Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005416

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55116/2022
LP/00732/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between
M M
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Halim, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at (IAC) on 5 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity order:
1. The FtTJ made an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
2. This is the remaking of the decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. In accordance with section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, it follows the decision made by Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce, issued on 4 August 2025 by which she concluded that the FtTJ materially erred in law when dismissing the appellant’s appeal and that its decision should be set aside. In that decision UTJ Bruce expressly preserved the finding of fact that the documents relied upon by the appellant were genuine. They referred to court documentation and FIR’s that had been issued in Bangladesh. The error of law decision is set out in the annex to this remaking decision.
Preliminary matters:
3. When remaking the decision, this would normally be carried out by the UTJ who had found the error of law. However, a transfer order has been made in this appeal dated 21 November. The directions given by UTJ Bruce at paragraph 22 of her decision have been complied with and that in light of the change of circumstances in Bangladesh, permission was given to produce further country background evidence. Furthermore, an expert report has been filed and served relevant to the issue of risk and respondent has filed her position statement.
4. As a transfer order had been made and there is no schedule of issues, at the outset of the case, the advocates were asked to clarify what factual matters were in issue and in particular were asked to provide their understanding of the preserved finding made by the Upper Tribunal in its decision promulgated on 4 August 2025 that the documents relied upon by the appellant were genuine documents.
5. Mr Halim, who had been Counsel before the Upper Tribunal at the hearing on 21 July 2025, indicated that whilst the decision was brief, the point concerning the genuineness of the documents was canvassed with the parties which had led to the preserved finding set out paragraph 16 and also paragraph 21. Mr Halim further explained that both parties have proceeded on the basis of that preserved fact both in his skeleton argument and also in the respondent’s position statement. He confirmed that as set out in his skeleton argument, having resolved that factual issue that the court documents were genuinely issued court documents it was conclusive evidence of political interest in the appellant and the issue to be determined was the risk to the appellant set in the context of the relevant country materials and objective evidence including the expert report recently filed on behalf the appellant. He further submitted that the 2017 decision was of no practical relevance, because the conclusion reached in that decision did not accept that there were any proceedings issued against the appellant and this finding was superseded by the provision of further evidence and importantly the expert reports. When asked about the other evidence submitted for this appeal which included photographs in the UK, Mr Halim confirmed that those documents were not of any relevance to that issue and no findings were sought. He confirmed that the appellant’s case relied upon the preserved finding that there were genuinely issued court documents demonstrating that he had been convicted and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and that there were two further outstanding arrest warrants and the question was what risk the appellant faced on return in light of having been convicted in absentia and considering the country information.
6. Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent, directed me to the previous decision of the FtTJ which had been set aside by UTJ Bruce and in particular paragraphs 41 and 42. He stated that the respondent agreed that the documents were genuinely issued as the two expert reports had confirmed but that the distinction made by the respondent was that they were not genuine cases although he stated it was accepted they were politically motivated. He clarified that the respondent’s position was that he would not be of any adverse interest upon return to Bangladesh in light of those genuinely issued charges because they were politically motivated under the former regime and were not legitimate cases. He submitted that if the appellant is able to demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood or a real risk that there will be an adverse interest in him as a result of political opinion either actual or imputed he succeeds under the Refugee Convention and in those circumstances it is not necessary to consider the other aspect of the appeal raised in the appellant’s skeleton argument under Article 3 of the ECHR in the context of prison conditions.
7. Mr Halim further responded stating that it was agreed that if the appellant is of adverse interest to the authorities, he succeeds under the Refugee Convention, but that Article 3 was a discrete argument. In this context he referred to his skeleton argument on this issue. He further sought to adduce 2 newspaper articles which post -dated his skeleton argument and upon which he submitted provided more up-to-date material than that in the respondent’s skeleton argument. He stated that those documents he said were in the public domain and referred to overcrowding in prisons .They had not been filed with the Upper Tribunal, nor had they been served on the respondent. Time was therefore given to Mr Wain to read the documents, for them to be uploaded to the electronic file and for any observations or submissions made on their admissibility given the lateness and in the circumstances in which they had been provided.
8. When the appeal resumed, Mr Wain opposed their admission in light of their timing and in his submission as an “afterthought.” Thus, he submitted they should not be admitted given that they had not been served and filed in accordance with the directions but if they were admitted, in his submission they did not take the case any further on the article 3 issue. Mr Halim referred to the relevance to the issue of prison conditions and that the material was provided to demonstrate a more balanced picture to that set out in the respondent’s skeleton. After hearing the submissions, I reached the conclusion that I would consider the question of admissibility and/or weight of the documents at a later stage and after hearing the submissions on the issues as agreed.
9. Both advocates have referred to the preserved finding of fact that the court documentation relied upon by the appellant is genuine. They have both provided their explanations for this preserved finding and neither party seeks to reopen that issue and when advancing their respective cases, both parties invite the Tribunal to assess the issue of risk in the context of those genuine documents. As I understand the position of both advocates before the Upper Tribunal in July 2025, they were in agreement as to that preserved fact. This has been explained by them in the context of the previous decision and that the FtTJ referred to the documents at paragraph 40 and made some observations upon those documents. However, at paragraphs 41 – 42 the FtTJ accepted the opinion of the two experts that the copies of the documents were copies of genuine court documents.
