Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005574

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50670/2024
LH/05948/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

Md Salman
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Kogulathas (instructed by DJ Webb & Co)
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 21 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought with permission, by the appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 30 September 2024 in which the appellant’s human rights appeal was dismissed.
2. In summary the appellant’s case is that he entered the United Kingdom illegally in June 2005. The appellant made a number of applications in an attempt to regularise his status, all of which failed. He then made an application on the basis of his private life on 7 August 2019, which is the subject of this appeal. The appellant is from the Bihari ethnic group from Bangladesh. He spent most of life in Bangladesh in refugee camps, until he came to the United Kingdom. The appellant claimed to have no meaningful ties in Bangladesh and that he would struggle to start his life again. The respondent refused that application on 19 January 2024 by reference to the immigration rules and exceptional circumstances.
3. First-tier Tribunal Judge Manuell (“the Judge”) did not accept that the public interest in the appellant’s removal was diminished because he had not been removed to date. The Judge did not accept that the respondent had delayed and found that the appellant’s anxiety and depression about his lack of status was of his own making. The Judge was critical of the appellant’s repeat appeal in this case as an attempt to appeal the earlier decision of Judge O R Williams, years out of time.
4. The Judge referred to country evidence and the improved current situation for Biharis in Bangladesh. The Judge did not accept there was satisfactory evidence that the appellant came from a displaced persons camp or a background of exceptional poverty. The Judge found it likely that the appellant maintained contact with his mother because she paid for his journey to the United Kingdom.
5. The Judge concluded that medical treatment is available and accessible in Bangladesh and the appellant had shown no links or ties of any significance to the United Kingdom. Ultimately the Judge concluded that there would not be very significant obstacles to the continuation of his private life in Bangladesh.
6. The appellant’s private life was developed at all times when he had no leave to remain and so by reference to s.117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, little weight was attached to it. The Judge concluded that the appellant’s private life appeal could not succeed.
Summary of grounds and submissions
7. Mr Kogulathas for the appellant relied upon six grounds of appeal. There was no rule 24 response, but it was confirmed by Ms Ahmed that the respondent resisted the appeal. I heard submissions on behalf of both parties in respect of all grounds of appeal.
8. Firstly, the appellant contends that the Judge erred at [25] in finding there was no satisfactory evidence that the appellant came from a displaced persons camp for two reasons. One, this fact was not disputed by the respondent or the first Judge, Judge Williams. Two, the appellant’s ID card showed that he originated from the Geneva Camp in Dhaka. The appellant submits that the Judge’s finding is materially inaccurate, fails to take account of relevant evidence and is procedurally unfair to a material issue. It is further submitted that the finding that the appellant has remained in contact with his mother is also procedurally unfair for failure to put it to him at any point.
9. Second and thirdly, in finding that the conditions for Biharis have improved, the appellant submits that the evidence relied upon by the Judge actually contradicts the Judge’s position. Furthermore, there were detailed references to the background evidence that the Judge has overlooked. In so doing, the Judge had failed to engage with the appellant’s submissions in support of departure from the first Judge’s decision, some 14 years earlier.
10. Fourthly, the appellant submits that the Judge was in error to conclude that the appellant would not be identified as an ethnic Bihari. This is attributable to the Judge’s failure to engage with the submission and background evidence cited in support.
11. Fifthly, the appellant submits that the Judge was wrong to find [19] that there was no evidence that the respondent had delayed in this case. There was a delay of five years in decision making and evidence in the appellant’s bundle of an upheld complaint in this regard.
12. Finally, the appellant submits that the Judge approached the appeal with a closed mind by chastising the appellant for pursuing the appeal as an abuse of process and other negative comments in the determination based on erroneous understanding of the evidence.
13. Ms Ahmed on behalf of the respondent contended that ground 1 was immaterial because ultimately the Judge found there were no significant obstacles to integration. She submitted that Deevaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKAIT 702 was relevant because Judge Williams had concluded at [17]-[18] of his decision that the appellant would not have to live in a refugee camp and in live in poor conditions and explained why.
14. In response to grounds 2 and 3, Ms Ahmed submitted that the appellant was simply disagreeing with the Judge. The background evidence did not contradict the Judge’s findings. The starting point is the previous Judge’s decision. The improvements for Bihari’s are not perfect. The Judge considered the background evidence and the specific facts of this appellant’s case but the threshold is high and the Judge is not required to list every paragraph of the evidence referred to and considered.
15. In relation to the previous determination, it is the starting point. Ms Ahmed contended that the appellant was in effect seeking to challenge the decision of the previous Judge out of time. The Judge in this case did make an assessment of whether to depart from that decision.
16. In response to ground 4 relating to the ID card, Ms Ahmed submitted that is unlikely that the appellant would need to show his ID card to the general public and so the Judge was not wrong to conclude that the appellant would not be identified as Bihari. She accepted that there was some discrimination and social stigma but that it does not reach the threshold of very significant obstacles and the onus is on the appellant to show that.
