Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005408

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/54668/2023
LH/05847/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SEELHOFF

Between

Hektor Celaj
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Pullinger, Counsel instructed by SMA Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Cunha, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 February 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
The Background
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Albania. His date of birth is 20 June 1983. He is married to Lithuanian national. They have two children born in 2010 and 2016 respectively. He has lived in the UK continuously since 2006 having entered lawfully having been granted an EEA Family Permit. He was granted ILR on 14 September 2020 under the EUSS. The Appellant’s wife and children have ILR through the EUSS.
2. The Appellant appealed against the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) on 9 March 2023 to refuse his human rights claim following the making of a deportation order. His appeal was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) on 6 January 2024. The SSHD’s appeal against this decision was successful. The Upper Tribunal found that the FtT erred in-law and set aside the decision of the FtT. The Upper Tribunal remitted the appeal to the FtT to be re-heard. The appeal came before the FtT on 30 August 2024. The FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal in a decision which was promulgated on 9 September 2024. The Appellant was granted permission by the Upper Tribunal on 19 December 2024 to appeal against the decision of the FtT to dismiss his appeal.
3. The Appellant is a foreign criminal. On 9 March 2023, the SSHD made a deportation order against him pursuant to s.32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (the UKBA). This followed the Appellant’s conviction on 6 December 2021, following a guilty plea, of possession with intent to supply a class A drug (the “trigger offence”) for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 30 months on 4 March 2022. The drugs that were recovered from the Appellant amounted to 50 wraps of cocaine weighing approximately 20 grams. At the same time he was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment for possession of criminal property of a value of £4,595 to run concurrently. He was also convicted of RTA offences, for which he received six points on his licence.
4. The Appellant was cautioned in 2013 for possession of an offensive weapon. The Appellant was convicted in 2014 of common assault. The judge, sentencing the Appellant for the trigger offence at Harrow Crown Court, said that the 2014 conviction was unrelated. He was satisfied that the trigger offence was out of character and that character references supported that the Appellant played a positive role in and was a positive influence on his family and that he was seen as a good person. Against this, the judge said that the Appellant took a decision to become involved in the “vile trade of Class A drugs”. He said that the Appellant “knowingly agreed” in order to earn money. The sentencing judge said that there were elements of the Appellant playing a “significant role” and “lesser role” and that he clearly had an expectation of significant financial gain. The Appellant’s sentence was reduced by 25% by the judge on the basis of the Appellant’s guilty plea.
5. The Appellant was incarcerated from December 2021 until 4 January 2023 when he was released on licence which expired on 5 April 2024.
Issues
6. Our task is to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law. We are not determining the appeal against the decision of the SSHD. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. It does not matter that we would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
7. We remind ourselves of the following principles that the law says must apply when considering whether there is an error of law. We summarise those, having considered: KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693 AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
1. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert tribunal, and an appellate court should not rush to find a misdirection an error of law merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
2. The UT should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
3. The UT should not be astute to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the UT's assessment of the facts.
4. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.
5. The UT is an appellate court, and it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the First-tier Tribunal judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that the First-tier Tribunal does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
6. Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically.
7. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
8. Decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself in law.
9. The focus should be on the way the First-tier Tribunal performed the essence of the analysis.
The decision of the FtT
8. The judge said that he found the evidence of the Appellant and his wife to be “compelling and candid,” and he said that he had no hesitation in accepting the evidence. They gave oral evidence and adopted their witness statements as evidence-in-chief.
9. The FtT heard evidence from both the Appellant and his wife. The issues were identified at paragraph 19. It was agreed that the first issue was whether Exception 2 applies. Exception 2 is a reference to s.117C(5) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum 2002 Act (NIA Act 2002) and the second issue was identified as whether there are very compelling circumstances with reference to s. 117C (6) NIA Act 2002.
10. The evidence as accepted by the judge was that before the Appellant’s arrest he owned a restaurant and before that he worked in the construction trade as a builder. At the date of the hearing he was working part-time as a car mechanic. The Appellant’s wife is the primary carer for the children. Whilst the Appellant was in prison, she worked around school hours and she also at times relied upon her friends. During this time, both her sons slept with her and they would “count down” the days to their father’s release. The judge said about her evidence that she, “vividly and candidly described this change in their behaviour”. She told the judge that in the event of the Appellant’s deportation she would seek to visit him as often as she could.