10. When the appeal was before the Upper Tribunal at a hearing on 21 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce assessed the grounds of challenge and found that notwithstanding the high threshold required for irrationality , her assessment was that the FtTJ’s treatment of the FIR’s /court documents was irrational and the analysis of those documents at paragraph 40 was flawed for several mistakes of fact. The UTJ concluded that the FtTJ had misunderstood what some of the documents were and had that not been the case the judge may not have reached the conclusion that she did. The UTJ expressly preserved the finding made that the court document/FIR’s relied upon by the appellant were genuine documents ( see paragraphs 16 and 21 of the UTJ’s decision). I therefore proceed on the basis of that preserved fact and in the context it was preserved as submitted by the advocates.
11. Mr Wain further confirmed that the appellant’s political background was not disputed or the events that had happened and that the respondent was not disputing his political profile. He further confirmed that it was not disputed that the charges were politically motivated but that he would not be of adverse interest to the current authorities and therefore the appellant would not be of adverse interest because they would not be acted upon due to the change of position now in Bangladesh. Thus, the dispute is whether the current authorities would pursue the appellant in light of the documents being genuinely issued. Mr Halim’s response was that the issue was a narrow one, given that the political profile was not now disputed nor that the appellant had provided genuine documentary evidence in support of his case. He outlined that the focus of the appeal was on the issue of risk.
12. As can be seen from the above discussion, it was necessary to have some clarity as to the issues to be determined in this appeal. It was unclear why the preserved finding had been made and the respondent’s position statement at paragraph 6 seemed to resile from that preserved finding. However, that has been clarified by the advocates, and I proceed on the basis upon which they have outlined their cases. Whilst there is reference to aspects of the appellant’s previous claim as not credible (see paragraph 5 of the position statement), as recorded above the appellant’s political profile was not now disputed.
The evidence:
13. At the outset of the hearing steps were taken to ensure that the evidence was available to both advocates and the Tribunal. There had been a large bundle of documents provided by the appellant consisting of the appellant’s supplementary subjective bundle (49 pages), the appellant supplementary objective bundle (77 pages) and the composite electronic bundle ( 1436 pages) which consisted of the material which had been before the Upper Tribunal and First-Tier Tribunal also included the respondent’s bundle.
14. No separate bundle had been served and filed on behalf of the respondent.
15. Mr Halim had prepared a skeleton argument for the hearing dated 12 September 2025. Mr Wain relied upon the Position Statement dared 13 November 2025 (although subject to the matters set out above).
16. The appellant gave his evidence with the assistance of an interpreter. There were no problems identified with the interpretation and both the interpreter, and the appellant confirmed that they were able to understand each other. The appellant confirmed the previous witness statement that had been filed for the previous proceedings dated 11/7/2024 )(p.56 CeF) and 11/9/2025 (p10 supplementary subjective bundle) a as his evidence in chief. There were no additional questions asked in chief.
17. Mr Wain question the appellant about the outstanding charges in Bangladesh, and the appellant confirmed that there were four separate cases filed against him. When asked to give the date that he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, the appellant said that it was in 2019. The appellant was asked about the witness statement from his father and whether this was the first time he had provided evidence. The appellant stated that it had “come before as well.” The question was repeated and the appellant was asked about the authorities coming in April 2025, and whether this was the first time his father provided evidence in support of the appeal. The appellant stated that this was the first one here, but a previous one was given in 2017. It was suggested to him that 2017 was before he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. He was therefore asked between 2019 and April 2025 what evidence there had been that the police had come to the family home. The appellant stated that they had come looking for him “many times” but he had managed to provide (evidence). The appellant further stated that the authorities had pursued him in earlier in 20 September 2016 when he was part of the student wing and that’s when he found out in his absence that they were was a case being pursued against him. It was suggested to him that he was attempting to strengthen his case. The appellant refuted that suggestion and that the previous court had not asked him as to whether the authorities had come to the village for him.
18. As to the charges which were levelled against him, he agreed that they were politically motivated by the Awami league authorities and also accepted that they were false charges that were made against him.
19. The appellant was asked if he had had any contact with his party about withdrawing the charges? The appellant responded that he had already been sentenced “so nothing has happened.” When asked if he had contacted his party about this evidence he said that he had not. He was asked why he had not contacted them? The appellant then stated that they had been in contact, and they told him because he had been sentenced. It was put to him that his evidence had changed. The appellant stated that he had been informed nothing had happened about his case. He then stated there had been communication with his party. He was asked if there was any reason he had not submitted the evidence and the appellant stated in response that it had come a while ago and the secretary general and provided this recently. He referred to the material coming last month and that he had spoken to the secretary general.
