Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005640

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01561/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

TYWANNE PATRICK
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Mupara, instructed by IAS Manchester
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice on 23 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal, following the setting aside, in a decision promulgated on 1 May 2025, of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The appellant is a Ugandan national who was born on 5 April 2002 in the UK and who, it is accepted, has never been to Uganda. His mother was born in Uganda but emigrated to the UK on 1 October 1989, at the age of 11 years with her own parents who had sought asylum in the UK. The appellant was born at a time when his mother had been seeking shelter from his father in a domestic violence unit. She and her other son, who was born in 1998 in the UK, were granted indefinite leave to remain on 25 July 2002, three months after the appellant’s birth. She had believed that the appellant was British and only recently found out that he was not. She had applied for a British passport for him at one time, but had received no reply. She had had no contact with the appellant’s father and had no idea of his immigration status. The appellant had never travelled outside the UK and did not have a Ugandan passport nor had he ever applied for one.
3. On 6 January 2020 the appellant was convicted of possessing a blade/article which was sharply pointed in a public place. On 17 January 2020 he was convicted of manslaughter, committed on 26 June 2019. He was sentenced on 5 March 2020 to 10 years’ detention in a young offenders institute on the manslaughter charge, with no separate penalty for the earlier offence. On 15 June 2021 he was convicted of attempt to wound with intent to do grievous bodily harm, an offence which was committed prior to the manslaughter, on 29 May 2019. On 5 November 2021 he was sentenced to 33 months in a young offenders institute, to run consecutively with the previous 10 year sentence.
4. The details of those offences are set out in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, extracted from the Crown Court Judges’ sentencing remarks. We summarise them as follows.
5. In relation to the conviction for manslaughter, the victim was a stranger who was 18 years old and who walked across a street when the appellant’s accomplice took out a large knife and stabbed him in the heart. The victim sought refuge in a shop but the appellant followed him carrying a large knife and repeatedly stabbed him in the legs. One of the wounds in the victim’s thigh was 13 cm deep. The attack was captured on CCTV as was the aftermath when the appellant and his friend were seen leaving the scene smiling and fist bumping. At the criminal trial the appellant confirmed that prior to the attack, he knew his friend intended to have a violent confrontation. His explanation was that he was acting because of peer pressure but it was noted that when the appellant was stabbing the victim inside the shop none of his friends were watching. At trial the appellant’s evidence was that he had started to carry a large knife on occasions in public in the months leading up to the attack. At the time of trial, the appellant had no convictions and he was 17. The starting point for the sentence was 16 years and this was reduced to 10 years on account of his guilty plea, his lack of convictions at the time, his age and personal mitigation by a parent.
6. In relation to the other offence which took place before the manslaughter, the circumstances of the offence were that the appellant was part of a group of youths. His victim was again unknown to him and was walking with his girlfriend. One or more of the group made a derogatory comment about the girlfriend and continued to shout offensive comments across the road. At first the comments were ignored but the victim then approached the gang and asked them to stop, he was challenged to a fight but walked away. Again, this attack was captured on CCTV. The victim was approached from behind and the appellant struck the first blow to his face, pulling him to the ground where the group of four set upon him repeatedly kicking and stamping him, targeting his head and face. The victim sustained bruising and swelling to his face and eye and damage to the facial bones. He suffered a complex fracture to the right eye socket requiring surgery and the insertion of a metal plate and screws into the eye socket in order to save and restore the integrity of the eye socket and support the eyeball.
7. At his induction interview at HMP Huntercombe on 24 August 2020, following his imprisonment, the appellant claimed to be British. On 18 October 2021 it was confirmed that there was no evidence to verify that he was a British citizen. The respondent accordingly made a decision to deport the appellant, on 2 November 2021, pursuant to the Immigration Act 1971 and the UK Borders Act 2007, and on 1 March 2023 the appellant was invited to submit further representations.
8. The appellant made representations on the basis of his family and private life. He stated in his representations that he was studying A level English literature through the Open University and was planning on undertaking a degree on his release from prison. He had always believed that he was British. He knew no-one in the country from where his mother came and had no family or friends there and he did not know how he would cope if he had to go there. He had a girlfriend. All his ties and connections were in the UK.
9. The appellant’s representations were treated as a human rights claim, which was then refused by the respondent in a decision dated 3 August 2023. The respondent noted that the appellant had not provided any details of his partner and therefore did not accept that he had a genuine and subsisting relationship. It was not accepted that the requirements of the family life exception to deportation were met. As for the private life exception, the respondent did not accept that the appellant had been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life, although it was accepted that he was not responsible for his unlawful residence as he was a minor for the majority of the relevant period. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK, as he had two convictions for three offences which showed a lack of respect for UK law, and there was no evidence of any history of employment or financial independence or evidence to show a significant positive contribution to the UK’s wider society. The respondent did not accept that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Uganda, as he spoke English, which was the official language of the country, and it was considered that he would be able to continue his Open University studies there. It was not considered that the presence of extended family members in the UK amounted to very compelling circumstances or that there were very compelling circumstances on any other basis.