11. During his prison sentence, the Appellant’s eldest son was bullied and on one occasion stabbed in the arm by a fellow pupil. Both of his sons found this period difficult. The Appellant spends time playing football and going to the cinema with his children. They enjoy family holidays in Cornwall. Whilst he was in prison the Appellant’s wife and children visited him every fortnight.
12. The Appellant had not adopted the recommendations made in the OASys Report. He said that he did not need to and that he could deal with any identified issues himself.
13. There were no issues of non-compliance during the licence period and this was supported by a letter from the Probation Service which was before the judge dated 5 February 2024.
14. The SSHD conceded that it would be unduly harsh for the family to relocate together to Albania. However the issue was whether separation would be unduly harsh.
15. In the unduly harsh assessment the judge accepted that the Appellant has a close relationship with his sons and that he is seeking to build on that relationship. The judge said that he had regard to the impact on the family from the Appellant’s imprisonment. The judge said, “the fact that the three of them slept together for the length of time the Appellant remained in prison, was telling” (see paragraph 53). The judge said at paragraph 54, “I have regard to the sentencing remarks of Recorder Johnson dated 4 March 2022”. The judge noted the details of the Appellant’s conviction and the length of imprisonment as well as setting out parts of the judge’s sentencing comments at paragraphs 54 and 55. The judge said that he had regard to the OASys Report. He said that the recommendations in relation to rehabilitation courses were not mandatory and he did not hold the Appellant’s failure to undertake them against him. He said that the OASys report supported the judge’s sentencing remarks as to the financial gain expected by the Appellant (see paragraph 56). The judge at paragraph 58 reminded himself that the Appellant was given a warning letter relating to deportation in 2016. The judge said that he acknowledged that there would be harsh consequences but that he had not been provided with any evidence that amounted to the impact of deportation being unduly harsh and that the elevated threshold was not met.
16. The judge said in relation to the factors relied on by the Appellant’s representative that they did not go “anywhere close to meeting the requisite test”. The judge said that there was no evidence to suggest a particular need of a child or the inability by the Appellant’s wife to properly care for the children. The judge said that there were no particular medical needs and that the Appellant could use his skills to obtain employment and assist in the financial maintenance of his family. The judge concluded at paragraph 61, “When I consider all the evidence a (sic) whole, I am not satisfied that the high threshold test has been met. I do not find that the effect of the Appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on either the Appellant’s wife, children or them as a whole”.
17. At paragraphs 65–67 the judge went on to consider very compelling circumstances. He directed himself on NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662 in relation to the best interests of the Appellant’s children. He acknowledged that there would be an impact on them following deportation. He took into account the point at which the eldest son had reached in his education and that he was about to embark on his GCSE year; however, the judge said that he had not been provided with any evidence to support an adverse impact on the children beyond what may be expected. He said that he had regard to the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. He said that he had regard to the serious offence committed by the Appellant and that he was given a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment. He took into account the sentencing remarks. He took into account that there was nothing in the OASys report that highlights a significant or heightened risk. He said that he had taken into account the positive probation letter and that the Appellant had been in the UK since 2002 and that he had developed both a private and family life here. The judge said there was no evidence before him to suggest any adverse impact on the health of the Appellant or indeed any significant inability to reintegrate in Albania. The judge said that the Appellant’s offending behaviour was serious and that he was satisfied that this increased the public interest in his deportation. The judge concluded that there were no “very compelling reasons” and dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
The grounds of appeal
18. There is one ground of appeal. The Appellant says that the judge considered immaterial matters when concluding that deportation would be unduly harsh; namely, the comments of the sentencing judge and the OASys Report. When granting permission Judge Canavan identified an arguable Robinson obvious point insofar as she found that it was arguable that there is a lack of structured reasoning in relation to the unduly harsh test and that the judge failed to conduct an assessment of the best interests of the children as an integral part of assessing whether deportation would be unduly harsh. She said that he only turned to that issue when considering very compelling circumstances.
The Law
The Statutory Framework
19. In this case, the relevant statutory framework is set out at s.117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIAA). This reads as follows:-
“117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.”
