Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005234

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64329/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE S GREY
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE S KUDHAIL

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Coleman, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms H Gilmour, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

INTRODUCTION
1. In a decision promulgated on 31 March 2025 an error of law was found in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lester (the ’Judge’) dated 18 September 2024, in which he dismissed the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal which was based on asserted risk arising from being a victim of trafficking. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) was set aside with no preserved findings. A copy of that error of law decision is annexed below and does not require detailed repetition herein. The matter was listed for a remaking hearing before this panel. We set out below our decision with reasons for allowing the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal on all grounds.
THE HEARING
2. At the remaking hearing the parties attended remotely and the panel were at Field House. The appellant gave evidence via an Albanian interpreter and we ensured they could understand each other. The documents before us included the consolidated bundle (‘CB’) comprising 332 pages and containing all documentation before the FTT, and a further appellant’s bundle (‘AB’) comprising 178 pages including some updating medical evidence and an updating witness statement from the appellant .
ISSUES
3. The Respondent conceded the following matters:
a) The appellant’s age;
b) The appellant’s nationality;
c) The appellant was a victim of trafficking as per the conclusive grounds decision;
d) There is a Convention reason namely particular social group;
4. The parties agree that the following issues remain in dispute:
a) Is the appellant at risk in Albania?
b) If so, is there a sufficiency of protection?
c) Is there an internal relocation alternative?
d) Are there very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Albania, as per the Immigration Rules?
e) Would removing the appellant from the United Kingdom otherwise amount to a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8 ECHR?
5. Ms Gilmour confirmed she would seek to cross-examine the appellant to elicit information about the appellant’s current circumstances and support.
6. The panel also sought clarity on the Country Policy Information Notes (CPIN) now relied upon given the refusal decision was made in December 2023. The parties agreed the following Albanian CPINs were relevant to this decision:
a) Actors of Protection, February 2025;
b) Mental Healthcare, January 2025;
c) Human Trafficking, July 2024.
7. In light of the appellant’s accepted mental health condition and the medical evidence before us, we asked the parties to confirm their agreement that the appellant was a vulnerable witness. Both agreed. Accordingly, we gave a vulnerable witness direction as per the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010. We carefully explained to the appellant that if she found the questions distressing or overwhelming she could take a break. We directed her to indicate to us if she needed time or if she needed questions re-phrasing, simplifying or repeating. We reassured her that no inferences would be drawn if she chose to seek assistance in this regard.
8. The appellant adopted her statements dated 30 March 2023, 21 March 2024 and 19 May 2025. She was then tendered for cross-examination. Ms Gilmour asked a number of questions concerning her current circumstances. We asked a few questions arising from the oral evidence. There was no re-examination. Both parties then made brief submissions. After a short retirement, at the conclusion of hearing we indicated that we would allow the appellant’s appeal for which we now set out our reasons.
ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS
9. In determining this appeal, we have carefully considered all the evidence and submissions on behalf of both parties. If we have not specifically mentioned a document, certain evidence or a particular submission in this decision it does not mean we have not considered it and given it appropriate weight in reaching our decision.
Asylum claim
10. Despite accepting the decision of the Single Competent Authority (‘SCA’) that the appellant is a victim of trafficking and modern slavery, the respondent’s position is the appellant does not have an objectively well-founded fear of persecution on return to Albania applying the guidance from TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) (‘TD and AD’). The respondent’s position is that there is sufficient protection available to the appellant on return to Albania and internal relocation is reasonable. Area’s identified as available to her were Vlore, Shkoder or Korce.
11. The Tribunal notes the SCA decision dated 27 June 2023 (§30/CB), which states :
“We found the following types of exploitation occurred: Forced prostitution in Albania and Germany, unknown locations, between December 2020 and July 2021.”
Medical Evidence
12. Turning firstly to the medical evidence, there are a number of authorities dealing with how a Tribunal should approach medical evidence, the most recent of which is HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC). We have considered the guidance given in this reported decision.