10. On 31 August 2023 the respondent signed a deportation order against the appellant, on the basis that it was deemed that his deportation was conducive to the public good.
11. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his human rights claim, and his appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on 25 June 2024. The appeal was allowed in a decision issued on 2 October 2024.
First-tier Tribunal
12. In her decision, the judge set out the details of the appellant’s two main offences, the appellant’s background and the circumstances under which he grew up. When considering rehabilitation and remorse, the judge quoted the appellant’s witness statement: “I do not regret any of the events that led to my arrest because without them I would most likely be either dead or in prison for a much more serious offence. I do however regret the pain and suffering I inflicted on the victims and their families. I hate (to think) that to learn my lesson, someone else had to suffer a great deal and a mere apology would only add insult to injury. That being said, I can only hope you accept my sincere apology. I committed these offences when I was a minor.” and noted that the appellant had said, in response to her question, that he stood by the content of his statement and in particular his confirmation that he did not regret the events. The judge had regard to the appellant’s education, qualifications and work experience, noting that he had been studying for his A-levels in prison and had set up a prison newspaper. She took account of statements which had been provided from individuals who had worked with him in prison, including the Educational Manager at Feltham YOI, a student support worker, a person who had trained him to work as a mentor for others to help their literary skills and help with paperwork and applications, and an interventions facilitator at Feltham who had helped him on his distance learning course. She also took account of the course the appellant had undertaken in violence reduction and his role as an equalities representative and rehabilitative coacher in which he would meet with the prison governors to share the views of his peers and represent them. The judge had regard to the OASys report which had been produced after the hearing and upon which neither party had made submissions despite being invited to do so, noting the references therein to the appellant being an enhanced prisoner displaying appropriate and respectful behaviour, but having also received an adjudication six months ago and displaying violent behaviour whilst in custody.
13. The judge considered the exceptions to deportation. With regard to the private life exception, she found that all of the appellant’s stay in the United Kingdom had been unlawful, but that given the unchallenged evidence that he and his mother had no knowledge of his unlawful status, it would be wrong to treat the public interest in his deportation as increased because of that factor or to reduce the weight to be applied to his private life. She found that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom having lived here all his life and been educated here and she also found that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Uganda, never having been there and having no family or connections there. The judge accepted that the family life exception could not apply as the appellant accepted that he had no partner and no children, his relationship with his girlfriend having ended. With regard to the question of ‘very compelling circumstances’, the judge concluded her decision at [56]: “Whilst the offending behaviour is amongst the most serious imaginable, in this case I find a combination of two factors amounts to very compelling circumstances. The first factor is the work done in prison with other offenders which is exceptional. That in itself would not meet the very high threshold. The second factor is the circumstances of the appellant, his belief that he was a British citizen, the failure to regularise his status not being his fault and his complete lack of connection and familiarity with Uganda.” On that basis she found that there were very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in deportation and she accordingly allowed the appeal on human rights grounds.
14. The Secretary of State sought, and was granted, permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on two grounds. Firstly, that the judge had erred in law by finding that the rehabilitative work done by the appellant while in prison was an ‘exceptional’ feature, when that was not supported by the OASys report which confirmed that he had had recent adjudications in prison relating to further violence, and which assessed him to remain a high risk of causing serious harm to members of the public. Secondly, that the judge had erred by finding that the appellant’s mistaken belief that he was British because he was born in the UK and had lived all of his life here, was also an exceptional feature.
Upper Tribunal: Error of Law
15. The matter then came before the Upper Tribunal sitting as a panel, on 4 April 2025. In a decision promulgated on 1 May 2025, the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside on the following basis:
“16. The only issue before the judge was that of ‘very compelling circumstances’. The judge found that a combination of two factors was sufficient to meet the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test, namely the appellant’s exceptional work done in prison and with other offenders, and the lack of connections with Uganda and belief that he was British.
17. With regard to the first of those factors, we have no hesitation in concluding that the extent of the judge’s reliance upon the appellant’s rehabilitative work in prison and the weight that she gave to that factor was fundamentally flawed. That is for several reasons. Firstly, the judge did not explain how that conclusion could be reconciled with the guidance at [141] of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 HA (Iraq), as quoted at [58] of the Supreme Court judgment:
“…the fact that a potential deportee has shown positive evidence of rehabilitation, and thus of a reduced risk of re-offending, cannot be excluded from the overall proportionality exercise. The authorities say so, and it must be right in principle in view of the holistic nature of that exercise. Where a tribunal is able to make an assessment that the foreign criminal is unlikely to re-offend, that is a factor which can carry some weight in the balance when considering very compelling circumstances. The weight which it will bear will vary from case to case, but it will rarely be of great weight bearing in mind that, as Moore-Bick LJ says in Danso, the public interest in the deportation of criminals is not based only on the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal in question but also on wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern.”
