The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005515

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63633/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

BK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Dingley, Counsel, of Five Paper Buildings.
For the Respondent: Mrs Arif, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 23 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a citizen of China born on the 18 November 1985, claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on 28 January 2022. His claim was refused by the Secretary of State and an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal dismissed on 28 August 2024.
2. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal. In its determination promulgated on 12 March 2025 the Upper Tribunal Judge noted the First-tier Tribunal’s positive credibility findings, which included that the Appellant genuinely held pro-Taiwanese independence views and had involved himself in meetings in the UK and to some extent online in which such views had been expressed.
3. The Upper Tribunal found that whilst the First-tier Tribunal did not materially err when assessing the Appellant’s credibility in respect of his material history in China, and had not erred in other respects, it was found the First-tier Tribunal’s findings in relation to risk on return at the date of the hearing were infected by material legal error.
4. A number of findings of the First-tier Tribunal are preserved, being:

(a) The Judges adverse credibility findings (as summarised) at paragraph 34 of the judgement.
(b) The Judge’s finding that the Appellant genuinely holds pro-Taiwanese political views (44).
(c) The Judge’s findings that the Appellant has attended a small number of pro-Taiwanese events in the UK (paragraph 45) and that he has taken part in online activities as well (paragraph 48).
(d) The Judge’s finding that the Appellant has expressed his political views on his own Facebook account (paragraph 47).

(a) It was also found the Appellant is a practicing Christian (paragraph 54).

