Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005363

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54749/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

NA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood of the Immigration Advice Service.
For the Respondent: Mrs Arif, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 19 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq born in 1983 who, on 28 October 2019, claimed asylum. His claim was refused by the Secretary of State in a decision dated 24 July 2023.
2. The Appellant’s appeal against the refusal was dismissed by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal against which the Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal. Permission to appeal was granted and the error of law hearing conducted by a Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge at a hearing held remotely at Field House on 17 February 2025.
3. At [44 - 45] of his determination the Deputy Judge found:
44. I therefore find that the Judge gave insufficient reasons for concluding that the Appellant does not face a real risk on return to the KRI on the basis of his accepted ongoing opposition to the current KRI authorities including his political dissent on Facebook. This error, which I find is material, also impacts upon the assessment of the Appellant’s likely behaviour on return to Iraq applying HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2010] UKSC 31.
4. The Deputy Judge also preserved the findings of the First-tier Tribunal set out at [18], [27], [23 -24], and [22] of the earlier determination in which it was found:
18. In light of the above adverse findings, I do not therefore find that the appellant was previously detained or had come to the adverse attention of the authorities in the IKR. In the alternative, I find that at its highest, the account put forward by the appellant shows that over a six-year period between 2009–2015, he was briefly detained for two short periods before being released. The authorities did not see him as someone of high profile, or a person of significant interest and that is why he was released.
22. Looking at the evidence and the round, I am prepared to make a finding that, at its highest, the appellant’s in-laws may have been unhappy that their daughter entered the acting profession and that this may have caused tension and strain in the marriage and in his relations with his in-laws. However, I find that the appellant has essentially manufactured a protection claim around this potential source of strain and tension within his marriage by creating a fictitious account of his father-in-law being a powerful individual with links to the PUK, of serious incidents of threats and intimidation involving firearms and of him being unable to seek redress from the authorities, or relocate elsewhere in the IKR. These aspects of the appellant’s account I reject in their entirety and as such, I find that there is no merit to this ground either.
23. The appellant states at paragraph 14 of his statement (page 39 of the stitched bundle) that whilst he has been in the United Kingdom that he has had contact with his father and brother in Iraq. At paragraph 28, he states that his CSID was left in Iraq. Furthermore, that his parents have confirmed that it is not within their possession and that his house is currently under the control of his father-in-law and therefore he does not have access to his CSID.
24. Firstly, I have already made adverse findings regarding the alleged power and reach of the appellant’s father-in-law. I do not accept that he is a powerful figure within the IKR and that he currently has control over access/entry to the appellant’s home in the IKR. Therefore, I find that he can obtain access to his CSID card within the IKR. Secondly, even if he has misplaced this document, I find that there is nothing preventing the appellant seeking the assistance of his family in Iraq in obtaining any replacement identification documentation. The appellant himself accepted in his most recent statement that he continues to have contact with his father and brother. I find that there is no merit to this particular ground.
27. In the appellant’s favour, I note that the respondent has conceded that the appellant was a member of the Goran party within the IKR for some years and that he attended a number of demonstrations. In his submissions, Mr Wood argued that this was cogent evidence of the appellant’s convictions being genuine and sincere and that he would want to continue with his criticism of the IKR authorities upon return to Iraq, but would be at real risk of adverse attention if he were to do so. On the evidence before me, I make the following key findings: (i) The appellant was a member of the Goran party between 2009–2015. (ii) During his membership of the Goran party the appellant did not hold any position of authority within the party. (iii) The appellant did attend several demonstrations within the IKR, protesting on a range of issues. (iv) The appellant also opened up a personal Facebook account within the IKR, which he would use as a forum to criticise the ruling authorities in the IKR. (v) The appellant did not receive ill-treatment or come to the adverse attention of the authorities whilst living in Iraq due to his political activism (in the alternative, taking his case at its highest, he was briefly detained on two occasions before being released because he was of no significant interest to the authorities). (vi) Since coming to the United Kingdom the appellant has continued to operate his Facebook account, criticising the IKR authorities and has attended at least one demonstration. (vii) The appellant can be described as a low-level political activist, who has challenged and criticised various policies of the ruling parties within the IKR and was once aligned with the Goran party (one of the minor parties in the IKR). (viii) Since leaving the Goran party in 2015, he has continued to be critical of the ruling authorities.
