Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005546

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56100/2023
LP/01082/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

IF
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Gajjar, Counsel instructed by SMA Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and her children are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or her children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, who is a citizen of Albania, appeals against the decision of the respondent dated 23 August 2023 refusing her asylum and human rights claim made on 27 September 2018.
2. The appellant’s appeal was originally heard and dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 22 April 2024. However, in a decision promulgated on 2 May 2025 a panel of the Upper Tribunal (Judge Sheridan and Deputy Judge Chana) set aside that decision on the basis that it contained a material error of law. The rehearing of the appeal was reserved to the Upper Tribunal for a de novo hearing.
3. For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the appeal.
Anonymity
4. The First-tier Tribunal made an order granting the appellant anonymity. No application has been made to set aside that order. While I take into account the strong public interest in open justice, I continue the anonymity order on the basis that the appellant is an accepted victim of human trafficking and suffers from mental health issues. For those reasons, I am satisfied that the balance weighs in favour of protecting her identity.
Background
5. The appellant was born in 1996. When she was 20, her parents arranged for her to marry an Albanian national living in Belgium. A few months later, she travelled to Belgium to meet her fiancé, Z, for the first time but he forced her into prostitution. She remained in Belgium for six months at which point Z arranged for her to be trafficked to the UK. According to the appellant, she managed to escape from the lorry in which she was being transported. On the day of her arrival in the UK, which was in late 2017, she met an Albanian man, S, who agreed to help her. Later, they began a relationship.
6. On 14 July 2018, the appellant was arrested and detained as an illegal entrant. She claimed asylum the same day. Two days later, she was referred to the National Referral Mechanism as a potential victim of human trafficking.
7. On 10 December 2021, the Competent Authority decided that there were conclusive grounds to accept that the appellant is a victim of modern slavery.
8. The appellant has two children, both of whom were born in the UK and are Albanian citizens. The first child was born in 2018. The appellant says that she does not know who that child’s father is. The second child was born in 2021 and S is the father.
The respondent’s decision
9. In a decision dated 23 August 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum and human rights claim. The respondent accepted that the appellant is a victim of trafficking and modern slavery. However, having taken into account her personal circumstances, she decided that the appellant was not at an increased risk of re-trafficking on return to Albania. She said that while the appellant did not have any work experience, she did have a high school level education. While the appellant said that she suffered from mental health issues including flashbacks and depression, the respondent found that the appellant had not been formally diagnosed with any condition and was not taking any medication. The respondent did not accept that the appellant’s family would try to hurt her. The respondent decided that the appellant could seek the protection of the Albanian authorities on her return, including the police and by accessing shelters and reintegration programmes established to help victims of trafficking. The respondent also said that the appellant could reasonably be expected to relocate to another part of Albania.
10. Taking into account the appellant’s human rights, the respondent found that she did not meet the requirements for leave to remain under the Immigration Rules. Furthermore, she did not accept that there any exceptional or compassionate circumstances that warranted a grant of leave outside of the Rules on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
The hearing
11. Mr Gajjar made an application, unopposed by Mr Wain, for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness, which I granted.
12. Mr Gajjar also made an application for the appellant to rely on a four-page additional evidence bundle that had been filed late. Mr Wain did not oppose that application and given that the bundle was short, I granted permission.
Evidence
13. I had the following evidence before me:
a. The 415-page composite bundle lodged by the appellant (“CB”).
b. The four-page additional bundle lodged by the appellant (“AB”).
c. The Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Actors of Protection (Version 3.0; February 2025) (“the Protection CPIN”).
d. The Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Human trafficking (Version 16.0; July 2024) (“the Trafficking CPIN”).
e. The Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Mental healthcare (Version 3.0; January 2025) (“the Healthcare CPIN”).
14. The appellant was the only person to give evidence, which she did using an Albanian interpreter. Her evidence is set out in her witness statements dated 25 January 2019 and 12 January 2024 and in the record of proceedings. It is not therefore rehearsed here except where necessary to do so.
Issues
15. The parties agreed that the following issues needed to be determined by the Upper Tribunal:
a. Whether the appellant faces a real risk of persecution as a victim of human trafficking.
b. Whether the appellant could seek the protection of the Albanian authorities and/or relocate to another part of Albania to avoid her persecutors.
c. Whether the appellant’s removal would be contrary to the best interests of her two children.
d. Whether removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellant and her children’s right to a private life.