20. The Appellant is a medium offender having been sentenced to period of imprisonment of less than four years having regard to s.117C(3). The Appellant relies on family life and says that Exception 2 applies (s.117C(5)). If he is right about this, statute tells us that that the public interest requires a medium offender to be deported unless Exception 2 applies. In those circumstances in accordance with the statute, the Appellant’s appeal must be allowed. If Exception 2 does not apply, the public interest requires deportation and his appeal must be dismissed unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exception 2 with reference to s.117C (6).
Case Law
21. We have summarised the principles set out in case law relating to unduly harsh and very compelling circumstances. The case law includes KO (Nigeria) & ors v SSHD [2018] UKSC 53, HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, MK (section 55 – Tribunal options) [2015] UKUT 223, NA (Pakistan) v SSHD & ors [2016] EWCA Civ 662, Velasquez Taylor v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 48, Akinyemi v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 236 and SSHD v Garzon [2018] EWCA Civ 1225
22. In relation to the unduly harsh test and the assessment of very compelling circumstance we have considered the relevant case law including HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 and NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662. We will not set out those cases in detail but we have summarised the salient points as they apply to the appeal.
23. The unduly harsh test is a self-contained exercise. That means that it is not permissible for a judge to consider public interest considerations, the seriousness of the Appellant’s offending and or the length of his sentence when assessing unduly harsh in the context of s117C (5). The assessment of unduly harsh is confined to the consideration of the impact of deportation on the children.
24. In relation to the unduly harsh test, it is matter to be evaluated only with reference to the child himself and the impact of deportation on the child is not to be weighed against the criminality of the parent. Unduly harsh does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. It poses a considerably more elevated threshold “harsh” in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb “unduly” raises an already elevated standard still higher. The focus should be on the emotional impact on the Appellant’s children.
25. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the hurdle is not as high as that set by the test of “very compelling circumstances” in s.117C(6).
26. In assessing very compelling circumstances “over and above” in the context of s.117C(6) the public interest requires deportation. A judge’s starting point is that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and the more serious the offence the greater the public interest in deportation.
27. An appellant can rely on features of their case in Exceptions 2 and those factors may, together with other factors, constitute very compelling circumstances. There is no exceptionality requirement but cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation are rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children will not be sufficient. The very compelling circumstances test is extremely demanding. It imports a very high threshold and compelling means circumstances which have a powerful, irresistible and convincing effect.
28. The public interest is not fixed and that there are factors that can bear weight on the public interest.
29. Relevant considerations include the nature and seriousness of the offence, the length of the appellant’s stay in the UK, the time that has elapsed since the offence was committed and the appellant’s conduct during that period, the appellant’s family circumstances and whether a partner knew about the offence at the time when they entered into a family relationship, whether there are children of the relationship, the seriousness of the difficulties which a spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled and the best interests and wellbeing of the children.
30. There is a high level of importance attached by Parliament to the deportation of foreign criminals and this can only be outweighed by very compelling circumstances in the case of an offender who does not satisfy the unduly harsh test.
31. Rehabilitation is in general likely to be of little or no material weight, but if there is evidence of positive rehabilitation it could have a bearing on whether deportation is necessary to protect the public.
Error of law
32. We took into account Ms Cunha’s primary submission. She said that it was not material that the judge considered the sentencing comments of the judge and the OASys report when assessing unduly harsh because they were assessed positively in the Appellant’s favour.
33. We find that the judge considered whether deportation would be unduly harsh taking into account the Appellant’s criminality and the public interest in deportation which is impermissible. While we exercise caution in finding the judge erred, the judge took into account the public interest when assessing unduly harsh which is an immaterial matter. The sentencing remarks were not all positive in favour of the Appellant and in any event, it is not clear what weight the judge attached to the Appellant’s criminality from the assessment that he made.
34. The judge materially erred in law and for that reason we set aside the decision of the FtT to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. We expressed our view to the parties that we should remake the decision following submissions. The findings of the judge are not challenged and the evidence was accepted. The issue is narrow.
