Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005507

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53975/2023
LP/00579/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY

Between

SH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hingora, of Counsel, instructed by Lamptons, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born in March 1985. He came to the UK in January 2011 with a Tier 4 student visa. He had leave in this capacity until September 2015, but on 5th July 2013 his leave was curtailed until September 2013. He applied for Tier 4 student leave again and this was granted until 5th April 2015. On 2nd April 2015 he applied to extend his leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”). This application was refused on 14th July 2015.
2. On 8th April 2019 the appellant applied for asylum. His claim was refused on 29th May 2019, and his appeal was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 30th July 2019. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was refused and he became appeal rights exhausted on 13th January 2020. He made further submissions on 8th September 2020 and these were refused with a right of appeal on 21st June 2023. The appellant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in a decision promulgated on 8th September 2024.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens and a Panel of the Upper Tribunal (in a decision dated 23 April 2025 (“the UT Decision”)) found that the First-tier Tribunal decision of September 2024 erred in the determination of the appeal under Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) but upheld the decision on the protection claim for the reasons set out in the Panel’s decision which is appended to this decision at Annex A.
4. We, as a differently constituted Panel of the Upper Tribunal, now remake the Article 8 ECHR appeal pursuant to a transfer order. The first Panel preserved the following findings from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal when finding an error of law:
• That the appellant is not a credible witness.
• That the appellant is not at Article 3 ECHR medical or suicide risk on return to Pakistan.
• That the appellant has not shown that he owns land or is involved with a land dispute with the Mohmand/Momand family, or that a protection claim arises from any land dispute.
• That the FIR and other court and police documents are not to be given weight.
• That the appellant is in touch with family members in Pakistan.
• That Dr Kashmiri’s diagnosis, including that of PTSD with comorbid depression and psychotic symptoms, is accepted.
• That the reports of Dr Wali and Dr Kashmiri are ones to which weight can be given.
5. At a case management hearing in this case on 20 August 2025 the parties were explicitly reminded that it would be helpful for any experts who were instructed in this case to be made aware that they had to take into account the preserved findings.
6. At the commencement of the hearing, we allowed Mr Hingora a short break to take instructions from the appellant, before we commenced, on the issue of the contact that the appellant continued to have with his family. We indicated that it would be helpful for us to understand who his family are, where they might be located and any additional context around the relationship. This was in light of the preserved finding that the appellant remained in contact with his family in Pakistan.
7. Mr Hingora requested that the appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness. There was no objection from Mr Ojo and we accordingly agreed that questioning should bear that in mind and we would allow appropriate breaks.
Anonymity Direction
8. We have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice because this was originally a protection claim.
Issues
9. There were two issues to be determined in this hearing:-
(a) under the Rules would the appellant face very significant obstacles to his integration in Pakistan?
(b) If not, would the appellant’s removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences for him such that the decision is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Legal Framework
10. The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that he meets the requirements of the Rules. If so, the refusal is disproportionate under Article 8.
11. If the appellant does not meet the Rules, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to enter or remain. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or a family member such that refusal is not proportionate. We take into account the factors set out in s.117B Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’) and balance the public interest considerations against the factors relied upon by the appellant.
Evidence & Submissions
12. The key evidence of the appellant is, in summary, as follows. He came to the UK in February 2011 as a student and has remained since that time. He is a Pashtu speak who does not speak good Urdu, and this is relevant to his ability to relocate within Pakistan. He argues that he has lost ties with Pakistan over his years of absence. He says that he suffers from nightmares, flashbacks to traumatic events, hears voices and sees things that are not real, has panic attacks and is constantly anxious. He has low mood and feels hopeless, and has recurrent suicidal thoughts and has attempted suicide in the past including in 2019 whilst in detention. He has a diagnosis of PTSD and severe depression with psychotic symptoms. He takes Duloxetine and Olanzapine (medications for depression and psychosis) every day, and is supported by a mental health team from the NHS who can provide support in a crisis. The plan is that he should have specialist trauma-focused therapy in the future when he is stable enough. The appellant argues that he would not be able to reintegrate if he were sent back there as he would not be able to obtain work as most work is through networks of family and friends which he does not have and if he did it would be only likely to be daily wage labour which would pay less than the cost of essentials such as renting a room, food and medication. Without any form of support the appellant would be street homeless without medication, food or shelter, and his mental health will deteriorate. He relies upon expert reports from Dr Kashmir, Dr Wali, Dr Ali and Mr Hakeem.