18. Secondly the judge did not properly explain how the appellant’s rehabilitative work and studies in prison was sufficient to reduce the risk to the public. At [54] she referred to the OASys report, where the appellant was assessed as being a high risk of serious harm to members of the public, particularly when challenged, and which stated that he did not fully appreciate the impact of his behaviour on his victims and that he had been violent in prison and had had several adjudications. At [55] she set out her own impressions of the appellant, including the fact that he had not fully taken responsibility for his actions. Although the judge concluded, at the end of [55], that there was evidence of a strong possibility for the future because he had been assessed as being very capable of change and reducing the offending, she did not provide details and neither did she explain how that was sufficient to satisfy the significant concerns that she had otherwise set out, particularly given the evidence at [22] and [23] of her decision. Thirdly the judge, whilst being aware of the serious nature of the appellant’s offending, did not appear to have properly factored into her conclusion the full extent of the public concern and the public revulsion arising from his crimes. Fourthly, as Mr Parvar pointed out in his submissions, the judge did not explain how, in giving significant weight to the appellant’s rehabilitation, he could be considered to be fully reformed when he was still in prison and had not been tested in the outside world.
19. For all these reasons, the judge’s reliance upon the appellant’s rehabilitative work in prison to the extent that she did was legally flawed. Given that it was a combination of the two factors which led the judge to conclude that the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test was met, and that neither in itself was considered by the judge to be determinative or sufficient in itself, any error in her findings on one of those factors would therefore be material to her overall conclusion that the relevant test had been met. As such there is no need for us to go any further. On the basis of what we have said above, the judge’s decision must be set aside.
20. We would add, however, that in respect of the second factor, the judge did not properly grapple with the significance of the appellant’s status in the UK, relying only on his mistaken belief that he was British and the fact that the failure to regularise his stay was not fault. We asked Mr Parvar to address us on the appellant’s status in light of Akinyemi v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2098, which concerned similar circumstances where the appellant was born in the UK and had never acquired status but would have been entitled to do so, who was, subject to the deportation provisions, effectively irremovable (see [40]), and who was a ‘home grown criminal’. Mr Parvar’s response was that people were deported in such cases and that, given the seriousness of the appellant’s offending which was “as bad it gets”, deportation was appropriate in this case.
21. We considered that that was a matter for the re-making of the decision in the appeal. We did not agree with Mr Parvar that the decision ought simply to be re-made by dismissing the appeal. Neither did we consider that it could simply be re-made by allowing it. Although the parties agreed that there was no dispute as to the findings of fact, and that there was no further fact-finding to be made so that it would not be necessary to hear further oral evidence, we considered that there needed to a further hearing at which the significance of the appellant’s status could be fully ventilated and addressed with reference to relevant caselaw.
22. Accordingly we set aside the judge’s decision. Her record and assessment of the evidence, and her fact-finding are all preserved. None of that has been challenged. It is only the judge’s conclusion arising from that evidence and fact-finding, that the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test has been met, which needs to be re-made. It is assumed that the re-making of the decision will be on the basis of submissions only, since Mr Habtemariam confirmed that there was no further evidence to be submitted. In such circumstances it will not be necessary for the appellant to attend, although he is entitled to if he wishes to do so. Should that situation change, the appellant is directed to advise the Tribunal in accordance with the directions below.
Decision
23. The Secretary of State’s appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge is set aside. The decision will be re-made at a resumed hearing on a date to be notified to the parties.”
Upper Tribunal: Re-making the Decision
16. The matter was listed for a resumed hearing on 23 June 2025 and came before ourselves as a differently constituted panel.
17. The appellant was produced for the hearing, at the request of his solicitors, although he did not give any further oral evidence. His family members, including his mother, attended to observe the proceedings.
18. Both parties produced skeleton arguments for the resumed hearing. However no further documentary evidence was submitted for the hearing and Mr Mupara confirmed that there was no further evidence and that reliance was placed solely upon the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. It later transpired that Mr Mupara was relying upon a pre-sentence report completed on 3 February 2020, but that document had not previously been produced before the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal. Although Mr Parvar objected to the document being produced at the last minute we decided to admit the document and provided Mr Parvar with an opportunity to read and consider it.
19. Following our enquiries Mr Mupara advised us that his instructions from the appellant were that he was expecting to be released in July 2025. However we were directed to the OASys report completed on 11 March 2024 which confirmed that the appellant’s licence expiry date was 1 April 3032 and that his conditional release date was 15 November 2025.