20. No further questions were asked of the appellant in cross examination. The appellant however stated he wished to add to his answer concerning returning 2016 and that he had said it in his statement that he had returned from Cyprus with his daughter who was ill with autism and that he had been advised to take her to Bangladesh by the GP. He said that on 20 September 2016 the police and members of the Awami -League was searching for him as a result of the charges filed against him. He had not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment that time as it happened in 2019.
21. I asked some questions to clarify his evidence as regards the identity of the people on the charge sheet and whether he knew any of those others. The appellant stated that he did not but that they were political supporters of the same party that he supported. He was asked about his political position in Bangladesh and that he had previously said that there were 50,000 ward officer and that he was one of them. He agreed and said that he was a political leader and that he had a leadership role and act in that capacity which he had been continuing. Neither advocate had any questions arising out those questions of clarification. No further evidence was called by either party.
The submissions:
22. At the conclusion of the evidence each party had the opportunity to provide their closing summary. I am grateful for the helpful submissions proved by both advocates. Each party relied upon the written submissions that they had provided, and they were supplemented by their oral submissions. It is not necessary to set out those submissions in any detail as they are a matter of record, and I confirm that I have had regard to those submissions in reaching an analysis on the issues in this appeal.
23. Mr Wain submitted that the preserved finding that the documents from the court were genuinely issued did not mean that the appellant would be of interest to the authorities because there now was a change in government. He submitted that the Awami League no longer held power and the appellant had not shown that the authorities were interested in him. In this context he submitted that he had not been credible previously and this was relevant in assessing the evidence from his father that there had been a visit made in April 2025. He submitted that his evidence had been inconsistent as to whether there had been visits made and the amount, and had there been such visits, there would have been reference to them in the statement of the appellant’s father. The appellant has also not contacted his party in Bangladesh to see if he could obtain the withdrawal of the charges.
24. Mr Wain submitted that when assessing the CPIN, the starting point was that in the decision of MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812, the Court agreed with the Executive Summary of the CPIN between paragraphs 14 – 17 and that an individual would not be at risk of persecution where there was a risk from nonstate agents. He submitted that the political affiliations between the appellant’s party and that of the appellant in MU was similar although he accepted that in MU there was no outstanding arrest warrant.
25. He submitted that the distinctions that Dr Hoque drew in his report which related to the appellant being at risk of localised mob violence due to ongoing political turmoil was not consistent with the CPIN relying on paragraphs 3.1.10-3.1.12. The Awami league is not part of the government, and the country material refers to the release of prisoners who had been detained under the previous regime. This is relevant as it gives a background of the interim government which is predominantly now ruled by those associated as oppositionists parties. Overall, he submitted current interim government enforced arrest warrants, but they were against the Awami league. Thus, the appellant would not be of interest.
26. Dr Hoque’s report was premised on the basis that the interim government were not revoking previous cases (see paragraphs 25 and 50) but that was contradicted by the material set out in the footnotes to paragraph 11 of the position statement. Furthermore, at paragraph 56, Dr Hoque refers to the party the appellant belongs to is being subject to discrimination however he does not say that this amounts to persecution and fails to factor in the material from the CPIN that the majority behind the interim government is the BNP who Jaamiat-e-Islami are affiliated to. He submitted that at its highest the report outlines a risk from rogue state agents, but that does not demonstrate there is a systemic issue with the current government. The CPIN sets out state protection (para 4.2.6) and there is reference to the improvements made to the police and the judiciary to remove the Awami league. Those actions do not support the conclusion of the expert that there is a significant number of Awami league people to enforce the charges on political grounds. Thus, he submitted there is no risk on return.
27. As to Article 3 based on the prison conditions, there are no grounds to depart from the CG decision of SH (prison conditions) Bangladesh CG [2008] UKIAT 00076 and the test set out in SG (Iraq) is not made out. The difficulty with the submissions made on behalf of the appellant is that they seek to rely upon the issue of overcrowding, but there is conflicting evidence about the increase and decrease of this. This is not consistent with the decision in Mursic v Croatia (2017) 65 EHRR 1 ( see paragraphs to 123 – 125 and that all the circumstances of the case need to be considered such as the impact on the mental and physical effects and the state of health of the victim. Consequently, there is no clear and cogent evidence to depart from SH (Bangladesh). This was not an issue that was addressed in the expert report.
28. Mr Wain submitted that if there was adverse interest in the appellant on return the appellant would succeed in his claim and it was not necessary to consider this discrete article 3 argument.
29. Mr Halim submitted that the respondent’s approach the case was difficult to follow in light of the preserved finding that the documents were genuinely issued documents from the court that were politically motivated and false rather than based on any criminal conduct. Those documents having been found to be genuine is therefore determinative of the appeal in the appellant’s favour. He submitted that the respondent’s submissions do not engage with the reality as the documents now demonstrate conclusive evidence not only that he faces proceedings but there is a sentence of imprisonment. The submissions made do not deal with the sentence that has been passed. Thus, it is no answer for the appellant to ask for the outstanding cases to be dropped as that cannot apply to a sentence already imposed. The articles in the footnote do not relate to sentences imposed and the legal provision refers to the power to withdraw cases but not after judgement is pronounced. That is unsurprising as a court order is valid until it is set aside. Thus, the evidence of withdrawal of cases does not apply to this appellant.