5. The scope of this hearing is to enable consideration of the Appellant’s UK activities and the potential risks on return to China in light of relevant country conditions [43].
6. The preserved findings, set out at [34], [44], [45], and [47] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision which are relevant, are in the following terms:
34. When this is all taken together and considered in the round I do not find that the Appellant has shown, even to the lower standard, that he was arrested on two previous occasions, or that his family were political activists with a high profile such as to bring him ongoing adverse attention from the state. His evidence in this regard was vague and inconsistent and his subsequent actions, including his accepted freedom of movement in and out of the country, do not suggest that he is a person of interest to the authorities. In this regard the Appellant’s account was largely unsupported speculation seeking to connect a number of different alleged incidents involving many different people over many decades, without any firm evidential basis.
44. The Appellant gave consistent evidence that he holds pro-Taiwanese political views. He was not specifically challenged in respect of these beliefs, and there is nothing inherently implausible with the suggestion that he might hold such views. I therefore accept that he is a person who holds such political beliefs.
45. I also accept that the Appellant has attended a small number of pro-Taiwanese events in the UK, the last of which he stated was in 2022. Again, he gave consistent evidence in respect of this and was not particularly challenged about it.
47. In relation to the Facebook posts, the Respondent suggested in closing that this might not be his account. This was not put to the Appellant, however, in either the refusal letter or cross examination, and so I do accept the Appellant’s evidence in this regard. Having said this, however, even taken at their highest these screenshots show a relatively limited number of posts over many years and with very little evidence of any significant engagement. As someone of no previous interest, therefore, I am not satisfied that it has been shown that these are likely to have come to the adverse attention of the authorities. Such a conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, as previously noted, the Appellant has visited China without difficulty since at least some of the posts were made.
7. The Appellant relies upon a report from Mr Matthew Parsfield dated 14 May 2025 whose expertise was not challenged before me.
8. Mr Parsfield discusses a number of questions specifically asked of him by Mr Dingley before concluding in section 4:
4. CONCLUSIONS
4.1. It is undoubtedly the case that the risk of persecution for a pro-Taiwan activist and unlicenced Christian worshipper in China has grown substantially since BK’s last visit to the country several years ago.
4.2. International tensions over the status of Taiwan, as well as separatist and secessionist movements in Hong Kong and Xinjiang which flared in the late 2010s, have meant that the PRC leadership has initiated a relative clampdown on secessionists, splitters and separatist supporters of national movements in recent years.
4.3. Some of these measures are based upon laws already in place since 2005 (the Anti-Secession Law) or before, which specifically target the subject of Taiwanese secession. In 2022 and 2024, major political and juridical statements, documents and guidance were put forward which significantly heighten the risk to somebody found in contravention of Anti-Secession Laws, specifically in regards Taiwan, with vague and wide-ranging punishments that are potentially very severe indeed – with life imprisonment and the death penalty both cited in the legal guidance (see section 3.1 above).
4.4. Simultaneously, although this has not been the primary focus of this report, it is also the case that the risk of arrest for worshippers in unlicensed churches is also greater now than it was when BK was last in the country, and greater than it was in certain decisions and documents cited in his First-tier Tribunal hearing (significantly, QH).
4.5. As to whether BK’s political activities to date have been visible or impactful enough to have drawn the attention of the Chinese authorities, exposing him to likely prosecution, I am unable to say from the documents and evidence I have been provided with. But I do conclude with a great degree of confidence that the risk to pro-Taiwanese activists in general is far greater than it was when he was last in China.
9. The scope of today’s hearing does not include a re-examination of the findings in relation to the Appellant’s religious activities so I intend to comment no further in relation to that aspect of the report.
10. I mentioned to the advocates during the course of the hearing an article published on the BBC website headed “China’s rhetoric turns dangerously real for Taiwanese”. It was written by Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, a BBC reporter, dated 15 August 2024.
11. In that article Mr Winfield-Hayes writes “Calls to denounce “die hard” Taiwanese secessionists, a tipline to report them and punishments that include the death penalty for “ringleaders” - Beijing’s familiar rhetoric against Taiwan is turning dangerously real.”
12. The article refers to the number of Taiwanese businesspeople and other Taiwanese nationals who are in China seeking to return to Taiwan as they are fear for their safety in China. The article refers to the Chinese authorities launching a website identifying Taiwanese public figures deemed “diehard” separatists which included an email address where people could send “clues and crimes” about those who had been named, or anyone else they suspected.
13. The article refers to scholars believing that Beijing hopes to emulate the success of Hong Kong’s national security laws, which it said were necessary for stability - but which have crushed the city’s pro-democracy movement as former lawmakers, activists and ordinary citizens critical of the government have been jailed under them.
14. The article quotes an academic, Professor Chan, stating that making pro-Taiwanese sentiments a matter of national security, Beijing hopes to “cut off the movements ties with the outside world and to divide society in Taiwan between those who support Taiwan independence and those who do not”.
15. The article also refers to guidance from the Supreme Court in China. That is reference to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) which along with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of State Security issued a joint document entitled “Opinion on punishing according to law crimes of splitting the country and incitement to split the country committed by ‘Taiwanese independence’ diehards”.