Legal framework
16. As her asylum claim pre-dates the introduction of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, to succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must show a real risk of serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on the appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.
Findings – Remaking
17. The respondent accepts that the appellant is a victim of human trafficking and there was no challenge by her to the appellant’s claim that she was forced into prostitution by Z and that she managed to escape him once she arrived in the UK. Neither is it in dispute that the appellant falls within a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. The key issue for determination, therefore, is whether, against that background, the appellant will be at real risk on return to Albania as a victim of trafficking.
The risk of re-trafficking
18. As recognised in the country guidance case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC), re-trafficking is a reality. However, whether that risk exists for an individual appellant will turn on several factors, including those that led to the original trafficking and the appellant’s personal circumstances.
19. The appellant was trafficked as a result of her father’s decision to arrange her marriage to a man he had never met, who lived in Belgium. I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard, that is a situation likely to reoccur in the future, especially when the appellant maintains that her family have disowned her.
20. I therefore go on to consider whether the appellant will nevertheless face a real risk of harm on return to Albania either because her previous trafficker, Z, will try to track her down or because she might fall prey to other traffickers seeking to exploit her vulnerabilities.
21. Beginning with the appellant’s fear of Z, her evidence is that she fears that he will track her down in Albania, which is a small country, using his “connections” to either re-traffic her or otherwise exact revenge for escaping. However, the appellant has not seen Z since November 2017. So far as she is aware, he has not contacted her family since late 2017. From the appellant’s evidence, he is based in Belgium and not Albania. Even applying the lower standard of proof, there is insufficient evidence before me to show that Z has the inclination to track her down after so many years or the capacity or influence in Albania to either know that she had returned there or track her down, especially if she did not go back to her home area. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant has failed to prove, even to the lower standard, that Z would continue to pose a risk to her on return.
22. I do, however, accept that without adequate support on return to Albania, the appellant may be vulnerable to other criminals seeking to exploit. I therefore proceed to consider whether she would generally be at risk of re-trafficking.
23. At headnote (h) to the decision in TD and AD, the Upper Tribunal set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account when assessing whether a female victim of trafficking will be at risk of persecution in Albania or whether they will be able to access sufficient protection from the authorities.
24. First, despite Mr Wain’s submission that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the appellant’s family have low status or economic standing in Albania, I am satisfied to the lower standard that is the case. In her first witness statement, at para 6, the appellant said that her mother is a housewife and her father is a labourer and works on construction sites [CB/177]. During her asylum interview, the appellant said that her mother is a housewife and her father is a carpenter (Q24) [CB/196]. It was not argued by the respondent that the references to “labourer” and “carpenter” are discrepant or mutually exclusive. His profession would indicate a lower economic standing.
25. Second, I am satisfied that the appellant has some level of education having completed high school in Albania. I deal with the implications of this below, as part of my findings in relation to the support available to the appellant on return.
26. Third, the appellant suffers from mental health issues. The most recent health records disclosed by the appellant in her additional bundle and dated 13 June 2025 say that the appellant suffers from mixed anxiety and depressive disorder. It also says that the appellant has suffered from panic attacks in recent months “[t]riggered by previous flashbacks, problems with immigration, home office [sic] wants to deport her back to albania [sic]” [AB/3]. She has been prescribed sertraline 50mg tablets for her depression and propranolol 40mg for her anxiety. The GP also recommends that she can try meditation, yoga and breathing exercises and, if things worsen, she can self-refer for talking therapies. In oral evidence, the appellant said that she had made a self-referral for talking therapies and was awaiting confirmation of an appointment.
27. The medical notes also record that the appellant has complained of pain in her left breast for the last six months. However, it was not argued by Mr Gajjar that this was a factor relevant to the determination of this appeal.
28. Fourth, it is not in dispute that the appellant has, to use the wording in TD and AD, two illegitimate children. As the Upper Tribunal found in TD and AD, Albania is governed by a strict code of honour that means single women with illegitimate children will be particularly vulnerable and face very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return and that, in extreme cases, some women may be forced by their family to abandon the child. I am not satisfied that there is a risk the appellant will be forced to abandon her children given that she is no longer in contact with her family. However, I deal with the difficulties that the appellant will face as a single mother below when considering the support available on return.
29. Fifth, the appellant comes from a municipality within Kukës in the north of the country. I accept that she does not come from a city and, consequently, patriarchal attitudes are likely more entrenched in her home area than they would be in a more cosmopolitan part of the country. However, for reasons that I discuss later in my decision, I accept that the appellant cannot reasonably be expected to return to her home area, although, with support from NGOs and the state, she could be expected to relocate to a city such as Tirana.