13. It is argued for the appellant that he would have very significant obstacles to integration if returned to Pakistan and therefore could meet the private life Rules at Appendix PL, and that his removal would be a proportionate interference with his Article 8 ECHR rights if looked at more broadly. The appellant has lived in the UK since February 2011, and thus for more than 14 years. Dr Kashmiri records the fact that he suffers from major depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms and PTSD, and needs treatment and resolution of his immigration situation to be able to recover, and is so unwell that at the time of her report he was not fit to fly. It is argued that in the UK he has friends who have provided him with support but without that social support in Pakistan he will be a risk of his mental health declining and of suicide. It is argued that the evidence of Dr Wali about the adverse impact on the appellant’s mental health in the context of social and societal victimisation and discrimination of those with these health problems in the context of the accepted mental health diagnosis of Dr Kashmiri is of key relevance. The appellant speaks English and is financially self-sufficient from friends in the UK and these should be treated therefore as neutral matters.
14. For the respondent it is argued that the appellant cannot meet the requirements of Appendix PL and that his removal is not a disproportionate interference with Article 8 ECHR. It is argued that the experts started from a position that the appellant did not have family he could turn to in Pakistan with respect to his need for medical treatment and support for his mental health problems, whereas the First-tier Tribunal had found that the appellant would have family to turn to. It is argued that he would be able to integrate in Pakistan, the country of his birth where he speaks a national language and lived for approximately 26 years. It is argued that he would be able to access his anti-depressant medication and that, with reference to the CPIN: healthcare and medical treatment, Pakistan, July 2024, there are sufficient mental health services in Pakistan for adequate treatment to be provided should it be needed.
Findings of Fact
15. That the appellant is a national of Pakistan born in March 1985.
16. The appellant lived in Pakistan until February 2011.
17. The appellant is a Pashto speaker with a more limited knowledge of Urdu. He has a limited knowledge of the English language.
18. The appellant is of the Islamic faith.
19. The appellant graduated in 2004 from the Government Degree College in Pabi with a degree in science.
20. The appellant family had a mobile phone shop and cultivated the land. The appellant worked in the mobile phone shop. The appellant’ father had previously served in the air force and had a pension. The appellants father died in 2013.
21. The appellant came to the UK in 2011 to study and graduated with a Diploma in Business Management – Level 6 in 2015.
22. The appellant’s education in the UK was funded by his father and his brother in Pakistan.
23. The appellant is financially self-sufficient in the UK and is financially supported by friends.
24. The appellant has one brother and two sisters living in Pakistan and remains in contact with his family in Pakistan.
25. The appellant has a mobile phone with the same number since 2013/14.
26. The appellant lives with a friend in the UK at 54 Ragstone Road Slough, SL1 2PX – occupying a room in their house without paying rent. The appellant attends his local mosque and takes meals there.
27. The appellant has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), chronic and Severe Depressive Episode with Psychotic Symptoms.
28. The appellant is currently taking the medications, Olanzapine and Duloxetine on a daily basis.
29. The appellant has attempted suicide in the past in 2019, 2022 and 2023. His suicide risk remains high in both the short term and long term.
30. Olanzapine and Duloxetine are available in Pakistan.
31. The appellant is not currently undertaking any therapy based treatment in the UK but has access to a mental health team from the NHS who can provide support in a crisis.
Application of Law to the Facts
32. In assessing the evidence our starting point is the preserved findings set out at paragraph 25 of the UT Decision. In particular, the two key findings that the appellant is not a credible witness and that the appellant is in touch with family members in Pakistan. Whilst we accept the submission from Mr Hingora that a finding that the appellant is not a credible witness does not mean (per Uddin -v- SSHD 2020 ECWA civ 338) that he must be disbelieved on all points we do need to proceed on the basis of, at the very least, caution, in relation to any evidence put forward by the appellant in relation to this appeal. On the issue of the appellant being in contact with his family we did at the outset give notice that it was for the appellant to provide further context around the position of his contact with his family. In giving evidence, the appellant maintained his position that he last had contact with his brother and two sisters in 2019 and had had no contact since. The onus is on the appellant to establish his case under Article 8 ECHR. In the absence of any further evidence regarding contact with his family we must proceed on the basis that he is still in contact with his family. We do accept the evidence that the appellant provided regarding the financial circumstances of his family. That his brother was the owner of a mobile phone shop and that his father and then his brother supported him financially when he came to the UK. From this, and the education he received in Pakistan, we conclude that his family in Pakistan certainly at one point had financial resources to call upon. In the absence of any further evidence, it cannot be said that the family would not be in position to support the appellant financially.
