Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-005279
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59549/2023
LP/06635/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
1st April 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
TP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Ms H Masih, Counsel, instructed by Deus Nexus Solicitors
For the respondent: Mr M Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

RE-MAKING DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is the re-making decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. It follows from the Upper Tribunal’s error of law decision (Upper Tribunal Judge Neville and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Bagral), sent out on 30 October 2025, by which the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside with preserved findings and the appeal retained in the Upper Tribunal.

2. The appellant is a Vietnamese national who came to the United Kingdom in May 2021, claiming asylum on the day of his arrival. He asserted that he had been arrested and ill-treated by the Vietnamese police after participating in a demonstration against pollution caused by a corporation. The asylum claim was refused on 6 May 2022 and a subsequent appeal dismissed on 23 February 2023. The appellant’s account was disbelieved. An onward appeal to the Upper Tribunal was dismissed on 9 July 2023.

3. On 17 July 2023, the appellant provided further submissions to the respondent. These included a Conclusive Grounds decision from the Single Competent Authority, dated 1 March 2023, that the appellant was a victim of forced labour whilst in Romania in 2021. The further submissions were treated as a fresh claim and that claim was refused by a decision dated 13 October 2023. In the subsequent appeal, the appellant continued to rely on claimed events in Vietnam, but also on sur place activities, which he claimed put him at risk on return. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 23 September 2024. The First-tier Tribunal concluded that there was no good reason to depart from the adverse credibility findings made in the 2023 appeal decision. It also concluded that because the sur place activities had not been put to the respondent at the time of the further submissions, it was in effect a “new matter” and could not be considered.

The error of law decision
4. In brief, the Upper Tribunal concluded that the First-tier Tribunal had been wrong to exclude consideration of the sur place activities and that this error was material. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside, but all previous findings relating to claimed events in Vietnam were expressly preserved.

The preserved findings
5. The Upper Tribunal’s preservation of the adverse credibility findings refer to those set out at [18]-[29] and [34]-[47] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, which itself referred back to the 2023 First-tier Tribunal decision. In summary, they are as follows:

That the respondent accepted the appellant’s identity, nationality, and that he
was a victim of people trafficking.

That there were aspects of the appellant’s account that were inconsistent and
incredible.

The appellant’s account of how his parents had died had changed,
and his explanation for the changes was not credible.

The appellant claimed to have a copy of an arrest warrant, but no such copy was produced in evidence nor was his story of obtaining it credible.

The appellant’s account of how his aunt passed away was not based on any evidence, and his claim to have obtained that information was incredible.

The appellant contradicted himself about being refused medication.

The appellant did not mention significant aspects of his claim in his screening interview (medical conditions, being subject to forced labour, his treatment by police, detention in Vietnam, the 2016 demonstration). He had instead claimed that he left Vietnam because he could not find a job and life was tough.

The appellant did not mention that he had been beaten by police in his
first witness statement, and had given inconsistent evidence about his
injuries and medical treatment he had received.

The appellant’s explanation for why he did not have photographs of the 2016 demonstration was not credible.

The appellant had changed his account of involvement in the 2016 demonstration to exaggerate his role in it, and his explanation for the change was not credible.

The appellant’s claimed treatment at the 2016 demonstration was inconsistent with the country evidence.

The appellant failed to mention the 2020 demonstration at his screening interview, despite the fact that it was said to be the event that made him decide to leave Vietnam.

The appellant had changed his evidence about whether he was arrested or beaten at that demonstration, and the explanation he gave was not credible.

The appellant’s claim that the police visited his aunt’s house regularly after the raid could not be reconciled with his claim to have lost touch with her.

The appellant’s account of hiding in the church had changed, and the explanation he gave was not credible.

The appellant’s claim that the 2020 demonstration had brought him to the authorities’ attention was not credible, given that it was not a demonstration against the state but rather a private wage dispute.