20. We then heard submissions from the parties.
21. Mr Mupara relied upon the case of Kiarie and Byndloss, R (on the applications of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 42 which in turn relied upon Boultif v Switzerland - 54273/00 [2001] ECHR 497 and Uner v. the Netherlands - 46410/99 [2006] ECHR 873, in identifying factors which could amount to exceptional circumstances, for the purposes of meeting the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test. He submitted that the first exceptional circumstance in the appellant’s case was his immigration status. Although the appellant had never had legal presence in the UK, he had always believed himself to be a British citizen and had missed various opportunities, through no fault of his own, to apply for British citizenship or register as a British citizen, namely when he turned 5 years of age, and from the age of ten years until his imprisonment when he was still a child. Secondly, the appellant had no connection to Uganda and had never left the UK. His grandparents were refugees from Uganda and his mother came to the UK with her parents in 1989 at the age of eleven. Thirdly, there were the chaotic circumstances in which the appellant grew up, having been exposed to violence and weapons from a very young age at home and in the community, having moved house and lived in refuges as a result of his father’s violence, having been bullied and threatened at school and forced into committing offences. Mr Mupara referred to the missed opportunity for the appellant to have been assisted by social services through targeted youth support when the local authorities were concerned about his welfare and wrote to his mother but she did not reply. He referred to an incident, mentioned in the pre-sentence report at [20] when the appellant denied being stabbed and claimed to have fallen on broken glass despite the concerns of the police and social services, and to another incident when his brother had his face slashed. He submitted that the appellant’s own offending followed these incidents and occurred within a very short period of time, from January 2019 to May 2019. Mr Mupara submitted that consideration should be given to the question of how the appellant’s life would have been different if he had been supported by social services through the targeted youth support, and to the fact that he probably would not have committed the offences for which he had been convicted.
22. Mr Mupara submitted that the fourth exceptional circumstance in the appellant’s case was his rehabilitation and his conduct in prison. He accepted, following the guidance in Danso v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 596, that it was an error to give significant weight to rehabilitation, but he submitted that some weight should be accorded to it (more than only little weight). He submitted that the appellant had only eight adjudications in prison, which was low, and that he had had no adjudications in the six months prior to the OASys report being completed. Of the eight adjudications, several were on the basis of simple involvement in fights but where he was not the aggressor. Further, the pre-sentence report referred to 91 positive recommendations. Mr Mupara accepted that the appellant’s offending was serious, but he submitted that the appellant’s lack of knowledge that he was not a British citizen, the fact that he was born in the UK and had no connections to Uganda, his home environment and exposure to violence and his rehabilitation amounted, when taken together, to very compelling circumstances. He accepted that none of those factors alone would be sufficient.
23. Mr Parvar relied upon his skeleton argument and submitted that, with reference to Akinyemi and with regard to the appellant’s residence in the UK and immigration status, the public interest was incredibly weighty and was as great as it could be in the appellant’s circumstances. Akinyemi did not say that the fact that someone had lived his whole life in the UK rendered deportation disproportionate. That was not sufficient in itself to amount to very compelling circumstances. Mr Parvar submitted that the picture painted of the appellant’s violent past was a new argument which had not previously been relied upon in mitigation and it was a claim that the appellant had not made himself. There was no evidence to support the claim that he was a victim himself in the past. At most, he was of concern to the social services. The matters set out in the pre-sentence report were at odds with what the appellant was relying upon in his own evidence. The question of peer pressure was considered in the Judge’s Sentencing Remarks but was rejected as it was clear that the appellant was the aggressor and was not intimidated by others. The points about the appellant’s chaotic lifestyle did not, therefore, even remotely justify his offending. As for rehabilitation, Mr Parvar submitted that that was not capable of attracting weight and, if anything, it reinforced the strength of the public interest. There were significant factors against the appellant in regard to his conduct as he had stated that he did not regret the events leading to his arrest and it was concerning that there should be a loss of life in order for him to learn a lesson. He was seen fist-bumping after the attack on the victim. There was therefore a lack of remorse and contrition and the appellant could not be rehabilitated. Mr Parvar referred to the OASys report and the reference to the appellant not completing offence focussed work and being a high risk of serious harm. The appellant had not yet been tested outside the prison. As for the fact that the appellant had no connection to Uganda, Mr Parvar submitted that there was no suggestion that he would face destitution there. The issues were not insurmountable. He had ties there in relation to his ethnic background. No protection issues had been raised.
24. In his response, Mr Mupara accepted that the very compelling circumstances test was unlikely to be satisfied by just one factor alone. He clarified further that he was not submitting that the fact that someone had lived their whole life in the UK was sufficient in itself to amount to very compelling circumstances. He submitted that the appellant’s case was, however, one of those cases where the public interest could be outweighed by sufficiently strong circumstances, considering all matters cumulatively. It was relevant to consider that, had the appellant’s family taken up the offer of intervention by social services, there could have been a different outcome. Mr Mupara clarified further that the appellant had not refused to take victim awareness courses in prison, as suggested by Mr Parvar, but such courses had not been offered to him. There was nothing to suggest that he would have refused to take such a course had it been offered to him.
