Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005194

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66071/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

30th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

HCS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T. Hussain, instructed by Henleaze Law (by CVP)
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 11 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of the Philippines, born in 1989. She has two children, born in December 2008 and June 2014, respectively, who are also citizens of the Philippines. She appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) of 12 September 2024, dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her asylum claim. Although she did not raise the best interests of her children in her asylum claim and offered no up-to-date evidence about her children in her appeal, she has been granted permission to appeal on the basis that the FTT may not have considered their best interests properly.
2. The appellant was granted anonymity before the FTT because she has made a claim for international protection. I consider it appropriate for that order to continue until her appeal is finally determined.
Background
3. The appellant and her children were all born in the Philippines and they lived together until 8 December 2018, when they came to the UK on visit visas valid through 30 April 2019. The appellant’s mother had come to the UK in 2006, her father in 2007, and her two brothers in 2008. They are all now British citizens.
4. In January 2019, the appellant’s children enrolled in school in the UK, and on 28 May 2019, the appellant made an application for leave to remain on the basis of her private and family life. The respondent refused that application, and the appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”). Her two children were dependants on her appeal.
5. In a decision dated 14 February 2020, the FTT dismissed the appellant’s human rights appeal. It noted that the appellant had raised several protection grounds in her application and dismissed them on credibility grounds. It then made the following findings about the family and private life elements of the appellant’s appeal:
(i) Prior to leaving the Philippines, the appellant had lived in the family home, which was owned by her parents: [43].
(ii) There was family life between the appellant and her parents: [47]
(iii) There was private life between the appellant and her brothers because they had a close emotional relationship and the brothers provided some ad hoc financial support: [48].
(iv) The children had resided with their grandparents for over a year at the date of the appeal, but there was no evidence that their grandparents provided them with care or that their relationship was characterised by anything more than the normal emotional ties between grandparents and grandchildren. There was private life but not family life between them: [49]
(v) The children’s close relationships with their extended family in the UK weighed in favour of it being in their best interests for them to remain in the UK: [50].
(vi) “However, the Appellant and the Appellant’s children are citizens of the Philippines. I find that it is in the interest the children to be brought up in the society and culture to which they belong. Given the Appellant’s children’s ages neither can be said to be a critical stage of their education. The Appellant’s daughter has just entered education. The Appellant’s son has will shortly embark upon his secondary education. However, this he is at a very early stage of his education, he is not in a position where he will be imminently sitting key exams such as GCSEs. There is no evidence before me to suggest that either child has any social, medical or educational needs. The Appellant’s evidence was that the oldest child was educated within the Philippines. There is no evidence to before me to suggest that education within the Philippines for the Appellant’s children would either be unavailable or inaccessible due to cost. The Appellant children have only been away from the Philippines for a short period. It can be said that the Appellant’s children’s connections to that country have been lost and I find that such connections could be re-established within a short period of return. Given the age of the youngest child I find that she will primarily be focused upon her parent, who will return with her, and self. Given the Appellant’s daughters age I find that she is adaptable. I accept the older child is likely to have made friends within the last school year. However, there is nothing to suggest that the Appellant’s son could not establish a private life of a similar quality within a reasonable period of return”: [51]
(vii) On balance, “the children’s interests are best served by returning to the Philippines with their mother [...] as soon as possible so that they may be brought up within the Philippines, being the country to which they belong and that they can re-enter the Filipino education system at the earliest opportunity to ensure long term continuity and security of their education. However, I accept that the children have extended family within the UK whom they are likely to have built a close relationship within the last year and accordingly whilst I find that it is in their interest to return to the Philippines as soon as possible, due to their family times within the UK, I find that this is not emphatically so.”
(viii) Considering the appellant’s age, education, work history, the length of time she had lived in the Philippines and in the UK, the lack of any risk of harm and the support available from her family, there would be no significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in the Philippines: [53]
6. On 21 May 2020, the appellant made the asylum claim that is the subject of this appeal. She set out the basis of her claim at her substantive interview. It was that her previous partner had been physically abusive to her, and she was afraid he would kill her if she returned. She said she had tried to filed a police report against him but it had been rejected as “just a husband and wife disagreement”. In addition, his mother was the chairperson of their barangay and he had friends in the police. At the end of her interview, she was asked if there was any other reason she wished to remain in the UK, and she replied, “my family and brothers are living here so I feel much safer here in the UK.”
7. In a decision dated 14 December 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. In accordance with her Family Asylum Claim process, she refused the claims of her two children as well. The respondent accepted that she had been a victim of domestic violence but refused the protection claim on the grounds that state protection and internal relocation would be available. With regard to the children, the respondent found:
“[They] have not lived in the UK continuously for at least the 7 years immediately before the date of application. You have raised that both children have bonded and have a close relationship with your parents and brothers, however it is not deemed unreasonable for them to be away from this family network, as they will continue to be with their primary carer – yourself. There are no insurmountable obstacles to them being able to continue their relationship with the family whilst living in the Philippines. Although both children have bene [sic] in the UK for 5 years and are enrolled in schools in the UK, both children spent most of, if not all, of their formative years in the Philippines.”