33. The issue of contact with his family is of some importance when one considers the expert reports that have been provided by the appellant. There are four experts put forward by the appellant:- Dr Kashmiri; Dr Wali; Dr Ali and Mr Hakeem. We deal with each in turn. We are also conscious of the preserved findings that Dr Kashmiri’s diagnosis, including that of PTSD with comorbid depression and psychotic symptoms, is accepted and that the reports of Dr Wali and Dr Kashmiri are ones to which weight can be given.
34. Dr Mariam Kashmiri is an adult consultant psychiatrist, who acknowledges the practice direction on expert evidence issued by the Tribunals amongst other guidance on expert evidence. She has provided two reports. The first dated 17 August 2020 (“the First Kashmiri Report”) and the second dated 11 August 2025 (“the Second Kashmiri Report”). It is the First Kashmiri Report in respect of which the preserved finding is that weight can be given to it.
35. Both reports essentially focus on a diagnosis of the appellants current medical condition at the time along with a short-term and long-term prognosis and commentary on treatment. In preparing the reports Dr Kashmiri met with the appellant and considered both the appellant’s account and relevant medical records. We do give weight to both the diagnosis and the prognosis given by Dr Kashmir as an expert in her field. However, we are also conscience that there are areas of Dr Kashmiri’s reports where she is relying upon information provided by the appellant that has been found not to be credible (specifically that information relating to the basis for his asylum claim). We are also conscious that in the instructions that were issued to Dr Kashmiri by the appellant’s solicitors on 4 July 2025 for the Second Kashmiri Report there is no specific reference to Dr Kashmiri having to take into account the preserved findings set out in the UT Decision. Dr Kashmiri was given a copy of the UT Decision but it would have been better if the preserved findings had been specifically drawn to Dr Kashmiri’s attention. Dr Kashmiri has also, in her Second Report, referenced Dr Wali’s report. For the reasons set out below – although some weight can be attached to Dr Wali’s report, we again need to be cautious that that report was prepared in support of the asylum claim and proceeds on the basis of a narrative provided by the appellant that has not been found credible.
36. Subject to the comments above we do accept the evidence of Dr Kashmiri as to the medical diagnosis and the prognosis for the appellant. We also note that this is entirely in keeping with that of the treating psychiatrist at Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, Dr Sophie Currier dated 30th May 2025.
37. Dr Wali is a sociologist who currently is a senior lecturer at Bangor University with expertise in Pakistan. In his report of 23 January 2024, he sets out at paragraph 19 the brief that he was given by the appellant’s solicitors. A considerable section of his report deals with matters related to the asylum claim and are of no relevance to this appeal. We do accept that from paragraph 91 through to paragraph 147 of the report his commentary on the medical system in Pakistan, approach to and treatment of mental health in Pakistan has relevance – and we do attach some weight to those sections of the report. However, we also take into consideration that in arriving at his conclusions in that report Dr Wali has proceeded on the basis that the appellant has no family or support network in Pakistan. That is not consistent with the actual position that the appellant remains in contact with his family in Pakistan. We also note that at paragraph 105 of his report Dr Wali makes the rather sweeping statement that “all individuals with mental health conditions experienced forced institutionalization” and that was backed up at paragraph 109 with a statement that “the police in Pakistan have legal powers to detain individuals with mental health problems (e.g. those deemed incapable of taking care of themselves).” There is no evidence to suggest that the appellant would fall into this category. We accept Mr Ojo’s submission that Dr Wali is speculating at paragraph 110 when he states that it is likely that the appellant would be sectioned by the Pakistani Police.
38. The report of Dr Nasir Ali of 18th September 2025, a psychiatrist working in Lahore concludes that neither the public nor private psychiatry systems in Pakistan can deliver what the appellant needs due to medication shortages, the absence of psychotherapy and prohibitive wait times, and the private facilities whilst technically better are prohibitively expensive, and the drugs the appellant takes are rarely stocked in Pakistan and would cost 21,500 Pakistani rupees per month which is 67% of the minimum salary. We do attach some weight to this report particularly as it relates to the current healthcare system in Pakistan but we note that the report does not reference the fact that the appellant does have a support network available to him through his family in Pakistan so that does have an impact upon the weight we can attach to the report in respect of the personal position of the appellant.