The 2023 First-tier Tribunal was clear that these examples were not an exhaustive
account of the inconsistencies and lack of credibility in the appellant’s account,
but they were the most significant ones.

The 2023 First-tier Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claim to not have any family in Vietnam or any contact with them.

The 2023 First-tier Tribunal considered whether the appellant was at risk from people traffickers and decided that he was not, on the basis that there was no outstanding debt, the appellant was not known to the traffickers, the appellant had family and friends in Vietnam who could form a support network for him, he could receive assistance from the church, he was educated and had worked in Vietnam before, and there was no evidence of any mental health issues.

The 2023 First-tier Tribunal also found that the appellant could relocate within Vietnam if he had concerns about returning to his home area.

The 2023 First-tier Tribunal found for these reasons that the appellant would not be at risk from people traffickers upon return to Vietnam.

The 2023 First-tier Tribunal found that there was no evidence put forward to support the appellant’s claim to be suffering from mental health difficulties, and that if he was the high threshold for Article 3 is not met.

The 2024 First-tier Tribunal rejected the application for asylum and humanitarian protection on the basis that the appellant had not established any truth to his account.

The 2024 First-tier Tribunal recorded that the appellant had conceded he had not made out a viable Article 8 claim.

However, the respondent had accepted the fact of trafficking at the hearing before the 2023 First-tier Tribunal, and the Judge had approached the case on the basis that the appellant had been a victim of modern slavery (namely, forced labour in Romania).

The 2023 First-tier Tribunal went through the various risk factors applying to victims of trafficking and decided that the appellant was not at risk of being re-trafficked if he returned to Vietnam. There is no reason to suspect that his conclusion would have been any different if this decision had been in front of the 2023 First-tier Tribunal.

The only thing that was different in the 2024 appeal was evidence which shows that the appellant does have the mental health conditions that he claimed to have. There was no further evidence to enable the 2024 First-tier Tribunal to depart from the 2023 First-tier Tribunal’s conclusions on his lack of outstanding debt, the fact he is not known personally to his traffickers, and the support available to the appellant from family, friends, NGOs and the church.

The 2024 First-tier Tribunal was not persuaded that the new evidence about the appellant’s mental health would change the conclusion reached by the 2023 First-tier Tribunal. The factors to be taken into account remain the same. The other factors identified by the 2023 First-tier Tribunal, even taking into account any increased vulnerability due to mental health, would still lead to the conclusion that the appellant is not at risk of re-trafficking if he were to return to Vietnam.

It was accepted that the appellant suffered from depression, anxiety, and poor sleeping, which are being treated by therapy and medication. There was no reason to doubt the appellant’s claim that he has suicidal thoughts, although he did not claim to have made any suicide attempts. There is no diagnosis of PTSD. The evidence does not establish that the appellant suffered from any memory loss or impairment.

The 2024 First-tier Tribunal considered carefully whether this evidence undermined any of the conclusions made by the 2023 First-tier Tribunal about the appellant’s credibility. It did not. First, because the 2023 First-tier Tribunal drew its conclusions on the basis that evidence was not given at the first reasonable opportunity to do so. Those opportunities included an interview at a point when the appellant was rested and refreshed, and a witness statement given when he was under no time pressure to provide answers. Second, because the evidence that was not given at the first reasonable opportunity, despite prompting, included key aspects of his asylum claim, such as attendance at the 2016 demonstration and his forced labour in Romania. Third, because of the sheer number of discrepancies that have been identified. Fourth, because the explanations for the discrepancies were themselves incredible. Finally, because there is no evidence before me that shows the appellant has any difficulties with memory loss or impairment, albeit it was accepted that his depression and anxiety may account for poor phrasing or missing some things when interviewed or questioned and feeling under pressure.

For those reasons, the 2024 First-tier Tribunal concluded that the new evidence did not entitle it to depart from the findings made by the 2023 First-tier Tribunal.