30. Sixth, the appellant is now 27 years old. Mr Wain submitted that while still a young woman, she was now old enough to be able to live independently: see the Trafficking CPIN at page 129 which says that young victims of trafficking who are over 18 years old and are willing to live independently are supported towards their economic independence. According to the CPIN, “after completing vocational training and maintaining a job for some time, they move out of the shelter into protected apartments” subsidised by “TVO NGO through project financing”. Mr Gajjar, however, submitted that there was no cut-off age in TD and AD following which a person would no longer be vulnerable; and while the older the person, the less likely they were to be targeted by potential traffickers, the appellant was still young enough to be at risk. In the trafficking CPIN at 8.3.8, UNICEF is quoted as saying that “Girls of age 14-18 years are most likely to be targeted for sex trafficking” and “children of age 13-14 are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking”. The following passage (erroneously numbered 8.3.1) says that most male and female victims of trafficking are under the age of 15 years old. I accept Mr Gajjar’s submission that the appellant is at an age where she may still be at risk from traffickers, although I am satisfied that she is less likely to be of interest to traffickers than she was before she came to the UK given that she is now older and has more life experience.
31. Seventh, I have considered what support network will be available to the appellant on return to Albania. For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that there would be an adequate level of support available to her in Albania, albeit not in her home area.
32. I begin with the question of whether the appellant could expect to receive support from her family. Mr Wain submitted that the appellant had given inconsistent accounts about when she had last spoken to them and this, he said, cast doubt on whether they had really cut ties with her. At Q235 of her asylum interview, the appellant was asked whether she had contacted her family in Albania once she was safe in the UK. The appellant answered, “Yes[,] once I called my father but he had found out what kind of work I had dome as [Z] had informed him” [CB/231]. In answer to a question from Mr Wain, the appellant said that conversation had taken place in 2018. Mr Wain contrasted that to the appellant’s earlier answer to Q28 of her asylum interview when she was asked, “When did you last have contact with your family?”, to which the appellant answered, “It must have been December 2017, it has been a while I don’t remember” [CB/197]. In oral evidence, the appellant said that she spoke to her family in both December 2017 and 2018 and that was the last time she had contact with them. Given that the appellant did caveat her answer to Q28 by saying that she did not remember, I am satisfied that her later answer in which she said that she had spoken to her family since arriving in the UK is not a significant credibility issue. The appellant’s case is that her family became angry with her after Z made her call her parents from Belgium in August 2017 to say that her relationship with Z had broken down because she had been unfaithful to him. As set out above, during her asylum interview, the appellant said that Z had told her father that she had worked as a prostitute. That her family would then want to distance themselves from her on the basis that she had brought shame on them is consistent with the findings in TD and AD at headnote (b) as well as the contents of the Trafficking CPIN, which acknowledges at 4.4.1 that victims of trafficking may experience stigma, including from their own family and at 9.1.7 that families “face shame as they do not see the woman as being exploited, they see her as exercising prostitution and putting shame on the family”. That state of affairs is likely to be exacerbated by the fact that she also has two children born out of wedlock. I am therefore satisfied to the lower standard that the appellant’s family will not offer her their support were she to return to Albania. I also take into account that the lack of a supportive family is likely to make it more difficult for the appellant to mitigate the risk of re-trafficking.
33. I am, however, satisfied that the appellant can reasonably be expected to access the reintegration services for victims of trafficking. According to 4.2.2 of the Trafficking CPIN, these reintegration services provide victims of trafficking with
“short-term and long-term accommodation (including 4 shelters), the prioritisation of trafficking victims for access to social housing, healthcare and psychological support, employment support, internships and opportunities to start new businesses, economic assistance and vocational training.”
34. 11.1.5 of the same CPIN says that the shelters
“provided food, mental health counseling [sic], legal assistance, health care, educational services, employment services, assistance to victims’ children, financial support, long-term accommodation, social activities, vocational training, and post-integration follow-up; [The National Coalition of Anti-Trafficking Shelters] and the government supported all official and potential victims in both 2022 and 2021.”
35. These shelters, based in Tirana, Elbasan and Vlorë, also accommodate the children of trafficking victims: see 11.1.4 of the Trafficking CPIN.