39. Mr Hakeem is a recruitment consultant and labour market specialist working with the Recruiters Agency in Lahore Pakistan. He has provided a report dated 16 September 2025 on the appellant’s employability and labour market conditions in Pakistan, tailored to the appellant’s individual circumstances. In his letter of instruction from the appellant’s solicitors of 9 July 2025 Mr Hakeem is not provided with either the UT Decision nor is he told of the preserved findings. We note that to some extent his report is based upon incorrect information – such as (paragraph 2.1) that a public sector role would not be open to the appellant as he has an outstanding arrest warrant – based upon information provided by the claimant that was found not to be credible. We also note that the report proceeds on the basis that the appellant would have no support network (see paragraph 3.3) – a statement that is inconsistent with the finding that the appellant remains in contact with his family in Pakistan. Accordingly, whilst we attach some weight to this report insofar as it is dealing with the general employment position in Pakistan we can attach only limited weight to it in respect of the specific position of the appellant.
Would the appellant face very significant obstacles to his integration in Pakistan?
40. The concept of “integration” for the purposes of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Rules requires a broad evaluative assessment of whether the applicant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in the country of return is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.
41. The appellant was born and brought up in Pakistan and lived there until he was almost 26 years of age. He was educated there to a reasonable level. He did work in Pakistan in the mobile phone shop. He speaks Pashto, one of the major regional languages of Pakistan. He has some knowledge of Urdu and English – the two official languages of Pakistan. He has a brother and two sisters still living in Pakistan with whom he is in contact. He is a practising Muslim and Islam is the official religion of Pakistan. He is not at risk on return. Based on these factors the appellant does have language ability, cultural and social ties, past experience in the country and the availability of support networks.
42. The basis upon which the appellant contended that there would be very significant obstacles to integration was upon his health and employment prospects. With regard to his health we accept the diagnosis of Dr Kashmiri that the appellant suffers from major depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms and PTSD, and needs treatment and resolution of his immigration situation to be able to recover. Dr Kashmiri also identifies a high and continuing risk of self-harm and suicide. The risk has been mitigated by regular contact with mental-health professionals and social support from friends and the local mosque community. She opines that removal to Pakistan, where such support would be absent, would significantly elevate that risk and could precipitate self-destructive behaviour. Dr Wali and Dr Ali in their reports highlight the challenges facing the health care system in Pakistan – and in particular with regard to the support that there might be for those with mental health problems. We accept that the care that will be available for the appellant in Pakistan will not be to the same standard of care that the appellant currently receives in the UK. The position as set out by Dr Wali and Dr Ali is broadly consistent with the CPIN healthcare and medical treatment, Pakistan, July 2024. That CPIN at section 12 notes that there is provision in both the public and private sectors in Pakistan for mental health care – although the available resources are limited. According at Annex A to that CPIN Olanzapine is available in Pakistan. Duloxetine is not referenced in Annex A although we heard no evidence from the appellant to say that suitable replacements for Duloxetine were not available. We also note that Dr Ali in his report at pages 1 and 3 confirms that both Duloxetine and Olanzapine are available privately – although at a cost he estimates of 67% of minimum salary (although he does not define what minimum salary is). Accordingly, we are satisfied that there will be healthcare available to the appellant in Pakistan – but it will not be to the standard he has received in the UK, may cost financially and there is no guarantee that any therapy-based treatment will be easily accessible.
43. When considering the issue of health we take into consideration that one of the preserved findings from the UT Decision was that the appellant is not an Article 3 ECHR medical or suicide risk on return to Pakistan. We also take into consideration that the UK is under no obligation to provide treatment that is not available in Pakistan – AA (Morocco) -v- SSHD 2025 EWCA Civ 144. When we consider the appellants current treatment in the UK he is not currently in receipt of any therapy. He is in receipt of medication. The evidence does not disclose that that medication will be unavailable in Pakistan – indeed the evidence confirms that it will be available – although in the case of one medication at a cost. Whilst the reports of both Dr Wali and Dr Ali are helpful in setting out the background position with regard to healthcare they both fail to engage with the fact that the appellant will have a support network in Pakistan through his family. We have limited information about the financial position of the family – save that at one point they would appear to have had sufficient means to own and operate a shop and pay for the education of the appellant in the UK. It is for the appellant to prove his case and there is no evidence to show that his family no longer have access to funds to potentially support the appellant. In these circumstances we do not consider that on health grounds it can be said that there is a very significant obstacle to integration.