13. The appellant has provided various letters from treating clinicians and support agencies involved in her mental health care (41-178/AB). We have carefully considered this medical evidence. The medical records disclose that the appellant has been diagnosed with complex PTSD, mixed anxiety disorder, depressive disorder and tinnitus. The diagnosis for mixed anxiety disorder and depressive disorder was made within weeks of joining her GP practice as she immediately disclosed symptoms of anxiety and depression including flashbacks and sleep disturbance. She disclosed to her GP her trafficking situation and her fears as a consequence. The diagnosis was made in September 2021 and it is recorded as an active condition. The PTSD diagnosis was made in September 2022 and is also an active condition. The appellant is on the following medication: Sertraline, Mirtazapine, Ferrous Sulphate and Acetic acid 2% ear spray. The respondent does not dispute the appellant has these conditions. We note the medical records identify appointments on a regular basis, generally fortnightly to monthly. The appellant repeatedly refers to her symptoms which include panic attacks, sleep disturbance, rapid heart rate, feeling breathless, dizzy, stress, headaches and mouth ulcers. As these are the appellant medical records over the period she has been in the UK, and are from her treating GP, we attach weight to these.
14. The NHS Talking Therapies letter dated 06 May 2025 [41/AB], sets out the current treatment the appellant receives for her mental health conditions. It also sets out her current symptoms which include “experiencing frequent flashbacks, nightmares, and other distressing symptoms related to the trauma. The symptoms include intrusive memories, heighten physical arousal, avoidance of trauma related thoughts and conversations, persistent feelings of fear and sadness, and difficulty concentrating. This causes [the appellant] to feel anxious in social situations and when she is alone/in public.”
15. The Perinatal Mental Health Team letter dated 21 February 2025 [44/AB] sets out a history of the appellant’s symptoms of experiencing anxiety, depression and complex PTSD, these manifest in physical symptoms. It records the appellant’s persistent subjective fears, past trauma and the consequent impact on her ability to function. These symptoms include persistent negative image, avoidance of triggers, avoidance of relationships, very low trust in others, feelings of guilt, low mood, poor sleep, nightmares, low appetite and anxiety symptoms. It is also noted she struggles to go out and is socially isolated. The medical evidence indicates that the appellant has made two attempts on her life; once whilst she was under the control of her exploiters and on another occasion since then.
16. The ‘U Matter’ letter dated 08 March 2024, from a treating counselling psychologist, indicates the appellant has had counselling and trauma focused therapy since 26 April 2022, which finished on 27 February 2024 [67/AB]. The appellant is diagnosed with complex PTSD, based on a diagnostic assessment.
17. We accept the medical records, the NHS letters and other medical evidence are not a medico-legal reports. The different general practitioners and psychologists who have treated the appellant have not written the letters/reports with a view to assisting this court and there is no reference to independence or their duty to this court. We exercise a degree of caution in this regard. However, we are mindful that the medical evidence before us is from qualified treating clinicians who have worked closely with the appellant and would have a professional understanding of her conditions. We accept they have accepted the account given by the appellant. We find the appellant in all the medical evidence has remained consistent about her account and the impact of her experience upon her. We also note that the respondent accepts the appellant has these conditions and symptoms (§12 refusal decision).
18. In oral evidence the appellant stated that she continues to see a psychologist and a psychiatrist. She normally has weekly therapy appointments and sees her GP once a month for checks on her medication. She considers that her baby daughter is the protective factor that prevents her committing suicide and states this is the only reason.
19. Standing back and considering the evidence in its entirety, we accept on the lower standard that the appellant continues to suffer from complex PTSD, anxiety disorder and depression disorder. We also attach weight to the appellant’s consistency in her account of her past experiences and symptomology to her clinicians, which we note has been accepted by them as a cause for her mental health conditions.
Risk
20. The respondent does not accept the appellant is at risk from her former traffickers. This is set out at paragraph 21 of the refusal decision, where the respondent refers to them as non-state actors and the appellant’s failure to discharge the burden of proof in establishing they have sufficient power or influence in Albania. The respondent does not accept the appellant’s account that her traffickers were powerful or that they had police connections as she claimed. With regards to the latter point reliance is placed upon the appellant’s acceptance she was not shown a police ID card belonging to the trafficker who claimed he was a police officer. We are unable to reconcile this point with the respondent’s acceptance that the appellant was forced into prostitution across borders where she was forcibly controlled and exploited. It is unclear why one of her traffickers would show her their police ID, given her situation. Given the appellant’s consistency throughout her claim and the accepted facts, we find her account that one of her traffickers informed her he was a police officer is credible.
