UI-2024-005391 & UI-2024-005392

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 29 Jul 2025
• Promulgation date: 10 Sep 2025
• Publication date: 25 Sep 2025
• Last updated on: 25 Sep 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005391
UI-2024-005392

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/54738/2023 HU/50536/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

ZBIGNIEW JAKACKI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Ferguson, instructed by Freemans Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N Ostrowski, instructed by the Government Legal Department

Heard at Field House on 29 July 2025


DECISION AND REASONS

1. I issued my first decision in this appeal on 30 May 2025. I found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in allowing Mr Jacacki’s appeal and I set that decision aside in part. I directed that the decision on the appeal would be remade in the Upper Tribunal following a further hearing. That hearing took place before me on 29 July and I reserved my decision. I now remake the decision on the appeal by dismissing it for the following reasons.

Background

2. The appellant is a Polish national who was born on 23 November 1989. He first left Poland when he was seventeen years old. Since then, he has lived in Sweden, Poland and the United Kingdom. He has received the following convictions:

Date
Offence
Sentence
Location




23.10.09
Drink driving
Fine & disqualification
UK

Uninsured driving






08.03.12
Drug importation
Imprisonment 8 years
Sweden

Drug supply
Deportation & re-entry ban


Criminal damage






11.04.13
Common assault
No additional sentence
Sweden




25.01.18
Common assault
Imprisonment 2 months
Poland




15.01.21
Criminal damage
Compensation £546.66
UK

3. As will be apparent from his antecedents, the appellant spent some time in the UK from 2009, before he returned to mainland Europe. The appellant states that he re-entered the United Kingdom in 2019 and that he lived and worked in this country. I should mention two other events which have occurred since then. In October 2022, the police attended an address in connection with a domestic incident between the appellant and his ex-girlfriend. No charges were brought.

4. More recently, the appellant was arrested on 24 November 2024, apparently for failing to provide a specimen. He was bailed to appear at the Magistrates’ Court, but he did not appear, having returned to Poland shortly after his arrest.

The Secretary of State’s Decisions

5. The appellant made an application for leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme (“EUSS”) on 30 April 2021. That application was refused on 21 July 2023 because the appellant had been made the subject of a “stage two” deportation order on account of his criminality. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against the deportation order, the refusal of leave to remain, and the refusal of his human rights claim.

The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

6. As I have already mentioned, the appellant’s appeal was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal. I set out a relatively fulsome summary of its analysis at [8]-[14] of my first decision. For present purposes, it suffices to mention only the following findings:

(i) At [45]-[51], the FtT found that the appellant had intentionally sought to deceive the respondent when he made his EUSS application, by claiming that he had no convictions.

(ii) At [52]-[55], the FtT found that the appellant was only entitled to the basic level of protection against deportation as he had not acquired a right to reside permanently in the United Kingdom.

(iii) At [56]-72], the FtT concluded that the appellant did not represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal – Error of Law

7. The Secretary of State sought and was granted permission to appeal. At issue in the appeal was the third finding summarised above; there was no attempt on the appellant’s part to challenge the first two findings by way of response under rule 24(1B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. There were three grounds of appeal. I found that the first and third were not made out but that the second ground did establish an error of law in the decision of the FtT.

8. I held that the judge had proceeded on a mistaken basis when she noted at [69] of her decision that “no violence was used” in the domestic incident in 2022. Whilst there was not said to have been any violence between the appellant and his ex-girlfriend, the appellant was said to have been violent towards her cat, having kicked it with such force that its leg was subsequently amputated. The appellant had accepted in his statement before the FtT that he had kicked the cat but he had changed his account in his oral evidence, and the judge had failed to make findings of fact on that incident or to factor it into her assessment of the risk presented by the appellant.

