Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-005118
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59354/2023
LP/03839/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

CS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Muzenda of Longfellow & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The Appellant appeals against the Respondent’s decision dated 18 October 2023 refusing her protection and human rights claim.
2. The Appellant is a Zimbabwean national. She entered the UK with leave as a partner in December 2018, returned to Zimbabwe and came back to the UK in September 2019. On 9 November 2020 she made a claim for asylum which was refused on 18 October 2023. In a determination promulgated on 21 August 2024 the First-tier Tribunal allowed her appeal. That decision was subsequently set aside by the Upper Tribunal on 10 February 2025 and the appeal was listed for remaking by the Upper Tribunal.
3. On 28 February 2025 the Appellant filed a bundle of further evidence. The remaking hearing on 13 March 2025 was adjourned due to the Appellant’s failure to serve the further evidence on the Respondent and her pregnancy-related illness. The hearing was further adjourned on 2 June and 8 July 2025. On 8 October 2025 I directed that the hearing be listed and that the Appellant’s solicitors file and serve any further evidence on which the Appellant proposed to rely. No further evidence was served in compliance with those directions.
4. The matter came before me at a remaking hearing on 27 November 2025. At that hearing the Respondent consented to the new matter of the Appellant’s child (born in August 2025) being considered by the Tribunal and to the admission of the 19-page bundle of evidence filed by the Appellant shortly before the hearing. Mr Muzenda indicated at the outset of the hearing that he proposed to serve further additional evidence from the Appellant’s partner during the course of the hearing. I did not permit him to do so at that very late stage, given the history of adjournments, the lack of response to my previous directions of 8 October 2025, and the fact that the Secretary of State would not have had the opportunity to consider or respond to the new material.
5. Having heard evidence and submissions from the parties I reserved my decision. Unfortunately, my decision was then significantly delayed due to my prolonged absence on sick leave following an injury. I apologise to the parties for the lengthy delay in providing this decision and for any inconvenience caused thereby.
Issues in the appeal
6. The parties agreed that the issues in the appeal were:
a. Whether the Appellant faces a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Zimbabwe; and
b. Whether the Appellant’s removal would breach Article 8 ECHR family life rights.
Evidence
7. The Appellant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. She was asked about her activities attending protests in the UK and said that she had attended more than five protests organised through the Zimbabwe Human Rights Organisation (‘ZHRO’) since 2021, the last one being in 2024 although she did not remember the date. She had been a member of ZHRO since November 2023. She had not been politically active since her pregnancy as she had been unwell, but intended to resume her activities once she felt stronger. She kept in touch with other ZHRO members via a Whatsapp group.
8. The Appellant identified the photographs in the bundle as relating to two protests which she had attended outside the Zimbabwean embassy. There was a photograph of individuals outside 10 Downing Street handing in a petition which did not include the Appellant, although she said that she had handed in a similar petition to Downing Street on another occasion.
9. The Appellant was also asked about an article dated 5 September 2021, posted to the New Zimbabwe website, which featured a photograph of her and quotes from her criticising the Zimbabwean government for mismanaging the economy and undermining human rights. She said she had contacted New Zimbabwe about an article she had written because she was concerned about the government’s conduct. The Appellant said that she would continue to write blogs critical of the government and to attend protests if she returned to Zimbabwe, but that it was not possible to hold peaceful protests as the police disrupted them and there was violence.
10. The Appellant was asked about her family in Zimbabwe and about her partner. She confirmed that her mother and sister still lived there and that some of her partner’s extended family also lived there. She had moved in with her partner in July 2025; he was a dual British and Zimbabwean national. He had known she did not have status in the UK when they met. Her partner would not return with her if she were sent back to Zimbabwe, because his family and career were here and he also required medication for multiple sclerosis (‘MS’) which was expensive in Zimbabwe. She confirmed that her partner provided care for their baby and that she was currently breastfeeding.