5. I also note the finding of the First-tier Tribunal at [28] in which the Judge accepted one of the key submissions made by Mr Wood, namely that given the Appellant’s track record and involvement in political activism he would want to continue to be politically active on return to the IKR.
6. The key issue requiring further consideration is, therefore, whether the Appellant has a sufficient profile to give rise to adverse interest from the authorities in the IKR and/or whether if he chose not to express his accepted political beliefs on return to Iraqi he would do so to avoid a real risk of persecution, which will infringe the HJ (Iran) principle, which will entitle him to a grant of international protection – see HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2010] UKSC 31.
Discussion and analysis
7. The Appellant was cross-examined by Mrs Arif and was asked about the demonstrations that he had attended which he confirmed were only in Birmingham. When he was asked why he had not attended others which had been organised for example in Manchester or London, he claimed he did not have a car and could not afford to travel. When asked whether he was saying that if he could have afforded it, he would have attended all demonstrations the Appellant claimed that that is what he believed.
8. The Appellant confirmed he had not experienced any problems due to his activities in the UK. He was also asked about an ID card that he produced in the bundle which he stated he had obtained when he went to a meeting at which they spoke of the views of the group concerned, after which he became a member. The Appellant confirmed he supports the ideology of the establishment and that they support each other and that he sometimes goes online.
9. The membership card, at page 5 of the Applicants Upper Tribunal bundle, is described as a Volunteer Member ID Card for the Regay Azadi organisation.
10. There are a number of articles on the website of this organisation criticising the PUK and KDP Armed Forces, questioning whether they are soldiers of the nation or defenders of the party, and also an article on the alleged lack of freedom and rule of law in the Kurdistan region and Iraq dated 24 April 2025.
11. It is said the organisation was originally founded by 12 individuals on 10 March 2025 who voluntarily came together with a shared commitment to justice, human rights, and democratic reform. It is a not-for-profit company registered in United Kingdom with the names of the 12 founding members shown on the website. The Appellant is not named as a founding member.
12. The organisation states that although political in nature the Committee is not a political party, does not participate in elections and does not support or affiliate with any political group either in Iraq, Kurdistan, nor in the UK. It is claimed that its activities centre on peaceful protest, documentation, raising awareness, advocacy, and the defence of civil and political rights through legal and peaceful means.
13. The organisation’s codes reflect it is a member-based voluntary organisation which is said to be composed of committed individuals who work collectively and voluntarily to achieve its mission by activities including community organising, support for the Kurdish and Iraqi diaspora, training and education, and international networking, all guided by democratic values and human rights principles with no financial or political affiliation.
14. I do not find it made out therefore that the Appellant’s membership of this group will cause any real risk to him on return to Iraq. It is clearly a non-affiliated UK based organisation with nothing to suggest that it is of adverse interest to the authorities within the Kurdish region of Iraq.
15. In relation to the Gorran party, the Movement the Change Party, also known as the Gorran or Goran, which means “change” in Kurdish is a political party in Iraqi Kurdistan. It was formed in 2009 by a former PUK member to challenge alleged allegations of corruption and nepotism of the two ruling parties, the KDP and PUK.
16. At one point Goran was the second major party in Iraqi Kurdistan, having secured 25 seats in an election in 2009 whilst PUK only won 18 seats. In Sulaymaniyah the Gorran when a majority of 51% of the votes in the 2009 elections.
17. Publications show that the party has suffered a steep decline in popularity for various reasons including its alliances with the KDP and PUK. In 2021 Parliamentary elections the party failed to secure a single seat and in 2024, 10 days before the Kurdistan regional October parliamentary elections the party withdrew from the Kurdish Regional Government and local administrations, indicating a significant loss of influence. The Appellant resigned from the party in 2015.
18. On behalf of the Appellant Mr Wood submitted the starting point of the positive findings of the First-tier Tribunal at [27]. In that paragraph the First-tier Tribunal judge wrote:
27. In the appellant’s favour, I note that the respondent has conceded that the appellant was a member of the Goran party within the IKR for some years and that he attended a number of demonstrations. In his submissions, Mr Wood argued that this was cogent evidence of the appellant’s convictions being genuine and sincere and that he would want to continue with his criticism of the IKR authorities upon return to Iraq, but would be at real risk of adverse attention if he were to do so. On the evidence before me, I make the following key findings:
(i) The appellant was a member of the Goran party between 2009–2015.
(ii) During his membership of the Goran party the appellant did not hold any position of authority within the party.
