Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005080

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62388/2023
LP/03517/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Gill

Between

AM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Coyte, instructed by Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 18 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against a decision by First-tier Tribunal Judge MM Thomas (‘the judge’), promulgated on 3 September 2024. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal on protection and Article 8 private life grounds.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq with Kurdish ethnicity. He made an asylum application on the basis that he had entered into an illicit ‘love’ relationship with an unmarried woman (‘ST’), which was not accepted by her family. As a result, he claimed that he was seriously assaulted by ST’s brother, who is part of another tribe. He fled Iraq and fears persecution from ST’s brother, family and tribe having committed a so-called honour-based crime. Furthermore, the appellant states that he is at risk of persecution from his own family and tribe, as a perpetrator of an honour-based crime and also having been the victim of a serious assault, due to the sexual nature of the assault.
3. The application for asylum was refused by the respondent on 10 November 2023 as set out in the Respondent’s Reasons for Refusal letter (‘RFRL’). The Respondent’s Review is dated 17 July 2024 and maintains the same position. The Respondent does not accept the appellant’s account, namely that he has faced adverse attention which amounts to persecution due a relationship he had entered into or that the appellant faces persecution or death from his own family due to the events that had taken place.
4. The appellant’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was heard on 23 August 2024. The judge’s adverse credibility findings were central to the judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal.
5. On 1 November 2024 permission to appeal was granted by the FtT, on all grounds.
Grounds of Appeal
6. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1 – failing to have adequate regard to country background information and erring in the assessment of credibility
b. Ground 2 – error of fact in finding the appellant knows the details of his previous legal representatives in Germany
c. Ground 3 - failure to provide adequate reasons in finding the appellant’s account not credible regarding male members of his family disowning him on account of his disability
d. Ground 4 - material misdirection in finding the appellant’s credibility damaged under s.8 the Asylum & Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 when the issue had not been raised by the respondent
Discussion
7. I was provided with a composite bundle consisting of 306 pages by the appellant and a Rule 24 response consisting of 2 pages by the respondent. I heard submissions from both parties and have referred to the relevant evidence and submissions in my discussion below.
Ground 1
8. On behalf of the appellant Mr Coyte submitted that the judge had found the appellant’s account between his written statements and oral evidence to be consistent (in other words internally consistent). However, the judge then erroneously found this did not equate to his account being ‘either a truthful account, inherently probable or one that is supported by the country background evidence’ [26] and found the appellant’s account in respect of his relationship to be ‘flawed from the outset’ and inconsistent when viewed against the background evidence (externally inconsistent) [20]. Mr Coyte relied on HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, where it was held inherent probability, which may be helpful in many domestic cases, can be a dangerous, even a wholly inappropriate factor to rely on in some asylum cases. Mr Coyte submitted that the judge erred in assessing the appellant’s account against the county background evidence [19] – [21], as the county background evidence did not undermine the appellant’s account. Furthermore, these were matters that were not raised as issues by any party.
9. The respondent submitted that the judge’s findings did properly consider the country background evidence in respect of the issue of honour killings and reached conclusions which were open to the judge, namely that the appellant’s account was inconsistent with the country evidence. The respondent argued that the grounds of appeal simply proffered an alternate conclusion and the judge was entitled to reach the findings made.
10. I have considered the judge’s decision with care and remind myself that I must exercise appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with it, bearing in mind the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462. The judge must consider all the material evidence, although the judge need not discuss it all in their judgement.
11. The judge at [18] – [21] makes the finding that the appellant’s account is “flawed from the outset” and finds the appellant’s account to be “inconsistent and contradictory when viewed against background country evidence”. The judge, however, accepts at [26] that the appellant’s factual account has been internally consistent. The judge ultimately concludes “I do not accept the truth of the Appellant’s account in relation to either the purported relationship with ST, the assault by [her brother], or his poor treatment by his family as a result of his disability”. In reaching these conclusions the judge refers to Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and tribal violence Version 1.0 July 2024 (‘CPIN honour crimes 2024’) and Danish Immigration Service report ‘Honour Crimes against men in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ( KRI) and the Availability of Protection’ January 2010 (‘Danish report’). Taking account of the country background evidence, the judge concludes that illicit sexual relationships are unacceptable in Iraq, those engaged in such relationships know that they take a very high risk, may be held to be in breach of the penal code and unable to seek the protection of the state [20]. The application of this conclusion is discussed further below.