The appellant established that he was suffering from anxiety, depression, and poor sleep, which are being treated my medication and therapy. However, the relevant CPIN is clear that both therapy and antidepressant drugs are available to the appellant if he returns to Vietnam. Although the quality of mental health care services in Vietnam may not be to the same standard as in the United Kingdom, they do exist and the appellant could access them.

There was no other evidence before me that demonstrated that the appellant would suffer a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health, resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy, if he were to be returned to Vietnam.

6. It is self-evident that the adverse findings were robust and comprehensive.

The principal controversial issues and agreed facts
7. Neither the First-tier Tribunal nor the parties specifically addressed the question of whether the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply to this case on the basis that the further submissions (treated as a fresh claim) were made after 28 June 2022. It is clear that they do.

8. At the re-making stage, the principal controversial issue is very narrow. The question for me to determine is whether any sur place activities undertaken by the appellant would, on the lower standard of proof, create a risk on return.

9. Ms Masih did not seek to contest any of the preserved findings. She confirmed that the appellant had not undertaken any social media activity whilst in United Kingdom.

10. Mr Pugh confirmed that the respondent accepted that the appellant had attended two demonstrations in this country: in April 2024 and May 2025.

11. Both representatives agreed that there has as yet been no finding as to whether the appellant holds any genuine political beliefs and that I was required to make a finding on this particular issue, with reference to the principle in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31.

12. Mr Pugh confirmed that if I were to find that the appellant did hold genuine political beliefs, he should succeed in his appeal.

13. Both representatives agreed that even if I were to find that the appellant did not hold genuine political beliefs, I must nonetheless consider whether any sur place activities would be reasonably likely to create a risk on return.

14. For the avoidance of any doubt, there has been no attempt before me to resurrect any claims under Articles 3 (medical) and/or 8.

The evidence
15. In advance of the resumed hearing, the appellant provided a composite bundle, indexed and paginated 1-567. In addition, I have been provided with the respondent’s CPIN, “Vietnam: Opposition to the state”, version 5.0, published in September 2025, together with media articles and a note on source materials confirming the Vietnamese government’s control over the media in that country.

16. The appellant attended the hearing and gave evidence with the assistance of a Vietnamese interpreter. That evidence was recorded and I also took a careful note.

The appellant as a vulnerable witness
17. An application was made to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness. This was unopposed. It was clearly appropriate to grant the application. The appellant is a confirmed victim of forced labour and, notwithstanding the preserved findings, he does suffer from mental health conditions (albeit not of a significant nature or impact on his day-to-day functioning).

18. At one stage of the hearing, the appellant became visibly upset. A break was taken and he confirmed that he was happy to continue thereafter. I was satisfied that the appellant fully understood the questions being put to him and was able to properly participate in the hearing and give evidence to the best of his ability.

The parties’ submissions
19. In brief summary, Mr Pugh submitted that the appellant was not a credible witness. The preserved findings were relevant to my assessment. In addition, the evidence on sur place activities was poor. The country information, combined with what is said in MH (Bangladesh) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 688 indicated that the Vietnamese authorities in this country might only have limited capacity to mount surveillance, but in any event, the appellant’s profile was clearly low-level. On return, the authorities would see the appellant for what he was, namely an opportunist acting in bad faith. There would be no risk.

20. In brief summary, Ms Masih relied on her skeleton argument and submitted that the appellant was credible in relation to the sur place activities. The Brotherhood for Democracy was well-documented and clearly of significant adverse interest to the Vietnamese authorities. It was reasonably likely that they will already know of the appellant’s involvement in political activities here. The country information indicated that the appellant would be at risk on return and this was so even if he did not hold genuine political beliefs.

21. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Findings and conclusions
22. I adopt the staged approach required by section 32 of the 2022 Act and JCK (s32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC).

23. I will not set out each and every aspect of the evidence relied on by the parties, nor will I address each and every specific submission made. My findings and conclusions are based on a holistic assessment of the evidence and the submissions made for and against the appellant.

