Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005379
UI-2024-005667

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00084/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

PIERRE DAMIEN BERSIER
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hawkins of Counsel, instructed by MSR Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr McVitie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 3 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) dated 18 October 2024 to dismiss his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim made in the context of deportation proceedings.

2. The appellant was notified on 8 July 2023 of a stage 1 decision of liability for deportation, having been convicted of possession of class A drugs with intent to supply and having been sentenced on 17 May 2023 to 28 months’ imprisonment.

3. The appellant responded on 19 July and 16 August 2023, and the human rights claim made therein was refused by the respondent on 20 December 2023. The appellant had relied on a private and family life in the United Kingdom, in particular a relationship with his partner and their child (both British), his length of residence in and ties to the United Kingdom, and his lack of any proper ties with Switzerland.

4. The appellant appealed against that decision on 9 January 2024, and the matter came before the judge on 8 October 2024. In dismissing the appeal, the judge found that the appellant was not socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom (on p11 at [28]), that he faced no very significant obstacles to reintegration (on p12 at [34]), that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported without his partner and child or for them to leave the United Kingdom with him (on p15 at [51]) and that there were no very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s deportation (on p16 at [59]).

The Grounds of Appeal

5. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on three of four pleaded grounds (grounds 1, 3 and 4). However, permission was granted also for ground 2 by Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi on 15 May 2025. The grounds are in short as follows. The judge was wrong to conclude that the appellant was not socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdon and, in any event, restricted himself to a review of the respondent’s conclusions on the point. The judge was also wrong in his approach to assessing very significant obstacles to reintegration. Consequentially, it was not open to the judge to conclude that deportation would not be unduly harsh on the appellant’s partner and child. By reason of the aforesaid errors, the judge undertook an incorrect or inadequate proportionality assessment.

6. In her rule 24 response, the respondent submitted that it was clear from reading the decision as a whole that the judge had not limited himself to reviewing the respondent’s decision but had considered the substantive issues for himself. The remaining grounds amounted to mere disagreement with permissible conclusions.

Submissions

7. The representatives each made oral submissions. Whilst I briefly summarise the submissions below for ease of reference, I took them into account in their entirety notwithstanding omission in that summary of any particular aspect of the submissions.

8. Mr Hawkins submitted that a number of matters were not taken into account when assessing the appellant’s social and cultural integration, as detailed in paragraph 3 of the grounds o appeal. He did not in any event accept that the judge had gone further than merely considering whether the respondent had reached a decision legitimately open to her. There was no analysis of the effects on the appellant of having not lived in Switzerland since the age of 3. There was no rational basis for the judge to conclude that the appellant would be an ‘insider’ in Switzerland. If the judge’s findings on very significant obstacles were unsafe then his findings on undue harshness of the partner and child going with the appellant to Switzerland must necessarily also be unsafe. He relied on the grounds of appeal in their entirety.

9. Mr McVitie accepted that the judge’s phrasing at [28] on p11 was unfortunate; however, it was clear from the preceding analysis that the judge had considered the substantive issue for himself. There was no proper basis to suggest that the judge had left any material matter out of account. Even if it could be argued that the judge had failed to take into account the appellant's GCSE results and his regional accent as signs of integration, they were trivial compared to the matters expressly taken into account. The judge reached a rational conclusion on social and cultural integration. Switzerland was one of the richest and safest countries in the world. There was no evidence that the appellant lacked the ability to reintegrate (including learning another language, if necessary). The judge applied the correct test and gave sufficient reasons for a permissible conclusion. There was no evidence that the appellant’s partner would be unable also to learn a language if necessary and integrate with the appellant’s assistance. ‘Very compelling circumstances’ was an exceptionally high test, and there were no grounds to find that the judge had misapplied it.

10. In reply, Mr Hawkins disputed that evidence of education was immaterial to the assessment of integration. He also emphasised the fact that the appellant had not previously been in prison. The cases relied upon by the judge concerned individuals with much worse records than the appellant. He drew attention to background evidence before the judge of the languages the appellant would be required to but did not speak.

Consideration

Ground 1

11. The appellant sets out at paragraph 3 of his grounds a number of matters he says the judge failed to take into account. When pressed, Mr Hawkins accepted that many had been expressly referenced in the judge’s decision but identified two subparagraphs that he said contained matters that were not: 3(ii) and 3(iii). It is fair to say that the judge identifies at [28] a number of specific matters leading him to find that the respondent was entitled to conclude that the appellant was not socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom. However, that is not in itself a basis to find that the judge left out of account matters not expressly identified in the paragraph, merely that the judge concluded that the factors identified tipped the balance of probabilities away from the appellant.

