Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005563

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66372/2024
LP/05657/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

MBI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hamad, instructed by Hanson Law.
For the Respondent: Miss Rushforth, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 23 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a determination promulgated on the 14 May 2025 a panel of the Upper Tribunal (‘the Panel’) set aside the decision of the judge of the First-tier Tribunal subject to preserving the findings of the First-tier Tribunal at [15] to [43] and at [44]. The Panel also found that the concession made by the Presenting Officer at the hearing of 30 September 2024 is withdrawn.
2. The scope of this hearing, as identified by the Panel is limited to the question of whether the Appellant can internally relocate to the IKR. Pertinent preserved findings are said to include the fact of the Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity, his evidence that he previously held a biometric ID card in Iraq [31], the finding that he failed to demonstrate that he had left that document in Iraq [34], that the Appellant had previously resided in Erbil and had attended university within that city, and that the Appellant had failed to establish he will be of continued interest to the authorities on account of his involvement with the New Generation Movement [42].
3. The Appellant filed a bundle for this hearing on 17 July 2025 which had not come to the attention of Miss Rushforth, that included an updated statement of 16 July 2025. Fortunately, Miss Rushforth was able to read the documents at the start of the hearing and confirmed she was happy for them to be admitted and for the matter to proceed.
4. There was no cross-examination and the appeal proceeded by way of submissions only.
5. The preserved findings relating to no evidence of risk on return is sustainable, for although the Appellant claims to have attended two demonstrations and one further one, it is not made out he has a profile of the type identified in the objective material that will have brought him to the adverse attention of the authorities in the IKR based on his sur place activities, including any social media, or that if he continued such activities on return he would be of adverse interest to the authorities. Country material records the large numbers of individuals who protest within the IKR and those of particular interest, such as journalists, leaders or organisers, and that although rank-and-file individuals may be detained they are released without evidence of adverse interest sufficient to entitle them to a grant of international protection.
6. It is not made out the Appellant will not be able to obtain a laissez passer which will enable him to be flown directly to Sulamaniyah Airport. As the Appellant has already provided necessary biometrics the objective material shows that a replacement document can be obtained, if required, meaning he can be returned with the necessary documentation to enable him to travel freely and live a normal life within Iraq. The First-tier Tribunal judge expresses doubt about the status of the Appellant’s claims relating to his Iraqi identity documents. The Judge notes a number of discrepancies in the Appellant’s evidence about identity documents which led to doubt about his account about the whereabouts of those documents [28]. Summing up the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s concerns in relation to documentation at [34] of that determination, it is written:
34. The Appellant’s evidence given during the hearing was not only internally inconsistent, but it is at odds with the findings in SMO. His account is, essentially, that because he was “from the area”, he was not asked for any identification. Ms Sepulveda suggested in her closing submissions that the Appellant’s answer was in the context of local checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of Makhmur. However, I reject that submission and the Appellant’s evidence on this point. Even on that account, the Appellant has not adequately explained how he would have been able to cross other checkpoints during the journey to Baghdad, including those near the airport where he would not have been ‘known’ to those manning the checkpoints. Put simply, I do not find the Appellant’s account of being able to travel from Makhmur to Baghdad without a CSID or INID to be credible. In my judgment, the Appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proof to the lower standard to demonstrate his account that he left his identity documents in Iraq. It therefore follows that the Appellant has failed to prove that he would be at risk of inhuman treatment on his return to Iraq as a result of lacking in identity documents.
7. There is nothing before me to warrant my finding any differently. The Appellant will therefore be returned as a documented Iraq Kurd to the IKR.
8. The Appellant’s claim in his representative skeleton argument that even if he could get to the IKR, which is not a hypothetical question at all as it is established that is precisely the point to which he will be returned, he would not be permitted entry has not been made out on the evidence. He will.
9. In relation to relocation within the IKR, the Upper Tribunal in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) specifically considered this issue. The relevant section of the headnote, which reflects findings made within the body of the determination, reads:
E. IRAQI KURDISH REGION
1. There are regular direct flights from the UK to the Iraqi Kurdish Region and returns might be to Baghdad or to that region. It is for the respondent to state whether she intends to remove to Baghdad, Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.