24. On the balance of probabilities, I find that a Refugee Convention reason is engaged in this case, namely political opinion (whether actual or imputed). The respondent has not disputed this before me.

25. On the balance of probabilities, I find that the appellant does hold a subjective fear. This is not dependent on what I say about his credibility, below. Even if he does not hold genuine political beliefs, it is more likely than not that he still fears what might happen to him on return as result of sur place activities.

26. For the sake of completeness, the findings in the two previous paragraphs would be the same if I had applied the lower standard.

27. I have considered section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. The appellant did pass through other European countries on route to United Kingdom. However, he was the victim of forced labour in one of them (Romania). In addition, he claimed asylum on the day of his arrival here. The respondent’s refusal decision makes no reference to section 8, nor, as far as I can see, did the First-tier Tribunal. Overall, there is either no damage to the appellant’s overall credibility, or any such damage is minimal.

28. I turn to the core question of the appellant’s sur place activities. I based my assessment on the lower standard of proof and in light of what is said in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216.

29. I have taken full account of the appellant’s vulnerability when assessing his evidence before me. As stated previously, I was satisfied that he was able to put forward his evidence and that he understood the questions asked of him. The preserved findings make it clear that the appellant does not suffer from poor recall. Indeed, the appellant gave full answers to the majority of the questions, at times being asked to break them up to assist interpreter. I bear in mind that the hearing before me was the third at which the appellant had given evidence and so this was not an entirely new setting for him. There were no apparent difficulties in communication between the appellant and interpreter. At no stage did Ms Masih suggested that the appellant was experiencing any particular problems in relation to the giving of his evidence and his vulnerability did not feature in her closing submissions. Overall, I find that the appellant’s vulnerability did not have a material impact on the evidence he gave.

30. I reiterate the preserved adverse findings. Clearly, they specifically relate to the emphatic rejection of claimed past events in Vietnam and not sur place activities. Having said that, they are relevant to my assessment of the appellant’s claim that he holds genuine political beliefs and that his sur place activities are simply a manifestation of those beliefs. That relevance has three aspects to it.

31. First, the fact that the appellant has been entirely untruthful about past events does not stand him in good stead when considering his own evidence at this stage. Of course, a person can be untruthful about one matter whilst truthful about others, and the previous findings are far from decisive. However, it would be artificial to exclude those findings from my overall assessment. The same would apply in the reverse scenario: if the appellant had been found truthful about past events this would have been a positive indicator of his overall credibility.

32. Secondly, and following from the first point, during the hearing the appellant reasserted his contention that he had been targeted in Vietnam. Again, it is not a significant consideration against him, but it did demonstrate the perpetuation of a claim which has been found to be entirely untruthful.

33. Thirdly, Mr Pugh made a valid point when he submitted that the adverse findings had a knock-on effect on the sur place evidence in the following way. If the appellant had been found credible in respect of past events, it would form a plausible basis for the continuation or inspiration for genuine political beliefs following the appellant’s arrival in United Kingdom. The corollary of this is that the absence of credibility removed such a plausible basis: in other words, there was no pre-existing credible reason for why the appellant might have held, or developed, anti-government views in the United Kingdom. This tied in with the fact that the appellant has not stated in evidence that he in fact developed his claimed political views entirely since being this country. Rather, his continued reliance on the untruthful account of events in Vietnam further undermined the genuineness of any political beliefs. As with the first two matters I have addressed, this does not carry great weight, but is a relevant consideration.

34. The respondent accepts that the appellant has attended two demonstrations in the United Kingdom: on 28 April 2024 and 4 May 2025. I find this to be the case. I find that the first of these was organised by the Brotherhood for Democracy. That much is clear enough from the photographs contained in the bundle, which depict at least one large banner emblazoned with the organisation’s name and symbols, together with photographs of political prisoners in Vietnam. Six photographs have been provided, each including the appellant. I am bound to say that they have the distinct appearance of being contrived in the sense that the appellant is looking directly at the camera, whilst everyone else is in what one might describe as “normal” or “natural” positions. I find that the photographs were taken for the specific purpose of assisting the appellant’s case (at which time the appellant’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was pending).