9. I therefore ordered that the FtT’s decision would be set aside in part. The findings which I have summarised at [6](i) and (ii) above were not tainted by legal error and were preserved. The appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal for the remaining issues in the appeal to be determined.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal – Remaking the Decision

10. As I have mentioned, the appellant left the United Kingdom (for Poland) after the FtT’s decision, at the end of November last year. By regulation 41 of the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016, the appellant was entitled to apply to the respondent for temporary admission in order to appear before the tribunal in person. He did so, and permission was granted. There was some disagreement between the parties about the conditions attached to his temporary admission. I declined to make any order on that disagreement, holding that I had no power to do so in an appeal of this nature (contrasting the Upper Tribunal’s powers in judicial review, as considered in R (Kasicky) v SSHD [2016] UKUT 107 (IAC); [2016] Imm AR 576.

11. The appellant duly returned to the United Kingdom and was detained by the Secretary of State. He appeared before me in a secure court at Field House.

12. There was a preliminary issue raised by Mr Ostrowski. He sought to provide me with an updated printout from the Police National Computer, which made reference to the appellant’s arrest and failure to appear at the Magistrates’ Court at the end of last year. He told me on instructions that the appellant’s arrest was for failing to provide a specimen, as that information did not appear on the printout.

13. Ms Ferguson objected to the late admission of this document, although she accepted that it was relevant to the issues at hand. I asked her whether she wished to have additional time with the appellant in order to take further instructions on the arrest and failure to appear. She did not seek any additional time and she did not wish to take an additional statement from the appellant.

14. I admitted the PNC printout despite its late production. I considered that it was highly relevant to the issue in the appeal. Given that Ms Ferguson was content to proceed without additional time, I was unable to detect any prejudice to the appellant.

15. The appellant gave evidence with the assistance of a Polish interpreter. He was examined by Ms Ferguson and cross-examined at some length by Mr Ostrowski. I asked three questions for clarification. There was no re-examination. There were no other witnesses.

16. I will not rehearse the oral evidence at this stage in my decision. I will instead refer to the appellant’s evidence in order to explain the findings I have reached.

Submissions

17. Mr Ostrowksi referred to the skeleton argument which was filed in advance of the hearing. He submitted that the appellant had a clear propensity to reoffend, as evidenced by his history of offending and absence of rehabilitation. He submitted that it was established on the balance of probabilities that the appellant had kicked his partner’s cat in 2022, causing it very serious injuries. He had admitted this in his original witness statement and it was implausible that he would have made an error in his statement. There was no statement from his solicitor to support his account of there having been an error. He had given evidence that he had given his partner £2300 in the aftermath of the incident. He said that this was merely to get her “off his back” but it was more likely to be a payment for vet’s bills because the appellant was responsible. He claimed to have made a report to the police about her harassing him but there was no evidence of that, and it was clear that he had made a Subject Access Request to the police.

18. The appellant had been asked about his conduct at the end of 2024, when he left the United Kingdom shortly after being arrested. He had maintained that he did not understand the reasons for his arrest or that he had been bailed by the police. Neither assertion was truthful; he was familiar with such processes and matters would have been explained by the police. The fact that he left the UK four days after being bailed to appear at court spoke for itself.

19. Mr Ostrowski submitted that the appellant was clearly not rehabilitated. There was no evidence of positive rehabilitation and he had been arrested and failed to appear at the Magistrates’ Court whilst his appeal against deportation was pending. Others might have been on their best behaviour whilst their deportation was under consideration. The appellant’s tendency to lie was also apparent. He had lied in his application for leave to remain, as the FtT had found. He had stated in his latest witness statement that he had had no further difficulties with the authorities in the UK and had intentionally made no reference to his arrest in 2024.

20. Mr Ostrowski submitted that the integrity and effectiveness of immigration control was one of the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom under paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the EEA Regulations. The appellant’s lies in his application form clearly undermined the effectiveness of immigration control and that was a matter to be weighed in the balance. The tribunal must consider the proportionality of the decision to expel but all factors in that assessment militated in favour of expulsion.

21. Ms Ferguson also relied on her skeleton argument and submitted that the appellant did not represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society.

22. Much had been made by the Secretary of State about the incident involving the cat but it was not open to the tribunal to conclude that the appellant was responsible for that injury. He had explained that the cat had been removed from the house prior to the incident. He did not blame his solicitors for the error in the original statement; he had had difficulty understanding the heavily redacted police records. Since that statement, he had consistently and plausibly denied kicking the cat. That chimed with the fact that he was not even interviewed by the police for offences of animal cruelty. The money he had paid to his ex-partner was plausibly to get her off his back.