30. Whilst it is submitted that he is of no adverse interest because there is a new interim government and the credibility points are raised in this context they are irrelevant to risk as he has a conviction with a 20-year sentence which is accepted to be genuine. In any event, given the documents themselves there is a real and obvious risk that he will be arrested when in Bangladesh, even if not at the airport and there is no evidence to suggest any other conclusion or outcome.
31. He submitted that the only point that might be against the appellant is that the government might not act against a final order however there was no reason to find this to be the position as there is no evidence to say that the government is not committed to the rule of law and therefore would pursue this. The question is whether there is a real risk, and on the evidence that is accepted and in the light of the country material there is a real risk that he will be pursued arrested and detained as a result not just of the arrest warrants but the conviction. It is not sufficient to argue that because there is a new government there is no risk to this appellant (relying on the dicta in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at paragraph 52 that “it is well established that the standard required is less than a 50% chance persecution occurring. Even a 10% chance that an applicant will face persecution for a Convention reason may satisfy the relevant test”).
32. He submitted that the respondent has invited the tribunal to “turn the clock back” to the 2017 decision, but the material now provided and accepted as genuine provides a different evidential world as they were not before the previous Tribunal. Mr Halim submitted that the decision in MU (Bangladesh) cited by the respondent was decided on its own facts concerning a supporter of the BNP and not someone who was convicted and sentenced nor was it a case involving arrest warrants or FIRs and such was irrelevant to the case.
33. In terms of the CPIN, he submitted that it was not evidence itself and the report should be afforded weight for the reasons set out in the skeleton argument. The Awami League is not wiped out and as stated at paragraph 30 of the report state bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies also still contain vast pro Awami league elements appointed by the previous regime and that the reforms will take years to consolidate.
34. In respect of prison conditions in Bangladesh breaching article 3, he relied upon his skeleton argument in this regard and the reference to the case of Mursic and that the CG decision of SH (Bangladesh) ( as cited ) would not have been decided in the same way had they been aware of the decision in Mursic. Mr Halim referred to the articles he sought to rely upon which had not been filed or served, were more recent than those provided by the respondent and did not show improvement.
Analysis and conclusions:
35. The position adopted the position on behalf of the appellant is that the preserved finding that the police and court documentation are genuinely issued documents is determinative of the appeal (see paragraph 3 of skeleton argument and oral submissions made) as they are conclusive evidence that there are proceedings pending but also that there has been a sentence of imprisonment which it is accepted as being false and politically motivated. It therefore submits that there is nothing in the respondent’s argument which deals with the reality of those factual circumstances.
36. In this context as recorded earlier the respondent’s position is that the documents are genuinely issued including the court sentence of imprisonment and that remains however it is argued on behalf of the respondent that the appellant is not wanted by the authorities or otherwise of adverse interest because of this as there has been a change in government. He submits that the change of government and the fall of the Awami League demonstrates that the appellant would not be at risk on return.
37. The burden is on the appellant to show in a protection appeal that their return will expose them to a real risk of an act of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. The risk assessment is conducted on the lower standard of proof of a “reasonable likelihood” or “real risk,” and both parties’ submissions place the issue of consideration of risk in the context of the current political situation in Bangladesh following the events that took place in August 2024 and the fall of the Awami League government.
38. I make the relevant factual findings considering the evidence as a whole and whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the material aspects of the appellant’s claim are demonstrated. The burden of proof remains on the appellant.
39. In this context it is necessary to record there were previous findings made by a FtTJ in 2017 and applying the well-established principles in the decision of Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702 and they are a starting point of any factual assessment. Whilst the respondent refers to this decision (see the position statement paragraphs 5 and 6 ) during the hearing the case advanced by the respondent accepted the appellant’s political profile and along with the preserved finding of the acceptance of the politically motivated charge and court sentence as issued by the authorities in Bangladesh. As Mr Halim submitted it undermines the assessment made by the previous judge who had made a specific finding that the appellant was not wanted by the authorities and was not facing any charges. The FtTJ did not have the advantage of the two expert reports dated 2021 and 2023 relating to the evidence that is now unchallenged nor did the FtTJ have evidence relevant to the subsequent conviction in 2019. The other findings made about the events in Bangladesh are also undermined by that evidence and UTJ Bruce ‘s assessment that the appellant had relied upon “meritorious” grounds where it was argued that the FtTJ and by extension the 2017 Judge when making a finding that the appellant was able to leave Bangladesh in 2006 indicating that he was not of adverse interest, failed to have regard to material evidence in the respondent’s own fact-finding mission that the immigration control is not linked up to the law enforcement agencies and that even serious opposition figures, who face multiple charges are able to come and go from country unimpeded. There was limited cross-examination of the appellant which related to the claimed interest in him in April 2025 and whether he had taken steps to contact his party in Bangladesh to petition on his behalf. There was no cross-examination of the appellant concerning documentation relied upon by the appellant in relation to his political profile which had formed the fresh claim, and which been produced after the hearing in 2017 nor were there any submissions made relating to the reports of Mr Mhadi and Mr Tushar. There was also no cross-examination or challenge concerning the events in Bangladesh prior to him leaving and in the context of the new documents provided. In his submissions, Mr Wain’s general submission was that the previous assessment was that there was a lack of credibility and thus this was support for his submission that the appellant’s evidence in relation to the events of April 2025 was an attempt to embellish the account or otherwise was not reliable.