11. The Appellant’s partner Mr Dhilwayo also gave oral evidence. He confirmed that he had lived in the UK since June 2012 and was a dual British and Zimbabwean national. He worked as an environmental health officer and would not be able to find work in Zimbabwe. He had started a formal relationship with the Appellant in around February 2024 and they had had a customary marriage in July 2025, about the same time they moved in together. He confirmed that the Appellant had been going to demonstrations until she became pregnant. When asked whether he had discussed with the Appellant what would happen if she lost her appeal and had to return to Zimbabwe, he said that he had not discussed it with her because his expectation was that she would remain here as his wife. He was however clear that he would not accompany the Appellant to Zimbabwe if she had to return. He stated that he had been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (‘MS’) in November 2023; he was taking MS medication and there were no facilities or medication for MS in Zimbabwe. He had not provided medical records for the hearing because he had not been made aware of the need for them. He could not return to Zimbabwe as he was British, his life and family were here, and he did not feel safe in Zimbabwe. Mr Dhilwayo confirmed that he took an active part in caring for his son, including feeding and bathing him and taking him to GP appointments.
12. I had before me the appeal bundle filed by the Respondent in December 2024, together with a further bundle filed by the Appellant in February 2025 and a 19-page bundle filed on 26 November 2025. During the hearing I was also taken to the supplementary bundle filed before the First-tier Tribunal in August 2024. I considered all of the documentary and oral evidence carefully.
Submissions
13. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Clewley relied on the Respondent’s refusal letter and review. The starting point was the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal that the Appellant had been a member of the MDC in Zimbabwe, but that her account of adverse attention and ill-treatment by the authorities was not credible, and the finding that the Appellant’s blog contained plagiarised articles. Although it was accepted that the Appellant was a member of the MDC, her credibility in respect of her political beliefs was severely impacted by (i) her delay in claiming asylum and (ii) her plagiarising of articles on her blog, which indicated that her political views were not genuine. The evidence from ZHRO did not attest to the Appellant’s participation or involvement in political activities, but simply that she was a member. Even if the Appellant’s political views were genuine, the nature of her political activities was such that she would not be at risk on return; the Appellant had not been organising protests or taking a high profile role. The Appellant’s blog was not widely shared or known and the article on which she relied was written in 2021. Another article on the blog was in fact a glowing review of the Zimbabwean government’s handling of the economy. There was no evidence that the Appellant had come to the adverse attention of the Zimbabwean authorities as a result of her blog. The Appellant was therefore not at risk of screening at the airport on return. The Appellant did not have the risk factors identified in the CPIN or country guidance caselaw, and therefore was not at real risk on return.
14. In relation to Article 8, Ms Clewley submitted that there were no insurmountable obstacles to the Appellant returning to Zimbabwe and that although Article 8 family life was engaged, any interference was proportionate. The Appellant’s relationship with her partner had been ongoing for less than 2 years, and had been formed in the knowledge of her precarious status; although there was a difference in living standards it was not unjustifiably harsh to expect the Appellant’s partner to return with her. There was no evidence of the partner’s MS or his medication, nor background evidence demonstrating that it could not be obtained in Zimbabwe. Both the Appellant and her partner had family in Zimbabwe who could provide support.
15. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Muzenda submitted that the Appellant was at risk on return, because the country guidance in HS (returning asylum seekers) Zimbabwe CG [2007] UKAIT 00094 demonstrated that all returnees would be screened in an intelligence-led process looking for relevant evidence of life in the UK, which in the Appellant’s case involved participation in forums and on blogs notwithstanding the plagiarised articles. Her profile did not need to be significant and the regime in Zimbabwe was ruthless. The Appellant fell within the risk categories identified in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 as someone with a significant profile returning to a rural area. The Appellant had indicated she would want to be politically active on return and would continue to write articles critical of the regime. She was therefore at risk.
16. In relation to Article 8, Mr Muzenda submitted that there was clear evidence of family life between the Appellant and her partner; although their relationship had been formed while the Appellant’s status was precarious, it was unfair and disproportionate for their British child to be removed from the UK.
Discussion and decision
Asylum
17. The Appellant claims that she would be at risk on return to Zimbabwe because of her political opinion. There are two aspects to her claim: (i) her profile as an MDC member and (ii) her sur place political activity in the UK.
18. The Appellant’s claim for asylum was made prior to 28 June 2022 and the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 therefore do not apply. To succeed in her appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show that she has a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of her political opinion. The burden of proof is on the Appellant and the lower standard of proof applicable to asylum claims (a “real risk” or “reasonable likelihood”) applies.
19. Both parties relied on CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC), which despite its age remains applicable country guidance.
