Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2024-005524
UI-2024-005525
UI-2024-005526

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/65847/2023
PA/65855/2023
PA/65862/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th May 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUTCHINSON

Between

KS
SKS
SSS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Ms S Akinbolu, Counsel instructed by Malik & Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellants] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The first appellant is a citizen of Albania, born on 13 August 1994. The second and third appellants are her children, with the second appellant born in the UK in March 2019 and the third appellant also born in the UK in October 2021. They are all Albanian nationals. The first appellant applied to the respondent for asylum on 18 February 2019. That application was refused on 3 December 2023. The appellants’ appeals against that decision were dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Rodger (“the judge”) on 9 October 2024, after a hearing on 1 October 2024.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal McMahon on 2 December 2024, on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier Judge had erred in law in:
(1) making a mistake of fact about contact between the appellant and her sister;
(2) failing to take into account the country background evidence.
Although a third ground was pleaded, that the judge took an unreasonable approach to the medical evidence, permission was not granted under ground 3 and there was no renewal application. It was agreed before me that ground 3 was not argued or arguable
3. The matter came before me, initially on 4 February 2025, and again on 29 April 2025, to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and thus whether the decision should be set aside.
4. The error of law hearing was adjourned at my direction on 4 February 2025, to allow the parties to listen to the recording of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, given that it emerged that the Record of Proceedings was disputed. The appellants’ representative, in a letter dated 19 March 2025 to the Upper Tribunal, confirmed that the Record of Proceedings was as indicated by the Senior Presenting Officer and therefore Counsel’s note of proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal was incomplete. Ground 1 was formally abandoned.
Submissions – Error of Law
5. In relation to the remaining ground, in the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions by Ms Akinbolu it is argued in short summary for the appellant as follows:
6. It was submitted that Judge Rodger had not addressed the background evidence. Reference was made to the country guidance case law, but solely to assess risk, once the judge had reached her conclusions on credibility. That position was legally erroneous. It was the appellant’s evidence that she had been rejected by her family because she had broken the honour code by running away from her fiancé, and because of her sexual exploitation. It was the appellant’s case that she further faced rejection as the unwed mother of two children. It was submitted both in writing and orally before the Upper Tribunal, that the background evidence, both in the respondent’s bundle and in the appellants’ bundle, together with the country guidance, supported that risk.
7. The Tribunal in AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 accepted that family rejection was common, particularly where there were children. In TD and AD (Trafficked women) (CG) [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) the Tribunal accepted this conclusion. Reference was also made before the judge to the CPIN on human trafficking February 2023 including at sections 8.1 and 14.2 with the report noting that rejection by family members is common, since the family honour is said to have been destroyed and that the situation is said to be aggravated where there are children born out of wedlock. Reference was also made to further articles including that most families rejected trafficking victims following return to Albania particularly those subjected to sexual exploitation.
8. It was further submitted that the updated CPIN published in July 2024 noted at sections 9.2 and 13.2 that victims of trafficking are rejected or shunned by family and the community from where they come, with single mothers facing the greatest difficulties reintegrating, due to rejection by families and societal stigma. Further reports that were before the judge were also cited. It was submitted therefore that the background material overwhelmingly suggested that for a victim of trafficking in the appellant’s position, rejection by family was the norm. It was submitted that the judge’s credibility conclusions could only be made in the context of that evidence. Ms Akinbolu also drew the Upper Tribunal’s attention to what was said in TD and AD in relation to women in this appellant’s situation being regarded as “kurva” and being rejected by her family, partly due to the shame on the family and partly due to perception of society. It was submitted that without taking into account all of this evidence, the judge’s plausibility findings could not be sustained.
9. Although there was no Rule 24 response, in oral submissions by Ms McKenzie for the respondent it is argued in short summary as follows:
10. It was submitted that the judge had considered all of the material before her and Ms McKenzie drew the Tribunal’s attention to paragraphs [11] and [39] of the decision in particular. At [39] the judge indicated that she had considered the factors at paragraphs 90 to 119 of TD and AD and it was submitted that it was clear that she engaged with the background country information.
11. Ms McKenzie noted that the appeal skeleton argument (ASA) before the First-tier Tribunal accepts, in effect, that the country guidance case law of TD and AD does incorporate background information including considering how society treats trafficked women and that this was part of the background information that the judge had considered. Whilst the judge may not have specifically mentioned particular paragraphs of the CPIN in reaching her credibility findings, it was submitted that it was clear that she had applied this information as reflected in her decision, including in [11] and [39].
12. It was Ms McKenzie’s submission that [39] was not “too late” in terms of the judge formally considering the country guidance and background country information at that stage as it was her submission that the judge had it in mind from the start of the decision.
13. It was Ms Akinbolu’s submission in reply that considering paragraph [39] it was clear that the judge had already reached her findings of fact without considering the relevant background material and country information.
Conclusions – Error of Law
14. I have reminded myself that appellate courts should be slow to infer a relevant point not expressly mentioned has not been taken into account: MA (Somalia) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49. I take into account what was said by Lewinson LJ in Fage UK Ltd. v Chobani UK Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 5, that in making their decision the judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to them, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping. Pertinently, and not to be forgotten on appeal, the hearing is not a dress rehearsal, ‘It is the first and last night of the show’.