40. As to the issue of the documentation it is expressly stated by the respondent that it is not asserted that the documents were lodged by the appellant on his instructions for the purposes of the claim or by someone unrelated to the Awami League (see paragraph 7 of the position statement) but that the respondent’s case is advanced on the basis that those documents in isolation are not decisive of risk in the light of the change in government. It is also important to observe that the respondent has not sought to argue that the author of the 2025 report is not an expert or does not possess the relevant expertise upon the issues raised in the report that relate to Bangladesh. What is argued is that the report does not take account of evidence contained in the respondent’s CPIN dated December 2024 relevant to the issue and assessment of risk.
41. Against that evidential background I make the following findings. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. His political profile when in Bangladesh was that he was a member and supporter of the Islami Chatr Shibir, known as BICS, which is a student wing of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party (“BJI”). The party has links to the BNP. The claim made is that he is a long-standing member having joined in 2000 and that he was actively involved for the party shown by his 2006 photo ID card issued by the student wing of the party. His participation for the party included attending rallies and demonstrations and he received adverse interest as a result of those activities. There are letters in support of his profile and positions held in the bundle which relate to his past political activities. There has been no challenge made to those documents which postdate the 2017 decision, and it is accepted that he has a political profile in Bangladesh consistent with his claim. Similarly, Mr Halim did not seek to rely on the sur place documents set out in the supplementary bundle as to his activities in the UK. That material consisted of pictures of the appellant attending political events relevant to Bangladesh. Mr Halim did not make reference in his submissions to that evidence. As there has been no challenge to the political profile based on his activity Bangladesh I proceed on that basis. I observe also that the country evidence both in the respondent’s CPIN dated December 2024 and the expert report provides sections relating to and examining the role of what are described as “auxiliary organisations “including student wings of the various political parties and the importance they play in Bangladesh politics as set out in the report at paragraph 23 and 60 – 70 and section 9 of the CPIN paragraph 9.1 and 9.4.2 by reference to the appellant’s party which is consistent with the factual claim he has made. I also make a finding that his activities in the UK taken at its highest demonstrate that he has retained an interest in Bangladesh politics.
42. I do not find that the appellant has given reliable evidence of a visit made in April 2025. He was not present and his evidence is reliant upon the evidence of a third party albeit a family relative. Whilst I accept the appellant has an outstanding warrant and that is the background to a possible visit, his evidence on this issue is not consistent. His oral evidence initially was that there had been no visits to the home following the conviction and the date claimed of April 2025 but then claimed that they had been visiting “many times”. That latter evidence is not consistent with his witness statement from 2024 where there was no reference to any visits and had that been the position, it is reasonably likely that it would have been set out there. Furthermore, the evidence of the appellant’s father does not refer to any other visits. Turning to his evidence, there is no supporting evidence provided from Bangladesh and any evidence given by his father cannot be tested in cross-examination as he has not given oral evidence. For those reasons I do not find that he has given evidence that is reliable to show that there has been recent interest and that is an embellishment on his part.
43. I therefore turn to the assessment of risk in the light of that factual matrix and that there are two remaining charges outstanding against the appellant and also that he has been convicted of an offence and that they are all politically motivated and not based on any legitimate conduct. The fourth charge is not politically motivated as the 2023 report sets out.
44. Dealing with the issue of the court documentation, the appellant relied upon 2 expert reports; a report dated 10 September 2021 by Mr S Mahdi and Mr Md Solaiman Tushar dated 16 August 2023. Mr Tushar was asked to examine the authenticity of various documents submitted and sets out in the report that he physically attended both police and court records’ rooms to confirm the authenticity and genuine nature of the documents.
45. As stated in the error of law decision of UTJ Bruce, the court documents alongside their translations are not in any particular order and it was this which had led to problems before the FtT. Some of those documents which are replicated in the consolidated bundle are also illegible. It is possible to find more legible copies in other bundles on the electronic file .For that reason Mr Halim, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant was asked to provide a schedule of the court documents with their corresponding page numbers. He identified the following documents in his schedule.
46. A “First Information Report” (FIR) filed at Fatullah Police Station (Case No 19/376) on 30 June 2025 (offence dated 29 June 2015) (Explosive Substances Act). This is the FIR that led to his conviction and sentence of 20 years imprisonment. At page 996 – 997.
