Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005214

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57082/2023
LP/05647/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

HM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gayle, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Rushforth, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 12 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. This decision follows the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran, sealed on 6 October 2025, in which she found that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error of law. The error of law appeal was allowed on a narrow basis in that the findings which went to the claimed risk presented by the appellant’s sur place political activity in the UK were found to be confused and unlawful. There were no errors found in relation to the underlying and central factual narrative that the appellant had been identified by the Iranian security services to have engaged in the dissemination of political leaflets on behalf of the KDPI in support of Kurdish political rights. The rejection of this plank of the appellant’s international protection claim was preserved.
Legal Framework
3. Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention 1951 defines a refugee as an individual who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
4. The appellant bears the burden of substantiating the primary facts of a protection claim. The standard is a reasonable degree of likelihood (sometimes referred to as a realistic possibility).
5. I have considered BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) [2011] UKUT 36, SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308, HB (Kurds) (CG) [2018] UKUT 430, PS (Christianity – risk) (CG) [2020] UKUT 46 and XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00023.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. At the remaking hearing, I heard oral evidence from the appellant, assisted by an interpreter, and submissions from both parties. I address any evidence or submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
7. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Rushforth agreed that the appeal should succeed on asylum grounds if I were to conclude that the appellant’s political activity in the UK was genuine. It is not difficult to see why the respondent adopted this principled position. If the appellant genuinely holds the political views he has espoused in attending demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy and on Facebook, HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 principles apply because he could not be expected to lie about the Refugee Convention reason of his political opinion at the pinch point of return when he would inevitably be questioned about why he was in the UK for a prolonged period and the basis on which he sought protection. Such a sequence of events would lead to the Iranian authorities identifying him as a Kurdish political dissident thereby engaging the ‘hair trigger’ response discussed in HB (Kurds). It follows that a decisive factual question to be resolved in the appeal is whether the appellant genuinely holds the political views he has espoused since his arrival in the UK.
8. In opening her cross-examination of the appellant, Ms Rushforth emphasised that his narrative account of distributing political leaflets in Iran had been roundly rejected as a fabrication. She went on to argue that this is the lens through which I should assess whether his political activity in the UK had been pursued in good faith. I agree that I should approach the appellant’s evidence with considerable caution because he has been shown to be prepared and willing to tell elaborate lies to secure protection in the UK. However, I must also be cautious not to adopt the overly blunt approach that simply because he has not been truthful about some matters he must be regarded as dishonest about all matters. As has been observed repeatedly, credibility is a multi-faceted and nuanced question, not a seamless robe. I reject Mr Gayle’s submission that I should be mindful that other judges may have been prepared to accept the appellant’s underlying narrative account. I am not concerned with what other judges may have accepted but bound by the preserved findings of fact of the judge who has rejected these aspects of his case.
9. All of the above being said, I was struck by the appellant’s unchallenged oral evidence that he had attended approximately 25 demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy. I have no reason to doubt that this is truthful supported as it is by extensive extracts from his Facebook account showing him at obviously different demonstrations over time. I was not provided with a full download of the appellant’s Facebook account which undermines the weight I can safely attach to this evidence in light of XX (PJAK), but I am equally mindful of the reality that the respondent has never sought to challenge the appellant’s attendance at quite so many overtly provocative political demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy. The persistence and determination shown by attending so many demonstrations coheres with genuine political opposition. I have also had regard to the country background information provided in support of the appeal which tends to reveal the extent of Iranian oppression of Kurdish political voices. This broad backdrop is entirely in step with HB (Kurds) and the ‘hair trigger’ response of the Iranian authorities to Kurdish political activism. These factors render it entirely plausible that the appellant, as a Kurdish Iranian man, would hold these kind of political views in opposition to the Iranian regime, and in support of Kurdish political freedoms, (see the answers to questions 36-46) which he proclaimed from the outset of his claim when he was substantively interviewed, and later in his witness statements.
10. I attach no weight to Mr Roosta’s evidence that he had observed the appellant at various political demonstrations and regards him to have done so in good faith. Mr Roosta did not attend the hearing to be tested under cross-examination. In those circumstances, his account cannot be taken at face value.
11. Overall, the parties were agreed that the central and potentially decisive question to be resolved in remaking this appeal is whether the appellant’s political activity is genuine. I find to a reasonable degree of likelihood that it is. Against this important finding of fact, there can be no question of the appellant being expected to lie about these activities or to delete his Facebook account. Properly read and, in particular, taking account of what the panel set out at paragraphs [98] and [102], XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG does not suggest that an appellant such as this should be required to delete a genuine Facebook account and conceal his political opinion when he is inevitably questioned on arrival.
12. HB (Kurds) remains the touchstone for deciding protection appeals such as this. The appellant’s ethnicity as an Iranian Kurd is not enough for his claim to succeed. However, when combined with his genuine, committed and outspoken opposition to the Iranian regime—and the reasonable likelihood of this becoming known to the authorities at the pinch point of return—this creates a real risk of persecution (see headnote paragraphs [7] and [9]–[10] of HB (Kurds)). I find that he would be questioned on arrival as a failed asylum seeker. He could only avoid adverse interest by lying about his genuine sur place activities and deleting a Facebook account critical of the regime. I am satisfied that he would wish to continue his political activism in Iran and would only refrain from doing so because of the persecution he would likely face. Applying the country guidance and HJ (Iran) principles, the appeal succeeds under the Refugee Convention solely on the sur place aspect of the claim.
Notice of Decision
I allow the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 November 2025