25. We advised the parties that we were reserving our decision.
Analysis
26. The starting point for the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal is the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal. Those findings were that the appellant could not meet either exception to deportation and that his failure to meet the private life exception was on the basis of the lawful residence requirement. That finding has never been challenged and Mr Mupara confirmed again to us that it was accepted that the appellant was not lawfully resident in the UK for the purposes of section 117C(4)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
27. The only issue before us for the re-making of the decision in the appeal was, as agreed by the parties, whether the appellant had demonstrated ‘very compelling circumstances’ for the purposes of section 117(6). Mr Mupara relied on what he submitted were four and a half exceptional circumstances which amounted to ‘very compelling circumstances’, the half being the appellant’s rehabilitation which he submitted ought to be given more than little weight. The first exception upon which he relied was the appellant’s immigration status: that he had always believed that he was a British citizen, that he would have been eligible for British citizenship, upon application, for a number of years prior to his imprisonment and that the missed opportunities to apply for British citizenship and to regularise his stay in the UK were through no fault of his own and could not be attributed to him. The second exception was the fact that the appellant had no ties or connections to his country of nationality, Uganda, his mother having come to the UK as a child herself. We shall take those two exceptions together, since together they form the strongest aspect of the appellant’s circumstances to be considered in the context of the public interest in his deportation. They also raise the same issues as that considered in Akinyemi.
28. In Akinyemi no. 2 the Court of Appeal considered the reasoning of the court in Akinyemi no.1 in regard to the question of the lawfulness of the appellant’s stay in the UK:
“40... First, one has to be careful to identify as a relevant fact that the appellant was in the UK lawfully for the whole of his life. It was a feature of the first appeal to this court that the UT had wrongly factored into the balance that his residence was unlawful or at least that it had the character of “the absence of any lawful leave” (see Akinyemi at [30] and [31]). The conclusion of this court was unequivocal: subject to the deportation provisions of the 1971 Act, the appellant was “irremovable” because “he was in breach of no legal obligation by being here” (see Underhill LJ at [35]).”
41. Second, and as a consequence of those facts, Underhill LJ went on to hold (at [47]) that the UT was wrong to direct itself “that little weight should be attached to the fact that [the appellant] had been in the UK his whole life and to rely also…on his presence being unlawful”. These conclusions are part of the context of this case and are the starting point for future determinations.
42. It is worth citing in full Underhill LJ’s reasoning that can be found at [49] because it predicts the issue that we have to determine in this appeal:
“…The judge’s misdirection went to the central issue in the case and one which required a peculiarly sensitive assessment. The facts are unusually stark because A had indeed lived here since birth, with an entitlement for most of that period to acquire British citizenship, and had no significant social or cultural links with the country to which he was to be deported: we were referred to no reported case in either the domestic or Strasbourg case law which could be regarded as substantially similar. In those circumstances the assessment of the weight to be given to the fact that A had never known any environment other than that of this country was of central importance; and it cannot be safe to conclude that the judge was unaffected by her direction that it should be given little weight because his presence had throughout been unlawful.”
29. The Court then went on to say at [50]:
“50. In my judgment there can be no doubt, consistent with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, that the Supreme Court has clearly identified that the strength of the public interest will be affected by factors in the individual case, i.e. it is a flexible or moveable interest not a fixed interest. Lord Reed provides the example at [26] of a person who was born in this country as a relevant factor. Applying this approach to the weight to be given to the public interest in deportation on the facts of this case could lead to a lower weight being attached to the public interest.”
and at [53]:
“53. In particular, the extent to which a foreign criminal who was born in the UK and has lived here all his life must be considered alongside all the other factors that relate to the public interest in deportation before that is balanced against an assessment of the article 8 factors.”
30. At [51], the Court cited Maslov v. Austria - 1638/03 [2008] ECHR 546 as strengthening that view:
“Although Article 8 provides no absolute protection against expulsion for any category of aliens (see Üner, cited above, § 55), including those who were born in the host country or moved there in their early childhood, the Court has already found that regard is to be had to the special situation of aliens who have spent most, if not all, their childhood in the host country, were brought up there and received their education there.”
31. Drawing from those principles and applying them to the appellant’s case, we acknowledge that the public interest is flexible. We accept that a lower weight ought to be attached to the public interest in this case. That is because the appellant was born in the UK, he always considered himself British and was unaware that he was not, he had an entitlement for most of the period prior to his criminal offending to acquire British citizenship and cannot be considered to have been here unlawfully (to the extent that, subject to the deportation provisions, he is irremovable), albeit that he has never had any lawful leave. That said, there is no absolute protection against his expulsion and the circumstances of his immigration status cannot be considered as determinative. It must be considered alongside all the other factors that relate to the public interest in deportation.