23. As for the arrest in November 2024, whilst it was accepted that it had taken place, it was odd that there was nothing in writing to show the basis of the arrest. The appellant said that he was not even driving a vehicle at the time that he was arrested. Nothing was to be inferred from his decision to leave the UK, and it was to be recalled that he had been successful in his appeal at that point. He had explained that his mother was unwell and that this had been the reason for his decision to leave the UK.

24. The respondent had relied on the appellant’s lack of candour but he had merely omitted his convictions; this was not a case in which the whole basis of the application was a lie, such as a sham marriage. The EU Settlement Scheme guidance stated in any event that spent convictions were not to be declared.

25. Ms Ferguson submitted that the appellant posed no demonstrable risk to the UK and that the appeal fell to be allowed on that basis. In the alternative, the respondent had not shown that his deportation was a proportionate step in light of the considerations set out in his witness statement.

26. I reserved my decision at the conclusion of the submissions.

Legal Framework

27. It is common ground in this case that the saved provisions of the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016 apply. The FtT found that the appellant was only entitled to the basic level of protection against deportation. In those circumstances, it is only necessary to make reference to two parts of the Regulations.

28. Regulation 27 relates to decisions taken on grounds of public policy, public security and public health. So far as material, it provides as follows:

(1) In this regulation, a “relevant decision” means an EEA decision taken on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.

(2) A relevant decision may not be taken to serve economic ends.

(3) …

(4) …

(5) The public policy and public security requirements of the United Kingdom include restricting rights otherwise conferred by these Regulations in order to protect the fundamental interests of society, and where a relevant decision is taken on grounds of public policy or public security it must also be taken in accordance with the following principles—

(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality;
(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned;
(c) the personal conduct of the person must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account past conduct of the person and that the threat does not need to be imminent;
(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to considerations of general prevention do not justify the decision;
(e) a person's previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision;
(f) the decision may be taken on preventative grounds, even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction, provided the grounds are specific to the person.

(6) Before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy and public security in relation to a person (“P”) who is resident in the United Kingdom, the decision maker must take account of considerations such as the age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P's length of residence in the United Kingdom, P's social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P's links with P's country of origin.

(7) …

(8) A court or tribunal considering whether the requirements of this regulation are met must (in particular) have regard to the considerations contained in Schedule 1 (considerations of public policy, public security and the fundamental interests of society etc.).

29. Schedule 1, to which I am obliged to have regard as a result of reg 27(8), provides materially as follows:

[…]

3. Where an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national has received a custodial sentence, or is a persistent offender, the longer the sentence, or the more numerous the convictions, the greater the likelihood that the individual's continued presence in the United Kingdom represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting of the fundamental interests of society.

[…]

5.The removal from the United Kingdom of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national who is able to provide substantive evidence of not demonstrating a threat (for example, through demonstrating that the EEA national or the family member of an EEA national has successfully reformed or rehabilitated) is less likely to be proportionate.

[…]

7. For the purposes of these Regulations, the fundamental interests of society in the United Kingdom include—
(a) preventing unlawful immigration and abuse of the immigration laws, and maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the immigration control system (including under these Regulations) and of the Common Travel Area;
(b)   maintaining public order;
(c)   preventing social harm;
(d)   preventing the evasion of taxes and duties;
(e)   protecting public services;
(f)   excluding or removing an EEA national or family member of an EEA national with a conviction (including where the conduct of that person is likely to cause, or has in fact caused, public offence) and maintaining public confidence in the ability of the relevant authorities to take such action;
(g)   tackling offences likely to cause harm to society where an immediate or direct victim may be difficult to identify but where there is wider societal harm (such as offences related to the misuse of drugs or crime with a cross-border dimension as mentioned in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union);
(h)  combating the effects of persistent offending (particularly in relation to offences, which if taken in isolation, may otherwise be unlikely to meet the requirements of regulation 27);
(i)  protecting the rights and freedoms of others, particularly from exploitation and trafficking;
(j)   protecting the public;
(k)   acting in the best interests of a child (including where doing so entails refusing a child admission to the United Kingdom, or otherwise taking an EEA decision against a child);
(l)  countering terrorism and extremism and protecting shared values.

