Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005155

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58765/2023
LP/06889/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 July 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OBI

Between
MWA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr F Aziz, Counsel, instructed by Lei Dat & Baig Solicitors
For the respondent: Mr J Thompson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 January 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ripley (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 1 September 2024 following a hearing on 19 August 2024. By that decision, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights claims.

2. The Judge made an order granting the appellant anonymity. No application has been made to set aside that order. While we take into account the strong public interest in open justice, we continue the anonymity order on the basis that the appellant’s claim includes a fear of persecution and for this reason, the balance weighs in favour of protecting his identity.

Background
3. The appellant arrived in the UK in November 2011 with Tier 4 student entry clearance that expired in September 2013. He was unable to continue his studies as his sponsor lost their licence. The appellant did not extend his stay before he was arrested in January 2022. He claimed asylum after removal directions were set.

4. The appellant was interviewed in September 2023. He claimed that he was at risk from the family of a woman called Nadya to whom he had been engaged as a child. He was at risk because he did not want to go through with the marriage. He claimed that Nadya’s family had contacts with a countrywide religious extremist group and also with a political party. He feared that he would be killed or harmed if he returned. The appellant’s claim was rejected.

5. The appellant appealed on asylum, humanitarian and human rights grounds and as stated above the matter came before the Judge on 19 August 2024.

Decision of the First Tier Tribunal
6. The Judge summarised the claimed history as follows:

“The appellant claims that his family agreed an arranged marriage for him and Nadya when he was 15 years old. He told his father in 2013/14 that he refused to marry Nadya. He claims that his brother was attacked in 2016/17 because of the appellant’s refusal to marry Nadya. That attack was confirmed by the contents of the FIR. Finally, he claims that a friend of his was told by Nadya’s brother, Khurram, that the appellant’s life would be threatened if he returned.

7. The Judge found that the appellant’s account was not reliable and set out the reasons for reaching this conclusion at paragraphs 19(a)-(h) of the judgment. These reasons insofar as they are relevant to this appeal included the following findings: (i) the appellant would have been old enough at age 15 to have learnt of his arranged marriage [paragraph 19(a)]; (ii) even if the appellant did not know about his planned marriage when he was 15 he would not have found out about the marriage when he was 26 years old [paragraph 19(b)]; and (iii) the appellant, according to his claim, would have been aware since at least 2015 that he was at risk in Pakistan but did not make his asylum claim until after he had been arrested and after removal directions had been set in 2022. It was not accepted that the appellant was unaware that he would be able to make an asylum claim if he was fearful of return to Pakistan [paragraph 19(e)].

8. The Judge accepted that there may have been motives for the appellant’s father to arrange a marriage with Nadya’s family. However, the Judge went on to state that he did not accept that “the appellant’s family arranged for him to be married when he was 15, that he refused to accede to that arrangement after he arrived in the UK and that Nadya’s family have threatened him as a consequence.”

9. The Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had shown that he could not rely on the police in Pakistan to provide protection. In the alternative, the Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had shown that he could not relocate to a different part of Pakistan.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner on 7 November 2024. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:

Ground 1 – The appellant explained in his witness statement that he knew of Nadya when he was 15 years old and at that time went along with his father’s request. In stating that there was no reason for the appellant to “be kept in the dark” about the arrangements for his future marriage the Judge made a factual error.

Ground 2 – the Judge did not consider the appellant’s evidence adequately in stating that the appellant would not have learnt of his family’s intention until he was 26 years old. The appellant explained in his witness statement that during the years leading up to his arrival in the UK he began to question his father’s decision because he was not happy about the idea of being forced to marry Nadya.

Ground 3 – the Judge did not consider the appellant’s evidence adequately in stating that he did not make his asylum claim until after his arrest and after removal directions had been set in 2022. The appellant explained in his witness statement that he was fearful of returning to Pakistan because of the risk to his life and was not aware that he could claim asylum. This fear was not adequately considered.

Rule 24
11. The respondent did not provide a rule 24 response.

The hearing
12. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and will not be set out in full here.