44. With regard to the issue of future employment we have the report of Mr Hakeem. As previously explained, we can only attach limited weight to this report given that it proceeds on the basis that the appellant has no support network in Pakistan and that he has an outstanding arrest warrant. We accept that it will be difficult for the appellant to obtain employment, but given that he has a family support network, is educated and speaks both Pashto and some Urdu and English consider that it should be possible for him to obtain some future employment. We do not consider that the challenges he will face in obtaining future employment amount to a significant obstacle to integration.
45. We also take into account that the appellant may be eligible to receive some support through the Voluntary Return Scheme, as set out in the Refusal Letter of 21 June 2023.
46. We accept life will not be easy on his return and there may be hardships, but we do not accept that these hardships either individually or cumulatively amount to very significant obstacles to his integration.
Is the respondent’s decision proportionate?
47. Taking into account our findings above we find that the appellant enjoys private life in the United Kingdom. It is not an extensive private life. There was only very limited evidence put forward in relation to private life. The evidence essentially consisted of his relationship with the family that he lives with and his attendance and involvement with the local mosque. There was no evidence of the appellant being more widely engaged with a network of friends or other organisations in the UK. Nevertheless, we find that the respondent’s decision causes an interference with the appellant’s enjoyment of their private life. We are satisfied that the likely consequences of the interference are sufficiently serious as to engage article 8(1). There was no dispute that the decision was made in accordance with the law or in pursuit of a legitimate aim.
48. The public interest lies in the maintenance of effective immigration controls. To strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, we adopt a balance sheet approach.
49. We weigh the following factors against the appellant: -
i. The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest. The appellant does not satisfy the rules, and the public interest carries significant weight.
50. We weigh the following factors in the appellant’s favour:
i. The appellant speaks English to a limited extent. We treat this as a neutral factor.
ii. The appellant is financially independent. We treat this as a neutral factor.
iii. He has established a private life in the United Kingdom. This carries little weight because for the most part (from 2015) it was established when the appellant’s status in the United Kingdom was precarious.
iv. We give some weight to the difficulties the appellant will face returning to Pakistan in terms of medical care and employment, even though we have found they are not very significant obstacles.
51. We find that the factors raised by the appellant do not outweigh the public interest because in a case such as this the essential elements of private life on which the appellant relies such as his relationship with his friend is capable of being maintained by modern communications. We note that the social network that the appellant has in the UK is limited. His religion will be available to him in Pakistan. In assessing the health and employment factors in the balance we take into consideration our earlier comments on these two matters. These are not factors that by themselves tip the balance.
52. In determining whether or not the respondent’s decision gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences we have considered all of the factors above. We find that the respondent’s decision does not give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant. We find that the respondent’s decision is proportionate and that it is lawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
53. The appellant also raised in their skeleton argument that based upon EB (Kosovo) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 41 delay on the part of the respondent in processing the appellant’s claim should be relevant to the proportionality test. Although raised in the skeleton argument we had no submissions on the point and there was no evidence that any delay was due to the respondent so we have not considered this point further.
Conclusion on Article 8 ECHR
54. For the reasons set out above we dismiss the appeal on Art 8 ECHR – Private Life grounds.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal under Article 8 ECHR is dismissed.
FEE AWARD
We have dismissed the appeal and there can be no Fee Award.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Neilson
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28th October 2025

Annex A: Error of law Decision

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born in March 1985. He came to the UK in January 2011 with a Tier 4 student visa. He had leave in this capacity until September 2015, but on 5th July 2013 his leave was curtailed until September 2013. He applied for Tier 4 student leave again and this was granted until 5th April 2015. On 2nd April 2015 he applied to extend his leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules. This application was refused on 14th July 2015
2. On 8th April 2019 the appellant applied for asylum. His claim was refused on 29th May 2019, and his appeal was dismissed by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Iqbal on 30th July 2019. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was refused and he became appeal rights exhausted on 13th January 2020. He made further submissions on 8th September 2020 and these were refused with a right of appeal on 21st June 2023. The appellant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in a decision promulgated on 8th September 2024.
3. The appellant’s asylum claim is, in short summary, that he fears persecution if returned to Pakistan from the Taliban and a family named Momand/Mohmand over a land dispute.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens on 16th February 2025 on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier judge had erred in law in the approach taken to the expert evidence because arguably inadequate reasons are given for placing little weight upon this evidence in the totality of the decision; and in addition arguably there is a failure to take into account a material factor in the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise. Permission is granted to argue all grounds.
5. The matter now comes before us to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and is so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
Submissions – Error of Law
6. In the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions from Mr Hingora, it is argued, in short summary, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law as follows.