36. According to the Trafficking CPIN at 4.2.3 to 4.2.8, since TD and AD was promulgated, between December 2019 and September 2022 the UK government has invested £3.5m in a programme delivered by a consortium run by UNICEF to fund reintegration programmes in Albania. A further agreement had been made to invest £2.9m to continue to deliver the programme up until March 2025.
37. In TD and AD, the Upper Tribunal found that unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, it cannot generally be said to be unreasonable to expect a victim of trafficking to access these services: see headnote (e). As explained above, the appellant does suffer from depression and mixed anxiety, and she has been prescribed medication to help her deal with these. There is no suggestion from the evidence before me that the appellant’s mental health conditions are so severe that they would prevent her from accessing shelters in Albania and I note from 6.1.1 of the Healthcare CPIN that antidepressants and drugs for the treatment of anxiety are available in Albania. Furthermore, as Mr Wain submitted, the reintegration services provide mental health support to victims of trafficking, with shelters offering treatment by trained psychologists: see 4.3.1 of the Trafficking CPIN. I am therefore satisfied that it is reasonable to expect the appellant to access reintegration services on return.
38. I am also satisfied that the programmes offered by the reintegration service can sufficiently mitigate the risk of the appellant being re-trafficked. While I accept that the appellant’s age does not necessarily take her out of the category of those likely to be of interest to potential traffickers, given the background evidence quoted above says that teenage girls are more likely to be targeted, I am satisfied that the appellant, who is now 27, will be of less interest to potential traffickers than she was when she was last trafficked. I also take into account that she was unwittingly placed into the hands of Z by her parents. As mentioned above, that it unlikely to occur again.
39. I am also satisfied that the reintegration services can help the appellant find work, which will reduce her vulnerableness. I take into account that the appellant has a high school education. Although that does not carry as much weight as a tertiary education would, I am nevertheless satisfied that it cannot be completely discounted or afforded as little weight as Mr Gajjar suggested. The appellant will have at least some qualifications to draw upon. However, she will be returning to Albania aged 27 years old with no employment history and, therefore, she might struggle to obtain anything above low-paid unskilled work, with which she would need to support two children. The Trafficking CPIN at 4.2.2 and 11.1.5 does, though, confirm that shelters in Albania provide trafficked women with employment services, including internships, vocational training and help setting up businesses. 12.3.2 also says that victims of trafficking can obtain rent subsidies for business properties. However, I also take into account that 11.1.5 quotes the US State Department as saying in 2023 that “experts reported of a lack of resources for long-term care, employment, and other reintegration efforts, particularly for…victims with children”. Therefore, while I am satisfied that the shelters can provide the appellant with short- and medium-term employment support, this support is unlikely to continue long-term. 12.4. of the Trafficking CPIN also sets out the measures the Albanian state provides to help vulnerable groups obtain education and vocational training free of charge. At 12.4.15 it records that a 2022 study by Economic Reintegration found that “appropriate training and internships can lead to decent employment for survivors in Albania.” It goes on to say that “Seven interviewed survivors (50%) were…employed in the same field in which they had trained: as a tailor, hairdresser, cook, car mechanic or other profession”. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant will have the opportunity to obtain assistance on return to help her find work with which to support herself and her children.
40. I am, however, satisfied that as a single mother with two children born outside of marriage, the appellant will face significant challenges living alone in Albania. As the Upper Tribunal found in TD and AD at headnote (f), this will include “stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found by either their families or former traffickers”. The Upper Tribunal went on to say that “Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship” while others “with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring” for whom it would not be reasonable to expect them to live alone. As already explained above, while I am satisfied that the appellant does suffer from depression and anxiety, the only treatment the appellant is currently receiving for these conditions is medication, which the CPIN on mental healthcare suggests would be available in Albania. Furthermore, as already discussed above, mental healthcare support is provided to victims of trafficking as part of the reintegration programmes. There is no medico-legal report before me and nothing in the medical evidence that has been provided to show that the appellant’s depression and anxiety cannot be treated with appropriate support.