35. I accept that the appellant is pictured holding A3-sized pictures of political prisoners, as well as holding a corner of the large Brotherhood for Democracy banner. It would be readily apparent to an interested party that he was not an organiser of the demonstration.

36. In respect of the May 2025 demonstration, the limited photographic evidence shows not many more than a handful of people outside of the Embassy. Again, the photographs have the appearance of contrivance, with the appellant looking directly at the camera, whilst others are not. There are no large banners. Only one individual (not the appellant) appears to be wearing a Brotherhood for Democracy T-shirt. Unlike the April 2024 demonstration, it is not apparent that this event was arranged by that organisation. There is no independent evidence to link the event to the organisation and the appellant himself did not specifically state that there was such a link. Overall, it is not reasonably likely that the two were connected.

37. There is a media article at page 43 of the bundle, which I accept is reliable, indicating that the May 2025 demonstration was reported and was probably known to the Vietnamese authorities.

38. The appellant claims that photographs of him attending one or both of the demonstrations have been published online. I am bound to say that his evidence on this point was confused, vague and, I find, unreliable and untrue. He appeared to say that he had in fact been shown photographs of him published online by unidentified friends, possibly on an unidentified website. There was no corroborative evidence of this by way, for example, of screenshots of a website or social media platform, witness statements from any of his friends. Indeed, there is no reliable evidence that any real efforts had been made to obtain any such evidence. Whilst corroborative evidence is of course not a requirement, such evidence might have assisted the appellant. As it is, I only have his word.

39. Initially the appellant confirmed that he was shown a photograph as it appeared online. He then appeared to retreat from this and state that had only been shown the photograph itself, and not the image as it allegedly appeared online. When it was put to him by Mr Pugh that this was the first time he had asserted that his photograph appeared online, the appellant said that he had been “struggling, panicking” and that he did not feel “stable”. Even taking account of his vulnerability, I conclude that he was simply not been truthful about this particular issue. It is not reasonably likely that any photographs of him attending one or both of the demonstrations has appeared online in any form.

40. Notwithstanding the above, it is reasonably likely that the Vietnamese authorities themselves had captured an image of the appellant at one or both of the demonstrations in question. I say this for four reasons. First, the photographs of the small-scale 2025 demonstration clearly show a pole with CCTV cameras on top, facing out towards the street on which the protesters are standing. Secondly, section 13 of the CPIN contains evidence that the Vietnamese authorities are “sensitive to the activities of foreign-based distant organisation’s led by members of the diaspora”, that the authorities “monitored dissidents abroad”, and that the authorities had “sophisticated surveillance capabilities and [were] able to monitor distance abroad”. Thirdly, the media article referred to previously indicates that the authorities were aware of the May 2025 demonstration undertaken an adverse view of it. Fourthly, I bear in mind what is said in MH (Bangladesh) to the effect that there is only so much an individual can be expected to provide by way of evidence on the surveillance activities of the authorities of a foreign government.

41. I shall return to the consequences of the photographs when considering risk on return, later on in my decision.

42. The appellant claims to have attended “a lot” of demonstrations in the United Kingdom beyond the two already considered. He told me that his attendances had begun in April 2021 and had continued beyond May 2025. For the following reasons, I do not accept this aspect of his evidence. First, in the 2024 First-tier Tribunal proceedings, his evidence was that he had only that point attended a single demonstration in April of that year. He told me that this was because that event was the most significant, that he had been “struggling and stressed” and that he had had “no opportunity to clarify”. I do not accept that. Whilst I appreciate that he might have been feeling anxious and stressed, he was legally represented throughout and clearly had had a reasonable opportunity to provide at least some details orally or in writing of attendance at other events, even if they were on a smaller scale. Secondly, there is no independent supporting evidence of additional attendances and therefore I only have his word to consider. Thirdly, the First-tier Tribunal had addressed the appellant’s mental health and concluded that it had not played a material part in his ability to present his evidence or recollect past events. Fourthly, the failure to have mentioned additional attendances is in many respects consistent with the adverse view taken of his credibility by the First-tier Tribunal.