21. The appellant’s evidence has been detailed and consistent account as to how, when and where she met her traffickers. Her account has also been consistent about; where she was taken, who was with her and how she was controlled throughout. It was the traffickers who arranged the appellant’s departure from Albanian to various European countries including the UK. These facts have been accepted by the respondent.
22. We have carefully considered the appellant’s account with regards to her traffickers and their connections, which is not accepted by the respondent with respect to current risk. The appellant has repeatedly referred to them as part of a gang/group/network, who operate across Albania and Europe. We note in her screening interview she refers to the group, gang, ‘them’, ‘they’ and men with drivers. In her substantive interview the appellant stated the traffickers were a group/gang (Q86,87), part of a network (Q88,234,235), that she was accompanied to Germany (Q110, 121), that when she returned to Albania three people took her from the airport (Q135, 145, 151), one person was in front and one behind her on the plane (Q136, 138), in Albania there were lots of different men in the house (Q149,151), she was guarded at the house (Q152,155,161), in Belgium their were other females and the flat was guarded 24 hours (Q172, 177, 188), she was beaten by the men (Q190) and she was accompanied when she was forced into a lorry to the UK (Q208, 212). We find the appellant has been consistent in her account that this was a highly organised gang.
23. We accept that the men who trafficked the appellant were part of an Albanian organised criminal gang as the appellant has repeatedly referred to a number of men/a network being involved in an organised operation. We accept the gang is involved in people smuggling and trafficking. We also accept they operate across borders and are reasonably likely to have police connections. Accordingly, in view of the evidence of escape from the gang and that these men saw the appellant as a profit making commodity, we find the appellant is at risk from this Albanian organised criminal gang.
24. The appellant’s core account has been detailed and consistent. She is an accepted victim of trafficking who experienced sexual exploitation in the most severe way and has significant mental heath issues. We find that her core account is consistent with the country background evidence, regarding organised crime and human trafficking in Albania (see CPINs on human trafficking (v16.0) §8.4.4, 8.4.6, 8.4.7, 8.1.2, 8.1.4, 8.1.9 and actors of protection (v3.0) §2.1.10, 7.2.5). Thus we find, the appellant’s fear is well founded.
Sufficiency of protection
25. The respondent argues that the appellant can rely on the state for protection. To consider this we turn to the objective evidence. We note Headnote (d) in TD and AD, and consider the appellant’s individual circumstances. We note and have carefully considered the Reasons for Refusal Letter (’RFRL’) on this point (§17-23). The appellant states she cannot turn to the state for protection as the traffickers informed her they have connections within the police and she does not trust them. The respondent argues that the appellant has no evidence that this gang had any connections to the police. It is difficult to see what evidence the respondent expects the appellant to be able to produce in this respect. For the reasons set out above we accept it is reasonably likely that the trafficking gang has police connections. The appellant’s account is consistent with the country evidence.
26. We have considered the respondent’s CPIN on human trafficking (v16.0). The evidence suggests an effort by the Albanian authorities at a strategic level to seek to eliminate trafficking, but there is an implementation gap at lower levels (See 7.1.15, 7.1.16, 7.1.17, 10.3.7). The CPIN notes that the USSD continues to assess that Albania fails to meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, despite significant efforts. The Actors of Protection CPIN identifies that “police corruption was a problem and was most prevalent among frontline police” (5.4.1). It also states “corruption remains a serious concern and preventative efforts have had a limited impact” (7.2.5). Further that “a verification process revealed a high level of criminal infiltration and corruption in police ranks” (7.4.7) and that there is “pervasive” corruption in Albania (9.1.1). Accordingly we find the objective evidence supports the appellant’s account.
27. In this context, we turn to consider the factors identified as relevant by the Upper Tribunal in TD and AD at (d) and (h) of the guidance:
a. The appellant’s account, which we accept on the evidence, is that her family were unemployed and received state benefits when she was growing up. This is accepted by the respondent (§13/RFRL). We find, this is indictive of a poor family who are reliant upon the state.