41. I also take into account that the appellant has no experience of living alone in Albania, although it appears that she does have some experience of this in the UK given that she no longer lives with S or her friend, ER. The Trafficking CPIN confirms that survivors of trafficking as well as those who are employed but on a low income can access a housing subsidy of up to 100% from the government: see 12.3.1. Victims of trafficking are also entitled to long-term social housing: see 12.3.2. Although 12.3.8 says that in practice the number of people who apply for aid and social housing is low because of a hesitation to apply because of prejudice, I am satisfied that with the help of the reintegration services, the appellant can reasonably be expected to seek such assistance if she requires it. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant would be entitled to accommodation and rent subsidy after she left a shelter. Furthermore, I take into account 13.2.1 of the Trafficking CPIN refers to a Global Initiative report from December 2021 which says that “it is possible for a woman to live alone in cities such as Tirana, Durres Fier, Vlora and Shkoder without her family, despite the fact that Albania has a relatively patriarchal culture.”
42. I am therefore satisfied that while it will be difficult for the appellant, especially with two children, to live alone in a city such as a Tirana, it will be possible with the assistance of the support services for victims of trafficking, including mental health and employment support, and the ability to seek housing assistance from the state.
43. Furthermore, the appellant’s evidence is that S, who is the father of the appellant’s second child, plays a role in both of her children’s lives, even though she says that she and S are no longer in a relationship. S is also an Albanian national and, during oral evidence, the appellant claimed not to know what his immigration status is. There is no suggestion that he is in the UK lawfully. Mr Wain submitted that if S supported the children in the UK, he could also be expected to do so if they moved to Albania; and, if he does not have any leave to remain, it was also possible that he could return to Albania to support the appellant and her children. In oral evidence, the appellant said that she and S had not discussed whether he would support the children if they went to Albania. I am satisfied that if, as the appellant says, S plays a parental role not just for his own child, but the appellant’s first child too, he can be expected to continue to play a supportive role in their lives. That would be the case whether or not he chooses to remain in the UK or returns (or is removed) to Albania.
44. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the risk factors that the appellant possesses can be mitigated through the provision of the support services offered by the Albanian state and NGOs for victims of trafficking as well as the support of S. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant has not proven to the lower standard that she faces a real risk of re-trafficking on return to Albania, either from Z or another trafficker.
Sufficiency of protection
45. In TD and AD, it was found that, in general, there was a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection in Albania, but it will not be effective in every case: see headnote (d).
46. For the reasons already discussed above, I am satisfied that the appellant can be expected to access reintegration services in Albania and that this will mitigate the risk of re-trafficking.
47. I am also satisfied that, if necessary to the appellant could seek the protection of the police in the event that, contrary to my findings at [21] above, Z managed to find her or, alternatively, a different trafficker sought to exploit her. While the appellant claimed that Z had connections to powerful people, she was unable to provide any detail on this. Furthermore, as Mr Wain submitted, the appellant’s own account of events suggested that Z did in fact have a fear of the authorities. That is because in answer to Q198 of her asylum interview, the appellant said that she when she spoke to her family by telephone while living in Belgium, Z would point a gun at her to make sure that she did “not tell them the truth” about what has happening to her. At Q199, the appellant was asked “What were [Z’s] concerns regarding your parents finding out?” to which the appellant answered, “He was afraid that my father would report him” [CB/224]. I therefore find that this does indicate that Z had a fear of the Albanian authorities.
48. Consequently, while I accept from 5.4 of the Protection CPIN that police corruption is a problem in Albania, on the evidence before me I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard, that Z has any or sufficient influence over police officers, let alone a significant number of police, in Albania to prevent the appellant from obtaining their protection.
49. I am also satisfied from the Protection CPIN that, despite corruption, in general there is a functioning legal system in Albania and, in Tirana in particular, police have a visible presence, although their response is often delayed due to limited resources and manpower: see 5.3.2. Furthermore, the Trafficking CPIN states at 4.1.2 that the “Police continue to investigate cases of trafficking”. The appellant could therefore be expected to seek the protection of the police if other traffickers sought to exploit her.
50. I therefore find that the appellant has not proven to the lower standard that she would be unable to access state protection on return.
Internal relocation
51. I am satisfied that the appellant cannot reasonably be expected to return to her home area where she is likely to face very considerable difficulties in reintegrating as a result of her estrangement from her family as a result of her experiences as well as her having two illegitimate children. However, for the reasons already discussed above, I am satisfied that it is reasonably open to the appellant to relocate to a part of Albania that provides reintegration services to victims of trafficking, most likely Tirana but also the other cities that host shelters and reintegration programmes for victims of trafficking.