30. It is not necessary to make extensive reference to authority on the proper approach to such cases. SSHD v Straszewski [2015] EWCA Civ 1245; [2016] 1 WLR 1173 is of assistance despite the fact that it concerned those with a right to reside permanently in the United Kingdom. For present purposes, the most significant aspects of the judgment of Moore-Bick LJ (with whom Davis and Sharp LJJ agreed) are to be found at [11]-[20].

31. Amongst other things, Moore-Bick LJ emphasised in those paragraphs that: the burden is on the Secretary of State; exceptions to the right of free movement are to be interpreted restrictively; neither deterrence nor public revulsion have a part to play; it will only be in the most exceptional cases that past conduct alone may suffice; whether a person represents a threat is to be determined solely by reference to the conduct of the offender and likelihood of re-offending; and the tribunal must look to the future rather than the past in all but the most exceptional cases.

Analysis

32. Mr Ostrowski did not attempt to submit that this is an exceptional case in which past offending may suffice to justify expulsion. Whilst the appellant’s offence in Sweden in 2012 was evidently a serious one (given the sentence of eight years), it was no part of the Secretary of State’s case before me that this was a case which fell within what is sometimes called the “Bouchereau exception”: R v Bouchereau (Case 30/77); [1978] QB 732 refers.

33. The appellant has a relatively small number of convictions spread over a twelve year period. All but one of those convictions is minor and he has never been before a Crown Court in the United Kingdom. I note also that the convictions are punctuated by significant gaps: nearly three years between the first and second convictions; nearly five years between the third and fourth convictions; and another three years between the fourth and the fifth. Considered without the other evidence in this case, the convictions do not establish that the appellant is a man with a propensity to commit further offences.

34. It is undoubtedly for that reason that the Secretary of State sought to bring additional considerations into the equation. Those matters are: (i) the appellant’s deception in his EUSS application; (ii) the domestic incident in October 2022 and the injury to the cat; and (iii) the appellant’s arrest in November 2024 and his failure to attend the Magistrates’ Court on 20 January 2025. The first of those matters is the subject of a preserved finding by the FtT. My findings on the second and third matters are as follows.

The Incident on 25 October 2022

35. The police records in connection with this incident appear at pages 128-129 of the bundle. They are quite heavily redacted. What can be seen is as follows, and records only the complainant’s version of events.

36. The police attended an incident on 25 October 2022. The appellant had come to the address, saying that his partner or ex-partner owed him money. He said that she “should start to look behind her and she should be running”. He had previously been “throwing stuff from the wardrobe into bin bags.” There had been no subsequent communication from him and there was no physical violence between the appellant and his ex-partner. There was no history of domestic abuse. The cat was injured. The bones in its leg had been shattered and the leg was amputated. The injury was comparable to one caused by a car. The vet said that the cat had been kicked. The cat was an indoor cat but the police thought that there was a “situation to be addressed regards access to open windows/cat flaps etc” before any consideration could be given to prosecution for animal cruelty. Ultimately, the police concluded that they could not confirm that it was the appellant who had injured the cat.

37. The appellant described the incident in the statement he made for the hearing in the FtT. At [19], he said this:

On the 25/10/2022 the police attended my house as I had arguments with my then partner. I was angry and I kicked a cat she had. There was no physical violence between me and my partner and the police left and I was not charged with anything.

38. Before the FtT, the appellant sought to withdraw that admission, stating that it was not true and that it should be ignored. The appellant made a further statement in preparation for the resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal. He dealt with the incident of 25 October 2022 at [15] of that statement.