32. We therefore turn next to the appellant’s offending. It is not disputed that the two offences leading to the deportation proceedings were very serious, particularly the offence which led to loss of life and to a manslaughter conviction and a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. There is clearly a strong public interest in the deportation of a foreign criminal with such a serious level of offending. We have regard to section 117C(2) in that respect: “The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal”.
33. Mr Mupara asked us to take into account and consider alongside the serious nature of the offending, the appellant’s unfortunate background and his rehabilitation in prison, which he described as further exceptional and very compelling circumstances.
34. With regard to the appellant’s background, we accept that he grew up in chaotic circumstances and was exposed to violence from an early age and we acknowledge that, given his background, it is not entirely surprising that he has ended up where he is now. We cannot help but be saddened by his unfortunate past, growing up in a home in which his mother was abused by his father and having to move home and live in various refuges to escape further violence from his father, witnessing his brother having his face slashed with a knife, being bullied at school and being influenced and drawn into criminal behaviour by some of his peers to avoid being bullied. We accept that he was identified by social services as a person who may benefit from targeted youth support and was offered such support but that his mother failed to pursue the offer. We also observe that there were concerns about his welfare and safety after he denied to the police that he had been stabbed and claimed instead to have fallen onto broken glass, and that attempts were made by Social Care to contact his family, but to no avail. All of these matters were set out in detail in the pre-sentence report and were relied upon by Mr Mupara. However these were matters which would clearly have been taken into account by the court when the appellant was sentenced and have thus already been reflected in the sentence he received. Further, as Mr Parvar submitted, they were not matters relied upon by the appellant himself in his own evidence and there was no clinical evidence to support the impact this may have had on him. In addition, we take account of the First-tier Tribunal’s observation, at [19] of its decision, that the appellant had reported enjoying his childhood and had little awareness of his father’s violence.
35. With regard to the question of the appellant’s experiences of peer pressure, we observe that that was specifically considered by the Crown Court Judge in relation to the appellant’s manslaughter charge, where at page J3 section F and page J5 at sections A and B of her sentencing remarks the Judge rejected that mitigation and was satisfied that the appellant’s culpability was high. The Judge referred to the fact that the appellant was caught on CCTV after the stabbing incident smiling and fist-bumping with his co-accused and at section A of J5 the Judge observed that none of the appellant’s friends were watching him when he attacked the victim inside the shop. At section F at J5 the Judge referred to there being an element of calculation in the appellant’s actions and in his conduct of his defence.
36. We have also taken into account the fact that the appellant was a minor at the time of the offending. However, again, that was a matter which was taken into account in his sentencing. The Judge, in her sentencing remarks at page J5 sections D and E, stated that had the appellant been an adult at the time the starting point would have been at the very top of Category B in the sentencing guidelines. She observed that, whilst the appellant was 17 years of age, he was intelligent and not immature and had a clear understanding of the issues in his case. We consider, in all the circumstances, that the appellant’s age does not materially assist him given that he was close to adulthood and was far from being a young and impressionable child.
37. Mr Mupara asked us to consider that had the appellant’s mother taken up the offer of targeted youth support the outcome for the appellant would have been very different and he may not have committed the crimes in question. That may be the case, but it is nothing more than speculation and we do not consider such a submission to carry weight. Neither do we give weight to Mr Mupara’s attempt to distinguish the appellant’s case from that of Mr Akinyemi who had committed many offences over a period of time as opposed to the appellant’s limited offending over a short window. Such a distinction is an empty one considering that the appellant has been in prison since that criminal offending and it therefore cannot be said that he would not have continued offending had he had an opportunity to do so. There is certainly no evidence to suggest that he was unlikely to re-offend. On the contrary, as discussed below, the OASys report refers to there being a medium risk of re-offending and a high risk of harm to the public.
38. Taking all of these considerations together we are not persuaded that the appellant’s chaotic past and exposure to violence, albeit unfortunate and saddening, can be given any material weight in the context of assessing the strength to be given to the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. As we have previously mentioned, it is not entirely surprising that the appellant has ended up where is now given his past circumstances, but that is not to say that it provides any justification for the serious nature of his offending. We have no doubt that the vast majority of people who grow up in similar circumstances do not go on to commit manslaughter.
