Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005074

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57640/2023
LP/04488/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 February 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKUP
SITTING IN RETIREMENT

Between

DMR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Frost, instructed by Barnes Harrild and Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 January 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Webb) promulgated 12.9.24 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 14.9.23 refusing his claim for international protection, a claim made on the basis of risk of honour-based violence arising from his relationship in Iraq with D, the daughter of a high-ranking PUK commander. The appellant relied on humanitarian protection and article 3 ECHR grounds only, his representative accepting that he could not succeed on refugee grounds and indicating that article 8 ECHR was not pursued.
2. In summary, the single ground argues that the Judge’s approach to the appellant's credibility assessment was flawed, with reference made to [60] of the decision and the claim that the relationship continued after being beaten. The first complaint is that the judge erred in stating that the relationship was not risky. Secondly, it is argued that given the series of positive credibility findings and the fact that the appellant engaged in a relationship that was by its nature risky, the judge’s finding that the relationship did not continue post-beating evidence was not credible, is unsustainable and not open to the judge on the evidence.
3. On 23.10.24, the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Parkes) refused permission to appeal. However, on renewal of the application before the Upper Tribunal, Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi granted permission in the decision issued on 29.11.24.
4. Judge Rastogi considered it “arguable that at [60] the judge made findings not open to him on the evidence particularly in light of the findings already made about the relationship having commenced and been pursued in circumstances which are risky in Iraq [52].”
5. Whilst not restricting the grounds of appeal, Judge Rastogi warned that “At the error of law hearing, the appellant will have the burden of showing that this was a material error, particularly as the judge gave additional reasoning at [62].”
6. The Upper Tribunal has received and taken into consideration the respondent’s Rule 24 response. I have also considered the impugned decision against the grounds and the helpful oral submissions by both representatives.
7. I indicated at the close of the submissions that the appeal would be dismissed, providing brief oral reasons but reserving the full reasons to be provided in writing, which I now do.
8. For the reasons set out herein and on a plain reading of the decision I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal carefully considered whether there was a real risk of serious harm on return, indicating at [24] that all the evidence had been taken into consideration, whether or not specifically referenced in the decision.
9. It is clear that this was a nuanced assessment of the evidence, with the judge finding for the appellant and against the respondent on a number of issues, including that he had been beaten as claimed. For example, at [37] the judge accepted that the appellant “did not have a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum while traveling through Europe and that his failure to claim asylum does not affect his overall credibility.” Similarly, at [46] the judge accepted that he worked as a bodyguard.
10. However, the judge found at [63] that the appellant did not continue his relationship after the beating and at [64] that any adverse interest from D’s family ended at that point, so that he would not be at risk on return on that basis. Reasons for those findings are set out in the decision between [61] and [63].
11. Complaint is made in relation to [60] of the decision, where the judge having rejected the submission that the relationship continued, found the claim both implausible and not credible, [59]. In particular, challenge is made to the following statement: “On the appellant’s own account, that I have accepted, the relationship had already resulted the appellant being beaten and left for dead: the relationship was not risky but had resulted in harm.” It was not entirely clear to either representative what the judge intended by stating that the relationship was not risky. It is submitted that it was never the appellant’s case that the relationship was not risky, and the grounds argue that, given the circumstances, it was indeed risky.
12. In his submissions, Mr Frost suggested that there may be a word missing from the sentence at [60] and that the judge may have intended to state that the relationship was risky but erred in the drafting of the wording. However, whatever the judge intended to state, it is clear that the judge had already accepted at [52]: “Relationships as described by the appellant are risky in Iraq. I find that the power and influence of individual families involved may increase that risk but that does not mean the account of the appellant starting the relationship and asking to marry D is implausible.” I am satisfied that the judge proceeded on the basis that the relationship was risky for the reasons already given in a finding that is in favour of the appellant. I am not satisfied that the challenge to the “not risky” statement at [60] makes any real difference or is material to the outcome of the appeal.
13. For the reasons set out herein, I reach the conclusion that more than adequate reasons were given for finding the appellant’s evidence claiming to have continued the relationship despite the very serious beating dealt to him. In essence, Mr Frost’s argument is little more than that because the appellant was credible on the fact of the relationship and the beating, he should be given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that the relationship continued thereafter. Mr Frost purported to address me on the alleged clarity of the appellant’s evidence at the First-tier Tribunal, disagreeing and stating that he was “surprised” at the way in which the judge described that evidence as lacking clarity and detail. I explained, however, that I could not accept such evidence from him as the appellant’s representative and pointed out that he had not asked for a transcript of the evidence to be produced.
14. It cannot be said that the findings in this issue were unsupported by reasons, nor that they are perverse, irrational or otherwise unreasonably made. It cannot be said that any other reasonable judge could not have reached the same conclusions on the evidence. The judge was entitled to reach the view that he did not believe that part of the appellant’s account and provided adequate and cogent reasons for that conclusion.
15. In the circumstances, I find no material error of law in the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands as made.

I make no order as to costs.

DMW Pickup

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sitting in Retirement

29 January 2025