(iii) The appellant did attend several demonstrations within the IKR, protesting on a range of issues.
(iv) The appellant also opened up a personal Facebook account within the IKR, which he would use as a forum to criticise the ruling authorities in the IKR.
(v) The appellant did not receive ill-treatment or come to the adverse attention of the authorities whilst living in Iraq due to his political activism (in the alternative, taking his case at its highest, he was briefly detained on two occasions before being released because he was of no significant interest to the authorities).
(vi) Since coming to the United Kingdom the appellant has continued to operate his Facebook account, criticising the IKR authorities and has attended at least one demonstration.
(vii) The appellant can be described as a low-level political activist, who has challenged and criticised various policies of the ruling parties within the IKR and was once aligned with the Goran party (one of the minor parties in the IKR).
(viii) Since leaving the Goran party in 2015, he has continued to be critical of the ruling authorities.

19. Mr Wood submitted to the authorities in the IKR would know of the Appellant’s Facebook activities and it should be accepted he has attended a number of demonstrations. It was submitted to Appellant had expressed an opinion and that he would continue his activities on return to the UK which would bring him to the adverse attention of the ruling parties. It was submitted that would lead to his arrest and sentence sufficient to amount to persecution as the Kurdish authorities manage online communications as a result of their sophisticated surveillance abilities.
20. On behalf of the Secretary of State Mrs Arif relied upon the reasons for refusal letter dated 31 July 2023 and Secretary of State’s review dated 18 February 2024 and the findings at [18] and those in relation to availability of documentation.
21. At [18] the First-tier Tribunal found:
18. In light of the above adverse findings, I do not therefore find that the appellant was previously detained or had come to the adverse attention of the authorities in the IKR. In the alternative, I find that at its highest, the account put forward by the appellant shows that over a six-year period between 2009–2015, he was briefly detained for two short periods before being released. The authorities did not see him as someone of high profile, or a person of significant interest and that is why he was released.
22. In relation to the question of whether the Appellant is at risk on return face of his political opinions expressed demonstration in the IKR, UK or online, the Secretary of State’s position in the review of 19 June 2024 reads:
24. The grounds of the RFRL are maintained. The R relies on the RFRL (RB, RFRL page 7).
25. It is noted that the A claims to have left Iraq on 15 th October 2019 (AB: 3, para 16) and submitted a claim for protection on 28 th October 2019. However, the A has claimed to have attended a protest in the UK until 17 th February 2024, six months after the date of the RFRL. The A is pictured holding a sign in some of these pictures. The R notes that the A has not provided any evidence that these pictures have been posted on social media. The A’s explanations as to why he has not attended any demonstrations in the UK prior to this date (AB: 4, para 27), have not been accepted. Therefore, it is concluded by the R that his Sur Place activities are an attempt at bolstering his asylum claim and delaying the deportation process. There is also no evidence that the Iraqi authorities would be aware of the A’s low-level political activism in the UK.
26. The R acknowledges the pictures labelled as showing the A at a demonstration in Birmingham on 17 th February 2024 (AB 6-9). The R also acknowledges the photographs labelled as showing the A at several protests in Iraq, one of which is stated to be on behalf of teachers and another labelled as being on 27th September 2016) (AB: 10-15. The R notes that no protest signs are visible in these pictures and that the A is not pictured holding any signs or banners.
27. Even if it is accepted that the A wishes attend public demonstrations against the Kurdish authorities in the IKR, which it is not, country information shows that such low-level activity will not put him at risk. The Iraq - CPIN - V2.0 - Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) - June 2021. Section 2.4.8 shows that in general a person will not be at risk on the basis of low-level activity in the IKR.
28. The R also acknowledges the Facebook screenshots provided by the A (AB 16-19, however, these are untranslated and the R further notes that the posts appear to be shared only with friends and are not public. The A also provided Facebook screenshots which are in the RB (RB 79 - 86). Again the R notes that the majority of these posts are set to share with friends only and are not public. Furthermore, some of the posts date back to 2011, 2015 and 2016, before the A left Iraq and it is noted by the R that the A has not claimed to have come to any adverse attention of the authorities due to these posts whilst he remained in Iraq.