15. The ground of appeal is not made out. In a careful and comprehensive decision which is well-reasoned, the judge, beginning at [4] noted that the first appellant was relying on TD and AD. Paragraph [4] also makes specific reference to the ASA and the oral submissions by Ms Akinbolu. The judge went on at [7] to indicate that she had had sight of the stitched bundle of documents and used this bundle during the hearing, before going on to set out at [11] that she had considered all of the objective material set out within the stitched bundle and referred to by Counsel, including the March 2024 CPIN and the country guidance case of TD and AD, with the judge going on to set out the headnote at [11].
16. The judge went on to consider at [19–20] that section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 was engaged in relation to damage to the appellant’s credibility. The judge at [21] set out that the appellant’s account of trafficking had been accepted as credible by the respondent, which was relevant to the judge’s assessment of the credibility of her account regarding risk on return. The judge also considered the appellant’s mental health diagnoses before concluding at [22] that the appellant had provided no persuasive explanation as to how her sister was able to contact her after the appellant claimed four years of no contact.
17. The judge properly considered all of the evidence before her concluding at [24] that the appellant’s account of no contact with her family for four years and her account of her sister telling her about the claimed threat, was not credible. The judge did not accept that a threat would have been made or that there would be any ongoing interest in the appellant four years after she had left, especially in circumstances where the judge noted that there had been no attempt to find the appellant in the three weeks after she had escaped and no evidence that her family had been threatened or contacted to find out about her whereabouts before mid to late 2022.
18. The judge noted at paragraph [25], that on the appellant’s account she had a good relationship with her sister and found that there was no credible explanation as to why the appellant would not have informed her sister of her whereabouts or that she was safe and maintain contact with her sister whilst in the UK. The judge noted that if the appellant had contacted her sister in late 2022 then there was no persuasive explanation as to how she was able to contact her sister after so many years, or if she had always had her number then why she had not made contact with her prior to late 2022.
19. It is notable, at [26] that the judge begins the paragraph with:
“Overall I do not find it credible that the Appellant is unable to recall details as to who made the call in 2022 and I find that her claimed inability to recall such details is more consistent with the Appellant’s account of not having any contact with her parents and sister since June 2018 to be an untrue account. This is not a finding that I make lightly in view of the accepted trafficking victim status of the Appellant and the known vulnerabilities and psychological difficulties experienced by former victims of trafficking but it is a finding that I make after careful consideration of all of the evidence before me”. (my emphasis)
20. The judge very clearly throughout the decision references her consideration of all the issues and all the evidence in the round, which will have necessarily included the country guidance caselaw and the background country information, including as detailed at paragraph [11]. In seeking to go behind those findings and suggest that the judge did not have in mind the background country information and country guidance, including in relation to the approach societally, culturally and otherwise in Albania towards those in the appellant’s circumstances, amounts to no more than a disagreement with the judge’s well-reasoned findings.
21. The judge was not required to rehearse each and every piece of information taken into account prior to reaching each conclusion that she did, and the careful reasons-based conclusions reached were open to her
22. The judge at [34] took into account the appellant’s vulnerability which again in my view would necessarily have included the judge’s awareness and consideration of the societal and cultural conditions in Albania. However, it was open to the judge to find as she did that she did not accept that this appellant would be without family support on return.
23. The judge also did not accept that this appellant’s family had shunned her or that they would not support her on return. The judge also noted that even if her father had shunned her, which was not accepted, the appellant was in contact with her married sister who lived away from the family home and the judge reached in effect, alternative findings that if her father/parents did not support her she would be supported by her sister. Those are findings that were properly open to the judge.
24. The judge also at [34] did not accept that her family would send her back to Niko or that Niko had the reach, connections or inclination to trace the appellant. The judge noted that her father did not do this in the three weeks that the Appellant was at home and there was no persuasive evidence that her family had been approached or threatened regarding the appellant since she left Albania.
25. The judge at [35] made adverse credibility findings in relation to the appellant’s evidence regarding her circumstances on return to Albania as a single parent of two children with no support. The judge noted that the appellant’s evidence regarding the assistance provided by a Mr SS did not sit well. The appellant in her witness statement had said she was living with a boyfriend F in his rented room within four days of arriving in the UK and that within a few days of telling him she was pregnant in August 2018 she was left in his room with all of his belongings. The judge describes the appellant living next door to a friend of F’s called SS who the appellant claimed took pity on her and who looked after her and paid her rent. She describes him as a British national originally from Albania. The appellant claimed asylum in February 2019 after being advised by Mr SS, so that could get access to medical care and help to look after her and her child. The appellant claimed that she did not know the surname of the father of her second child born in October 2021 and that he left her shortly after she told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter at page 50 of the bundle, the judge notes that Mr SS stated that he did not know much about the appellant’s situation as he had never asked but that he gave food and necessary things and saw her as his daughter and supported her. The judge found it surprising that Mr SS did not attend the Tribunal. The judge at [36] was not persuaded that Mr SS was a British citizen or that he had never asked the appellant about her situation in the six years that he had been paying her rent and supporting her children as he claimed in his letter at page 50. At [37] the judge went on to conclude that she was not persuaded overall that the appellant was telling the truth about her situation in the UK and about the friendship with Mr SS.
26. It was in this context that the judge reached the finding that ‘overall’ there was no persuasive evidence the appellant would return to Albania as a single mother of two children with no support from anyone within Albania.
27. Having reached careful findings of fact, the judge went on at [38] and following to consider the risk on return to the appellant including of re-trafficking and again those findings were properly open to the judge.
28. The judge’s decision, read fairly and as a whole, does not disclose a material error.
Decision
(1) The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
(2) I do not set aside the decision.

M M Hutchinson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 May 2025