20. I have given careful consideration to all of the written and oral evidence, and have also carefully considered the September 2021 Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’) (‘Zimbabwe: Opposition to government’, v5.0).
21. The starting point in considering the Appellant’s asylum appeal is the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the Appellant had been an MDC member in Zimbabwe. It also found that she had not come to the adverse attention of or been ill-treated by the authorities as she claimed, and that many of the articles written on her blog were plagiarised from other sources.
22. Although the Appellant has been found to have been an MDC member in Zimbabwe, I find that she does not have a significant MDC profile. Her account of her adverse treatment by the authorities as an MDC member was rejected by the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant has not been in Zimbabwe since September 2019 and she has not claimed that she has continued to carry out activities on behalf of the MDC in the UK. Her attendance at demonstrations in the UK has been through the ZHRO and her online blog is in her own name and does not present or identify her as an MDC activist or supporter. There is no evidence before me which suggests that the Appellant has a significant MDC profile or would be of adverse interest to the Zimbabwean authorities as a result of her MDC membership.
23. I turn then to consider the Appellant’s sur place activity, which consists of attendance at political demonstrations organised by the ZHRO and her online blog. Although I address each aspect separately below, I have considered risk on return taking the Appellant’s sur place activities as a whole.
24. The Appellant’s claim to have been a member of the ZHRO is supported by a letter from the organisation dated 5 February 2024, which states that she joined the organisation on 10 November 2023 having been in discussions about joining since July 2021. The letter states that the Appellant contributes to the ZHRO chiefly via her blog. The letter does not however identify the Appellant as an active member or describe her activities on behalf of the ZHRO with any precision. There are no other letters of support or statements from other ZHRO supporters attesting to the Appellant’s activities or her political beliefs; as the Appellant is in touch with other supporters via a Whatsapp group it would have been reasonably straightforward for her to obtain such evidence.
25. The Appellant provided, in the First-tier Tribunal bundle filed on 5 August 2024, undated photographs of demonstrations which she identified in her oral evidence as being of two separate demonstrations outside the Zimbabwean embassy. The photographs show small groups of between 6 and 12 people including the Appellant, some draped in the Zimbabwean flag, carrying a banner critical of the Zanu-PF regime. There is also an article from the ZHRO website stating that the ZHRO handed over a petition to 10 Downing Street on 30 May 2024, as well as a photograph which the Appellant identified as being of that event. The Appellant is not visible in the photograph of those handing over the petition but is identified in the article as an activist who accompanied the group.
26. I then turn to the Appellant’s blog. The Appellant has not provided a full printout of the blog and there is no evidence which demonstrates the reach of the blog or the number of views of any of the articles. The Appellant provided (in the First-tier Tribunal bundle) printouts of 18 articles from her blog dated between 20 March 2021 and 7 January 2024, all of which were critical of the Zanu-PF government. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant had plagiarised many of those articles.
27. The Respondent’s supplementary bundle provided a printout of another article from the blog dated 6 October 2023, in which the Appellant praised President Mnangagwa’s extension of the multicurrency system as “a lighthouse guiding the nation towards the shores of economic stability and growth”. A further printout of an article dated 29 October 2023 was a factual account of the SADC summit in October 2023.
28. In the bundle filed in February 2025, the Appellant included a printout of an article from the New Zimbabwe website dated 5 September 2021 which included a picture of her and described her as castigating the Zimbabwean administration for mismanaging the country’s economy and disrespecting human rights. In fact, whilst the Appellant is quoted as criticising the lack of free speech in Zimbabwe, the bulk of her quote refers to the price of used cars and the poor state of roads.
29. The February 2025 bundle also includes a screenshot of what appears to be the homepage of the Appellant’s blog, which shows the headline of 10 articles dated from 8 April 2024, with the most recent article posted on 21 September 2024. Most of the headlines relate to economic or business stories. The headline of the most recent article refers to President Mnangagwa’s helicopter having crashed but is not itself critical of the regime, and the body of that article is not visible. The Appellant has not served any updated witness statement or printout of other articles from the blog.