12. The judge’s credibility findings can be summarised as follows; (i) the appellant, as a cleaning supervisor, would not have been provided with confidential information by a receptionist, (ii) the appellant would not have messaged a female he had never met and knew nothing about, with his desire to meet up with her, then engage in an illicit relationship with her, considering the potential risk to him on the basis of background evidence (iii) the appellant, who at the time was in his mid to late twenties, knowing of the risk to both himself and ST if discovered would not have taken such a risk, (iv) the appellant’s account that he was sexually assaulted by ST’s brother but that his family remained ignorant as to what happened was not credible, on the basis that the background evidence suggested that resolution of the ‘honour crime’ committed by the appellant would have required, at some level, the involvement of the appellant’s family. Each of these adverse credibility findings, (i) – (iv) were key findings in the decision.
13. In respect of (i) the judge does not provide any reasons, nor reference to background evidence, as to why the appellant’s account was found not to be credible. It is therefore difficult to see, without further reasoning, how the judge reached adverse credibility findings on this issue, having accepted at [26] that the appellant’s factual account had been internally consistent. Furthermore, there is merit in the appellant’s argument that the country background evidence in fact supports the appellant’s account as it demonstrates that there are poor confidentiality practices in Iraq. I am therefore satisfied that the judge has not had adequate regard to the background evidence in reaching the conclusion summarised at (i).
14. With regard to (ii) and (iii) it is difficult to see how the judge reached these conclusions based on the county background evidence. By their very nature honour crimes, revenge crimes and blood feuds are generally committed in response to ‘high risk’ actions taken by individuals, in circumstances where the individuals know they are high risk, yet choose to engage in that activity, for example illicit pre-martial and extramarital relationships. The country background information referred to by the judge does confirm that there are risks to individuals who engage in illicit sexual relationships, but it is somewhat of a stretch to then conclude that the country background evidence indicates that someone in the appellant’s position would not take such risks. In fact, throughout CPIN honour crimes 2024 reference is made to the occurrence of illicit sexual contact, premarital and extramarital relationships. I am therefore satisfied that the judge in reaching this adverse credibility finding does not adequately engage with the country background information.
15. In respect of (iv) the judge refers to ‘CPIN honour crimes’, which has previously been identified by the judge at [19] as the 2024 version. This document does refer throughout to the concept of honour relating to family honour and at [3.1] discusses blood feuds, tribal disputes and violence. I am satisfied that the judge has adequately engaged with the background evidence in reaching the conclusion summarised at (iv), on this aspect of the appellant’s account. Although another judge may have reached a different conclusion, the conclusion reached by the judge was within the range of permissible findings.
16. For the reasons set out above I am satisfied that the judge erred in law in reaching the adverse credibility findings at (i) – (iii), on key aspects of the appellant’s account, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that these findings have infected the overall conclusion that the appellant’s account was “flawed from the outset” and in rejecting the appellant’s account, despite having found it to be internally consistent and notwithstanding that there was no error of law in the finding summarised at (iv). Given that credibility was at the heart of the underlying appeal, the errors of law identified are material errors of law and infect the entire decision, therefore the judge’s decision is set aside with no findings of fact being preserved.
17. Although I heard submission in relation to grounds 2, 3 and 4 there is no utility in addressing those arguments as the appellant succeeds on the basis of ground 1.
18. I heard submissions from both parties as to whether the underlying appeal should be remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh, or whether it should be retained in the Upper Tribunal to be remade. Both parties agreed that the matter should be remitted to the FtT.
19. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides:

“7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:

(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or

(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.”
20. Taking into account the fact that credibility was at the heart of the underlying appeal I consider that the nature and extent of judicial fact finding necessary in this case is such that it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT. I have had regard to the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC).
Notice of Decision
21. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error of law and is set aside.
22. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided de novo and to be heard by a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Mm Thomas.
23. I do not preserve any findings of fact.

A. Gill
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 June 2025