Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005384
UI-2024-005868

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00090/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

11th June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOKE

Between

MIA
(Anonymity Direction Made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr L. Youseffian, Counsel instructed by Wilsons Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J. Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Monday 2 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
BACKGROUND
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) dated 1 October 2024 (“the Decision”) dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 7 December 2023 refusing his application for asylum made on 21 May 2022.
2. The Appellant filed an application for permission to appeal with the FtT on 9 October 2024. This application was granted by the FtT on 20 November 2024 with respect of Ground 2 only. The application was renewed before the Upper Tribunal, who granted permission with respect of Ground 1.
3. The Grounds relied on by the Appellant can be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: The Judge erred in assessing the Appellant’s credibility.
Ground 2: The Judge was unreasonable in finding that the Appellant would not be at risk upon return.
4. In granting permission with respect of Ground 2, First-tier Tribunal Judge Dieu stated:
4. Ground 2 is arguable. There is some merit in the submission that the FTTJ having found the Appellant to be a low-level member, and although properly found that he was not known to the authorities in Bangladesh, erred by not assessing whether the Appellant would be at risk upon return with his low profile and if he were to continue his activity upon return.
5. In granting permission with respect of Ground 1, Upper Tribunal Lovato stated:
Judge Dieu refused permission on ground one because it was decided that the challenges to the judge’s reasoning were nothing more than a series of factual disagreements. A particular point, at [14] of the grounds, which did not find favour with Judge Dieu was that the passage of time between the hearing and the decision being promulgated, a period of approximately three months, did not arguably undermine the judge’s findings of fact. While I agree with Judge Dieu that the delay could not, in and of itself, arguably unpick the assessment of credibility, the events which unfolded in Bangladesh during this period arguably required further consideration in the assessment of risk which is the primary issue to be addressed under ground two. The hearing took place on 5 July 2024 and the decision was not promulgated until 30 September 2024. Between those dates, the political conditions in Bangladesh arguably fundamentally changed in that the ruling Awami League, which the applicant claims to fear, were ousted from power with the leader fleeing the country and the leader of the BNP released from custody while an interim government took control of the functions of the state. Not only did these developments arguably fall to be considered by the time the judge assessed risk when he decided the appeal, these developments may have an important bearing on the materiality of any error established under ground two. For these reasons, I conclude that permission should be granted for ground one to be argued.
ISSUE
6. My task is to determine whether the FtT made a material error of law. I am not determining the appeal against the decision of the SSHD. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. It does not matter that I would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached, or is otherwise vitiated by some other identifiable error of law.
7. I remind myself of the following principles that the law says must apply when considering. In summary, having considered: KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693 AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
1. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert tribunal and an appellate court should not rush to find a misdirection an error of law merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently
2. The UT should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
3. The UT should not be astute to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the UT's assessment of the facts.
4. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.
5. The UT is an appellate court and it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the First-tier Tribunal judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that the First-tier Tribunal does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
6. Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically.
7. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
8. Decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself in law.
9. The focus should be on the way the First-tier Tribunal performed the essence of the task required
8. If I determine that the Decision does contain an error of law, we then need to decide whether to set aside the Decision in consequence. If we set the Decision aside, we must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
9. I had before me a bundle running to 407 pages (pdf) ([B/xx]) containing the documents relevant to the appeal before us, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. I was also sent the Respondent’s response to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 dated 21 March 2025 by way of a separate email.
10. Having heard from the representatives I indicated I would reserve my decision and provide that in writing, which I now turn to do.
DISCUSSION
11. The grounds of appeal that we are concerned with are at B/27.
12. I turn to Ground 1 first. Ground 1 is diffuse, lacking in succinctness and contains a number of complaints.