16. The Opinion purports to be based on the 2005 Anti-Secession Law and the Criminal Law and it is said appears to be part of China’s war of intimidation against the people of Taiwan.
17. Article 23 of the Criminal Law criminalises actions of “organising, plotting, or carrying out the splitting of the country and the sabotaging of the countries unity” (Article 23 (a)) as well as “instigating splitting of the country and the sabotaging of the country’s unity (Article 23 (b)).
18. Paragraph 2 of the Opinion lays out all the activities associated with what it calls “Taiwanese independence” that constitute crimes under Article 23 (a) which includes efforts to change Taiwan’s legal status through changes to Taiwan’s domestic law, efforts to gain entry for Taiwan into international organisations whose membership is limited to States to “wantonly distort” “the fact that Taiwan is part of China” and finally, “any other actions that seek to separate Taiwan from China”.
19. Although the wording of paragraph 2 appears to be addressed to state authorities I am unaware of anything that specifically limits its application to that group meaning that private citizens may also fall foul of it.
20. Paragraph 7 of the Opinion as detailed to Article 23 (b) of the Criminal Law on “instigation” or secession spelling out that it is a crime to “stubbornly spread advocacy” of Taiwanese independence and related programs and plans of action. There is also, within this provision, further clause covering “other actions instigating the separation of Taiwan from China”.
21. The range of punishments were already spelt out in the Criminal Law which for the most minor offences could involve deprivation of political rights to the more serious to life imprisonment. In cases “where harm to the state and the people is especially serious and the circumstances especially odious”, the death penalty may be imposed.
22. In relation to who can be liable, China’s criminal law covers all actions committed on Chinese territory and, that as China views Taiwan as part of its territory, it also covers actions committed in Taiwan, although that is not an issue in this appeal. The Criminal Law also states it covers all actions committed by Chinese citizens anywhere in the world.
23. A reading of the Opinion and relevant provisions of the Criminal Law clearly supports a finding that the authorities in China deem the advocacy of Taiwanese independence undertaken by anyone anywhere in the world to constitute a criminal offence, making those responsible liable to be prosecuted if they come within reach of the authorities in the PRC.
24. Even if the authorities in China have no knowledge of the Applicant’s activities in the United Kingdom it is likely that on return or in connection with an ETD (if required) he will be interviewed by the Chinese authorities. If he is asked about what he has done in the UK or in relation to any political activities he cannot be expected to lie. The reason for that is it has been found by the First-tier Tribunal that he holds a genuine view in support of Taiwanese independence. If he tells the authorities that he has attended demonstrations and posted entries on Facebook they are likely to see those entries, if they have not already had access to them, and they will again show his attendance at the demonstrations in support of Taiwanese independence.
25. I accept the submission that was made by Mrs Arif that the Appellant, even if his activities were discovered, only demonstrates a low-level activity and does not indicate that at this time he will fall within the category of those of concern to the Chinese authorities. I accept there is nothing to show that the Appellant has a high-level profile.
26. The authorities could, as they would deem the activities are a challenge to the territory of China, charge the Appellant and prosecute him in a criminal court. If that happened it is not made out that the criminal law process or any sentence imposed would be sufficient to amount to persecution. In some cases where the highest potential penalties are under three years imprisonment prosecutors may elect not to prosecute according to Mr Parsfield.
27. I find, however, that even of the authorities decide not to charge him it is plausible that the Appellant will be given a warning and will be subject to detailed surveillance.
28. If he continues to express his pro-Taiwanese separatist beliefs there is a real risk that the authorities in China will become aware. If they do it is likely that further action will be taken against the Appellant, which will increase in severity, especially if it transpires that he is ignoring earlier warnings and penalties, such that the authorities are likely to view him as having a high level of activity and posing a potential threat as a “hard line” separatist. If so, it is plausible that the treatment the Appellant will be subjected to will be sufficient to amount to persecution, which would be for a Convention reason namely his actual or imputed adverse political opinion.
29. If as a result of the threats and the fear of persecution the Appellant decides not to express his views, in person or online, in a situation where he would not otherwise choose to act discreetly, he is entitled to a grant of international protection on the basis of the HJ (Iran) principal.
30. It is clear from the international news stories, and is reflected in the Appellants experts report, that the situation in China has changed since the Appellant left to come to the UK and will no doubt continue to deteriorate for those who express views in support of Taiwan being an independent state, especially if the Chinese authorities continue with their rhetoric and threats of military intervention to prevent the same.
31. Having sat back and considered the issues in this appeal in the round, I conclude that whilst the Appellant may be able to be returned to China as he does not have the type of profile indicated in the report that will give rise to a real risk at this stage, there is a credible risk of harm sufficient to amount to persecution if he continues with his pro-Taiwanese activities in China, and is entitled to a grant of international protection on the basis of the HJ (Iran) principal. In either case the Appellant is entitled to be recognised as a refugee and his appeal is allowed on that basis.
Notice of Decision
32. Appeal allowed.


C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


27 May 2025