29. In his AWS, the A claims to have supported the Goran party and been a member between 2009 and 4th November 2015 (AB: 2, para 5). He claims to have been arrested in 2009 after attending a demonstration against the PUK and the KDP (AB:2, para 6). He does not claim to have been arrested after this date which was at least fourteen years ago. The A also claims that on one occasion in 2015 or 2016 he was detained at border control for five hours and refused entry into Erbil (AB: 2, para 7). However, this is inconsistent with his earlier answers in his AIR that he had never been accused of an offence for which he had been or could have been convicted (RB: 125, qn 12) and that he had never been detained (RB:125, qn 13).
30. The R therefore maintains that the A has not demonstrated that he had or has a profile sufficient to have come to adverse attention from the authorities in Iraq. There is no evidence to demonstrate that the authorities are aware of the A’s Facebook account or that they are aware of his attendance at any protests.
23. Mrs Arif submitted, therefore, that the Appellant would face no risk on return as a result of his sur place activities.
24. Mrs Arif also raised an evidential point during the course of her submissions on the basis that although the Appellant had provided copies of his Facebook account in his bundle the purported translations into English did not appear to be official translations.
25. Official translations are crucial in court proceedings to ensure fairness, understanding, and the proper application of relevant legal standards. The minimum requirement is a certified translation verified as accurate by a qualified translator to ensure that the version provided in the English language is reliable for court or tribunal use. As the documents provided do not have a certified translation verifying their accuracy, I accept Mrs Arif’s submission that is relevant to the weight that may be placed upon the same. As what is being purportedly translated is not supported by other evidence on which weight may be placed, I find that little weight may be placed upon documents that have not been officially translated.
26. Both parties referred to the country material in the Country policy and information note: opposition to the government in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI), Iraq, July 2023 (‘the CPIN’)
27. In section 3 entitled “Risk” at 3.1.1 – 3.1.2 it is written:
3.1.1 CPIT was unable to find any evidence that substantiates a generalised real risk of mistreatment or risk relating to the support, membership or any activity on behalf of an individual political party in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in the sources consulted. If there was such a risk, it is reasonable to consider it would be reported on and there would be information available. Based on the available evidence, it is concluded that any risk regarding political activity in the KRI is centred around protesting against the KRG more generally, rather than as a result of being a supporter, member or carrying out activities on behalf of a specific political party.
3.1.2 The evidence is not such that a person will be at real risk of serious harm or persecution simply by being an opponent of or having played a low-level part in protests against the KRG. Despite evidence that opponents of the KRG have been arrested, detained, assaulted and even killed by the Kurdistan authorities, there is no evidence to suggest that such mistreatment is systematic. The instances of mistreatment are small in relation to the vast numbers who attended the protests. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the KRG have the capability, nor the inclination, to target individuals who were involved in the protests at a low level. As such, in general, a person will not be at risk of serious harm or persecution on the basis of political activity within the KRI. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. Decision makers must consider each case on its merits.
28. At [3.1.3], relied upon by Mr Wood, the report states:
3.1.3 However, available evidence does indicate that the following groups of people may be at higher risk of arrest, detention, assault, excessive use of force and extrajudicial killing by the KRG authorities:
• Individuals with higher profiles: Those who have a prominent public presence, who are actively involved in or have previous history of organising or participating in protests and demonstrations.
• Journalists: Those who are seen to be criticising government officials or engage in critical reporting on controversial political or other sensitive issues, for example protests and demonstrations, corruption, abuse of authority etc.
29. The submission that because the Appellant had participated in demonstrations in the UK he fell into a risk category identified in this section is not, on the evidence, accepted as an accurate representation of either the Appellant’s profile or what is said in this section of the evidence. The reference to those with a previous history of organising or participating in protests and demonstrations falls within the definition of individuals with higher profiles. There is nothing in the evidence to warrant a finding that the Appellant is a person who will be identified as having a higher profile by the KRG authorities even though he has attended demonstrations.
30. At section 3.1.4 is reference to evidence that indicates journalists who are covering protests were targeted with excessive force and had equipment seized, damaged or destroyed, with arrests, but it is not made out the Appellant will fall within such a identified group, as per the definition at 3.1.3 above. The Appellant does not pose a threat to the ruling parties in the IKR on the facts.
31. Mr Wood also relied on various paragraphs of section 14 of the document.
32. In relation to Section 14.1.14, he referred to arrests that relate to an article published in January 2021 by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights which stated that in Sulamaniyah Governorate many activists were arrested but all were released after a short period. More than 50 activists were arrested in Dohuk Governorate, and dozens were arrested in Erbil Governorate during the past three months. The article stated a number of them had been released at various times but some of them were still in prisons run by the internal security services, and journalists who covered the protests were targeted with excessive force and a number of them arrested.