Kurds
2. For an Iraqi national returnee (P) of Kurdish origin in possession of a valid CSID or Iraqi National Identity Card (INID), the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by land is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
3. P is unable to board a domestic flight between Baghdad and the IKR without either a CSID, an INID or a valid passport. If P has one of those documents, the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by air is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
4. P will face considerable difficulty in making the journey between Baghdad and the IKR by land without a CSID or an INID. There are numerous checkpoints en route, including two checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the airport. If P has neither a CSID nor an INID there is a real risk of P being detained at a checkpoint until such time as the security personnel are able to verify P’s identity. It is not reasonable to require P to travel between Baghdad and IKR by land absent the ability of P to verify his identity at a checkpoint. This normally requires the attendance of a male family member and production of P’s identity documents but may also be achieved by calling upon “connections” higher up in the chain of command.
5. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds.
6. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
7. If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a ‘relatively normal life’, which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision-makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P’s family on a case by case basis.
8. For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited:
(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;
(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;
(iii) P could resort to a ‘critical shelter arrangement’, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;
(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.
9. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking the following matters into account:
(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;
(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%;
(iii) P cannot work without a CSID or INID;
(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;
(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;
(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.
10. The issue of internal relocation was considered by the Respondent in her review and as identified by the Panel, was a live issue before the First-tier Tribunal which that judge failed to properly determine.
11. Dealing with the specific questions raised in SMO: it is clear that the point being considered is whether it is reasonable for the Appellant to internally relocate having left the airport in Sulaymaniyah. I do not find he has established any real risk or entitlement to international protection up to that point. There is, in particular, no credible evidence that the Appellant will face a real risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process as his family do not have a known association with ISIS, and even if it comes from an area formerly associated with ISIS and is of fighting age, he has evidence of the time he spent in the United Kingdom which would show he had not arrived in the IKR directly from ISIS territory.
12. The Respondent in her review refers to the availability of the Voluntary Returns Scheme which is specifically mentioned in SMO and to which the Appellant will therefore have access if he made the necessary application. The purpose of that program is to ensure a person who is returned will not be subject to destitution during the time that they re-establish themselves in their home country. The Appellant was aware of the Secretary of State’s position in this regard but has failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that either he will not be able to benefit from this scheme or that the sum provided will not enable him to re-establish himself on return.
13. The availability of such funds indicates the Appellant will not be required to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR. The Appellant fails to make out that he will not be able to obtain some form of accommodation it is reasonable to expect him to occupy during the time he is re-establishing himself in Iraq.
14. As noted in SMO, money obtained under the Voluntary Return Scheme can also be added to by other sources. The Appellant has not provided evidence that he will not be able to access ad hoc charity donations or not able to access PDS rations, and the fact he attended Erbil university and has work related experience was specifically raised by the Secretary of State. The Appellant has failed to establish that he will not be able to secure employment as he will face no gender issues being male, although the unemployment rate for Iraqi IDP’s living in the IKR is said to be 70% the Applicant has attended University and has work related experience and has not established he will not be able to obtain employment, the Appellant has been found to possess the necessary identity documents, the Appellant is not an unskilled worker who would be at greatest disadvantage but has skills, education, and experience which it has not been shown would disadvantage him in the labour market or mean he could not obtain some form of employment. It has not been made out potential employer would be deterred based upon the Appellant’s family history of his family leaving Makhmur in 2014 and moving to Erbil due to attacks by ISIS at that time. That clearly showed there was no difficulty in the family relocating. The Appellant’s claim he experienced difficulties in Erbil as a result of his support of the New Generation Movement was found to lack credibility.
15. Although the First-tier Tribunal Judge found the Appellant’s claim of the events in Iraq credible, that was that Hashd AL Shaabi took over the family home to use it as a base and shot his father. If it was his father who was shot that must mean the remaining members of the Appellant’s family were able to relocate to Erbil in the IKR.
16. The key question when internal relocation is being considered is whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances. As the issue was raised by the Respondent it is for the Appellant to establish on the evidence that this will be the case. In this appeal the Appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proof upon him, even to the lower standard, to show that internal relocation to the IKR is not a reasonable option for him. As Miss Rushworth put it, there was nothing to show he could not.
17. Having sat back and considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny I find the Appellant has failed to establish that internal relocation to the IKR is not something that can be reasonably expected of him, on the basis he has not established that it would be unreasonable or unduly harsh for him to relocate and to re-establish his life in that part of Iraq.
18. On that basis I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
19. Appeal dismissed.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 August 2025