7. Firstly, it is argued, that the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to give adequate reasons for not attaching weight to the expert reports of Dr Mariam Kashmiri, Mr Niazi Muhammad and Dr Wali. Dr Wali and Mr Muhammad are experienced country experts on Pakistan. Dr Kashmiri is a medical expert. The respondent accepts that all the experts have the relevant expertise to provide opinions in the supplementary review. There is only brief reference to the report of Dr Wali at paragraph 48 of the decision, where it is referred to as merely part of the evidence, and no reasoning is given as to why the conclusions of this report are not accepted. It is said by the First-tier Tribunal that the report of Dr Muhammad contains “emotive” reasoning but this is not explained and it is not explained why weight is not given to this report despite his qualifications to provide an expert opinion apparently being acknowledged and in the context of it being acknowledged that the report is valuable in providing background on the strength and influence of the Momand/Mohmand family in Pakistan. It is argued that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in finding the appellant not credible despite the supporting evidence, particularly of Dr Wali, and that there ought to have been explicit weighing of and grappling with all of the expert evidence in the context of the original finding of the appellant’s lacking credibility in order to make a decision in the round. Mr Hingora accepted that reasons had been given for finding the appellant not to be credible but argued that his mental health problems might explain inaccuracies recalling dates.
8. Secondly, it is argued, that there is an error of law by finding that the court documents and FIR reports are forged at paragraph 61 of the decision, as this conclusion is simply on the basis that the CPIN states that fraudulent documents are easily obtained. It is argued that this is insufficiently reasoned. Mr Hingora accepted that there was no expert opinion that the documents were genuine but argued that greater reasoning than the First-tier Tribunal provided was still required for placing no weight upon them.
9. Thirdly, it is argued, that there was a failure to properly consider whether the appellant would have very significant obstacles to integration if returned to Pakistan, and therefore could meet the private life Rules at Appendix PL, and also a failure to conduct a proper proportionality exercise. It is argued that the expert evidence ought to have been weighed when making findings on these matters, particularly the evidence of Dr Wali about the adverse impact on the appellant’s mental health in the context of social and societal victimisation and discrimination of those with these health problems in the context of the accepted mental health diagnosis of Dr Kashmiri.
10. Fourthly, it is argued, that there was a failure to follow Devaseelan , and thereby consider whether new evidence warranted a departure from the decision of the previous First-tier Tribunal Judge (Judge Iqbal).
11. Fifthly, it is argued, that there was a failure to consider the legal opinion of Mr Haider Ul Islam with respect to the danger from the Momand/Mohmand family, and the evidence that a FIR report lodged against the appellant by these people was a tool of persecution in the context of a corrupt system of justice where torture and killings took place in detention.
12. In the Rule 24 notice and in oral submission from Ms Isherwood it is argued for the respondent, in brief summary, as follows. It is argued that the grounds are just a disagreement with the findings in a well-reasoned decision. It is argued that all evidence was considered and that weight to be given to expert evidence is a matter for the First-tier Tribunal.
13. Ms Isherwood argued with respect to the first, second and fifth grounds that the approach taken to decision-making was as follows. The respondent and the previous First-tier Tribunal took the view that the appellant had failed to show that he owned land, and thus the appellant and his solicitors were aware that this was the case at the point in time when the fresh claim was made, indeed this position was acknowledged in the fresh claim representations. This issue had not been taken any further by any of the documents submitted by the appellant with his fresh claim: there were no land ownership documents included with this claim. It was open to this First-tier Tribunal to find that such documents were reasonably available to the appellant, particularly as he contended he had other documents, the FIR documents, sent from Pakistan. It is clear that the First-tier Tribunal considered all of the reports as there is reference to the reports of Dr Wali, Mr Muhammad, Dr Kashmiri and to consideration of all of the new evidence, but these reports, in relation to the issues in the protection appeal, all work from a starting position that the appellant owned land, which, given the appellant is a person whose own evidence has been found to lack credibility, there is ultimately no evidence of any weight to support. As the ownership of land was found not to be shown to the required level of proof, it is argued, there was no need for further reasoning relating to these reports in the protection appeal.
14. It is argued with respect to the fourth ground that the First-tier Tribunal took the correct approach to Devaseelan, as set out at paragraphs 41 and 42 of the decision.