33. It is accepted that there were demonstrations in these region which began on 5 December 2021 by employees and teachers in Sulamaniyah, who demanded payment of back wages and financial dues that they had not received for many years, which gained in size due to poor living conditions for citizens, deteriorating public services, rampant financial and administrative corruption, lack of transparency in oil revenues, and ambiguity of contracts made with foreign oil companies.
34. The country material speaks of heavy-handed actions by the security forces who attacked the demonstrators most of whom were activists and young demonstrators which does not fit the profile of the Appellant in this appeal.
35. It was submitted by Mr Wood that the Appellant will face a real risk in any event, in support of which he made reference to section 14.1.16, in which it is written:
14.1.16 On 30 March 2021 the United States Department of State (USSD) published its annual report on human rights practices in Iraq, covering events in 2020. The report stated:
‘KRG security forces detained at least 50 protesters, activists, and journalists in late August in the towns of Zakho and Duhok. Many observers called the detentions arbitrary, either because persons were detained for exercising their right to peaceful assembly, or because authorities ignored their right under law to be brought before a judge within 24 hours.
‘Central government and KRG forces arrested and detained protesters and activists critical of the central government and of the KRG, respectively, according to statements by government officials, NGO representatives, and press reports.’
36. Again, it is acknowledged that such activities have been undertaken, but this article covers events that occurred in 2020 which appears to be a further reference to the strike by the teachers and others discussed above.
37. One effect of the 2020 events is that although the Kurdish region of Iraq was considered a safer place for online activists that was no longer the case. At Section 14.1.18 is reference to a more up-to-date report where it is written:
14.1.18 The EUAA report published in June 2022 stated:
‘KRI was considered a safer place for online activists for many years, however that was no longer the case due to crackdowns on journalists and media in September 2020.
‘Online activists were being harassed and intimidated online. There were also cases where they were physically hurt, even killed, by state and non-state actors because of content they would post online. Courts in the KRI ruled in some cases against attempts to penalize activists for the content they posted online, however those who targeted them were very rarely punished. It has also been reported that, in December 2020, the KRI authorities arrested many young men because they were calling for protests in posts on social media.
‘Most of the incidents targeting activists were related to the attempts by the authorities to prevent media coverage of the protests and were recorded between March and August 2020. In the KRI, the targeting of civil society activists has been reported to intensify since August 2020. As reported in October 2021, 55 out of 81 activists arrested by the KRI authorities in the period between August and October 2020 remained in detention, with only five activists being brought to trial. Most activists were arrested under the charges of “undermining the security and stability of the region” which is punishable by life imprisonment under Article 1 of Law No. 21 of 2003.
‘Human rights activists were reported to have faced arrests by the KRI authorities. Activists criticizing [the] social and economic situation were arrested and tried on defamation charges.’[footnote 78]
14.1.19 On 20 March 2023 the USSD published its annual report on human rights practices in Iraq, covering events in 2022. The report stated:
‘As of December, NGOs reported six of the so-called “Badinan” detainees – referring to the area in Duhok Province where Asayish forces and KDP intelligence service Parastin officers arrested dozens of activists, journalists, and protesters in 2020 – remained in prison. In December the Erbil Criminal Court ordered the release of five activists from Shiladze after they served their full two-year sentences for “undermining the national security” of the IKR. The activists had been arrested in 2020 while protesting Turkish military attacks inside the IKR, and the court had denied their request for conditional release in August. In July media reported 52 journalists and activist detainees, including some of the Badinan detainees, went on hunger strike to protest what they called the KRG’s “manipulation of their legal right to conditional release.” The hunger strike ended in September.’[footnote 79]
14.1.20 On 28 March 2023 AI published its annual report on human rights practices across the world, covering events in 2022. The section on Iraq stated:
‘Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) security forces continued to repress the right to freedom of expression and assembly. KRG security forces arbitrarily arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned journalists, activists and perceived critics. Two journalists and three political activists, detained since August 2020 and convicted in February 2021 on national security-related charges, went on three hunger strikes during 2022 in protest at their continued detention, despite a decree issued in February by the KRG president Nechirvan Barzani to reduce their sentence from five to two years.