8. The appellant appealed. She was unrepresented, and she did not set out any grounds in her appeal form. Her evidence before the FTT consisted of the three refusal decisions and a document purporting to have been issued by her local police station in March 2017, recording her complaint of abuse by her partner. The respondent’s bundle contained the records of her screening and substantive interviews, her bundle from the 2020 appeal, and the respondent’s CPIN.
9. The appellant’s appeal came before the FTT on 11 September 2024, and in a decision dated 12 September 2024, the FTT dismissed the appeal.
The Judge’s decision
10. The FTT’s decision sets out the appellant’s immigration history, the basis of her claim, the respondent’s reasons for refusal, and the relevant law. It records at [10] that it followed the guidance with regard to unrepresented litigants, and there has been no complaint raised in the grounds of appeal in that regard.
11. At [15]-[17], the FTT noted that the appellant was making the same protection claim as in her 2020 appeal but that the respondent now accepted that the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence. At [19]-[24], the FT set out its reasons for finding that the appellant would have access to state protection and internal relocation would be safe and reasonable.
12. At [25], the FTT repeated the findings about the best interests of the children that had been made in the appellant’s 2020 appeal. At [26], it noted that nearly five years had passed and that the elder child “will do GCSEs next year” and his education will “soon reach a critical stage”. The younger child would start high school. However, they had not lived in the UK for seven years, were not qualifying children for the purposes of 117B(6) of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 and did not meet the requirements for a grant of leave under para. 276ADE. At [27], the FTT found that the children “will have developed a private life of greater depth since 2020”, but noted that the mother’s evidence was that they had friends in the Filipino community and spoke some Tagalog at home, such that they had retained ties to Filipino culture. It concluded, “Due to their connections with friends and family in the UK, although I find it is in their best interests to return with their mother, it is not emphatically so and clearly becomes less so the more time passes.”
13. There would be no significant obstacles to reintegration for the reasons set out in 2020: [28].
14. The FTT noted that it had been accepted in 2020 that the appellant had a family life with her parents. It then conducted an article 8 proportionality assessment. The public interest in immigration control weighed against her. She spoke English and was financially independent, and she had volunteered during the COVID pandemic, but her private life in the UK had been formed while her status was first precarious and then unlawful: [29]. At [30], the FTT noted that the appellant’s parents and brothers were British and could not be expected to return to the Philippines with her. It concluded:
“The children are still of an adaptable age and their relationship with the diaspora will mean that the culture and language are familiar. I have found that she would be likely to find work and accommodation. I find that the relationship of the children with their grandparents and uncles could continue and the Appellant said that her parents planned to visit the Philippines next year anyway for a reunion.”
15. The article 8 balance was resolved against the appellant and the appeal was dismissed.
The grounds of appeal
16. The appellant raises three grounds of appeal:
(i) “The FTT errs in applying a higher burden.”
(ii) The FTT erred in the weight to given to the appellant’s and the children’s family life.
(iii) The FTT had erred in the assessment of the children’s best interests.
17. The grounds of appeal are prolix and consist mainly of block quotes from the challenged decision and from caselaw. A careful reading discloses that they are focussed on the best interests of the appellant’s children. Specifically, it was argued that it was irrational to conclude that it was in the children’s best interests to return to the Philippines, because they had lived in the UK for 6 years. Those had been formative years for their identity and education. In particular, the elder child was in year 11 and would be sitting his GCSEs this academic year. The FTT had failed to take into account the strong bonds the children had formed with their grandparents and uncles. Nor had it taken into account the vulnerability of the appellant and her children, arising out of their experience of domestic violence. It had erred by concluding that there was a public interest in separating the appellants from their relatives in the UK.
18. The UT granted permission to appeal on all grounds.
The hearing
19. At the hearing before me, I had sight of a 392-page composite bundle prepared by the appellant’s representatives. This included 91 pages of new evidence that was not before the FTT, as well as an application for that evidence to be admitted in accordance with Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. The appellant does not argue that there was any procedural irregularity or unfairness that prevented her from submitting this or similar evidence at the time of the appeal. I therefore do not consider it relevant to the decision before me, which is whether the FTT made an error of law when deciding the appeal on the basis of the evidence before it.
20. In his submissions, Mr Hussain confirmed that the appellant was not pursuing a ground related to the burden or standard of proof. He had been unable to understand what was meant by “the FTT errs in applying a higher burden”, and he could not identify any error as to the standard or burden of proof in the determination.
21. Mr Hussain described the grounds as a challenge to the FTT’s failure to take into account all relevant factors when conducting its proportionality assessment. His submissions were initially hampered by his lack of familiarity with the appellant’s evidence; there was confusion about what year of school the older child was in and whether there had been any evidence before the FTT concerning the children’s ties with their grandparents or the emotional impact on them of leaving the UK. After perusing the bundle during the hearing, however, he acknowledged that there had been no updating evidence about the children before the FTT. The only evidence about the children had been in the respondent’s bundle, which contained the appellant’s bundle from her 2020 appeal.