Application for an adjournment
35. Mr Pullinger applied for an adjournment on the basis that the Appellant wishes to instruct an expert to consider the effect of deportation on his children. Ms Cunha objected to the application. We refused to adjourn the appeal. We had regard to the overriding objective: Rule 2 of the Tribunal (Upper Tribunal) Procedure Rules 2008 (the “2008 Rules”). Fairness does not demand an adjournment. Mr Pullinger submitted that the purpose of the report was to assist the Tribunal, but he was unable to be more specific about this. Moreover, the Appellant has had ample opportunity to obtain an expert report in support of his appeal. He has had two appeals to date. We were told that an expert has not to date been instructed or identified. The Appellant’s solicitors have not served a notice under Rule 15A(2) of the 2008 Rules or made an application before the hearing for an adjournment. The application was made at the last minute and what is hoped to be gained from it is entirely speculative. The standard directions which were issued to the parties clearly set out the position and the expectations of the parties including the presumption that in the event of the Tribunal deciding that the decision of the FtT is to be set aside, the remaking of the decision will take place at the same hearing. A delay in determining this appeal is contrary to the overriding objective.
Re-making
The SSHD’s submissions
36. In summary Ms Cunha submitted that the SSHD relied the decision of 9 March 2023. She said that the elevated test was not met in respect of unduly harsh. She said that it would be easier for the children to cope with their father’s deportation to Albania than serving a prison sentence. The Appellant can find work in Albania. His wife is the “bread winner” and can continue as such. There are no very compelling circumstances. She relied on the offence committed by the Appellant and the length of sentence to support that deportation was proportionate.
The Appellant’s submissions
37. Mr Pullinger relied on Mr Gajar’s skeleton argument that was before the FtT. We summarise the aspects of the Appellant’s case which were relied on to support that the unduly harsh test is met. They are as follows:
1) The Appellant’s eldest child is at a significant point in his education (year 9).
2) The Appellant’s youngest child is in year 3 at school and this is a sensitive time.
3) The Appellant was visited regularly by his family whilst in prison.
4) The children would be permanently separated from their father as opposed to when he was serving a prison sentence.
5) The children counted the days until the Appellant’s release from prison
6) The Appellant plays an active role in the lives of the children. He takes them to and collects them from school. He takes them to football.
7) The practical impact on the Appellant’s wife faces the prospect of raising two children alone. She will have to work full-time.
8) The children will not have their emotional needs met.
38. In respect of very compelling circumstances, Mr Pullinger relied on the following:
1) The public interest is not fixed.
2) The factors put forward to support that separation would be unduly harsh on the family.
3) The Appellant has not reoffended since his release from custody.
4) The letter from his probation officer and certificates support that the Appellant has completed educational courses.
5) The OASys report supports that the Appellant ‘s criminality is unlikely to be repeated (our attention was drawn to pp 402, 403, 406, 408, 409 and 410)
6) The Appellant was give enhanced status when in prison.
7) The cause of the Appellant’s offending was drug use and the stress relating to running a business. He is no longer exposed to these risks.
8) The significant period of time that the Appellant has been in the UK.
9) The family is financially independent and they have cultural ties to the UK.

Findings and reasons
39. There is no doubt that the best interests of the children are for them to remain in the UK with both parents. We are in no doubt that the impact of deportation on the Appellant’s wife and their children will be devastating; however, there is no evidence before us that supports that the elevated test has been met. The Appellant has a close relationship with his family. Although he concedes in his witness statement that his relationship with his sons has been “shaky”, he is now a supportive and caring father with the intention of mending his relationship.
40. It was traumatic for the family when the Appellant was incarcerated and we do not accept Ms Cunha’s submission that deportation will be easier for the children than the Appellant serving a determinative prison sentence in the UK. In addition we do not accept that holidays to Albania to see their father and contact through social media is a substitute for living with a parent. The impact of deportation will be harsh. We take in to account the sleeping issues relating to the children when the Appellant was in prison and their longing for his release. However, this is nothing more than expected in the circumstances. We remind ourselves that the interpretation by the courts of the unduly harsh test and that harsh denotes something severe, or bleak and it is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable and that the adverb “unduly” raises an already elevated standard still higher. It does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. There is no evidence that the children’s suffering or that of the Appellant’s wife will be exacerbated by health or other issues so as to meet the elevated standard required to succeed under s.117C(5). We take into account the evidence that the Appellant’s wife will have to work full-time and as a result will spend less time with the children. We do not accept the submission that this will amount to the children being neglected. Many parents work full-time and there is no evidence that the Appellant’s children’s needs will not be met should their mother work full-time. In any event, there is no reason why the Appellant would not seek work in Albania and make a contribution towards the maintenance of the family. While the impact on the Appellant’s wife and children will be difficult, we find that the evidence falls very much short of meeting the elevated unduly harsh test.
