulnerable woman suffering from episodes of psychosis severe enough for her to have been detained under the Mental Health Acts. The Appellant is an adult man who has been in prison, and has been involved in criminality himself: in contrast to PS, he is able ‘to look after himself’ in this respect.
78. Drawing all of this together I do not underestimate how difficult it will be for the Appellant. He might find it difficult to find employment. He will, at first at least, be isolated and lonely given his lack of contacts there. He may not be able to access government food aid. He will have to be vigilant to make sure that he always has a good supply of his medication, for instance by visiting pharmacies and placing orders well in advance of needing it. Even with those drugs he may well feel more depressed and anxious about his situation, and experience a deterioration in his PTSD symptoms. All of that is going to be hard. It is not, however in my view unreasonable. The Appellant is able to live independently, as he has done in this country. He will in due course be able to meet new people and make new friends. If he cant find a job, he can start a business. He will, I am wholly satisfied, always be able to turn to his family in the UK for support.
79. For those reasons, I find that internal relocation to a city in Zimbabwe would be a reasonable alternative to international surrogate protection in this case.

Article 3 Health Claim
80. Given my findings above, here I can be brief. I do not find that the Appellant is a seriously ill person. He has PTSD, depression, anxiety and, according to some reports, related conditions such as auditory hallucinations and ‘social adjustment disorder’. These conditions have not prevented the Appellant from studying, working or living in the UK. I do not accept that they would do so in Zimbabwe. There is no credible or reliable evidence before me that removal would result in a serious, rapid or irreversible decline in the Appellant’s mental health such that he would ensure intense suffering. The Article 3 health claim is for these reasons without merit.

Article 8
81. Again, here I can be brief.
82. The Appellant is not placing any reliance on family relationships with a partner or children. He is unable to meet the requirements of the ‘private life’ exception to the automatic deportation provisions because he has not lived lawfully in the UK for most of his life, and for the reasons I have set out above in respect of internal flight, is unable to show that there are very significant obstacles to his integration. The only basis upon which the Appellant could succeed under Article 8 would be to show that there are very compelling circumstances over and above the other exceptions not to deport him.
83. The Appellant has lived in this country a very long time. The foundations for his private life are all, at present, in this country. He came here as a child and I am sure he regards it as home. He went to school and college in this country, build friendships here, got himself a flat and found work. I accept that he has a close relationship with a large number of friends and family members here, in particular his mother, whom, I do not doubt, dotes on him and offers him a lot of support in a variety of ways. I have read the harrowing accounts in the witness statements of the domestic violence that M and the children endured at the hands of the Appellant’s father and I do not think I need expert evidence to accept that this must have played a part in his troubled teenage years. It will probably affect him for the rest of his life. I have placed as much weight as I can on those matters. I have also placed some weight on the undisturbed findings of the First-tier Tribunal that the Appellant does have various mental health issues, and at least some degree of mild learning disability.
84. I accept that relocation to Zimbabwe, a country he has not been to since he was a young child, is going to be challenging. I have however found that the obstacles that the Appellant faces in Zimbabwe cannot be described as “very significant”. He will, in a reasonable amount of time, be able to work, find a house, establish a new network of friends and perhaps found a family of his own.
85. Against all of that I must weigh the substantial public interest in deporting the Appellant, a criminal who has been sentenced to eight years in prison, for taking someone’s life. In his sentencing remarks the trial judge emphasised the profound grief and loss faced by the family of the woman who died, and although this does not in itself add to the ‘public interest’, it illustrates exactly what we mean by that term.
86. Given the Appellant’s troubled history, his struggles with mental health and the fact that the death was not intentional, I can imagine a scenario where he could have succeeded under s117C(6) Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in showing his deportation to be disproportionate. That would however have depended on the Appellant having demonstrated a real understanding of the harm that his offending over the years has caused and showing himself to be completely rehabilitated. The evidence of these matters instead falls far short. The First-tier Tribunal upheld the s72 certificate because it could not be satisfied that the Appellant was no longer a danger to the public. As I outline above, the index offence was the last of a long line of criminal offences including robbery, GBH, theft, burglary and possession of drugs. The Appellant was last evaluated by the probation service in their OASys report dated 13 November 2023. He said at the time that he was unable to remember anything about the offence because he had been so drunk, and that at the time he was heavily abusing alcohol; the officer completing the assessment considered him to be minimising his culpability for the crime. Even having had regard to all the positive things that could be said in the Appellant’s favour, the headline conclusion of the report was that the Appellant will continue to pose a medium risk of harm to the public upon his release. In those circumstances I find the public interest to decisively outweigh the cumulative total of the matters that go in the Appellant’s favour.

Decisions
87. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is re-made as follows: the appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.
88. There is an order for anonymity.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24 September 2026