39. The appellant claimed that his first statement was inaccurate and that he did not kick the cat. He did not know how the cat had been injured and he had never harmed an animal. The appellant said that he had asked his ex-partner to leave the flat because she had been using drugs and relying on him to pay her debts. She subsequently came to collect her property and there was an argument. She threatened to report the appellant to the police for forcing her out of the property but he reminded her that the flat was his. The cat, he said, had already been taken elsewhere and he did not see it again. There was no physical violence during the exchange. He took some additional property to her place later. Shortly after that, she contacted the appellant to say that the cat was injured and required an operation. She accused him of injuring the cat. He said that he had nothing to do with the injury but he eventually sent her the money because she promised to leave him alone and he wanted the situation to be over. He said that he later reported her for harassment, to the police in Poole, because her text messages had become increasingly aggressive and a friend had advised him to go the police. They took no action and did not give him a reference number. A couple of days afterwards, he was arrested by the police, who took no action against him but handed him to the immigration service.

40. The appellant gave extensive oral evidence about this version of events. In answer to questions from Ms Ferguson, he said that he had given his solicitors a document which the police gave him and that the sentence about the cat in his statement had come from that material. He said that he had never kicked a cat in his life. He had not understood what he was signing.

41. In cross-examination, the appellant said that everything in the statement was true apart from the part about the cat. The statement had been prepared with the assistance of his solicitors, either by video call or on the telephone; he never met with them in person. It was his current solicitors who had been assisting him at that stage. There had been no interpreter. He thought that there was a “misunderstanding” about the cat. The police never questioned him about it. His ex-partner’s drug use had cost him £20,000.

42. Mr Ostrowski suggested to the appellant that he would not have paid his ex-partner £2300 for the cat’s operation if he had not been responsible for the injury. He said that the police in Poole had not been interested in his complaint that she had been harassing him, so he paid the money to secure some peace and quiet. That sum was small compared to the sums he had spent on her drug debts. He was concerned that she had his passport details and that she would try to use it against him.

43. Mr Ostrowski observed to the appellant that he had said nothing in his statement about his partner threatening him or having his passport details. The appellant said that he was living with his brother at the time, who was having difficulties over contact with his children. His brother had pressed him to pay the money so that there would be no further difficulties between the appellant and his ex-wife. Mr Ostrowski observed that none of that was in the appellant’s statement either. He said that he was not asked many questions about it. Mr Ostrowski suggested to the appellant once again that he had only paid the money because he caused the injury. He laughed, and stated that it was just for peace and quiet.

44. Mr Ostrowski asked the appellant why there was no record of his having made a complaint to the police in Poole. He said that he had not asked them for the notes. The appellant thought that they would have made some notes but he was not sure what they did. He was unable to explain why that had not been disclosed to his solicitors under the Subject Access Request procedure, but maintained that he had been to the police as he did not want his ex-partner to use his passport against him. Now, all the lies that his ex-partner had told about him carried more weight than his word.

45. Having observed the appellant give evidence on this issue for some time, I regret to say that I found him to be wholly untruthful, for the following reasons.

46. Firstly, the account which the appellant gave of his first statement being prepared was illogical. If he gave the SAR material to his solicitor, they would obviously not simply have copied what was said in that material into his statement. The appellant had not (as the statement recorded) been prosecuted over the offence, so the obvious question which any lawyer would have asked was whether the appellant accepted responsibility for the injury to the cat. It is clear that that question was asked and that it produced an admission, an explanation and an exculpatory statement. The appellant stated that he had kicked the cat; that he did so as a result of an argument during which he was angry, but that there were no charges and no physical violence between himself and his ex-partner. The suggestion that this sentence in the witness statement was somehow produced on the basis of an assumption by the appellant’s solicitor makes no sense.

47. Secondly, there is no statement from the appellant’s solicitor to support his version of events. It will have been apparent, at least since my initial decision, that this was likely to be a matter of contention between the parties. The appellant has made a detailed statement in which he seeks to retract what he has said before but there is nothing from his solicitor to confirm that there was somehow such a serious misunderstanding when he produced the SAR material that he admitted in writing something he had not done.