b. The appellant’s evidence is that she completed a political and societal administration degree and started a masters, which she did not finish. The appellant has also consistently stated she did work for a short time as a sales assistant during her studies. We find the appellant is highly educated and has some limited work experience. We also accept that since coming to the UK, despite having the right to work, she has been unable to do so due to her mental health issues.

c. There is evidence before the Tribunal regarding the appellant’s mental health as identified in paragraphs 12-19 above. We attach weight to this. We accept that she has ongoing physical and mental symptoms which impact her ability to function on a daily basis. We accept that she lives in persistent fear, is afraid to go out and experiences social isolation. We also accept that she has some limited support from a friend in the UK, but this only assists her with her child. The appellant is an accepted victim of trafficking and we accept that she has been highly traumatised as a consequence of the severe sexual exploitation she endured. We accept on the basis of the medical evidence, that the appellant is struggling in the UK despite being safe and is reliant upon support from medical practitioners, charities and her friend.

d. The appellant has an illegitimate infant child of seven months. The appellant has no relationship with the child’s father.

e. The appellant is from Northern Albania, Kukes.

f. The appellant is a still relatively young, aged 29 years and single.

g. We find that while the appellant has family in Albania, that she cannot turn to them for support or any kind of assistance, as accepted by the respondent (§13/RFRL). The appellant has not had contact with her family since she refused to marry a man of their choice and moved to Tirana to go to university. There has been no contact with her family since. We accept the appellant cannot turn to her family in view of the loss of contact but also due to her status as a victim of sexual exploitation and the likely associated stigma in Albanian society.
28. The appellant’s evidence for reasons given above support that the traffickers were part of an organised criminal gang, who have links to the police. We are also mindful, that the appellant is too fearful to approach the police, due to the police connection. In view of her subjective fears and her mental health, we find she would not be in a position to access such protection, even if it was available to her.
29. Although we accept the country guidance that there is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, taking into account all of the above, we find that the protection offered by the Albanian state would not be sufficient or effective in this particular case, and that this appellant would not be able to access sufficient protection on return in view of her particular profile as a highly vulnerable single women, with a young child.
Internal relocation
30. The respondent has argued the appellant can internally relocate. We consider whether there is a place of internal relocation where the appellant would not be at real risk of persecution:
a. We have found that the appellant was forced into prostitution. She escaped from an organised criminal gang during her journey to the UK, and they exploited her to make profits. The appellant’s evidence, which we accept, is that the gang are aware of her particulars such as where she was from, where she went to university and where she lived in Tirana.

b. Albania is a very small country, the respondent’s human trafficking CPIN confirms that it is only slightly larger than Wales, and the population of even the capital Tirana is relatively small (§13.1.1). We note that the traffickers were accepted as Albanian and that we have accepted they are part of a wider criminal network who operate across borders. We find it is reasonably likely that the gang continues to operate across Albania and indeed across Europe.