15. With respect to the third ground it is argued that the Article 8 ECHR assessment is properly conducted with a proportionality exercise and is adequate in all of the circumstances. It is argued that Dr Wali started from a position that the appellant did not have family he could turn to in Pakistan with respect to his need for medical treatment and support for his mental health problems, whereas the First-tier Tribunal had found that the appellant would have family to turn to, so this rendered the sections of the report on medical matters ones which did not warrant reference in the Article 8 ECHR consideration.
16. At the end of the hearing we informed the parties that we found that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law with respect to the determination of the Article 8 ECHR appeal but not with respect to the protection appeal. We did not give reasons orally but set them out in writing below. Both parties agreed with our suggestion that the Article 8 ECHR appeal be remade in the Upper Tribunal. An Urdu interpreter was requested for the appellant.
Conclusions – Error of Law
17. With respect to grounds one, two, four and five, which relate to contended errors in the determination of the protection claim, we find they are not arguable for the following reasons. There is a correct direction by the First-tier Tribunal with respect to Devaseelan at paragraphs 41 to 42 of the decision. As the previous First-tier Tribunal Judge, Judge Iqbal, found the appellant not to be credible this was correctly the starting point as per paragraph 42 of the decision. It is correctly acknowledged at paragraph 43 of the decision that the FIR report and associated court and police documents, a letter from Farook Khan, reports of Dr Wali, Mr Muhammad, Dr Kashmiri were not before Judge Iqbal however and so must be considered when coming to a new decision. We find that it is clear that the First-tier Tribunal also made its decision in light of the report of Mr Ul Islam as reference is made to having regard to all of the evidence uploaded to CCD at paragraph 22 of the decision.
18. The First-tier Tribunal finds at paragraphs 49-51 of the decision that the key problem for the appellant is that he has not shown to the lower civil standard of proof that his family owns the land he says is disputed by the Momand/Mohmand family and which leads to his claimed problems and well founded fear of persecution. As noted above the First-tier Tribunal starts from a position that the appellant is not a credible witness due to the finding of Judge Iqbal, so his own testimony does not carry weight without more. Further given that the appellant has asked to be treated as a vulnerable witness suffering from PTSD the First-tier Tribunal properly finds that greater weight should be given to the objective evidence before the Tribunal. The appellant, it is found, has produced no evidence of landownership and his friend Mr Farook Khan has sent over other documents in support of his claim and so it is properly found that there is no reason why these documents could not have reasonably easily also been sent given there is no plausible explanation provided on this issue. The appellant knew this had been an issue in his losing his appeal before Judge Iqbal and so ought to have understood the importance of land ownership documents to his appeal succeeding before this First-tier Tribunal. The findings relating to his not having shown he owned land are not challenged as containing errors of law in the grounds of appeal.
19. Further the First-tier Tribunal finds that there are additional problems with accepting the appellant’s evidence as credible, as set out at paragraph 52 of the decision. The appellant’s evidence was that neither he nor his brother were involved in the incidents in the FIR report but in the Rule 35 report and in the appellant’s account in Dr Kashmiri’s report he said his brother was fighting with the family who took their land and shot a person; and his own account to the Tribunal is that his father died in 2002 but in the Rule 35 report his father was said to have been alive in 2007 and to have bribed his release from Taliban detention. In addition it is found to be unclear why the Momand/Mohmand need to bring false charges against the appellant as he and his brother have left the family home, according to the appellant’s account, and so had already achieved their alleged land grab. These findings are not challenged as being contaminated by errors of law, and we find provide additional reason why the appellant’s testimony was not accepted as being sufficient to show that he owned land which led to the contended land dispute.
20. It is against this backdrop that the expert evidence going to country conditions from Dr Wali and Mr Muhammad (and by implication that of Mr Ul Islam), is found, we find properly, not to be of any assistance to the appellant in winning his appeal, as their reports are premised on their being a land dispute with the Momand/Mohmand clan which endangers the appellant due to this clan being a notorious criminal group with significant political power. As the First-tier Tribunal finds that the appellant has not shown he even owns land over which there could be a dispute this clan cannot pose a threat to the appellant in the way he claims, even if they might pose a threat to others who did own land which they wished to seize as set out in the country of origin reports filed for the appellant. In these circumstances we find that it was rational not to give weight to the report of Dr Wali, even though it is found to be a report setting out valuable background information. Similarly the report of Mr Muhammad, which provides local insight into the risk from this family, we find was rationally found not to assist the appellant.
21. We find that it was clearly rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal, to find, as is done at paragraph 57 of the decision, that the court documents and warrant were not reliable in the context of there being no evidence about how they were obtained in the letter provided from Mr Farrok Khan; and given that the finding that there was apparently no rational reason for the Momand/Mohmand family to bring proceedings; and given that it was accepted for the appellant by Mr Hingora that none of the expert evidence provides any verification of this evidence as genuine.