48. The appellant suggested in his oral evidence that the statement was taken without the assistance of an interpreter. I note that there is no declaration from an interpreter at p61 of the bundle, confirming that the contents of the statement had been read back to the appellant in a language that he understood. To that extent, his claim is plausible. It is wholly implausible, however, that any legal professional would have invited the appellant to sign something which he did not understand. Again, there is nothing from the appellant’s solicitor – Ms Katarzyna Jurkun of Freeman’s Solicitors - to confirm whether or not a Polish interpreter was used and I proceed on the basis that the appellant either understood his statement in English or that it was read to him in Polish. To find otherwise would be to find that the appellant’s solicitors have served him very poorly indeed, and there is no proper reason to make such a finding.

49. I also note that the claimed error in respect of the cat is the only part of the statement which is said to be erroneous. If there were difficulties with interpretation, or if the appellant’s lawyers were so inept that they were merely copying the statement from other documents without taking proper instructions, there would have been other errors in the document.

50. Thirdly, I agree with Mr Ostrowski’s submission that the appellant’s decision to pay his ex-partner a significant sum of money is likely to be an indication of a guilty conscience, rather than an attempt to get his ex-partner “off his back”. That aspect of his story became more elaborate when he was giving his oral evidence, and I gained the distinct impression that he was warming to his theme, and adding details in the hope that the account would sound more plausible. There was no mention in his statement of a fear that his ex-partner would cause him immigration difficulties or that his brother was worried about any trouble having repercussions on his child contact arrangements, for example.

51. Fourthly, there is no evidence in support of the suggestion that the appellant had been to the police in Poole to make a formal complaint about his ex-partner. He accepted during cross-examination that the details of the complaint had been written down. One might not always expect confirmation of such matters but the context in which these claims were made is important. The appellant is obviously on the backfoot, in that he is trying to retract an admission made in a signed witness statement which was prepared with the assistance of his solicitors. He would naturally seek to provide as much detail as possible, and to corroborate every aspect of his account which was capable of corroboration. His claim that he was the victim of a campaign of harassment which was so difficult that he reported it to the police was obviously capable of corroboration, yet there is nothing from the police. The other important point of context in that connection is that the appellant has already obtained SAR material from the police, so he cannot claim that he was unaware of that procedure.

52. I also noted that the appellant was dismissive and contemptuous of legitimate questions asked by Mr Ostrowski. Mr Ostrowski put to the appellant at one point that he had changed his story about the cat because the admission was bad for his case. The appellant smirked and began his answer with “I wish this cat all the best.” As I have already observed, there was also an occasion when the appellant laughed before answering another of Mr Ostrowski’s questions about the cat.

53. Ultimately, therefore, I consider it more likely than not that the admission in the original statement was made because it was true. The appellant evidently had a re-think before the hearing in the FtT and decided that he should not make a potentially damaging admission, hence the volte face at that stage and before me. The explanation for that change of direction does not hold any water, however, and I reject it as untrue. It is part of the same pattern of behaviour which the appellant exhibited in completing his application under the EUSS, of trying to paint himself in the best light by whatever means necessary. The finding I make on the balance of probabilities is that it was the appellant who kicked the cat in October 2022, causing it such serious injury that it lost a leg.

The Events in November 2024

54. The appellant accepted in oral evidence that he was arrested in November 2024. To that extent, his statement of 10 July 2025 is wrong. The final paragraph states:

I have not been in any trouble with the police or authorities in the UK since and I led a quiet life working and spending time with my friends. I want to return to UK and continue my life there.

55. Mr Ostrowski suggested to the appellant that the first of those sentences was a lie. The appellant said that the police had used “strange words” when he was at the police station and he had not understood. He did not think that he was a suspect – they just wanted him to explain something. He knew not what.

56. Mr Ostrowski noted that the appellant had been bailed to appear at the Magistrates’ Court in January 2025 but that he had failed to attend. The appellant said that he did not know that he had been bailed, or that he had to appear before the Magistrates. He said that he had not received a telephone call or an email. He said that he would have been content to go to court “to explain” if he had been asked to do so.