13. It is submitted at paras 2-3 of the grounds that at [17] and [19] of the Decision the Judge failed to give reasons as to why he found there to be discrepancies and a lack of detail in the Appellant’s account. Issues of credibility are first and foremost a matter for the Judge, and the Upper Tribunal should be slow to interfere with the Judge’s primary findings. Furthermore, the paragraphs complained of must be looked at in the context of the Decision as a whole. At [19] the Judge was completely entitled to note that there was a lack of any detail regarding the threats the Appellant claimed he faced.
14. In the Appellant’s screening interview held on 10 December 2022 at B/78 in answer to Q4.1 the Appellant stated:
I cannot go back to my own country as I fear that I would be killed by the Government or the Army. Since 2018 I was the Press Secretary of the BNP and was involved in anti-government propaganda and protests. In September 2021 I started to receive death threats via third parties. This frightened me and I made the decision to leave Bangladesh and study in the UK. Now as my father can no longer fund me and it means a return home. I cannot do this as I fear I will be killed. Therefore, I now want to claim asylum and stay in the UK.
While a screening interview is a brief summary, the Judge was entitled to note that there was a lack of basic detail, eg how the threats were received and by whom. Surprisingly in the Appellant’s asylum interview held on 22 November 2023 at B/135 no reference is made by the Appellant of any particular threats he received.
15. The Judge noted at [20] that the Appellant had stated he was not able to provide full details of the threats in his asylum interview. However, the Judge was plainly justified in finding that the Appellant’s asylum statement dated 28 March 2024 at B/118 was no better. In that statement the only reference to the threats are at para 4 and 13 of the witness statement. At para 4 the Appellant stated ‘After receiving death threats from an unknown person I came to the UK as a student with the intention of returning to Bangladesh when the situation has changed.’ At para 13 the Appellant stated ‘I was threatened many times by Awami League activists. It is a practice in Bangladesh to file false cases against political opponents and send them to jail. I further state that I was attacked by the Awami League party cadres on many occasions.’ Again, no detail of how these threats were received or the details of those threats or the details of any attacks suffered by the Appellant.
16. It is quite clear on the documentary evidence before the Judge, he was entitled to find that the Appellant’s account was vague and lacking in detail.
17. At paras 4-5 of the grounds of appeal it is complained that the Judge failed to consider the oral evidence given by the Appellant. I was not invited to consider any audio tape, transcript or counsel’s note of the hearing. I was not pointed to any part of the hearing where it could be submitted particular parts of the Appellant’s ought to have been taken into account by the Judge and were not. Mr Youseffian acknowledged in oral submissions that without any such transcript that I could not be assisted further. Thus that limb of Ground 1 is not made out.
18. At paras 7-9 of the grounds of appeal it is complained that the Judge erred in finding that the documents lent little or no weight to the Appellant’s claim. With respect of the certificate dated 2 November 2023 and the pledge document dated 8 September 2022, the Judge gave reasons as to why he rejected those documents at [25-27]. He was entitled to take into account the lack of any details regarding the provenance of the documents, the lack of any explanation as to why they were not provided sooner, and the fact the documents were inconsistent with the Appellant’s account of being threatened. At [28-29] of the decision the Judge considered the letter from Dr Amin. He was entitled to note that the letter was not reliable given this assault was not mentioned in his interview or witness statement. Secure reasons were given by the Judge for not attaching weight to the documents provided.
19. At para 16 of the grounds it is complained that the Judge unreasonably took into account the fact that his father had run out of money. At [30-31] the Judge made the following findings:
30. Mr Ali’s true reasons for claiming asylum are identified in the answers he gave in the Registration Interview. At q2.6 he described that he started a degree in Business Management at Portsmouth University but that he had not attended since March 2022 because: “my father could no longer support my education as Covid ruined his business.” In answer to q3.4 he said: “My circumstances have now changed because I can no longer be funded here, and I need to claim asylum as it would be a danger for me to return to my country.” He was by then living with his cousin in London.
31. If Mr Ali had established to the low standard that he was at risk of persecution on return then the fact he had entered as a student and waited until he could no longer afford his studies before claiming asylum would not be significant. But the evidence he has provided does not establish that he was harmed or threatened when he was in Bangladesh and he entered the UK as a student because he wished to study, not because he was fleeing persecution. When lack of finances cut short his studies before the end of his degree course, he claimed asylum as a means to avoid removal.
It is plain that the Judge at [31] was well aware that the delay in claiming asylum or the lack of funds did not necessarily mean that the asylum claim could not be made out. The Judge considered these aspects of the Appellant’s circumstances in the context of the evidence as a whole. In making adverse credibility findings regarding the core of the Appellant’s claim it was open to the Judge to go on to observe that there were parts of the Appellant’s circumstances which alluded to the real reason behind the asylum claim.
