Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005173

First-tier Tribunal No: DA/00359/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

RH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Toal of counsel, instructed by Turpin & Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant either directly or indirectly. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a Slovak national who has been recognised as a victim of trafficking and modern slavery. He appeals against the Respondent’s deportation decision dated 14 June 2019 and supplementary decision dated 22 December 2020.
2. This appeal came before the Upper Tribunal as a rehearing in which the sole question for determination was whether there is a real risk that if removed to the Slovak Republic the Appellant would be exposed to treatment contrary to Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’). For the reasons set out below I have concluded that there is such a real risk and I therefore allow the Appellant’s appeal.
Background
3. The Appellant is a Slovak citizen of Roma ethnicity. He has a long history of mental illness, self-harming and suicide attempts and has been diagnosed with emotionally unstable personality disorder.
4. At the age of 2 or 3 the Appellant was placed in state care where he suffered abuse and isolation. The Appellant was brought to the UK by his parents in 2011, then aged 12. He began to use cannabis at around the age of 15 and later became addicted to heroin, as the result of which he became subject to the control of a criminal gang, who forced him to commit offences for profit. Between September 2016 and 30 March 2022 the Appellant was convicted of 14 offences, culminating in a sentence imposed on 30 March 2022 of 876 days’ imprisonment for burglary.
5. On 14 June 2019 the Respondent made a decision to deport the Appellant on EEA grounds. A supplementary decision was made on 22 December 2020 refusing his human rights claims. The Appellant’s appeal against those decisions was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 23 February 2023. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal, which on 18 October 2023 set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and remitted the appeal for rehearing.
6. On 5 October 2023 the Home Office made a positive conclusive grounds decision recognising the Appellant as a victim of trafficking and modern slavery. In particular, it was recognised that the Appellant had between 2014 and 2018 been subject to forced criminal exploitation.
7. In May 2024 the Appellant was released from his sentence. He was again targeted for forced criminality and was re-arrested.
8. On 8 October 2024 the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The judge accepted that the Appellant was a victim of modern slavery for the purpose of forced criminality between 2014 and 2018 and that his culpability for offences committed during that time was therefore reduced. However, he concluded that the Appellant’s deportation was justified under the EEA Regulations and that his removal would not breach the UK’s obligations under Article 4 ECHR.
9. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal, which on 3 April 2025 set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and listed the appeal for rehearing on Article 4 grounds only.
Evidence and submissions
10. The Appellant attended the hearing by videolink and gave evidence. It was accepted that the Appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness by reason of his mental health difficulties. The Appellant adopted his two witness statements together with the letter sent to the Secretary of State on 22 January 2022. He also confirmed that he had told the truth to the experts who had assessed him for the purposes of reports in these proceedings. The Appellant was briefly cross-examined by Mr Ojo on behalf of the Respondent.
11. I had before me a 662-page bundle containing the core documents and a supplementary bundle of 57 pages. I have considered all of the documents carefully. Although for conciseness I have only summarised the expert evidence below, I have considered all of the reports in their entirety.
12. In submissions for the Respondent Mr Ojo relied on the Secretary of State’s refusal letters dated 14 June 2019 and 22 December 2020. He confirmed that there had been no further decision by the Secretary of State and none subsequent to the conclusive grounds decision of 5 October 2023. He did not make any further submissions.
13. The Appellant’s submissions focused on the expert evidence. In summary, Mr Toal submitted that on the basis of the Appellant’s largely unchallenged account, much of which had been accepted in the conclusive grounds decision, and on the unchallenged evidence by three different experts with different areas of expertise, the Appellant was at real risk of exploitation on return to Slovakia. The expert evidence was that the Appellant had multiple vulnerabilities to re-trafficking by reason of his childhood background, mental illness and Roma ethnicity. The Appellant was highly vulnerable to re-trafficking especially if he was not able to access the necessary mental health treatment and social support, which on the evidence was not available to him on return.
Legal framework
14. Article 4 of the 1951 European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) prohibits slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour. That includes trafficking and modern slavery as defined in the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (‘ECAT’) and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and associated statutory guidance. Article 4 is a fundamental, absolute and non-derogable right. It imposes positive obligations on states to prevent an actual or foreseeable breach of Article 4 and to protect and support victims: Rantsev v Cyprus (2010) 51 EHRR 1.