41. We go on to consider whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above in the context of s.117C(6). In the Appellant’s favour we take into account the following:
1) The findings we have already made in respect of the impact of deportation on the family including the children’s best interests.
2) The Appellant has been in the UK for a significant period of time and has developed a significant private life. He has been here continuously since 2007 and on and off before then.
3) The Appellant pleaded guilty to the offences and has not attempted to distance himself from his criminal behaviour in these proceedings.
4) The Appellant’s behaviour in prison and the completion of educational courses.
5) The Appellant has been assessed by his probation officer as presenting a low risk of re-offending
6) The Appellant is remorseful and regrets his criminal conduct. The judge’s sentencing remarks support that the trigger offence was a one off and out of character.
7) The Appellant relies on having not committed an offence since his release from prison. While this is a matter we take into account, it is not a weighty factor. The Appellant was released on 4 January 2023 and on licence until 5 April 2024. Thus, the period of time is not significant.
8) The OASys report indicates that the Appellant’s offending was motivated by drugs and alcohol, the stress of running his own business and financial circumstances and that there is no evidence that at the date of the hearing these motivators apply.
42. We have considered the factors that support that deportation is proportionate. In so doing our starting point is that deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. We are cognisant that the public interest is not fixed and that there are factors that can bear weight on the public interest.
43. We take into account the following:
1) The reasons we have given for finding that the impact of deportation would not be unduly harsh the Appellant.
2) The Appellant received a warning of deportation from the SSHD in 2016 following his conviction for common assault. Nevertheless common he knowingly got involved in the trade of Class A drugs which causes significant harm to society.
3) The Appellant has been convicted of a serious offence reflected in the length of sentence imposed.
4) The Appellant has been in the UK continuously since 2007. He was in born in the UK. He arrived here as an adult. He spent most of his life in Albania. There is no evidence that he does not have family in Albania.
5) Low risk of reoffending does not equate with no risk.
6) There will be financial difficulties as the Appellant is currently working as a part time mechanic in the UK. However, the Appellant’s wife works and continue to do so.
7) The Appellant can reasonably be expected to seek employment in Albania and contribute towards the maintenance of his family in the UK.
44. The offence committed by the Appellant is unarguably extremely serious and we take into account and adopt the comments of the sentencing judge concerning the seriousness and the impact on society of this kind of crime. We find that the factors in favour of deportation far outweigh those against. Deportation is contrary to the children’s best interest which carries great weight in the Appellant’s favour; however, separation of the Appellant from his children is a consequence of his criminal conduct. We remind ourselves that the desirability of children being with their parent is a commonplace feature of family life and not usually a sufficiently compelling circumstance to outweigh the high public interest in deporting foreign criminals. We accept that there will be distressing consequences for this family as a result of what the Appellant has done. However, the factors relied on by the Appellant do not nearly meet the extremely demanding test to amount to very compelling circumstances so as to reduce the strong public interest in the deportation of the Appellant.
45. There are matters we note but do not attach weight to because Ms Cunha did not rely on them in submissions. They were not issues raised by the SSHD. It is of course a matter for the SSHD how to present their case. While the Appellant has been assessed as presenting a low risk of re-offending he has also been assessed as presenting a medium risk to children and a known adult following the assault on his wife in front of their young son in 2014. Ms Cunha was not able to tell us the details of the offence; however, they are disclosed in the OASys report. It also discloses that there was some involvement of the social services relating to the children following “domestic violence” and that the Appellant and his wife had marital problems in 2021 when he left the family home. As stated we attach no weight to these matters in our assessment of proportionality for the reason that they were not raised by the SSHD. Similarly we do not attach weight to the Appellant having not undertaken recommended courses in light of the unchallenged finding of the FtT.
46. The appeal is dismissed under Article 8 ECHR.

Joanna McWilliam

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 February 2025