47. The Court judgement in order issued in absentia in respect of the Fattulah FIR at page 1005.
48. This document is referred to in the 2023 report at paragraph 25 )p290). It is described as case number 19 dated 30 June 2015 and GR No. 376/2015 dated 30 June 2015. The author of the report stated that on 9 August 2023 he attended at the records room examination and liaising with the officer in charge. He found the case number name of the accused in the section under which the case was filed to be matching with the case provided. It was confirmed that the police admitted the charge sheet to the court on the 30/oh/2015 and the charge sheet number was 587. It is said that the document is genuine.
49. The 2021 report summarises this document at paragraph 7.6. It is stated that while the appellant was in Cyprus a criminal case under the Explosives Act 1908 was lodged against him and some other individuals on 30 June 2015. This was renumbered as special tribunal case number 107/16. After trial, the first additional District and Sessions Court of Narayanganj sentenced the appellant and five other individuals to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment and also ordered to issue sentence warrants for the fugitive convicts.
50. A FIR filed at Bhanga police 71) on 24 February 2017 (section 406/420 penal code 1860 (offence of cheating by criminal breach of trust, offence dated 25 September 2016). At page 359.
51. This document is described as Bhanga police station (in Faridpur) case number 22 dated 24 February 2017 and GR No. 71/2018 dated 24 Feb 2017. On 29 July 2023, he collected the charge sheet of the case as part of the verification. He found the case number as genuine, and the appellant was the only accused of the case. Police admitted the final report to the court on 15 December 2017 under section 173 of the code of criminal procedure 1898.
52. This document was not verified by Mr Madhi as he considered this to be a personal case, lacking any political motive and was not initiated by the police.
53. FIR filed at Mohammadpur police case number 157/1280) on 27 September 2018 (offence dated 26 September 2018)-charged under section 15 (3) special Powers act 1974 offence of conspiracy of destructive acts and important public structures (appellant named at page 410 and 434). At pages 407 – 453.
This document is referred to in the report as case number 157 dated 27 September 2018 and GR No 1280/2018 dated 27 September 2018. On 6 August 2023 he spoke to the court officer and was shown the filing registration of the case and confirming the court proceedings. The case number, name of the accused in the section was matching with the information ( see paragraph 23).
The 2021 report also order number 17 dated 10 February 2021 ( para7.13).
54. FIR filed at Khilket police station (case number 24/221) on 30 September 2018 (offence dated 30 September 2018) at pages 485 – 509. . Offence: Explosives Act 1908/2002. This is referred to as case number 24, dated 30/9/2018 and GR No 221/2018 (p288) . On 1 August 2023, following the record examination he visited the General Registered (GR) section of Khilket of the Chief Magistrate Ct, Dhaka and spoke to the court officer. He was shown the filing registered the case and confirm the court proceedings. He found the case number, name of the accused in the section which matched that case ( para 22 of the report).
55. The 2021 report refers to this at para 7.14, and that on 30th of September 2021 the appellant along with others was accused in another case under penal code 1860 along with the Explosives Act 1908. This is recorded. The order for the issuance of arrest warrant against the applicant was issued by the Metropolitan Mag via order number 16 dated 25 February 2021) (p315Cef).
56. Mr Mhadi in his report (paragraph 23) outlined that the applicant had three cases against him that were of the profile of political cases or “ghost” cases. He did not verify the Bhanga case as it appeared to be a personal one, lacking any political motive and was not initiated by the police. He therefore verified the three pending cases as the “Fatullah” case the Khilkhet case and Mohammadpur case. The first two concerned criminal cases under the explosives act and the last was a criminal case under the Special Powers Act ( para 23;p319Cef).
57. Mr Mhadi undertook a search in the office of the session judges court to examine the authenticity of the Khilket case and Mohammadpur case and in his opinion he found the certified copies provided as genuine as they corresponded with the respective court records ( see para 24;p320Cef). He did not conduct a physical verification of the papers in the Fatullah case as they were in a different district jurisdiction but in his opinion considered those documents to be authentic ( see para 25[p320). He concluded that there was a “ high likelihood “that upon his return the appellant could get arrested immediately at the port of entry as he is a convicted fugitive in a criminal case and that the two other cases which appear to be politically motivated still appear to be pending and to arrest warrants been issued in his name which are currently outstanding. In respect of the Fatullah case, his opinion that the scope of filing an appeal against the verdict of the court “appears to be impossible as the limitation period for appealing against sentence is long gone..” ( see para 38;p325 Cef).
58. Both parties rely on the relevant CPIN for Bangladesh dated December 2024 and there is additional evidence relied upon by the appellant in a new objective bundle along with a report from Dr Hoque dated 8 September 2025. As stated earlier it has not been disputed by the respondent that Dr Hoque is entitled to be viewed as an expert. I accept that the author of the report has the necessary knowledge and experience to report on the issues relating to Bangladesh and he has provided his conclusions by reference to the sources he has set out, and which underpin his written evidence. The issue of weight attached to the report is a matter for the Tribunal to determine. Mr Wain has pointed to parts of the report which he submits is either not consistent with other country materials available in the CPIN and thus has failed to take account of factual information when reaching his conclusion on risk on return. I confirm that I have assessed the report in the context of the submissions made by each of the parties and the sections relied upon by Mr Halim and Mr Wain. I do observe that the report does cite parts of the CPIN and there are consistencies between the contents of the report and the CPIN.
