Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005677

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/50507/2024
LP/07380/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th April 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

ZMM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Brown, Counsel, instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge C J Williams. The judgment delivered on 24 October 2024 deals with the appellant’s protection claim.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq and he appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the decision of the Home Office dated 13 December 2023 to refuse a protection claim made on 16 March 2022.
3. Before me today I have a bundle of 714 pages including human rights documents, a skeleton argument and the grounds of appeal.
4. The appellant appealed on four grounds. Ground 1, that the judge gave inadequate reasons for concluding the appellant’s core account was incredible. Ground 2, that the judge inadequately assessed the risks arising from the appellant’s sur place political activities. Ground 3, that the judge failed to adequately assess the documentation issued in relation to Iraq. Ground 4, that the judge misdirected themselves in relation to applying the case of XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 0023.
5. On 10 December 2024 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Taylor granted permission only in relation to ground 2. At paragraph 4 of the grant of permission the judge stated the following:
“4. As to ground ii, I do not accept that the Judge did not adequately assess the risk from the appellant’s sur-place activity itself. The Judge assessed the nature of the appellant’s role in demonstrations and the lack of reliability of the Facebook evidence produced. The Judge did however fail to consider whether the appellant holds a genuine political belief and thus whether the appellant would be at risk upon return, if his political beliefs are genuine. This element of this ground raises an arguable error of law”.
As a result, permission was granted in relation to one ground, that ground in relation to whether or not the appellant holds a genuine political belief.
6. The judge sets out in detail the assessment of credibility and of the evidence. In particular, at paragraph 20 the judge looks at the evidence in relation to this appellant’s purported political activity which was posts on Facebook and attendance at demonstrations against the Iraqi regime. I have been helpfully referred to that evidence in the course of argument. The judge says at paragraph 20:
“20. The appellant also relies on his sur place activity in the United Kingdom. This can be summarised as the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and posting anti-regime material on Facebook. Looking first at the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations, the appellant has provided details of the demonstrations he has attended in his witness statement, placing the number at seven in July 2024. Before me, he said he attended ten demonstrations. There are a number of photographs taken from Facebook which show him at demonstrations I accept the appellant has attended demonstrations as claimed”.
7. The judge then goes on to examine the Facebook evidence and makes findings that in fact there is no risk from those Facebook posts to the appellant on return distinguished in the case of XX, and the judge then concludes in relation to the assessment of credibility at paragraphs 24, 25 and 26. The judge says:
“25. ... In light of my findings on the appellant’s credibility, I find his political activities are simply an attempt to bolster a weak claim.
26. Drawing all of these factors together, I do not find the appellant has discharged the burden upon him in showing he would be at risk upon return to Iraq. I find he has never come to the adverse attention of the authorities whilst he lived in Iraq, and that his sur place activity is purely confected, and in any event would not place him at risk upon return”.
8. Mr Brown on behalf of the appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal Judge was not explicit in a determination of whether or not the appellant held a genuine political belief such that if returned to Iraq he would face risk of reprisals on return.
9. Mr Wain submitted that the decision at paragraph 25 and 26 and in particular, the reference by the First-tier Tribunal Judge to the sur place activities being confected was sufficient to show the judge had well in mind those issues and had made a positive decision about both the appellant’s credibility and his political beliefs. I agree with Mr Wain. In reading the judgment it is clear that the judge has balanced all the factors in the case, examining the Facebook posts and the attendance at demonstrations and has concluded from that evidence, which is limited that the appellant lacks credibility and that the attendance at those demonstrations was both an attempt to bolster his weak protection claim but more importantly that is purely confected, meaning that the appellant attended those demonstrations not because of a genuinely held political belief which is the normal reason for attending a political rally but instead attended them simply to bolster his protection claim.
10. As a result of those findings the judge found that the appellant had no credibility and in my judgment could not have found that the appellant somehow held a genuine political belief at the same time. Therefore, in my judgment the fact the judge did not explicitly state words to the effect that “I have found he does not hold a genuine political belief” were not required because the judge had found firstly, that the appellant was not credible, and secondly that he had contrived to attend those political rallies in order to bolster his claim rather that because of his genuinely held political belief.
11. In my judgment I find that there is no error of law made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge and I dismiss the appeal.

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 February 2025