39. As for the question of rehabilitation, which Mr Mupara submitted should be accorded medium weight, we again do not consider that that is a matter which carries such weight. Indeed the significant weight the First-tier Tribunal Judge gave to the appellant’s evidence in that regard was, in part, a reason for her decision having been set aside. The First-tier Tribunal Judge had regard to the appellant’s education, qualifications and work experience whilst in prison, noting that he had been studying for his A-levels in prison and had set up a prison newspaper. She was impressed by the supporting letters provided in the supplementary bundle for the appeal from individuals who had worked with the appellant in prison, including the Educational Manager at Feltham YOI, a student support worker, a person who had trained him to work as a mentor for others to help their literary skills and help with paperwork and applications, and an interventions facilitator at Feltham who had helped him on his distance learning course. She also took account of the course the appellant had undertaken in violence reduction and his role as an equalities representative and rehabilitative coacher in which he would meet with the prison governors to share the views of his peers and represent them, as well as the reference in the OASys report to him being an enhanced prisoner displaying appropriate and respectful behaviour. Whilst we do not seek to minimise the appellant’s achievements in prison, we have to consider them in the context of the guidance in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1176, referring in turn to Danso v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 596, as set out in the error of law decision at [17]. In addition we observe that no further evidence has been produced in support of the appellant’s progress and conduct in prison since those letters were submitted. We also observe that the supplementary bundle before the judge did not in fact contain the full letters of support but were rather undated extracts from letters and therefore the judge did not have the complete letters before her.
40. We also have to consider those matters against the other observations made in the OASys report about the appellant’s conduct in prison and in general, and the risk he posed, as well as the appellant’s own evidence for his appeal, on the question of remorse. With regard to the latter the First-tier Tribunal Judge referred, at [22] of her decision, to the appellant’s explanation in his witness statement that, whilst he regretted the pain and suffering he inflicted on the victim and their families, he did not regret his actions as without them he would be dead or in prison for a more serious offence. At [24] she referred to his evidence that he had to be the person that he was at 17 years of age to bring himself to the person he was now. We consider it to be of particular concern that the appellant considered a person’s death in terms of his own self-development and it is also of significance that there is no further evidence to temper such concerns.
41. We also consider that evidence in the context of the OASys report which, at 2.14, states that the appellant “has an emerging pattern of offending involving violence, possession of a weapon and use of it during which the victims have either suffered serious injury or lost their life. Mr Patrick's thinking and attitudes towards violence/weapon carrying and his misplaced loyalties towards his peers raises serious concerns which are linked to risk of serious harm.” As for the risk he was considered to pose, the OASys report states at R10.1 that “Mr Patrick has been assessed as posing a high risk of harm to the public. Those at raised risk are those he perceives to be in conflict with him, predominantly male peers who have challenged/ threatened him or his group of friends. The risk is likely to be greatest when Mr Patrick is with negative peers/associates. The nature of the harm is likely to be serious physical assault, with the potential to cause loss of life…. Mr Patrick has been assessed as posing a medium risk of harm to other prisoners. This is based on his behaviour whilst in custody and the violent incidents he has been involved with.” At R10.2 of the OASys report, the nature of the risk the appellant posed was said to be “Physical violence and aggression, including the use of weapons (knives) to threaten and/or stab/slash others, causing serious harm including death.” At R10.6 the risk in the community was said to be high in relation to the public and the risk in custody to be medium in relation to prisoners. We note that, whilst the appellant is said to pose a high risk to the public, the actual risk of violent re-offending is said at R11.12 to be medium.
42. Mr Mupara referred to the appellant having eight adjudications in prison, the last being six months prior to the OASys report being prepared in February 2024, and submitted that that was very few considering the period of five years. However, page 25 of the OASys report provides further clarification and refers to the appellant reporting himself that he had approximately eight fights in prison up until July 2024 at the previous prison, with further information having been requested in relation to more recent behaviour but none received in time for the OASys report. In the absence of any further information before the Tribunal since the OASys report of February 2024 it is therefore not possible to ascertain that there have been no further fights or adjudications. In any event, we agree with Mr Parvar that that in itself, together with the medium assessment of risk to other prisoners, is evidence of a continuation of violent behaviour. Mr Mupara submitted that the adjudications included fights where the appellant was not the aggressor, but there is no direct or independent evidence of that before us.
43. Having considered all the evidence it seems to us that, whilst the appellant has, to his credit, made some achievements in prison, there have also been significant concerns about his conduct to the extent that he has been assessed as a medium risk to other prisoners and a high risk to the public. Whilst it may well be the case that he is treated as an enhanced prisoner in prison and that there are positive factors referred to in the OASys report (see 12.8) and positive recommendations referred to in the pre-sentence report, the evidence is far from demonstrating that he is rehabilitated, and we therefore give little weight to the question of rehabilitation. The fact that he still remains in prison means that there cannot be any assessment of his behaviour in the public in real terms. In the absence of any further evidence to the contrary, the only conclusion we can reach is that the appellant remains a high risk to the public and that the actual risk of him re-offending is medium.
44. Taking all these matters together, and taking account of the reduction in the weight to be given to the public interest as a result of the appellant’s circumstances, being born in the UK and having lived here all his life, we conclude that there nevertheless remains a strong public interest in deporting the appellant in the interests of preventing crime and disorder, given the nature and seriousness of his offending, the risk he poses to the public and the limited weight given to his rehabilitation.