22. Dr Mariam Kashmiri is an adult consultant psychiatrist, who acknowledges the practice direction on expert evidence issued by the Tribunals amongst other guidance on expert evidence. Her report contains all relevant declarations at paragraph 17 including that relating to her duty to the court. Her report is based on the applicant’s GP records as well as other letters relating to the appellant’s treatment in the UK and Rule 35 reports from the respondent. From this evidence supplied to Dr Kashmiri it is clear that the appellant has injuries consistent with torture (beating, laceration and cigarette burns as verified by Dr S Mumtaz in a Rule 35 report) and has been taking antidepressants prescribed by his GP since 2019. As per the report at paragraph 15.1 the opinion is not simply based on his own account: it is based on his history, an expert mental state examination by Dr Kashmiri and the other sources of medical information itemised above.
23. We find that it was rational and sufficiently reasoned for the First-tier Tribunal to find at paragraph 62 of the decision that Dr Kashmiri’s medical report did not assist the appellant in making out his protection claim as whilst it was clearly a reliable source of a diagnosis about his mental health issues it cannot ultimately determine the cause of those problems, and clearly they could have arisen from matters such as uncertainty with immigration status or other matters unrelated to a land dispute. We do not find however that it could be fairly said that the report was largely based on the appellant’s own account, as the report was clearly also based on a psychological assessment conducted by the consultant psychiatrist, GP notes, and letters from various mental health agencies. We find that it was an error to have found, at paragraph 62 of the decision that for this reason “little weight” could be placed on the report but in the determination of the protection claim we find that this was not a material error as nothing in the report of Dr Kashmiri links the appellant’s mental health problems with the land dispute history beyond his own testimony, which we find is given little weight for proper reasons as set out above.
24. However with respect to ground three and the determination of the Article 8 ECHR appeal we do find that the First-tier Tribunal has materially erred in law by failing to provide a sufficiently reasoned decision. The decision on this matter is very brief in its reasoning at paragraph 71 to 73, only finding essentially that he will have no obstacles to integration in Pakistan because he has family and will get some medical treatment. Whilst we accept that medical matters are dealt with under the “Article 3” heading at paragraphs 66 to 70 of the decision even in this section we find there is no finding as to where the appellant would be returning to / where his family will be living (which we find to be relevant as rural areas are clearly less well served with mental health services); no findings as to the actual treatment the appellant will need, which ought to have been considered in the context of his diagnosis and the fact that there is medical evidence that he has been a victim of torture in the form of cigarette burns as well as the psychiatric evidence of PTSD, depression and psychosis which could have wider causes; and no engagement with the evidence of Dr Wali about the paucity of psychological and psychiatric care in Pakistan and issues of discrimination and victimisation against those with such problems which would potentially impede the appellant’s integration.
25. We therefore find that the decision dismissing the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds must be set aside. When this aspect of the appeal is remade we preserve the following findings from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal:
• That the appellant is not a credible witness.
• That the appellant is not at Article 3 ECHR medical or suicide risk on return to Pakistan.
• That the appellant has not shown that he owns land or is involved with a land dispute with the Mohmand/Momand family, or that a protection claim arises from any land dispute.
• That the FIR and other court and police documents are not to be given weight.
• That the appellant is in touch with family members in Pakistan.
• That Dr Kashmiri’s diagnosis, including that of PTSD with comorbid depression and psychotic symptoms, is accepted.
• That the reports of Dr Wali and Dr Kashmiri are ones to which weight can be given.

Decision:
1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law in the determination of the Article 8 ECHR appeal.
2. We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the human rights appeal, but uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the asylum and humanitarian protection appeals.
3. We adjourned the remaking appeal.

Directions:

1. Any updating evidence that either party wishes to rely upon must be served by email as a PDF on the other party and uploaded in the correct format to CE file ten days prior to the remaking hearing.
2. Each party should serve on the other party and file with the Upper Tribunal a skeleton argument, which should be no longer than 5 pages (of 12 font) in length ten days prior to the remaking hearing.
3. The appellant’s representative will confirm to the Upper Tribunal the language of the interpreter required as Mr Hingora requested an Urdu interpreter but it would appear that a Pashto interpreter was used before the First-tier Tribunal and the appellant says in his statement he speaks Pashto not Urdu.

Fiona Lindsley

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23rd April 2025