22. Once he recognised that there had been no updating evidence about the children before the FTT, Mr Hussain argued that there did not need to be. Although the appellant had the burden of proof, the FTT should have taken the evidence and findings from 2020 and extrapolated from them, because it was obvious that the children’s ties to the UK would have deepened in the intervening five years. He relied on EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41. Given their young ages, this passage of time would have had a “massive” impact. It also would have been obvious that the elder child was about to take his GCSEs, but there had been no assessment of the impact on him of removing him from the UK at such a critical stage in his education.
23. Ms Simbi submitted that the FTT had in fact taken into account the likely effects of the passage of time since the last appeal. They had not been disregarded as claimed. The proportionality assessment had been properly conducted.
24. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision, which I now give with my reasons.
Discussion
25. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
26. The appellant put forward no new evidence about her children in the course of making the asylum claim that is the subject of this appeal. When asked at the end of her asylum claim if there was any reason she wished to remain in the UK, she did not mention them. She adduced no new evidence about them for the appeal.
27. The appellant does not now argue that the FTT erred by determining the appeal without making directions for the production of further evidence about the children, because there was a “vital gap in the evidence” and no reasonable tribunal could have concluded it had sufficient evidence about the children to determine the appeal (see CAO v SSHD [2024] UKSC 32 at [48]). Mr Hussain’s argument before me was, rather, that no new evidence was required.
28. In light of the importance the Supreme Court placed in COA on the tribunal’s duty to be satisfied it had sufficient evidence about the best interest of children before it, I have nonetheless considered whether the FTT erred in not requiring further evidence about the children, and whether that error was Robinson obvious.
29. I consider that the FTT did not err by assessing the children’s best interests on the basis of the limited evidence before it. In the first place, I take into account what was said at [47] of CAO:
“where an appeal is brought to the FTT, as here, by a parent seeking to rely on the best interests of their child in order to say that the child’s removal from the United Kingdom would be in breach of their Convention rights, the burden is on the appellant to make good that case and in ordinary circumstances the FTT will be entitled to assume that the parent has adduced all the relevant evidence which is sought to be relied upon which bears on that issue. It is not incumbent on the FTT to cast about, or to order inquiries to be made, to see whether any evidence has been omitted or overlooked.”
30. Although the appellant did not present any new evidence about the children during the course of her asylum claim, the respondent nonetheless made a decision about their best interests in the course of her refusal decision. She then put the limited evidence she had about the children, namely the appellant’s evidence from the previous appeal, in her respondent’s bundle. Although the appellant was unrepresented, I consider that she had been put on notice that her children’s best interests were considered relevant to her appeal and of what evidence about the children would be before the FTT. She was unrepresented, but she is educated, speaks English, lives with and is supported by her British relatives, and had pursued a previous appeal in which she had presented evidence about the children. Under these circumstances, the FTT was entitled to assume that the appellant had nothing further to add to what she had previously said. The determination also makes it clear that the appellant gave oral evidence about the children’s current circumstances at the appeal; the reference to the children having friends in the Filipino community and speaking Tagalog at home at [27] and to the grandparents’ planned visit to the Philippines at [30] must come from the appellant’s oral evidence, as they are not in the statements or determination from 2020. The FTT thus did obtain some up-to-date evidence about the children before making its decision.
31. For these reasons, I do not consider that the FTT erred in not requiring further evidence about the children.
32. I find that the FTT did not err by failing to taking into account all relevant aspects of the children’s circumstances. At [25]-[26], it did precisely what Mr Hussain said it ought to have done, which was to take the findings from the 2020 appeal as its starting point and the extrapolate how the children’s circumstances were likely to have changed in the intervening five years. It expressly noted the stage they each were at in their education and recognised that for the elder child, this would soon be a ”critical stage”. At [27], the FTT again did what Mr Hussain said it ought to have done, and took into account that it was likely that the children had developed “a private life of greater depth” in the five years since the previous appeal. For that reason, it found that it was less “emphatically” in their best interests to return to the Philippines with their mother than it had been five years earlier. It also took into account the evidence before it of the impact on the children of returning to the Philippines, including that they had ties to the Filipino community and spoke Tagalog, that they would be maintained and accommodated adequately there, and that their grandparents would be visiting in the following year.
33. The appellant says in her grounds the FTT overlooked the elder child’s vulnerability as a former victim of domestic violence. It is true that this is not something that the FTT took into account or even mentioned in its determination. However, there was simply no evidence of this before it. All of the 2019 statements describe both children as happy, making friends, and doing well in school. Children can be resilient, even in the face of trauma, and there was no legal error in the FTT not speculating that in spite of this evidence, the elder child must actually be vulnerable.
34. I conclude that the grounds amount to nothing more than an assertion that the FTT should have put more weight on the children’s education, private life in the UK and ties to their UK family than it did. It is beyond dispute that the amount of weight to be put on various factors is for the judge, unless it can be shown to be irrational. There was nothing irrational in the weight the FTT put on the various factors it took into account.
35. For these reasons, there was no error of law in the FTT’s decision.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision of 12 September 2024 stands, and the appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 June 2025