57. I found these to be further lies. The appellant has lived and worked in the United Kingdom for some years. He has worked as a lorry driver and a mechanic. He told the First-tier Tribunal that he can speak enough English to communicate, although he stated that he cannot read or write English. He is also a man with some familiarity with the criminal justice system in this country and elsewhere. If he was arrested and taken to the police station, the reasons for that would have been explained to him in a manner that he understood. I considered that his suggestion that the police used “strange words” which he did not understand was merely an attempt on his part to escape from the difficulty caused by the fact that his statement is flatly at odds with having been arrested on 24 November 2024.

58. Mr Ostrowski suggested that the appellant had left the country on 28 November 2024 so that he did not have to appear at the Magistrates’ Court. The suggestion was that he had absconded from bail so as to avoid a further conviction. I have considered that submission carefully, and in light of the evidence which appears at pages 38-46 of the consolidated bundle. Those pages contain evidence, in Polish and translated into English, of the appellant’s mother’s state of health towards the end of 2024. That evidence shows, and I accept, that the appellant’s mother was admitted to hospital between 10 and 13 December 2024, suffering with a range of problems, most notably cardiac problems. The headline in the “diagnosis” section of the discharge summary states that she had “Heart failure, unspecified. Chronic heart failure with preserved left ventricular systolic function.” Other health problems are also noted.

59. The appellant said in his statement, and in oral evidence before me, that his decision to leave the UK for Poland on 28 November 2024 was motivated partly by a desire to be with his mother when he was unwell, and partly because the pressure caused by the ongoing appeal was also becoming overwhelming. I certainly accept that his mother would have been unwell at that time; problems such as those which are described in the discharge summary are unlikely to have arisen suddenly and it is perfectly plausible that she would have been ailing at the end of November if she was admitted into hospital on 10 December 2024.

60. I do not accept, however, that the appellant’s decision to leave the United Kingdom was motivated entirely by the pressures of life in the UK and his mother’s ill health. Both of these factors are likely to have been present for some time. In my judgment, the catalyst for his decision to leave the United Kingdom was his arrest on 24 November 2024 and a desire to avoid the hearing at the Magistrates’ Court in January. The appellant maintained that he did not know that he had to attend the court but I do not accept that, for essentially the same reasons I gave in relation to his arrest. Care would have been taken at the police station to ensure that he understood that he had to attend court. He speaks some English. He is a man who has some familiarity with the criminal justice system. I consider the truth of the matter to be that the appellant was contemplating a return to Poland to see his mother and to alleviate some of the pressure of this appeal, and that his arrest on 24 November 2024 served to accelerate matters. He is a lorry driver by profession and he could ill afford a conviction for failing to provide a specimen, so he decided to leave for Poland rather than appearing at the Magistrates’ Court.

61. I consider the appellant to have withheld his arrest in November 2024 and his failure to attend the Magistrates Court in January 2025 because he wished, again, to paint himself in a better light. He knew that he had been arrested and that he had failed to attend the court but he suggested otherwise in his statement in an effort to improve his prospects of success in this appeal.

A genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat?

62. I have made reference above to the decision of the Court of Appeal in SSHD v Straszewski, and I remind myself again that the test which I must apply is a forward-looking one, considering the risk the appellant is likely to present in the United Kingdom. As Ms Ferguson put it in her skeleton argument, one is looking for prospective risk in such cases.

63. I also remind myself again >that the appellant’s convictions over the last thirteen years have been comparatively minor and punctuated by long periods of good behaviour. I have also taken account of the character references written by various individuals in the United Kingdom in the assessment which follows (although the extent to which those individuals knew about the appellant’s past is unclear.)

64. Regulation 27(5)(d), which I have set out above, states that the threat need not be imminent. Given the lengthy periods between the appellant’s offending, and given the nature of that offending, it is not likely that he will commit serious offences as soon as he is permitted to return to the United Kingdom. His history simply does not tell that tale. He is not, for example, a drug addict with a history of violent offending to feed his addiction or a sex offender with a string of such offences.