c. The respondent’s CPIN on Human Trafficking contains a section addressing ‘Anonymity in Albania’ (§13.3.1-13.3.9). This contains evidence that “Albania is a small country and people can be easily traced… it is very easy to track someone and find people via family connections across the country” (Global Initiative, December 2021). Officials in Albania indicated to the respondent's FFM that "it would be relatively easy" for a victim to be located, and "We are a very small country, we all know each other. It might not be the same trafficker, but someone from within the same network". Another source informed the FFM that "it is easy for the traffickers to find what they’re looking for”. UNICEF Albania noted that recent cyber-attacks resulting in the release of “everyone's personal data”. The respondent did not address or engage with this evidence in the refusal letter, review or oral submissions.
31. In these circumstances we find that there is a real risk that the appellant would be tracked down and re-trafficked, or otherwise caused serious harm, in any potential place of relocation in Albania.
32. Alternatively, in the context of the country evidence regarding the size of Albania and the difficulty faced maintaining anonymity, the steps which the appellant would be required to take in order to maintain her anonymity and avoid coming to the attention of the gang would be such that she would be forced to live an extremely limited and circumspect life. It would not be ‘reasonable’ to expect the appellant to live in this way in order to avoid persecution. Accordingly, we find relocation to any location in Albania would be unduly harsh.
33. The respondent also refers to the option of accessing a shelter, which is available for her for up to 2 years (§29). This is taken from TD and AD (paragraph 119(e)) which states:
“Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to; stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.”
34. We accept the appellant may have the option of a shelter available to her and she would gain entry into the Albanian NRM, although we also recognise the country information indicates that such resources are in very limited supply (Trafficking CPIN sections 11 and 12) with just one specialised centre for assisting persons who have experienced sexual violence (CPIN §11.1.4). As the appellant has a young child it is likely that she will be treated as a “heavy” case. Her stay in the shelter could potentially be as long as 2 years. We have carefully considered if she would, in view of her own particular circumstances, substantially gain from this support to be able to live independently, once she is required to leave. We are mindful that since her arrival in the UK the appellant has had the support of her GP, other healthcare professionals and a friend. Despite this care and support and being in a country where she feels safe, she still stated she struggles day to day and has been unable to work. She stated in oral evidence that she needs her friend to help her care for her baby. The appellant has been in the UK for over 3 years, yet is unable to live independently, despite having care and support. The medical evidence outlined above sets out that her symptoms manifest in an external, physiological way, as well as causing her internal pain. These symptoms seriously compromise the appellant’s ability to cope, and to parent her daughter without long-term support. The medical evidence sets out fully her intrusive thoughts, particularly at night. We note the letter dated 18 March 2024 from ‘Hope: Asylum-seeker & Refugee Trauma Service’ of the NHS written by Dr M Griggs, Consultant Clinical Psychologist and Manager, which states: “It is my professional opinion that being returned to Albania or threatened with return would be highly detrimental to [the appellant’s] already fragile mental health and would significantly increase risks of self harm and suicide. The appellant has already made attempts to take her own life and reports frequent suicidal urges, which has left us concerned about her vulnerability.”. This leads to serious concerns about the risk of deterioration in the appellant’s mental health including the risk that the appellant would attempt suicide should she be returned to Albania, or perceive a threat that she and her daughter would be found. This is particularly this case as Albania is the country where the organised criminal gang operate and from where she was trafficked multiple times. Having taken all of those factors into account we conclude that internal flight is not a reasonable option for the appellant and her child.
Conclusion
35. We consider that the appellant’s individual circumstances are such that there is a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm, inter alia from forced re-trafficking, whether she is returned to her home area or to another part of Albania as a highly fearful victim of trafficking who is single, has a young child, has significant mental health issues and is without family support.
HP / ECHR
36. Return to Albania would also be in breach of Article 3 ECHR for the same reasons. As the appellant is a refugee she cannot fall within the scope of humanitarian protection. In the alternative, in respect of the appellant’s Article 8 claim, we find that she qualifies for leave to remain under paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules (as it was at the time of the appellant’s claim) because there are very significant obstacles to her integration in Albania, for the reasons given above.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is allowed on asylum and human rights grounds, Article 3 and 8 ECHR.

S K Kudhail

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 June 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005234

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64329/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE T BIBI