‘On 6 August, KRG security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse peaceful protests in the cities of Erbil and Sulaimaniya in the KR-I against delayed payment of government wages and lack of employment opportunities, resulting in several injuries. Asayish forces, the KRG’s primary security and intelligence agency, briefly detained at least 20 journalists in connection with protest coverage. The New Generation Party, an opposition party that called for protests, reported that Asayish forces arrested dozens of its members at their homes or during the protests in Erbil and Sulaimaniya. After several days in detention, they were released on bail without being informed of any charges.
‘In September, Asayish forces arrested a journalist working for a media outlet aligned with the opposition during his coverage of a Turkish drone attack targeting PKK fighters in Erbil governorate. He was released the next day without charge after signing a pledge to no longer cover similar incidents. In October, Asayish forces arrested two journalists near Erbil under the vaguely worded 2008 Law to Combat the Misuse of Electronic Devices, used in the past to prosecute individuals for posting content deemed critical of officials. They were released by the end of the month.’
38. Mr Wood referred to a document from the United Nations High Commissioner the Refugees (UNHCR) entitled “International Protection Considerations with regards to people fleeing Iraq – Update 1 [Risk Profiles -Individuals Opposing, or Perceived to Be Opposing, the Government, ISF or KRG], 30 January 2024.
39. The view of the UNHCR is that individuals who fall in one or more of the risk profiles identified in that report may be in need of international refugee protection, depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Whether a person is so entitled is therefore a fact specific question requiring an assessment of the evidence as a whole. I find this means the submission by Mr Wood that the Appellant is at risk as a result of the way he has acted in the past, is not on its own sufficient, especially as it is a preserved finding that in the past he has faced no credible risk.
40. The risk profiles identified by the UNHCR are said to include individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the government, influential officials or politicians, or the ISF, including PMF factions offering outside state control.
41. The article refers to those being targeted including a number of partially overlapping profiles, such as journalists and other media professionals, civil society activists, human rights defenders, political analysts and protesters.
42. In relation to protesters, the UNHCR report refers to a Human Rights Watch report for 2024 in which it is written:
"Violent repression of protesters and arrests of journalists covering protests continued in 2023"; HRW, World Report 2024: Iraq, 11 January 2024, www.ecoi.net/en/document/2103133.html.
Occasional protests over corruption, unemployment, and lack of public services continued after the end of the Tishreen protests, mostly at the local level, and have at times been met with excessive force by the ISF, including physical attacks, arrests and the use of live ammunition. For example, on 6 December 2022, in Nasiriyah (Thi-Qar), the ISF reportedly used live ammunition to disperse a protest against the sentencing of activist Haider al-Zaidi to three years imprisonment over a tweet in which he allegedly criticized the PMF. At least two protestors were reportedly killed and 17 wounded; AP, 2 Killed in Iraq Protest over Activist's Prison Sentence, 7 December 2022, https://bit.ly/3iR9PCy. "In typical fashion the Iraq Security Forces responded by not bringing the police responsible for the three deaths to justice but rather arrested a number of people including a few businessmen they accused of inciting the demonstrations"; Musings on Iraq, Activist Imprisoned over Tweet Leads to Deadly Protests in Iraq, 13 December 2022, https://bit.ly/3J90DVo. See also, CIVICUS, Reports and Monitoring Missions Document Extreme Repression and Violence Against Activists, 18 August 2022, https://bit.ly/3VKE9h0; NINA, Civilian Shot Down During Protests in Nasiriyah, 27 July 2022, https://bit.ly/3JiiCXr; GCHR, Iraq: GCHR's 23rd Periodic Report on Human Rights Violations in Iraq, 24 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3fWQiz1; and Section II.A.1.a.
43. The reference is not specific to the IKR and appears to relate to Iraq as a whole, as evidenced by the reference to the Popular Mobilisation Force.
44. The article also refers to individuals being singled out solely on account of their political views expressed on social media and the reintroduction of two controversial security laws in the Kurdish region.