59. There is no dispute between the parties that there has been a significant change in the country conditions since the appellant left Bangladesh following the events in August 2024. Politics in Bangladesh has historically been dominated by the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP). At a local level, support is garnered through auxiliary (often student and youth) groups affiliated with the main 2 parties. In July and early August 2024 widespread protests resulted in the resignation of AL Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the establishment of an interim government on 8 August under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, who is not from any political party.
60. The protests which began on 1 July were peaceful, led by students in university towns but turned violent in mid-July 2024. The protest movement against the job quota system began on 1 July. Peaceful protests led by students in university towns turned violent in mid- July 2024, as the focus widened to incorporate frustrations with the government and economy. Although not initially aligned to any political group, the protests gained opposition supporters mainly from the BNP, its student wing Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dol (JCD) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party, a longstanding ally of the BNP. The AL student wing – the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) – alongside other pro-AL groups, aligned with the security forces who used violence and weapons including, rubber bullets, tear gas, batons and, during some protests, live ammunition to disperse and control the crowds.
61. Sources vary on the total number of people injured but it is thought to be tens of thousands and upwards of 300 fatalities during the protest period. Many AL leaders fled or went into hiding after former PM Hasina left Bangladesh. Most arrests since have been high level including former ministers, members of parliament, top leaders of the AL party and lawmakers for actions that took place during AL's rule and during the protests. Other cases have been instigated against mayors, police officers, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) officials and members of AL auxiliary organisations ( see executive summary).
62. The number of arrests that occurred during protests and in subsequent raids on university campuses and homes varies between sources, but most estimate over 2,000 people were arrested up to the 26 July. Targeted state surveillance and threats occurred against BNP and JeI leaders, and student organisers. The interim report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) noted that from 12 July to 3 August over 450,000 unknown people and 2,000 identified people were registered for offences in at least 286 criminal cases in Dhaka alone. However, as Bangladeshi law allows for anyone to file a case, including against unknown suspects, it is not clear how many of these have proceeded or will proceed to prosecution.
63. The appellant’s bundle cites the material in the USSD HR report ( from CPIN Actors of Protection) that under the constitution detainees must be brought before a judicial officer to face charges within 24 hours, but this is not regularly enforced. The government or district magistrate may order a person detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act that could threaten national security: however, authority sometimes held detainees a longer period with impunity ( and see para 6.4.4 of the same report).
64. The OHCHR indicates a number of those arrested were subjected to ill treatment in police custody, including torture. No further reports at the time of writing provide a reliable figure to enable assessment of the scale and extent to which this occurred.
65. The protest movement led to the resignation of AL Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024 and the establishment of an interim government on 8 August under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, who is not from any political party.
66. Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent places reliance upon the changes in Bangladesh since the appellant left and that he would not be at risk on return based on the change in government as the Awami League are not in power. Whilst reference is made to the interim government, the material in the objective evidence is that the interim government mainly consist of civil society representatives, two student leaders of the protests and enjoys the support of the Bangladesh Army. It includes a mix of the main opposition parties; the BNP and members affiliated with the Jamaat-e-Islami. There are no representatives from the former ruling AL party ( see paragraph 11.3.1 of the CPIN which is consistent with the report at paragraph 41 which refers to the proscription of the AL student wing for its role in the protests).
67. Having assessed the country materials alongside the report it establishes that the government is committed to a series of reforms for the electoral system and public administration which includes the establishment of various Commissions ( see paragraph 4.1.4 of the CPIN and paragraph 42 of the report). There have been many reshuffles in the police force and removal of those loyal to the AL including retirement, reinstating, or transferring of police officials, replacement of those implicated in abuses and the arrest of senior officers. There is a functioning police and criminal justice system although their effectiveness continues to be undermined by poor infrastructure, corruption, and bribery. ( see 4.1.15 and 13.2.2). There have been efforts to clear out most of the pro-Awami League from the bureaucracy, the judiciary and some of the security forces but that has created more resentment (see para 13.3.4). The evidence refers to the politicisation of the police force (para 13.3.4) and that trust in the police remains low and morale is poor. Awami league officials remain in place as full clean-out is impractical, and the government wants to give all those who remain a chance to get behind the reform agenda ( paragraph 13.3.5). This is consistent with the material in the report and that efforts had been made to reform the police by removing Awami league aligned senior officers but that the vast majority of high, middle and low-level police officers from the regime previously remain in post. ( see paragraphs 29 and 30 of the report).