13. Mr Aziz submitted that the adverse credibility findings by the Judge as set out in paragraphs 19(a) and 19(b) of the judgment were contrary to the evidence. He further submitted that these findings relate to a core element of the claim. Mr Aziz withdrew Ground 3 during the hearing. He accepted that the Judge had taken into account the appellant’s alleged fear of returning to Pakistan. In response to questions from us Mr Aziz submitted that the Judge’s factual error was likely to have a bearing on the Judge’s finding with regard to the appellant’s ability to relocate to a different part of Pakistan. He invited us to conclude that but for the factual error the Judge would have accepted the appellant’s evidence relating to the influence of Nadya’s father.

14. Mr Thompson submitted that it was open to the Judge to make the adverse findings in paragraphs 19(a) and 19(b). He submitted that these paragraphs of the judgment should not be considered in isolation but as a whole and invited us to conclude that even if the Judge fell into error, it was not a material error. He further submitted that even if the appellant’s account had been accepted, he could internally relocate within Pakistan. Therefore, the outcome would have been the same.

15. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision.

Conclusions
16. The First-tier Tribunal is recognised as a specialist fact-finding Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint when considering the merits of any challenge to the reasoning of a First-tier judge who saw and heard the appellant give evidence (see Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]). The Upper Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ (see Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 (05 April 2022) at [2]-[5]).

17. The appellant, in his witness statement, dated 8 January 2024, stated in clear terms that when he was 15 years old his father arranged for him to marry Nadya (the daughter of one of his father’s close friends). This is consistent with the information the appellant provided during his initial screening interview and his substantive interview in September 2023. The appellant also stated during the substantive interview that “when I came to the UK, my father called me and said we got you engaged at a very young age, he told me you have to marry this girl and told me everything about the family.” In his witness statement, the appellant stated that in the years leading up to his arrival in the UK he began to question his father’s decision and after his arrival he decided that he was not prepared to go through with the marriage.

18. The appellant gave oral evidence during the appeal hearing and adopted his witness statement. The Judge states that the appellant was asked about the issues raised in the Reasons for Refusal Letter, the reasons for the delay in his claim, his contact with his father and Nadya’s family and the evidence relied on including the letter from his friend and a First Instance Report. The Judge set out the claimed history (see paragraph 6 above) and then went on to state at paragraph 19(a) of the decision that the appellant would have been old enough at 15 to have learnt of his arranged marriage and there was no reason for him to “be kept in the dark”. This finding is at odds with the evidence of the appellant that he was aware of the arranged marriage from the age of 15. The Judge stated at paragraph 19(b) of the decision that even if the appellant did not know about his planned marriage when he was 15, he did not accept that the appellant learnt of his father’s intentions when he was 26 years old. Again, this is at odds with the evidence before the Judge. The appellant acknowledged that he had discussions with his father about the arranged marriage before and after his arrival in the UK (when he would have been approximately 26 years old). However, there appears to be no basis for the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant claimed to be unaware of the arranged marriage until he was 26 years old. This finding is inconsistent with the appellant’s witness statement and no explanation for this inconsistency is provided by the Judge. The findings at paragraphs 19(a) and 19(b) are closely interlinked and are factual errors.

19. Although we concluded, for the reasons stated above, that the Judge made a factual error it was not material to the decision and the ultimate dismissal of the appeal. The decision of VOM (Error of law – when appealable) Nigeria [2016] UKUT at [15] makes it clear that for the Upper Tribunal to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal it is essential for the error of law to be material. In this regard, an error of law is material if the judge might have come to a different conclusion had he not made the factual error. The Judge made a number of other adverse findings at paragraphs 19(c) to (h), including that (which have not been challenged) and we conclude that the Judge would have come to the same outcome. The factual error does not undermine the Judges findings when the decision is considered as a whole. Therefore, the factual errors are immaterial.

20. In any event, the Judge considered, in the alternative, whether there would be sufficiency of protection in Pakistan and whether the appellant could relocate to a different part of the country to avoid his claimed persecutors. At paragraphs 22 and 23, the Judge found that there is a general sufficiency of protection in Pakistan and that there was a lack of evidence that the appellant would not be provided an adequate level of protection by the State. Furthermore, at paragraph 24, the Judge provided adequate reasons for concluding that he was not satisfied that the appellant could not internally relocate to different part of Pakistan. These findings were not challenged by the appellant. For these reasons also, the factual errors are immaterial.

21. Grounds 1 and 2 are both dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and therefore the outcome stands.

Margaret Obi
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 5 February 2025