30. Taking all of the evidence of the Appellant’s sur place activities into account, I make the following findings. I accept that the Appellant has been a member of the ZHRO since 10 November 2023. I find that she has attended two protests organised by the ZHRO between 2021 and 2024, but that she has not attended a protest since 5 August 2024 (as all the photographs available pre-date the First-tier Tribunal bundle which was filed on 5 August 2024). I also accept that the Appellant attended Downing Street with others in May 2024, but find that she was not one of the individuals who handed over the petition. I do not accept that the Appellant has attended “more than 5” ZHRO protests as she claims. Whilst there is no requirement for corroborating evidence, the ZHRO support letter makes it clear that the organisation keeps a photographic record of all protests and attendees, and it would therefore have been reasonably straightforward for the Appellant to obtain photographs of other protests if she had in fact attended them. Similarly, I do not accept that the Appellant was photographed handing over a petition to Downing Street as she claims, as photographic evidence of that event would also have been reasonably available through ZHRO.
31. The evidence before me does not indicate, even to the lower standard of proof, that the Zimbabwean authorities have taken any interest in the ZHRO protests in London, which are small and sporadic, or that there is any attempt by the authorities to identify attendees at the protests. There is no evidence before me that there has been wider press coverage of the protests beyond the ZHRO website. The Appellant does not claim to have organised the protests or taken any part beyond attending. In any event, on her own case the Appellant has not attended any protest since 2024. Even if the Appellant had attended five protests as she claims, I find that it is not reasonably likely that the Appellant has come to the attention of the authorities, or that she would be of adverse interest to the authorities on return to Zimbabwe, as a result of her attendance.
32. I find that the Appellant has not posted any articles on her blog since 21 September 2024. Further, whilst the content of most of the plagiarised 2023 articles was critical of the Zanu-PF regime, the 6 October 2023 article provided by the Respondent praised the regime’s handling of the economy in glowing terms and the 2024 articles appear from the headlines not to be overtly critical of the regime. I find that the Appellant has selectively provided the Tribunal with articles which present her as a critic of the regime. On the evidence before me, I find that the Appellant has not posted material critical of the Zanu-PF regime since 7 January 2024.
33. The overall picture is that the Appellant has not engaged in any sur place political activity critical of the Zimbabwean regime since September 2024, shortly after the First-tier Tribunal decision allowing her appeal was promulgated. I find that the lack of any activity after that date (whether attendance at protests or posting on the blog), combined with the fact of the plagiarised 2023 articles, indicates that the Appellant does not currently genuinely hold political beliefs opposed to the Zanu-PF regime. I further find that the lack of evidence of any activity after September 2024, even taking into account the Appellant’s pregnancy, indicates that the Appellant would not, if returned to Zimbabwe, seek to engage actively in political activities opposing the regime.
34. I have also considered whether risk arises to the Appellant as a result of the 2021 New Zimbabwe website article. However, there is no evidence of the reach of that article, or any evidence demonstrating that it has come or is reasonably likely to come to the attention of the authorities if the Appellant were returned now. Further, the contents of the article, whilst critical of some aspects of the government’s policies, are in the main directed towards matters which are not overtly political.
35. Applying the country guidance in CM to the Appellant’s circumstances, I have found that the Appellant does not have a significant MDC profile. The general situation is therefore that she would not be at risk on return, even to the lower standard. The Appellant is from an urban area on the outskirts of Harare and would be returned there; she would not therefore be someone returning to a rural area without Zanu-PF connections and CM indicates that she would not in general face a real risk of having to demonstrate loyalty to Zanu-PF.
36. Mr Muzenda relied on the country guidance in HS (returning asylum seekers) Zimbabwe CG [2007] UKAIT 00094 as demonstrating that the Appellant was reasonably likely to face intelligence-led screening at the ‘pinch point’ of return to Harare airport; if screened, the Appellant’s blog would be visible, and the Appellant was reasonably likely to be of adverse interest to the authorities as a result, whether or not her sur place activities had been carried out in good faith.
37. It is right that an individual can be at real risk of persecution as the result of sur place activities undertaken even in bad faith: Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000. However, HS makes it clear that the fact of having made an asylum claim abroad is not sufficient to give rise to adverse interest leading to screening at the airport; only those individuals in the risk categories in AA (Risk for involuntary returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2006] UKAIT 00061, and individuals active in human rights or civil society organisations identified by the authorities as opponents of the regime, are at real risk of intelligence-led screening. On the evidence before me the Appellant does not fall within the relevant risk categories identified in HS, even taking into account her limited sur place activities. I find that she is not reasonably likely to be subject to screening at the airport. If I am wrong about that then I have found that the Appellant does not currently hold genuine political beliefs opposed to the regime, and she could therefore reasonably be expected to delete her blog, or the articles critical of Zanu-PF, prior to her return.