20. With respect of Ground 1, Mr Youseffian sensibly focussed his oral submissions on the Judge’s finding at [26] of the Decision, which found that the Appellant was a member of the BNP and a press secretary, however also concluded that it was not established that the title of press secretary was a significant role. Mr Youseffian relied upon the answer given in the asylum interview at Q46-47 where the Appellant stated the following:
Q46 How did you get into the position of press secretary?
So in 2018 when BNP are arranging around the election the national election so they have to be announcing in every area. In my area the leaders saw me working hard and the leaders saw I was doing good for our party and the decision made by the leaders actually of the post press secretary actually after seeing my work from previous years.
Q47 What work had you done in previous years that got you recognised?
So previously when I was a general member I used to do lots of work for the BNP and the press secretary had been hijacked by the Awami League and also the member of parliament got hijacked by them actually and then because of that we used to do some protests and demonstration and our meetings and when the time comes to decide a new committee there are several candidates actually and there are a voting system actually and all the members were voting for the position and after the voting my votes were high and I was selected for press secretary at the time.
Mr Yousseffian also relied on the Judge’s summary of the Appellant’s case at [2] of the Decision, submitting that the Judge had not engaged with the evidence as to what a press secretary was when concluding that it was not a significant role.
21. The extract of the interview relied upon indicates that the Appellant was voted Press Secretary. This does not automatically lead one to the conclusion that this role was a significant role or even a medium-level role within the BNP party as a whole without further examination of the rest of the evidence. The Judge at [2] of the Decision was simply recounting the Appellant’s case. Mr Yousseffian’s reliance on the Judge’s finding at [26] that the Appellant was a BNP member and a press secretary, overlooks the remaining and fundamental adverse credibility findings that were made with respect of the Appellant.
22. It was open to the Judge to accept that the Appellant was a BNP member and a press secretary, however to find that there was insufficient evidence to indicate that such a position was a significant position when looking at the Appellant’s evidence as a whole. Having rejected the documents provided, there was very little else to show exactly what the Appellant had done for the BNP in the role of press secretary. The Appellant claimed to have arranged meetings and been responsible for publicity and social media promotion, however no such social media evidence or other evidence had been provided. The Judge was entitled to find that notwithstanding the title of press secretary, the evidence of the Appellant’s activity in Bangladesh together with his sur place activity, did not indicate more than a low-level involvement with the BNP. I am satisfied that no material error of law is disclosed by Ground 1.
23. With respect of Ground 2, Mr Yousseffian submitted that the Judge had failed to apply HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31. However, the Judge’s findings at [30], that the Appellant’s claim for asylum were related to his inability to continue studying, gives rise to the irresistible inference that the Judge did not find that the beliefs held by the Appellant were genuine. This can be the only sensible interpretation of [30].
24. Having found that there is no error of law in the Judge’s assessment of credibility, and having found the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant being of low level involvement is secure, it follows that there can be no error of law in the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s risk upon return. The Judge found at [29]:
There is no cogent evidence that [AB] was of any interest to the authorities in Bangladesh when he left and his low-level involvement at demonstration in the UK is not such as to attract the monitoring of the authorities and the resumption of interest which was not established to have been there in the first place.
The Judge found that the Appellant had not come to the attention of the authorities in Bangladesh, and that his sur place activities were insufficient to attract the attention of the authorities upon return. This together with [30] where the Judge finds that the Appellant’s true reasons for claiming asylum are to do with his changed circumstances in the United Kingdom make it quite plain that the Judge simply did not accept that there was anything in the Appellant’s activities or beliefs held that was significant enough to concern the authorities upon return. I am satisfied that no material error of law is disclosed by Ground 2.
25. As an aside, I note that Judge Lodato granted permission to argue Ground 1 on the basis that the country guidance had changed between the appeal hearing and the promulgation of the determination, the result being the Awami League were no longer in power. Judge Lodato concluded that it was arguable that the Judge ought to have considered this. Bangladesh is now subject to an interim government, which is no longer dominated by the Awami League. Had the Judge considered this change, it could only have fortified his conclusions, namely that as a BNP supporter or member the Appellant would not have faced a risk of persecution upon return.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ferguson dismissing MIA’s appeal stands.

S Y Loke
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Loke
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 June 2025