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
And

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Daniel Coleman instructed by Morgan Pearse Solicitors
For the Respondent: Dr Suzana Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Background
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lester (“the Judge”) dated 18 September 2024 dismissing her asylum and human rights appeal.
37. The Appellant is an Albanian national. She entered the UK clandestinely on 05 July 2021 and claimed asylum on 08 July 2021. On 09 August 2021 she was referred to the National Referral Mechanism as a victim of modern slavery. In summary, the Appellant fears return to Albania based on her membership of a particular social group, namely as a victim of trafficking/modern slavery. Her account is that she was forced into prostitution because of threats to kill her and her family. She was trafficked from Albania to Germany, France and then the United Kingdom. After being trafficked to the UK in July 2021 the Appellant managed to escape her exploiters and claimed asylum. The Single Competent Authority (SCA) issued a conclusive grounds decision on 27 June 2023 that the Appellant was a victim of modern slavery involving forced prostitution at various locations between December 2020 and July 2021. At the time of the hearing the Appellant was pregnant. She has since given birth to a baby girl. She is not in a relationship nor in contact with the baby’s father. The Appellant claims to have severe mental health issues.
38. The Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her protection claim came before the First-tier Tribunal at a hearing on 06 August 2024. The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on the basis that she does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason and does not face a real risk of serious harm. The Judge found that the Appellant would have sufficiency of state protection and would be able to internally relocate in Albania. The Judge also concluded that the Appellant does not meet the requirements of Article 8 and Article 3 (on medical grounds) of the European Convention of Human Rights.
39. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds the Judge had erred in that he had: i) placed an inappropriate amount of weight on the Respondent’s caseworker guidance contained in paragraphs 1 to 6 of the Country Policy and Information Note (the ‘CPIN’) and did not form his own opinion; ii) failed to give anxious scrutiny to the Appellant’s evidence and submissions and did not give adequate reasons for rejecting the same; iii) applied the incorrect legal test by applying AM Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 when considering the asylum and humanitarian protection claim; iv) addressed humanitarian protection only in terms of the Appellant’s living circumstances; and, v) developed a different case to what was being pursued by the parties.
40. Permission was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Elliott on 12 November 2024 in the following terms:
A reading of the Judge’s decision shows that he quoted extensively from the CPIN, yet makes scarcely any reference to the Appellant’s oral or written evidence or any reference to the submissions made by the representatives. It is arguable that the Judge has elevated the CPIN to the level of independent, objective evidence or to the level of a country expert’s report, which it is not.

It is also arguable that the Judge’s determination has failed to engage with the issues raised in evidence and submissions and has failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting them, instead substituting the contents of the CPIN as his rationale without reference to the respondent’s individual circumstances, evidence, or submissions.

It is arguable that the Judge has considered the test in AM (Zimbabwe) in the context of the Appellant’s asylum/humanitarian protection claims, given his reference to it at paragraph 60 when considering the risk factors in TD & AD.

It is also arguable that the Judge developed a line of argument that was not pursued by the parties. The respondent’s refusal letter had accepted that the Appellant did not have contact with her family and would not have their support on return to Albania. The Judge accepted that at paragraph 27 of his decision, yet appears to have decided later at paragraph 93 that this was simply because the Appellant had not tried to contact them and factored that into his assessment of the Appellant’s life in Albania, something not advanced by the respondent.