43. As confirmed by Ms Masih, I find that the appellant has not engaged in any social media activity in this country. To that extent, this rules out any adverse profile which might otherwise have been created through anti-government posts and suchlike. Beyond that, whilst only of limited relevance, the lack of any such activity does nothing to underpin the appellant’s assertion of committed sur place political activity.

44. I now turn to the Brotherhood for Democracy organisation. The country information contained within section 9 of the CPIN indicates that this organisation is illegal in Vietnam and the subject of repression by the authorities. I accept that this is the case.

45. There is then the question of the appellant’s interaction with this organisation in the United Kingdom. He claims to have known about it since 2021, has attended at least one meeting, and has personally met its president, Mr Nguyen Van Dai (who appears to be based in Germany). This association is relied on by the appellant as part of his overall risk profile.

46. There is no evidence before me as to whether individuals such as the appellant can become formal members of the organisation. There is no supporting letter which might have provided general and/or specific evidence as to membership and the appellant’s affiliation. Once again, whilst corroborative evidence is not required, it is of relevance that the appellant has failed to provide any clear and reliable evidence as to what steps he has ever taken to obtain a letter of support or other such documentation. Once again, aside from the minutes of a meeting from January 2026 (which I will address below), I only have the appellant’s word. His own evidence is to be assessed in the round with everything else before me.

47. In terms of the written evidence, the appellant’s witness statement is extremely light on detail.

48. It is unclear whether the appellant has asserted that he attended more than a single meeting. To the extent that the appellant is making that assertion (at one point in oral evidence he suggested that he had attended meetings through Zoom), I reject his evidence. No details of any additional meetings have been provided and the appellant has had every opportunity to provide at least some information. There are no screenshots of the arrangements or links for any such meetings.

49. I accept that the appellant did attend a single meeting in January of this year. It is of some note that, notwithstanding his claimed commitment to political beliefs and support for the Brotherhood of Democracy, he has in fact only attended a single meeting throughout his time in this country.

50. The single meeting in question raises a number of evidential questions. The minutes of the “conference” are somewhat odd in their content. There is no detail about what was actually said at the meeting: what took place is set out in five very short paragraphs, each consisting of a single sentence. The great majority of the minutes consists of a long list of attendees (138 in total). The full names of the attendees are recorded. I have concerns about this. First, given the status of the Brotherhood for Democracy, it is to my mind strange that the full names are recorded: that would appear to create a potential danger for the attendees were the document to be seen by the Vietnamese authorities (I note that a passage in the CPIN suggest that infiltrators are sometimes employed for the purposes of identifying dissidents). Secondly, the appellant told me that all attendees were given a copy of the minutes, whilst at the same time asserting that the minutes were “confidential”, and that participants were “anonymous”. The potential risks entailed by listing of full names and the widespread circulation of the minutes are self-evident. When asked questions about this in cross-examination, the appellant said that attendee’s photographs were not been taken to protect their identity, but that explanation does not answer my concerns. Nor does Ms Masih’s submission that the names were recorded in order for the organisation to know who attended, presumably allowing it to identify any possible infiltrators. Yet, in the absence of any evidence that there was a membership register held in advance of the meeting, it would have been near-impossible to know if any of the 138 attendees was in fact an infiltrator. Thirdly, the appellant’s evidence on how he obtained the minutes and/or in what format, was unsatisfactory. He initially said that he had been given the minutes at the meeting and took a photograph of them. When the minutes themselves were shown to the appellant (as they appear in the bundle) he then said that they had in fact been scanned by a friend and then sent to his solicitors. In addition to the evidence being inconsistent, it represents yet another seemingly reckless disregard for the need for secrecy, given the Vietnamese authorities’ attitude towards the organisation: scanning such a document and sending it through email left open the possibility of, for example, hacking into an email account.