12. As it is, the judge gives detailed consideration to the appellant’s evidence on pp 3-5 at [11] to [22] and Mr Hawkins’s submissions on his behalf on p6 at [30] to [33]. Moreover, he makes clear on p6 at [25] (where the paragraph numbering goes awry for the first of a number of occasions) that he has taken all of the oral and written evidence and all of the submissions into account. There is no sustainable basis to conclude that the judge did not then do so.

13. Furthermore, dealing with those paragraphs containing matters it is said the judge does not expressly refer to:

a. In respect of paragraph 3(ii) of the grounds, the judge expressly notes the year in which the appellant and his parents settled in the United Kingdom (p3 at [12]) and the fact (to the extent that it is remotely relevant) that they now live in France (p5 at [22]). He remarks on the appellant’s education and work experience (p3 at [12]) and goes into some considerable detail of those matters within his analysis (pp9-10 at [42]).

b. As for paragraph 3(iii), the judge expressly details the appellant’s offending history on pp1-2 at [3].

14. Of greater concern is the way that the judge phrased himself on p11 at [28] when he said, ‘I find the respondent was entitled to conclude that the appellant is not socially and culturally integrated…’ Mr Hawkins submits that this shows that the judge limited himself to a review of the respondent’s decision, thereby failing to consider the test for himself. However, the judge directs himself at p8 at [34] to the correct test he should apply, having noted at [33] that the appellant could argue that that test applies. It is clear from those paragraphs that the judge understood he had to assess whether the test in question was satisfied.

15. Moreover, it is not argued that the same apparent error was made by the judge when assessing very significant obstacles to reintegration (another limb of the same exception to deportation). It is vanishingly unlikely that the judge undertook a full merits assessment of one limb of the exception but merely a review of the respondent’s conclusion on another limb of the same exception.

16. In any event, it is clear from p9 at [41] that the judge was undertaking a holistic assessment of the appellant’s behaviour whilst in the United Kingdom and from p10 at [44], [25], [26] and so on that the judge was considering for himself the evidence presented. Finally, on p11 at [29], the judge commenced his analysis of obstacles to reintegration by saying, ‘Even if the Appellant had demonstrated that he is socially and culturally integrated…’ The only reasonable inference is that the judge was satisfied that the appellant had not so demonstrated the necessary integration.

17. In short, notwithstanding the judge’s infelicitous use of language, I am satisfied that the judge applied for himself the test for integration into the United Kingdom and, moreover, came to a permissible conclusion on the evidence.

Ground 2

18. Ground 2 is, with respect, transparent disagreement with the judge’s decision. It lists a number of matters relied upon by the appellant, quotes from Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 and baldly asserts that the judge’s assessment of very significant obstacles was fundamentally flawed. However, most of the matters identified in paragraph 4 of the grounds are expressly mentioned in the decision and, for the reasons given above under ground 1, there is no sustainable basis for concluding that the judge then left out of account any of the matters raised in evidence or submissions.

19. The judge rejected the appellant’s claimed French language limitations, and was unarguable entitled to do so. Moreover, the background evidence relied on by Mr Hawkins falls far short of establishing that the appellant would also need to speak Swiss German in order to be able to integrate into Switzerland, and certainly not enough to establish that the judge’s conclusions were irrational or unreasonable.

20. There is no arguable basis for the suggestion (implicitly made) that the judge misapplied the ‘very significant obstacles’ test as explained by Parveen. The test as described in the guidance quoted by the judge on p12 at [32] is not materially more different or more rigorous.

21. All in all, notwithstanding the matters preyed in aid by the appellant, I am satisfied that the judge’s conclusions were neither based on a misapplication of the law nor fell outside the range of reasonable decisions available on the evidence.

Ground 3

22. The challenge in ground 3 to the judge’s approach to the question of undue harshness appears to be predicated on there being errors as pleaded in grounds 1 and/or 2 (see paragraph 5 of the grounds). Therefore, the ground also fails for the reasons given above.

23. To the extent that it is pleaded that, because of those matters set out at paragraph 6 of the grounds, it was not reasonably open to the judge to find that deportation would not have unduly harsh consequences for the appellant’s partner and or child, that is simply unsustainable. The judge sets out his analysis at pp12-15 at [38]-[51]. It is a comprehensive assessment considering those matters advanced in the appellant’s favour. The judge’s conclusions were entirely rational and reasonable.

Ground 4

24. As recognised in the grant of permission, ground 4 alleges no error of law separate to grounds 1 to 3. Consequently, it must also fail for the reasons given above. In any event, the judge plainly applied the correct legal test and, for unarguably adequate reasons, permissibly found that there were no very compelling circumstances making deportation disproportionate.

25. For these reasons, the appellant’s appeal against the judge’s decision fails.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, and so stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 January 2026