These are arguable errors that are material to the issues in the case and its outcome. Permission to appeal in therefore allowed on all the grounds sought.
41. There was no Rule 24 response filed by the Respondent.
The Hearing
42. Dr Ibisi indicated that the Respondent was conceding ground 2 in all respects. It was accepted that the Judge failed to give anxious scrutiny to the Appellant’s evidence and submissions and did not give adequate reasons for rejecting the same. However, she indicated that the Respondent was not conceding grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5. We therefore invited submissions from Mr Coleman in respect of the grounds that were not conceded.
43. Mr Coleman relied on the detailed written grounds. He submitted that the Judge, at [41] to [48], [76], [96], [99] to [100] of the decision, instead of considering the case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (‘TD and AD’) directly, had only referred to the Respondent’s account of what TD and AD says and the Respondent’s caseworker guidance at paragraphs 1 to 6 of the CPIN (Albania: Human trafficking, version 16.0, July 2024) on how to apply it. In Mr Coleman’s submission the Judge had only referred to the caseworker guidance in determining key disputed issues and had failed to make his own assessment based on objective evidence including the objective information elsewhere in the CPIN and in TD and AD. In particular, in his submission, the Judge had placed a disproportionate amount of weight on the caseworker guidance in the CPIN in relation to the risk of re-trafficking, the sufficiency of protection available to the Appellant in Albania, and the ability of the Appellant to internally relocate within Albania and re-integrate into life there including what support would be available on return.
44. Although ground 2 was conceded by the Respondent, whilst Mr Coleman addressed us on the Judge’s assessment regarding the risk of re-trafficking, sufficiency of protection, viability of internal relocation, and availability of suitable health provision in Albania, he also referred to the Judge’s treatment of the Appellant’s medical evidence and the assessment of the best interests of the Appellant’s unborn child in respect of these issues. In Mr Coleman’s submission the Judge had totally failed to engage with the medical evidence and the diagnosis of Complex Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder and had failed to give the Appellant’s evidence anxious scrutiny by referring to a single suicide attempt when the evidence was clear that the Appellant had attempted suicide on two occasions.
45. In relation to the Appellant’s unborn child, Mr Coleman submitted that the Judge had failed to conduct an assessment of the child’s best interests. Even though the child was unborn when assessed by the Judge, the case had been approached by him on the basis the Appellant would be a single mother on return to Albania and therefore, in his submission, a section 55 assessment was required.
46. In relation to ground 3, Mr Coleman submitted that in applying AM (Zimbabwe), the Judge carried out the analysis required by TD and AD incorrectly. AM (Zimbabwe) relates to whether removal would breach Article 3 of the ECHR on health grounds. The Judge was wrong to apply AM (Zimbabwe) when applying the guidance of TD and AD.
47. In relation to ground 5, Mr Coleman stated that the Respondent’s refusal letter had accepted that the Appellant did not have contact with her family and would not have their support on return to Albania. The Judge accepted that at [27] of his decision yet appears to have decided later at [93] that this was simply because the Appellant had not tried to contact them and factored that into his assessment of the Appellant’s life in Albania. However, this was not an argument that had been advanced by the Respondent.
48. Dr Ibis declined to respond to Mr Coleman’s submissions. She confirmed that it was accepted that the Judge had made material errors of law in relation to the matters referred to in ground 2.
49. At the hearing we confirmed that we were satisfied that the making of the decision involved material errors of law. Our reasons are set out below.
Decision on the appeal
50. The principles and cautious approach to be applied by an appeal court to first instance findings of fact are well established and set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. We remind ourselves of the role of the First Tier Tribunal as an expert Tribunal and bear in mind that a determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to narrow textual analysis: HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, 1 WLR 3784 at [72].
51. Turning to ground 1, the Appellant’s case is that the Judge placed an inappropriate amount of weight on the Respondent’s caseworker guidance contained in paragraphs 1 to 6 of the CPIN and did not form his own opinion on the risk of re-trafficking. Mr Coleman submitted that paragraphs 1 to 6 of the CPIN provides guidance to caseworkers on how the Respondent wants them to make decisions. It sets out how the Respondent interprets the country evidence and law. We accept Mr Coleman’s argument that the ‘Assessment’ section at paragraphs 1 to 6 of the CPIN represents the Respondent’s guidance to caseworkers and is not in itself objective evidence but comprises the Respondent’s assessment of that evidence.
52. Mr Coleman referred us to paragraphs 9.1.1, 9.1.2 and 9.1.3 of the CPIN which deal with the treatment and perception of victims of trafficking, and paragraph 11.2.3 which relates to the three Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) shelters for victims of trafficking. These had not been considered by the Judge.
53. We note that at [73] to [84] of the decision, the Judge relied on paragraphs 4.2.8 to 4.2.1 of the CPIN to reach the conclusion that even without a supportive family there is support for the Appellant. This theme continued at [96] to [101] of the decision relying on paragraphs 4.1.1. to 4.1.5 of the CPIN, that the Albanian state is willing and able to provide protection. The Judge further goes on to find at [105] to [111] of the decision, relying on paragraphs 5.1.1 to 5.1.6 of the CPIN, that it is reasonable to expect the Appellant to internally relocate. At [65] to [66] of the decision the Judge concluded that there will be support for the Appellant as the mother of an illegitimate child.