45. We turn next to the Article 8 factors relied upon by the appellant and to his family and private life considerations, which are to be balanced against the public interest in his deportation. Much is made in the appellant’s most recent skeleton argument about his family life with his mother and brother, although that was not a matter upon which Mr Mupara made any specific submissions. We consider that he was right not to do so, as the argument is a weak one. Whilst the appellant may have had a family life with his mother and brother prior to his imprisonment, he is no longer a child and he has been living apart from them for some five to six years whilst he has been in prison. The appellant’s mother attended and gave oral evidence at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal and she attended the hearing before us. She is clearly still involved in the appellant’s life. However there is no evidence to suggest that there is anything more than the usual family ties that exist between a parent and an adult child or between adult siblings in the relationships. There is no evidence of any emotional or other dependency over and above those usual family ties. We do not, therefore, accept that Article 8 is engaged in terms of family life in the UK, but consider that even if we were wrong about that, the family life does not add anything of significance by way of ‘very compelling circumstances’ for the reasons already given. The appellant would be able to maintain contact with his family from Uganda and they would be able to visit him there. There is no evidence to suggest to the contrary.
46. As for the appellant’s private life, the length of his stay in the UK and the fact that he was born in the UK and has never left, and had always considered himself to be a British citizen, has already been considered and accepted as a factor reducing the weight to be given to the public interest in his deportation. Even if that were to be counted again as a factor weighing in his favour (which would in effect be ‘double-counting’), the fact is that almost a third of his life has been involved in criminal offending or in prison, which certainly reduces its weight and, for the reasons already given, does not make it a sufficiently compelling factor to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
47. With regard to the circumstances he would face in Uganda, it has been accepted by the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant has no family ties to Uganda and no connections there, other than the fact of his nationality. It has been accepted, and not since disputed by the respondent, that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Uganda. That finding has been preserved. However there are other relevant factors to take into account. Mr Mupara accepted that the appellant had no medical issues and that there were no protection issues and therefore the appellant’s ability to integrate into Uganda would not be adversely impacted on those grounds. There has been no suggestion that the appellant would find himself destitute on return to Uganda and certainly no evidence has been produced to support such a suggestion. The respondent, in her refusal decision, referred to the fact that the appellant spoke the official language of Uganda, namely, English, which would assist him in Uganda in establishing himself there, albeit that he does not speak the local languages. The respondent also made reference to the appellant’s ability to continue his open university studies in Uganda and to the fact that he was a young healthy male who would be able live independently, as well as to there being the possibility of assistance available to him under the Facilitated Returns Scheme (FRS). None of that has been disputed. The appellant would no doubt find it very difficult arriving in a country in which he has never lived, particularly initially, but that is the country of his nationality and, as Mr Parvar submitted, people do move abroad and find their feet. There is an absence of any evidence to support a claim that he would not be able to re-establish himself in Uganda, despite the difficulties he would face. He does not have the same personal and health problems which afflicted Mr Akinyemi and there is no reason why he would not be able to find some employment there. Certainly no evidence has been produced to suggest that he would have particular difficulties in that respect, aside from the obvious ones arising from being a stranger to the country. Accordingly whilst we accept that, in terms of the guidance provided in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, the appellant would be an outsider in Uganda and would thus face very significant obstacles to integration in that country for the purposes of section 117C(4)(c), we do not accept that it would be impossible for him to re-establish himself in that country or that the difficulties he would face would be insurmountable or sufficient to amount to ‘very compelling circumstances’.
48. For all these reasons, we conclude that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that there are any factors which, either individually or cumulatively, amount to ‘very compelling circumstances’ sufficient to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
49. It is important to add that, even if it was the case that the requirements of Exception 1 in section 117C(4) were accepted as having been met in full, given the circumstances pertaining to the appellant’s status in the UK (which we do not accept to be the case in any event), section 117C(6) requires there to be very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. There has never been any question of Exception 2 applying as there is no qualifying partner or child involved. For the same reasons as we have already given above, we do not consider that the appellant has demonstrated that his circumstances, even when taken together and considered cumulatively, could amount to ‘very compelling circumstances’ beyond the factors in Exception 1. Even with the benefit of a reduction in the public interest as a result of the length and quality of residence in the UK and his lack of residence in or meaningful ties to Uganda, there is nevertheless a strong public interest in the appellant’s deportation as a result of the seriousness of his crimes and the risk of him re-offending. When balanced against each other, the factors against deportation are clearly and substantially outweighed by the factors in favour of deportation, in the particular circumstances of the appellant’s case.
50. As such, we find that the appellant’s removal to Uganda, pursuant to the deportation order issued against him, would not be disproportionate and would not be in breach of Article 8.
DECISION
51. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, the decision is re-made by dismissing the appellant’s human rights appeal.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 June 2025