51. Overall, the evidence leads me to form the strong impression that (a) the appellant’s attendance at the meeting was contrived to create a link between him and the organisation, with the added benefit of having his name listed and (b) the minutes themselves were designed to assist in creating risk profiles for one or more of the attendees.

52. Ms Masih sought to counter the suggestion by Mr Pugh that the entire meeting was a contrivance by pointing out that the organisation’s president had put his name to the minutes and that his integrity should not be impugned. I acknowledge the point made, but this leads back to a point I have made earlier, namely the absence of any evidence from the organisation itself in support of the appellant’s case. For example, the president (or someone in his behalf) could have confirmed the minutes and/or provided further information on the procedures which have given rise to my concerns. There is no such evidence. Once again, this leaves me with the appellant’s word alone.

53. Overall, I find that the production and format of the minutes was contrived in order to assist in creating risk profiles and I place very little, if any, weight on it.

54. Even if the meeting and/or the minutes were not of themselves a contrivance, I find that the appellant’s attendance at the meeting and his desire to have his name recorded on the list of attendees was contrived in order to create a risk profile for himself.

55. The appellant has said that he had a further connection with the president of the organisation, through a telephone call. His evidence relating to the arrangements by which this occurred was, to say the least, vague. It was unclear to me how the call was set up. In any event, even if the call took place, it is not reasonably likely that the Vietnamese authorities would have the capacity to monitor that form of communication.

56. The final point concerning the Brotherhood for Democracy relates to the media article referred to previously, which indicated that the Vietnamese authorities were aware of the demonstration in May 2025. The article goes on to say that the authorities had identified “at least 18 participants” in the demonstration as originating from Nghe An Province and that contact had been made with their families, who in turn had “expressed indignation and shame” at their relatives’ behaviour. I note that the appellant comes from Ho Chi Minh City, not Nghe An Province. That does not necessarily mean that the appellant did not attend the event, and I previously found he did, but it does indicate that those to whom material adverse interest was attributed had been specifically identified and that the cohort did not include the appellant. This is consistent with the fact that the appellant has not provided any evidence that his family in Vietnam have been approached by the authorities.

57. I now bring together everything contained in my assessment thus far and make the following findings of fact in relation to the principal controversial issue in this case.

58. It is not reasonably likely that the appellant has been truthful in respect of his claim to hold genuine political beliefs. It is not reasonably likely that he does hold such beliefs. Rather, the appellant has contrived to create a sur place profile which she hopes will permit him to succeed in his appeal.

59. It is not reasonably likely that the appellant is a member or genuine supporter of the Brotherhood for Democracy. His involvement has been limited to the attendance of a single demonstration which was arranged by the organisation. He has never held any form of formal role. He has attended a single meeting.

60. The appellant has no social media presence expressing support for the Brotherhood for Democracy, or indeed any other anti-government issues.

61. The appellant’s attendance at the meeting in January 2026 was contrived in furtherance of the creation of a false political profile.

62. The appellant has attended only two demonstrations in this country: April 2024 and May 2025. He did not play a prominent role in either.

63. On return to Vietnam, the appellant would not wish to express any genuinely-held political beliefs, whether privately or publicly. That is because he does not hold any such beliefs. In light of this, the HJ (Iran) principle does not apply to the appellant in terms of actual political opinion (I will return the question of perceived political opinion, below).