15. Removal of an individual will be unlawful where there is a “real risk” of treatment contrary to Article 4 on return: R (Ullah) v SSHD [2004] 2 AC 323. The burden of proof is on the appellant. ‘Real risk’ is a low threshold, and may be significantly below the balance of probabilities: see, e.g. MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at §52. In an appeal raising Article 4, the task of the Tribunal is to determine for itself whether there is such a real risk on the evidence before it and at the date of the hearing.
Discussion and decision
16. The scope of this appeal is limited to Article 4 ECHR only. Because Article 4 is an absolute and unqualified right, I am not in this case balancing questions of the public interest nor considering whether the Appellant’s removal is proportionate to a legitimate public aim. The only question for me to determine is whether, on the evidence before me, there is a real risk that the Appellant would be exposed to treatment contrary to Article 4 on return to Slovakia. That includes but is not limited to a real risk of the Appellant being coerced or forced into criminal activity or other exploitation as he has been previously. If there is a real risk of a breach of Article 4, then the Appellant’s appeal must be allowed.
17. I note at the outset that the Respondent has not set out her case on the sole issue in this appeal. The Respondent’s decisions which are the subject of this appeal (the deportation decision dated 14 June 2019 and the supplementary decision of 22 December 2020) pre-date the conclusive grounds decision of 5 October 2023 in which the Appellant was recognised to be a victim of modern slavery. Neither the 2019 nor the 2020 decision addresses Article 4 ECHR or the risk of re-trafficking on return to Slovakia. Although the First-tier Tribunal decision of 8 October 2024 addressed Article 4 ECHR the Secretary of State’s submissions on the issue, if any were made, are not recorded in the decision. In the Upper Tribunal, although the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and the grant of permission to appeal both identified Article 4 and re-trafficking as the core issue in the appeal, the response filed by the Respondent under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 did not address the issue. Before me, the Respondent’s submissions were limited to reliance on the 2019 and 2020 refusal letters. Beyond formally contesting the appeal, the Respondent has not put forward any case which addresses the basis on which the appeal is to be determined.
18. I turn first to the Appellant’s evidence. The Appellant is accepted to be a Slovak national of Roma ethnicity. His account of his background in Slovakia and the UK is set out in his witness statements, the conclusive grounds decision minute, and the accounts given to the experts during their assessments. The Appellant’s account is that his family were from an area in Kosice which is subject to extreme poverty and deprivation. At the age of 2 or 3, the Appellant and his brother were placed in a state children’s home where they had no further contact with their parents and were subject to bullying and physical abuse from other children. The Appellant developed significant mental health problems; whilst still a child he was hospitalised in a psychiatric hospital and prescribed Diazepam medication. When the Appellant was 12 or 13, his parents brought him to the UK, where he again experienced bullying and physical attacks. He left school after about a year and began to work carrying out construction and labouring jobs. The Appellant began to use cannabis at around the age of 15. He left home aged 16 and had periods of homelessness, including periods in which he ate from bins. He became addicted to heroin and became subject to coercive control by criminal gang members, who supplied him with drugs and forced him to carry out thefts and burglaries; the Appellant was beaten if he refused. Between September 2016 and 30 March 2022 the Appellant was convicted of 14 offences, culminating in a sentence imposed on 30 March 2022 of 876 days’ imprisonment for burglary.
19. The Appellant was released on 29 May 2024 at the expiry of his sentence without a release address and travelled back to his previous home city. He encountered a woman on the street who bought him food and clothing in exchange for sex; she and her partner were drug addicts who took the Appellant’s benefits. Other people visited the house to take drugs and one person died of an overdose, after which the Appellant left the house. He was then located by one of the criminal gang members who had previously known him, who coerced the Appellant to carry out burglaries for him in exchange for food. The Appellant was arrested and re-sentenced in February 2025. Whilst in prison he has completed methadone treatment for his heroin addiction, but has continued to suffer mental illness. He has expressed suicidal ideation and has self-harmed. He is currently prescribed Quetiapine (an anti-psychotic medication).
20. In cross-examination during the hearing the Appellant was asked about his links to family members in Slovakia. He said that he did not have links to any family in Slovakia. He was not sure where his other brothers and sisters were, and thought that some of them might still be in state care; they had been completely separated. He was asked about his parents having provided witness statements in his previous First-tier Tribunal appeal, and he said that he had not been in contact with his parents but thought that his sister might have contacted them when he told her about his appeal.