68. Both the CPIN and the expert report refer to the culture of lodging false cases against political rivals. This occurred under the previous government, and this has continued under the present interim government. It records that after the violence, relatives of the victims of violence filed cases against the Awami League activists known to them in their respective constituencies even if those individuals are not involved in the violence but hundreds of miles away from the scene of the crime. Those who are targeted appear to be related to the Awami League ( see paragraph 36 report and the CPIN para 12.2.16 and 3.1.9).
69. The court documents are dated prior to the fall of the Awami League and were not issued by the current interim government.
70. As to the prevalence of false charges the country materials demonstrate that the interim government are actively dealing with that issue and I accept the evidence relied upon by the respondent, which I find is set out in sourced documents relating to Bangladesh that demonstrates 14,000 political motivated cases were withdrawn by the interim government (see paragraph 11 of the respondent skeleton and footnote with those sources and the reference to committees recommending cases for withdrawal). It is recorded that if such cases exist the state may recommend their withdrawal. The government also has called from all parties to submit documents including FIR’s and Charge Sheets, to the committees. The BNP have submitted a list of 16,000 cases. Whilst Mr Wain challenges the report on the basis that reference is made at paragraphs 25 and 27 that it is unclear whether the interim government have revoked politically motivated cases lodged during the previous administration, in fact the report did refer to the intergovernmental commissions reviewing all politically motivated cases lodged during the previous regime but concluded that the situation is “challenging” owing to the levels of institutional corruption and the sheer volume of sham cases ( see paragraph 43 of the report) and that following the events in February 2025, this has accelerated the process investigating pending cases and leading to a number of innocent people being arrested, including those accused under the previous government or in the aftermath of the protests (see paragraph 50 and 51). I accept the content of the report in this respect and that the appellant’s cases remain live despite the change in government and that there remains instability at the current time ( see paragraph 84).
71. Whilst my assessment is that there is credible evidence that politically motivated cases are being withdrawn none of the material referred to relates to cases that involve a conviction as here. Mr Halim points to the article relied upon by the respondent and this relates to pending charges involving FIR’s and charge sheets but not a final judgement ( see the reference to Section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1898). There is no expert evidence relating to court proceedings and criminal proceedings in Bangladesh in this context. On the available evidence here, there is no reference to or in the context of this particular appellant’s conviction which is not a short-term but a very long term of imprisonment, that the interim government are seeking to deal with such convictions or final orders in the same way as charges which are outstanding. As set out above the materials in the CPIN refer to the OHCHR report and that those arrested have been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody (3.9 and 10.4.7) although I note that there are difficulties in being precise as to numbers and in respect of the allegations made.
72. In light of the evidence set out above, I reach the conclusion that there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would be arrested on return pursuant to the sentence imposed which is politically motivated. It is extant and the reference in the materials to withdrawal of pending charges does not apply to this. The evidence that relates to where the appellant would be arrested has not been consistent during this hearing. UTJ Bruce in her decision referred to the respondent’s material in the fact-finding mission report which referred to people being able to pass through the airport despite having outstanding charges against them. However, the report relied upon by the appellant stated that the appellant would be arrested at the airport. Nonetheless, the latter opinion does not negate risk once outside the airport. Once in his locality and being seen there is a reasonable likelihood that steps would be taken for the sentence to be implemented.
73. The position as regards the arrest warrants is different as there is demonstrable and reliable evidence that the interim government is taking steps to deal with the politically motivated charges including those that relate to those in the appellant’s own party.
74. This is a case specific decision and is decided on its own particular facts and on the available evidence. In this context it is necessary to consider the decision in MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 (see paragraph 2 of the respondent’s skeleton). The facts of that case involved a different factual matrix and the court found that this was not a case involving interest by the State authorities but that the risk was from non-State actors ( see paragraph 10 of the judgement) and therefore the issue of State protection and internal relocation were relevant considerations. It was against that factual background that the Court assessed the material in the December 2024 CPIN and that the change of government has changed the picture in such a way that there was no reason to suppose that the appellant in that case, would be at risk of serious harm. Paragraph 4.1.1 of the CPIN sets out that those who fear the state are unlikely to obtain protection nor they be able to relocate ( and see 5.1.1).
75. Drawing those matters together, I therefore conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood on these particular facts of the appellant being detained for what both parties accept are politically motivated charges and conviction and which are not legitimate and do not reflect any wrongdoing by the appellant. Whilst they relate to events from the previous regime, the conviction remains and the sentence is a long one and on the evidence as it stands there is a real risk that he will not be released on bail, unlike those who have outstanding charges which may be reviewed. Therefore, the appellant has discharged the burden to show a reasonable likelihood that he would be arrested on return and the material set out above refers to a risk of being subject to ill-treatment in police custody, pursuant to the conviction, which demonstrates a real risk of serious harm and this amounts to persecution on the basis of political opinion as perceived.
76. For those reasons, the appeal is allowed under the Refugee Convention. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the alternative and discrete basis advanced relating to Article 3 of the ECHR.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law; the decision was set aside by the decision of the Upper Tribunal in the decision of the 4 August 2025. It is re-made as follows: the appeal is allowed .

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
16 January 2026