17. Ms Ahmed submitted that the delay ground raised bad points. The immigration history was not in dispute and so the Judge was correct at [19] to find there was no evidence of the respondent’s delay. The appellant had absconded and so this is not an EB (Kosovo) [2008] UKHL 41 point because it was the appellant who had frustrated removal. The only period of delay the appellant relies upon is the period waiting for a decision on his application, it is not a case where he was appeal rights exhausted and the respondent has done nothing.
18. As for apparent bias, Ms Ahmed submitted that the issue of the appellant’s previous claim to be stateless was dealt with by Judge Williams and the Judge’s comments about the appellant’s claim to be stateless as “discredited” does not go to bias. There is no issue taken with the conduct of the hearing, only what is said in the determination. The robust approach taken by the Judge to the appellant’s immigration history is not tantamount to bias. She invited me to dismiss the appeal.
19. Both parties agreed that if an error of law was found the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.
20. I reserved my decision.
Conclusions
21. In reaching my conclusions I have taken account of the general principles regarding the restricted jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal to errors of law set out in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at §26.
22. I find that there are material errors of law identified in grounds of appeal for the following reasons.
Ground 1 and 4
23. In my assessment, the Judge is wrong to have concluded [25] that there is no satisfactory evidence that the appellant came from a displaced persons camp. The reasons are that the issue was not in dispute, the appellant was not given a fair opportunity to address the issue and there was positive evidence before the Judge in the form of the appellant’s ID card that goes to the core of this issue, had it been in dispute, that he failed to address.
24. The errors of ground 1, feed into the errors identified in ground 4. The Judge has not considered the possibility of the appellant being identified as Bahiri from his ID card and whether that will have an impact on his ability to find work and access services. I do not accept Ms Ahmed’s submission that the appellant would not be identified because it is unlikely he would have to show his ID to the general public. More to the point is that in the course of attempting to access employment or services the appellant is likely to have to produce some ID and it would in those circumstances be relevant that he is identifiable as a Bihari.
25. I consider these to be fundamental facts relevant to the assessment of whether there are very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh and therefore a material error of law.
Ground 2 and 3
26. I agree with the appellant that the material cited by the Judge in the determination contradicts his finding that things have improved for the Bihari’s. The material cited states inter alia at [23] and [24]:
“Urdu speakers living in extreme poverty are sometimes unable to access basic services, either because of the unavailability of such services in their area, or because they are unable to meet the necessary legal or administrative requirements applicable to all Bangladeshi nationals.”
“Nearly 50 years since Bangladesh's independence, Biharis are now recognized as citizens but remain stranded in neglected encampments with few economic opportunities to improve their status.”
27. There was a substantial amount of other country information cited in the appellant’s skeleton argument which in summary, details continued discrimination in the access to medical treatment, employment, education, social stigma and some instances of violence in attempts to further displace Biharis. The Judge simply has not considered this evidence or given any reasons why it is rejected, if in fact it is. An example of the Judge’s apparent failure to consider all of the evidence is that the Judge concluded at [29] that there was “no evidence produced to show that the current labour market in Bangladesh was adverse”, whereas the appellant’s ASA specifically cited the ‘Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission’ which states “Biharis can access education and employment but may still face discrimination due to the social stigma against them.”
28. Although I accept Ms Ahmed’s submission that the Judge is not required to mention every piece of evidence in the judgment. The Judge is required to engage with the issues and the substance of the material and save for focusing on the appellant’s ability to obtain a Bangladeshi passport, the Judge has not engaged with the continued day-to-day issues faced by Biharis which appeared on the face of the evidence referred to by the appellant.
29. The errors identified in grounds 1-4 are sufficient to require the decision to be set aside and remade. If it were necessary to consider the remaining grounds of appeal, I find as follows.
Grounds 5 and 6
30. Ms Kogulathas accepted that ground 5 regarding delay was not the strongest ground. However, it is correct that the Home Office upheld the appellant’s complaint about the delay in making a decision on his application submitted on 27 June 2019. The evidence of the letter dated 24 October 2023 from the Home Office upholding the complaint was part of the appellant’s bundle before the Judge and so it is difficult to reconcile the Judge’s explicit finding [19] that there “was no evidence that the Home Office has somehow delayed” and that the appellant’s “anxiety and depression about his lack of status is entirely of his own making.” with the evidence before the Judge.
31. It maybe that in the total scheme of the appellant’s immigration history that this period of accepted delay on behalf of the respondent may not carry much weight but that will be a matter for another judge who considers this appeal afresh. The important point is that the Judge was wrong to find there was no evidence of delay attributable to the respondent and that the appellant’s anxiety was entirely of his own making. I am not prepared to accept, in a case where there are arguably fine margins, that this error is immaterial.
32. As for the final ground, I agree with Ms Ahmed. The Judge was robust in his recounting of the appellant’s immigration history and his view as to the merits of appeal but in my view, this was a reflection of the Judge’s errors identified above rather than any actual or apparent bias against the appellant.
Error of law conclusions
33. Grounds 1 to 5 identify material errors of law impacting the sustainability of the whole decision.
Notice of Decision
34. The appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law and is set aside with no findings preserved.
35. The appeal will be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for remaking to be heard by a different judge.

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 June 2025