21. The Appellant’s account of his experiences in Slovakia and the UK has varied in minor respects but has been materially consistent throughout his appeal proceedings and his trafficking and modern slavery claim. His account was not materially disputed in either of the Respondent’s decision letters or his two previous First-tier Tribunal appeals, and was accepted in the conclusive grounds decision. His recent witness statement addressing events after his release in May 2024 was not challenged in cross-examination. I accept the Appellant’s evidence.
22. I then consider the expert evidence. I had before me the following reports:
a. A psychiatric report by Dr Obed Bekoe dated 20 July 2021;
b. Two reports dated 26 March 2022 and 16 June 2025 by Ms Michelle Cregg, a consultant forensic psychologist;
c. A report dated 23 May 2024 by Mr Colin Carswell, a specialist anti-trafficking and policing expert;
d. A country expert report dated 15 July 2025 by Ms Alexandra Malangone
23. All of the reports post-date the Respondent’s decisions in this case, and Ms Cregg’s second report and the country expert report of Ms Malangone have not previously been considered by the Tribunal. The Respondent has not sought to challenge the expertise of any of the experts nor taken issue with the contents of their reports. Having considered all of the reports carefully, I consider each of the experts to be well-qualified to give their opinions and accept each of the reports as detailed, balanced and based on matters well within the writer’s particular expertise. I summarise the reports in turn below.
24. Dr Bekoe’s report was prepared for the purpose of previous criminal proceedings and addresses the Appellant’s mental health and whether he was (in July 2021) fit to plead and stand trial. Dr Bekoe noted that the Appellant described a long history of mental health problems, including auditory hallucinations and depression, that he had previously self-harmed by cutting and had fresh lacerations on his wrists, and had attempted suicide in the past. He diagnosed the Appellant with emotionally unstable personality disorder (‘EUPD’). He noted that the Appellant’s offending was not directly attributable to his mental disorder but rather his “social circumstances and vulnerability to exploitation”.
25. Ms Cregg’s first report (26 March 2022) was based on a 3-hour assessment using both structured assessment measures and a full clinical interview. She agreed with Dr Bekoe’s EUPD diagnosis and recommended that the Appellant receive specialist personality disorder treatment and support including Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT). She noted that the Appellant presented with a number of vulnerabilities which made him “an obvious target for trafficking” including his experience of the care system, his previous experience of bullying and discrimination, homelessness, poverty and the lack of a support network, low self-esteem and substance addiction. She identified the Appellant’s vulnerability to exploitation as the biggest factor in his risk of reoffending.
26. Ms Cregg’s second report (16 June 2025) was based on a 70 minute assessment session, the Appellant having declined to attend a second session. Ms Cregg noted that her report was limited both by that and by the Appellant’s presentation in the first session, including his expression of suicidal ideation and a specific plan to end his life together with fresh visible marks of self-harming. She noted that the Appellant appeared to be struggling to meet his basic needs even in prison. He had not had any specific interventions to reduce the risk of future exploitation; his previous vulnerabilities and his obvious mental health problems meant that he continued to be vulnerable to being trafficked/exploited. In the absence of essential specialist mental health intervention and support to enable him to develop life skills and interpersonal skills, which she detailed in her report, she concluded that the Appellant was likely to remain vulnerable to exploitation and re-trafficking in the future.
27. Mr Carswell’s report (23 May 2024) stated that the Appellant displayed “numerous serious vulnerabilities” which were relevant both to his past exploitation and potentially highly relevant to the risk of future exploitation. Like Ms Cregg, Mr Carswell identified the Appellant’s childhood experiences in care in Slovakia, his serious mental health issues, his experience of racially-motivated verbal and physical abuse in the UK, and his substance addiction as factors rendering him particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Mr Carswell’s view was that the Appellant was at “very high risk of re-trafficking” either in the UK or another country, particularly in the absence of long-term specialist support. He noted that the Appellant’s circumstances displayed the factors identified in a 2021 report by the UK’s Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner as most likely to increase an individual’s risk of re-trafficking. He also noted that many of the Appellant’s specific vulnerabilities had not changed since his trafficking and were unlikely to change in the future. He, like Ms Cregg, identified the need for both practical support with housing, employment, and education as well as specialist mental health treatment: “[the Appellant’s] vulnerabilities are severe and manifold and he is highly likely to require long-term support in order to overcome them.” If denied that support, Mr Carswell’s view was that the chances of the Appellant being re-trafficked in the UK or anywhere else were “very high indeed”.