64. That is not an end to the matter, however. I have found that it is reasonably likely that the Vietnamese authorities in this country have a photograph of the appellant attending the two demonstrations. The question is whether, on what is known of the appellant now or at the point of return, he would be at risk notwithstanding the absence of genuinely-held political beliefs. In other words, is it reasonably likely that the Vietnamese authorities will impute a political opinion to him such as to put him at risk of persecution and/or Article 3 ill-treatment?

65. My answer to that question is that the appellant is not reasonably likely to be at risk. I say this for the following reasons.

66. First, I fully acknowledge the status of the Brotherhood for Democracy and the Vietnamese authorities’ significantly adverse view of the organisation.

67. Secondly, as set out above, the appellant does not fall within the cohort of attendees at the May 2025 demonstration which attracted specific scrutiny and resulted in the identification of individuals and their families.

68. Thirdly, despite what I have said about my concerns surrounding the minutes of the meeting in January 2026, it is not reasonably likely that the authorities will already know of the appellant’s attendance, nor is it reasonably likely that they would ever find this out. It would be wholly speculative to suggest that the meeting was infiltrated by agents of the authorities and such a submission has not been put forward on the appellant’s behalf. It is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be questioned about this particular event on return or thereafter.

69. Fourthly, and importantly, section 13 of the CPIN contains the following country information:

13.1.2 ‘Vietnamese people living abroad who have an established record of criticising the party and government, particularly those who are prominent in the diaspora, have high-profile affiliations with dissident diaspora groups and/or have large online followings and networks in Vietnam, are likely to be known to, and have their activities monitored by, Vietnamese authorities. This may occur online and through party sympathisers and informants within the diaspora. Vietnamese people living abroad with a lower profile, including people attending public protests or expressing anti-government views, including online, are likely to be of significantly less interest, and their activities may not necessarily be known to the authorities.

‘Vietnamese people living abroad may also have their social media monitored, particularly people of high profile who are critical of the party and government, such as: people who hold leadership positions and have influence in the diaspora; have known affiliations with dissident diaspora groups; organise public protests against the party or government; and/or have large online followings and networks in Vietnam. Vietnamese people living abroad with a lower profile, including people attending public protests or expressing antigovernment views, including online, are likely to be of significantly less interest.”
[Underlining added]

70. This evidence provides a clear indication that despite their animosity towards dissent and their surveillance capabilities, the authorities do operate a filter as to who is and is not of sufficient interest to warrant adverse attention/action. On my on my findings, the appellant clearly falls within those with a “lower profile”. Indeed, his profile is, at most, minimal.

71. Fifthly, there is no countervailing evidence to which I have been referred which would indicate that any and all returnees identified as having attended a demonstration in the United Kingdom will be at risk.

72. Sixthly, I have considered whether the mere fact of his attendance at an event organised by the Brotherhood for Democracy would of itself create a risk. I conclude that it would not. In light of my findings, it is not reasonably likely that the Vietnamese authorities would regard the appellant as being affiliated with that organisation in the sense that he was an active member, committed supporter, or a person of any other description which might otherwise excite sufficient adverse interest. The country information to which I have been referred does not indicate that anyone seen to have even the thinnest of connections to the organisation is reasonably likely to be at risk.

73. Seventhly, the appellant can, if questioned, truthfully say that he does not hold genuine political beliefs.

74. Eighthly, the appellant has no pre-existing adverse profile in respect of any activities carried out whilst in Vietnam.

75. All-told, whilst there may be a risk that the authorities could perceive the appellant as having criticised the government abroad, impute a political opinion to him and ill-treatment him on return, I conclude that such a risk is not reasonably likely (even applying a notional 10% threshold) and it is not reasonably likely that the Vietnamese authorities will in fact regard the appellant as anything other than an opportunist, or, put more colloquially, a “hanger on”.

76. It follows from the above that the appellant’s appeal falls to be dismissed.

Anonymity
77. I maintain the existing anonymity direction on the basis that this is an international protection case and remains pending.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision has been set aside.
The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is dismissed on protection grounds.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 31 March 2026