54. We accept Mr Coleman’s submission that the Judge did not consider paragraph 9.1.7 of the CPIN which states “families face shame as they do not see the woman as being exploited, they see her as exercising prostitution and putting shame on the family. In families where the daughter went abroad or to Tirana, or victims of sexual violence in general, they experience discrimination”. We also accept that the Judge failed to carry out any analysis of the Appellant’s evidence on key disputed issues. At [2] of her witness statement the Appellant states that “in Albania, due to the way society and local culture is set up, there is a lot of shame and humiliation attached to women like me, and we are social pariahs there. Again, this will lead to isolation and make me completely vulnerable to exploitation again”. The Judge fails to provide any indication of what weight he attached to the Appellant’s evidence in this regard. Instead of conducting an assessment of the evidence in the round, the Judge has quoted extensively from the paragraphs 1 to 6 of the CPIN and appears to adopt this as his reasoning in most parts of the decision without examining further material in the ‘country information’ section of the CPIN at paragraphs 7 to 13.
55. We accept Mr Coleman’s submission that the Judge appears in effect to have elevated the status of the CPIN to an expert’s report give the reference at [92] of the decision to taking into account “expert and objective evidence” despite the fact no expert report had been adduced in the appeal. It was for the Judge to make his own assessment of risk, including the risk of re-trafficking, based on the objective evidence which we find he failed to do.
56. We also accept that instead of considering the country guidance case of TD and AD directly, the Judge referred to the Respondent’s account of what TD and AD says and how to apply it in the caseworker’s guidance in the CPIN. It is apparent that the Judge erred in failing to conduct his own assessment of risk based on the guidance in TD and AD. The Judge considered selective parts of the case and did not consider the risk of trafficking beyond the caseworker’s guidance. Given that risk on return arising from trafficking/re-trafficking and the availability of internal relocation were central issues in the appeal we consider the Judge’s failure to apply TD and AD appropriately was a material error of law.
57. For the reasons set out above we find that ground 1 is made out.
58. In relation to ground 3, at [60] of the decision the Judge states “the medical evidence in its totality does not meet the high bar of the test in AM Zimbabwe… from this I conclude that there is suitable mental health provision available to the Appellant in Albania”. It is trite law that AM Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 is a case relating to whether the removal of a person would breach Article 3 on health grounds. We accept that the Judge was wrong to apply AM Zimbabwe when applying the guidance of TD and AD which states that “unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable, whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis”. We accept the Appellant’s argument that in applying AM (Zimbabwe) the Judge has made a material error of law in respect of the analysis required by TD and AD. It is also apparent that the Judge failed to conduct a full analysis of the appellant’s medical evidence and the impact of her health condition on her ability to safely return to Albania.
59. Turning to ground 4, it was argued that in terms of humanitarian protection the Judge only considered the Appellant’s living circumstances at [112] to [113] of the decision. We accept that the Judge’s findings were inadequately reasoned and that he failed to consider the risk of serious harm, which we conclude was a material error.
60. In relation to ground 5, it was submitted that the Judge considered a matter that was not being pursued by the parties. The Respondent’s refusal letter accepts that the Appellant did not have contact with her family, and she would not have their support on return to Albania. The Judge accepted that at [27] of the decision yet appears to have decided later at [93] that this was simply because the Appellant had not tried to contact them and factored that into his assessment of the Appellant’s life in Albania. This was not an argument advanced by the Respondent at the hearing. We conclude that the Judge acted unfairly by basing his conclusions on an issue that was not being pursued and to do so was a material error.
61. As recorded above, Dr Ibisi conceded ground 2 on the Respondent’s behalf in that the Judge failed to give anxious scrutiny to the Appellant’s evidence and submissions, and did not give adequate reasons for rejecting the same. It was accepted, that this involved material errors of law. We consider that Dr Ibisi’s concession was made on a proper basis.
62. Having found all grounds of appeal established and that the decision involved the making of material errors of law we set aside the decision in its entirety with no findings preserved.
63. We have considered paragraph 7.2 (b) of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and the principles in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). We are of the view, supported by the submissions of the parties, that there is no reason why the decision should not be remade in the Upper Tribunal. Although the decision of the First-tier Tribunal has been set aside there is very little fact-finding required, if any.
Directions
64. The decision of the First Tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside. The appeal is to be remade by the Upper Tribunal at a resumed hearing to be conducted via CVP.
65. The Appellant is permitted to adduce further evidence should she wish to do so. Any further evidence should be filed and served no later than 14 days before the resumed hearing.
66. Should the Appellant wish to give evidence at the hearing and requires an interpreter to assist her, her representatives should advise the Tribunal of the need for an Albanian interpreter no later than 14 days before the resumed hearing.
Notice of Decision
67. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside. The appeal is to be remade by the Upper Tribunal at a resumed hearing.

T Bibi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 March 2025