Conclusion on the protection appeal
52. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the appellant’s removal would not breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention or to those eligible for humanitarian protection, nor would it be unlawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Article 8 ECHR / The best interests of the children
53. I accept that the appellant will have established a private life since arriving in the UK in 2017. The appellant and S are not currently in a relationship and I am therefore satisfied that they do not enjoy a family life for the purposes of Article 8. The appellant’s children will also have developed a private life and I accept that they likely have a family life with S.
54. I must therefore consider whether the respondent’s decision to remove the appellant and, as a consequence, her children, is proportionate. The public interest lies in the maintenance of effective immigration controls. To strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, I adopt a balance sheet approach.
55. On the respondent’s side of the scale, I take into account that the following:
a. The appellant does not qualify for refugee status and she does meet the requirements of the Rules, which is an important, although not determinative, consideration.

b. I am not satisfied for the purposes of s.117B(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 Act that the appellant, who gave her evidence through an interpreter, speaks a sufficient level of English to show that she is able to integrate.

c. Given the appellant’s lack of English, British qualifications or work experience, I am not satisfied that she would be financially independent if permitted to remain in the UK for the purposes of s.117B(3).
56. Turning to the appellant’s side of the scale, I take into account the following:
a. The appellant has lived in the UK for over seven and a half years.

b. The appellant is a recognised victim of human trafficking and was brought to the UK.

c. The appellant will likely face stigma and other obstacles on return to Albania arising from being a single mother with two children born out of wedlock, her status as a victim of trafficking, depression and anxiety, lack of employment history and lack of family support. However, for the reasons given earlier in this decision, I am satisfied that these obstacles could be overcome with the assistance of the reintegration and other services available to her as a victim of trafficking.

d. The appellant has accessed medical treatment in the UK, including for her depression and anxiety. She takes medication for both and states that she has self-referred for talking therapies although, as of the date of hearing, she has not been notified of an appointment. However, as discussed earlier in this decision, the appellant can access medical treatment on return to Albania, including through the integration services for victims of trafficking.

e. The appellant has made friends in the UK with ER. She had a relationship with S, but that has now ended and it appears from her oral evidence that the contact she has with him relates solely to her children. However, any private life the appellant has established in the UK would have been developed at a time when her presence in the UK was unlawful or otherwise precarious. I therefore find that I can attach little weight to it: see s.117B(4)(a) and (5).

f. The appellant’s two children were both born in the UK. They have only known life in this country. They will also have developed a private life, although primarily through their mother. However, they are both Albanian citizens and, given that their mother appears to speak little English, it is more likely than not that they speak Albanian. I am also satisfied that at five and four years old, they are both young enough to adapt to life in a new country.

g. Taking into account the children’s best interests, which are a primary, but not the paramount, consideration, while I accept that they would likely enjoy a better quality of life in the UK than Albania, they are Albanian nationals and their presence in the UK is tied to their mother’s circumstances. Furthermore, for the reasons given above, I am satisfied that they and their mother can access support and reintegration services to help them re-establish their lives in the UK. Although S has not provided any evidence in support of the appeal, I accept that S is the father of the youngest child but plays a role in the lives of both children, and it therefore likely enjoys a family life with them, and that it would be in their best interests to continue to have contact with him. However, I am also satisfied that given the appellant’s claim to be unaware of S’s immigration status despite knowing him for over six years, it is more likely than not that he is in the UK illegally. It therefore remains open to S to return to his home country to be with the children. Ultimately, the best interests of the children lie in remaining with their mother, even if that means going to Albania with her.
57. While not raised in submissions before me, in the appellant’s skeleton argument it is argued that the public interest factors should be diluted as a result of the five-year delay in processing her asylum claim. I have therefore had regard to the case of EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41. While I accept that this delay in principle would have enabled the appellant to develop closer social ties to the UK, ultimately the evidence before me regarding the extent of her private life is very limited. The evidence is that she has made one friend, ER, who has not provided any evidence in support of her appeal, and that she has had one relationship, now over, with S, who also has not provided any evidence. There is insufficient evidence before me to demonstrate that the appellant’s sense of impermanence faded as a result of the delay. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to prove that the delay was the result of a dysfunctional system that yielded unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair outcomes. I therefore find that while the delay was unacceptable, it does little to dilute the public interest factors.
58. Having given careful consideration to both sides of the scale, on balance, I am satisfied that the appellant’s private life, and her children’s private and family life, do not outweigh the strong public interest requirements. I am therefore satisfied that their removal to Albania would not lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences for them and it would therefore be proportionate.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16th July 2025