28. Ms Malangone’s report (15 July 2025) addressed the extent of human trafficking in Slovakia, the situation of the Roma community there, the Appellant’s vulnerability to trafficking and the availability of support on return. Her report outlines the disproportionate and extreme poverty of the Roma population in Slovakia, with around 17% of Roma living on €3.80 or less per day, and widespread, persistent and structural discrimination that the Roma community experiences in housing, education and employment. Some Roma communities, including those in the area of Košice from which the Appellant’s family originate, live in squalid conditions without adequate access to water, sanitation or electricity. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights had conducted a visit to Slovakia in July 2024, after which he had called for emergency intervention to address the housing conditions and extreme poverty of Roma communities. There was significant evidence of discriminatory treatment and violent abuse of Roma by police officers and law enforcement. The Roma community in Slovakia is disproportionately affected by trafficking, and according to the Slovak police most of the identified victims of trafficking for labour exploitation are Roma. Homeless people were also identified by the Slovak authorities as particularly vulnerable to trafficking. The 2023 US Trafficking in Persons report had identified Slovakia as a Tier 2 country not fully meeting the minimum standards for eliminating trafficking.
29. Ms Malangone assessed the Appellant as “highly vulnerable” to trafficking applying the SIPPS Worksheet Trafficking Risk Assessment tool, by reason of his adverse childhood experiences. She noted that the specialist personality disorder services, including DBT, and support services in the community as recommended by Ms Cregg do not currently exist in Slovakia. The Appellant would be “extremely unlikely” to have access to housing, medical or social assistance on his return and without a supportive social network would be likely to be destitute and homeless. The Appellant’s Roma ethnicity is “a multiplying factor in his vulnerability to destitution…his ethnicity in combination with his personal history accentuates and makes him especially vulnerable to exploitation”.
30. I give full weight to the reports of Ms Cregg, Mr Carswell and Ms Malangone and accept those reports in their entirety. Dr Bekoe’s report was not prepared for the Appellant’s immigration proceedings and is now four years old; it is therefore of less direct relevance to this appeal than the other reports. However, I give weight to Dr Bekoe’s report as a diagnosis of the Appellant’s mental disorder and evidence of his long-standing mental health problems and his vulnerability to exploitation, which are relevant to the issue which I am required to determine.
31. As Mr Toal observed, although the experts have differing areas of expertise, they all concur in their views. Considering all of the expert evidence together with the Appellant’s evidence it is in my view clear that the Appellant would be at significant risk of re-trafficking on return to Slovakia. The Appellant has been recognised as a victim of trafficking and modern slavery, having previously been forced to commit crimes for the profit of criminal gangs. He has multiple individual factors which make him vulnerable to re-trafficking and exploitation. Those include his long-standing serious mental illness, his history of self-harm and suicide attempts, his childhood experiences of abandonment, abuse and neglect in state care, his limited education, his experiences of bullying and discrimination, his history of substance misuse and addiction, and his lack of a familial or social support network. The Appellant’s Roma ethnicity is an additional factor which, in the context of entrenched and systemic discrimination and poverty for the Roma community in Slovakia, further increases his vulnerability to exploitation and re-trafficking.
32. The Appellant has not to date been offered the specialist personality disorder treatment or support identified by Ms Cregg and Mr Carswell as necessary to reduce his vulnerability to re-trafficking. Ms Malangone was unequivocal that such specialist support is not available in Slovakia. The necessity of such support is in my view underscored by the events following the Appellant’s release in May 2024, in which he was released without support or housing and very quickly was again subject to forced criminality by one of his previous traffickers. I accept and concur with the experts’ views that without specialist mental health treatment and support, which is not available in Slovakia, the Appellant is very likely to be subject to exploitation and forced criminality as he has been in the past.
33. On the evidence before me, and in particular the expert evidence, I find that the Appellant would be at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 4 ECHR on return to the Slovak Republic. I therefore allow the appeal.

Notice of Decision
The Appellant’s appeal is allowed.
L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 August 2025