65. However, considering the totality of the appellant’s conduct in the United Kingdom, and having regard to the evidence that he gave before me, I think it more likely than not that he will commit further offences in the future. I think it likely, in particular, that he will commit further violent offences in this country. He is a deceitful man. He lied on his EUSS application. He lied about his responsibility for the serious injuries to his ex-partner’s cat. And he lied about his arrest in November 2024 and his decision to leave the country whilst on bail. He claims that he is a changed man, and that his tendency to damage people or property has come to an end as he has become more mature. That, in my judgment, is a further lie, and his temperament is now as it always has been. He undertook aggression replacement training in prison in Poland in 2014 but he went on to commit a further offence of violence in 2016 (the conviction for which was in 2018). It was his ex-partner’s cat who bore the brunt of his violent outburst in October 2022 but he has previously directed violence at people and property and I consider that there is a genuine, present and sufficiently serious risk of him doing so upon return to the United Kingdom.

The Fundamental Interests of Society

66. If I understood him correctly, Mr Ostrowski submitted that one of the risks presented by the appellant was to the maintenance of lawful and effective immigration control. He made that submission in reliance on the fact that the appellant had lied on his EUSS application form. I consider the link to be too tenuous to withstand scrutiny. In my judgment, the risk is to public order and the public from offences of violence. The prevention of such offending is evidently within the scope of the fundamental interests of society, whether one considers the list in paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 or the jurisprudence of the CJEU.

Proportionality

67. I accept Mr Ostrowski’s submission that there is little if anything in this case which points towards the appellant’s deportation being other than proportionate. He is thirty five years old and in good health. He lived for a few years in the UK and he has not acquired permanent residence. He has no relationship with a partner nor any children in the UK. He is said to have a sister and a brother in Dorset. He told the FtT that he sees them once or twice a month. They made statements in response to the respondent’s original intention to deport but they have played no part in these proceedings.

68. The appellant has worked in this country but he has also worked elsewhere in Europe. He suggests in his latest statement that he has found it difficult to find work in Poland but there is no other evidence before me to show what attempts he has made or any difficulty he has encountered. He is able to work in other countries in Europe and he is currently working as a lorry driver for a company in the Netherlands. He says that the loneliness of the role is causing him mental health problems but there is no medical evidence in support of the latter assertion. The appellant’s parents remain in Poland, and he is better able to return to see his mother if he is in Europe.

69. I am required to consider the effect of deportation on the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation, although it is not a matter which carries significant weight in the case of a person without a right to reside permanently in the host state: SSHD v Dumliauskas [2015] EWCA Civ 145; [2015] Imm AR 773, at [54]. In this case, the appellant has not undertaken any rehabilitative work in the UK and I consider that his prospects of rehabilitation are the same in this country as they would be in Poland, where he has his parents.

70. Drawing those threads together, I am satisfied that the respondent has established that the appellant represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society and that his deportation is both appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the public policy objective sought (B v SSHD [2000] Imm AR 478 refers, at [45].

71. The appeal brought under the saved provisions of the EEA Regulations will therefore be dismissed.

ECHR - Article 8

72. It remains for me to consider the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim, although no freestanding submissions were made by Ms Ferguson in that regard.

73. The appellant is not a foreign criminal as that term is defined in s117D(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Whilst he has been convicted of offences in the United Kingdom, he has not been sentenced in this country to a term of imprisonment of at least twelve months and he is not said to have caused serious harm or to be a persistent offender. Section 117C is of no application in his case, therefore.

74. I am prepared to assume that the appellant has a private life in the UK, consisting of the ties he has to this country through family and employment. There can be no doubt that the respondent is permitted by law to order the appellant’s deportation. The only real question is whether his deportation is a proportionate course for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR. Whilst the proportionality assessment under the ECHR is distinct from that under regulation 27(5), many of the factual matters above are relevant to both.

75. Given the appellant’s criminality, his deception and the likelihood of his committing further offences, I conclude that the matters which militate in favour of deportation clearly outweigh the matters which militate in favour of him remaining, and I also dismiss his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim.


Notice of Decision

The decision of the FtT having been set aside in part, I remake the decision on the appeal by dismissing it on all grounds.



Mark Blundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


28 August 2025