45. In relation to individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the KRG, or those affiliated with the KRG, the author of the report writes:
Individuals who criticize or are perceived to criticize the KRG authorities, the dominant ruling parties, or others with political influence in the KR-I, or who allege government abuse or corruption in the KR-I, are reported to be targeted by the authorities, influential government and party officials and party-affiliated security forces. [854] Those falling under this profile are reported to include in particular journalists and other media professionals, [855] members of rival or opposition political parties, [856] civil society activists, [857] religious figures [858] and protestors, [859] the profiles of whom may overlap. Forms of targeting include intimidation, harassment, physical assault, arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention, [860] as well as politically motivated criminal prosecution (e.g., on charges of espionage and undermining national security). [861] The authorities have also targeted for harassment, arrest and prosecution individuals who have posted criticism of the local or regional authorities on social media. [862] Such repressive measures have reportedly created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. [863] Attacks on persons of this profile are rarely investigated and are largely committed with impunity. [864]
According to reports, family members of real or perceived KRG critics as well as their lawyers have, at times, also been subjected to harassment, intimidation and arrest by KRG authorities or unknown actors. [865] UNHCR considers that, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the KRG authorities, the dominant ruling parties or others with political influence in the KR-I are likely in need of international refugee protection on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the State for reasons of their political opinion or imputed political opinion, and/or other relevant Convention grounds.
Depending on the particular circumstances of the case, family members of individuals of this profile as well as lawyers representing these individuals may be in need of international refugee protection on the basis of their association with individuals at risk.
46. The material, again, reinforces the need for a fact specific analysis.
47. Although there are problems presented by failure to ensure that all the Appellant’s evidence is admissible, that does not affect the photographs or other visual evidence provided. It is only the text that cannot have weight placed upon it as it has not been properly translated.
48. The Secretary of State accepts that the pictures are labelled as showing the Appellant to the demonstration in Birmingham on 17 February 2024 and also claims that they are labelled as showing the Appellant at several protests in Iraq, one of which is stated to be on behalf of teachers and another labelled as being on 27 September 2016, although the Appellant was not pictured holding any signs or banners, and the weight to be given to that material has to be considered in light of the preserved findings of fact. The country material also refers to large numbers attending such protests and that just being there does not, on its own, give rise to a real risk.
49. The Appellant’s claim in his asylum interview, to have been arrested after attending a demonstration against the PUK and KDP, has been found to lack credibility.
50. The starting point is, therefore, that the Appellant has no adverse profile that will bring him to the attention of the authorities in Iraq on return.
51. Whilst the photographic evidence provided as part of the Appellant’s Facebook shows him holding a sign in some of the pictures it is not made out on the evidence that they will have come to the attention of the authorities in Iraq, or will be sufficient to create any real risk for him on return. The Secretary of State in her review refers to the fact that the privacy setting only permits friends to view the Facebook entries with insufficient evidence to establish a general setting.
52. In his original witness statement dated 3 April 2024 the Appellant refers to joining the Goran party in 2009 but that he resigned from the party on 4 November 2015 and since he arrived in the UK has not been involved with the party.
53. The Appellant refers to demonstrations in Iraqi in 2009 in which he claims he was arrested, and claims that his father-in-law and his family are traditional and religious and through them have influence in the PUK party. But such claims have been found to be lies.
54. The Appellant in his witness statement claims to have demonstrated against the PUK and KDP in Iraqi, the UK and on Facebook, which the Respondent in the refusal letter and review describes an opportunistic action to bolster his weak asylum claim.
55. Whilst it is accepted the Appellant has had some involvement with groups, has attended demonstrations in the UK, and posted material on Facebook, it is not made out, when one looks at UNHCR document and the CPIN country evidence as a whole, that the Appellant has discharged the burden of proof upon him to the required standard to show that he has an adverse profile that will bring him to the attention of the authorities in Iraq sufficient to give rise to a real risk of harm or persecution warranting a grant of international protection.
56. It is clear that some may be harmed at demonstrations but not all are killed or arrested. Country material makes it clear that the key question is whether the profile of the individual concerned or their actions will place them in a category where they face a real risk.
57. I do not find the Appellant’s low-level activities and low-level profile mean he does fall within any of the identified risk categories. He has not established his claim on this basis on the evidence.
58. In relation to the HJ (Iran) point, it is not made out that a person with the Appellant’s profile is not able to express their view in the Kurdish area of Iraq, or that they would need to act discreetly to avoid persecution. The key question is, again, the profile of the individual concerned and how they will be perceived in the eyes of any potential persecutor.
59. It is not made out on the facts that the Appellant will fall into this risk category even applying the lower standard of proof for the reason stated above. Although findings have been made about the Appellant’s views, it is not made out that he will have to act discreetly to avoid being persecuted if he did not do so.
Notice of Decision
60. Appeal dismissed.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 May 2025