38. I therefore conclude, applying the lower standard of proof to all the evidence before me, that the Appellant does not face a real risk of persecution on grounds of her political opinion on return to Zimbabwe.
Article 8
39. I turn then to consider the Article 8 aspect of the appeal.
40. The Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules as a partner, not least because she cannot satisfy the requirements in paragraphs GEN 1.2(iv) or E-LTRP 2.2.
41. I therefore consider the Article 8 appeal outside the Rules. It is not in dispute that family life exists between the Appellant and her partner and their child. I must determine whether the Appellant’s removal would be proportionate to the legitimate aim of immigration control, applying sections 117A-D Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and relevant caselaw.
42. The documentary evidence before me relevant to the Appellant's Article 8 case was extremely limited. The Appellant's witness statement, which was prepared for the First-tier Tribunal hearing, was dated 31 January 2024 (before her cohabitation with her partner or her pregnancy) and there was no updating statement. Mr Dhliwayo provided a brief witness statement dated 27 February 2025. There were a series of photographs of the Appellant and Mr Dhliwayo at their marriage ceremony, and a single council tax bill dated 5 August 2025 in the couple’s joint names. Evidence relating to the couple’s child (‘J’) was limited to the birth certificate and an application for a British passport for J.
43. The best interests of J are a primary, although not the paramount, consideration. J was born in August 2025. In oral evidence, the Appellant confirmed that she was breastfeeding J and both she and Mr Dhliwayo confirmed that they shared tasks such as bathing J, changing nappies and taking him to medical appointments. J is still very young and given his age is dependent on the Appellant as his primary carer. I find that it is in J’s best interests to be with his mother, and that it would not be in his best interests to remain in the UK without the Appellant. However, J’s best interests are not a ‘trump card’ and other factors must also be considered.
44. Taking all of the oral and documentary evidence into account, and considering the factors in s117B NIAA 2002 I find that the Appellant's removal would not be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of immigration control. The Appellant can speak English (a neutral factor in the proportionality assessment), but she is not financially independent. That is a factor which weighs in favour of removal.
45. I accept, on the basis of the oral evidence and very limited documentary evidence, that there is a genuine and subsisting relationship between the Appellant and Mr Dhliwayo. However, as that relationship was formed when the Appellant's status in the UK was precarious I can give it little weight. The evidence before me did not indicate that it would be disproportionate for Mr Dhliwayo to accompany the Appellant to Zimbabwe, or for the couple to be separated and the Appellant to make an application for entry clearance from Zimbabwe.
46. Mr Dhliwayo stated in his oral evidence that he would not be able to obtain treatment or medication for his MS. However, there were no health records or other evidence confirming Mr Dhliwayo’s diagnosis or his current treatment, and there was no evidence before me about the availability or otherwise of treatment and medication for MS in Zimbabwe. Mr Dhliwayo also stated that he would not be able to work as an environmental health officer in Zimbabwe; however, when cross-examined about why he could not do so he simply reiterated that he would not be able to work and that his life and family were in the UK. There was no objective or country evidence which suggested that Mr Dhliwayo would not be able to obtain work in Zimbabwe, and I note that he is well educated, with a Masters degree in Environmental Health, and was brought up and educated in Zimbabwe.
47. Both the Appellant and Mr Dhliwayo have family in Zimbabwe and the Appellant is in contact with her mother and sister; there is no evidence that they would be unable or unwilling to support the Appellant upon her return. The Appellant was brought up and educated in Zimbabwe before moving to the UK in December 2018; she has a degree in business management and there is no evidence before me that indicates that she would not be able to find employment and accommodation. Although J’s best interests lie in remaining with his mother, I find that given his young age it would not be unreasonable or result in unduly harsh consequences for J to accompany the Appellant to Zimbabwe. I accept that separation from Mr Dhliwayo would be difficult for the Appellant, but I do not accept that it would have consequences of such gravity as to outweigh the public interest in immigration control.
48. On the limited evidence before me, I conclude that the Appellant's removal would not be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of immigration control. I therefore dismiss the Article 8 aspect of the appeal.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 May 2026