UI-2024-005680
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005680
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02763/2024
PA/66429/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
31st July 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
Between
SECREATRY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and
BND
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Rushforth, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Main instructed by Elmas and Shakeel Solicitors
Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 23 July 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the above respondent is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the above respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 30 October 2024, who allowed BND’s appeal against the refusal of her application for international protection and/or leave to remain in the United Kingdom on any other basis.
2. The Judge sets out findings of fact from [18] of the decision under challenge. The Judge accepts that BND is a citizen of Liberia, that she has undergone FGM, and also sexual and physical abuse from her stepfather whilst in that country.
3. In dealing with BND’s claim she that she is at risk due to her membership of a particular social group, the Judge finds BND’s account to be consistent, coherent and plausible as to be capable of belief.
4. The Judge accepted at [21] that BND was a victim of sexual abuse by her stepfather, physical abuse from her mother and that her mother refused to accept that the abuse from her stepfather was happening. The Judge accepted BND’s statement that she had undergone FGM as that was the cultural norm and that she had no way of objecting to the procedure.
5. In relation to risk on return the Judge at [24] accepts BND’s evidence that she will face a real risk on return from her stepfather as Liberia is a small country and her stepfather is an influential businessman who will be able to locate her, and that she would eventually be forced to return home. The Judge finds BND is a vulnerable female and that if she is unable to return to her home she will return as a lone vulnerable female which the Judge finds poses significant risk on return [25].
6. In relation to sufficiency of protection, the Judge records BND’s evidence that she informed her mother and aunt of the abuse but that neither took any protective action and that she did not inform the police as she did not believe any action would be taken [26].
7. The Judge at [27] accepts the aunt and mother failed to take any action to protect BND and that she was of the firm belief she would not be offered any protection by the State. At [28] the Judge rejects the Secretary of State’s argument there is a sufficiency of protection as the authorities are generally willing to provide protection and therefore a sufficiency of protection. The Judge finds there is no such sufficiency of protection in light of BND’s specific circumstances as she is a victim of sexual and physical violence in her own home, she received no support or protection within the family, and did not find the offer of protection ‘generally’ as sufficient for a lone vulnerable female with no family support.
8. In relation to internal relocation, the Judge finds BND cannot relocate to another area within Liberia as if she did she eventually would have to return to her family home where her stepfather continues to reside. In addition, if she did not go to the family home she would be returned as a vulnerable, lone female. In light of her specific circumstances the Judge was not satisfied she would be afforded sufficiency of protection.
9. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal which was refused by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal and renewed to the Upper Tribunal where permission was granted on 2 January 2025, the operative grant part of the grant being in the following terms:
1. Notwithstanding the acceptance by the respondent that the appellant had been a victim of abuse in her home country by a family member and thus having accepted the credibility of that part of the factual claim ( see paragraphs 18 and 21) the grounds are arguable insofar as they challenge the assessment of sufficiency protection and internal relocation for the reasons set out at grounds 1 and 2.
2. Whilst the FtTJ found that she would be at risk of harm in her home area (paragraph 24) as the grounds contend there is a lack of reasoning as the circumstances in which it could be said her stepfather would be able to or would seek to locate the appellant or what influence he had over the authorities given the lack of specific evidence given by the appellant in interview, and as reflected in the decision letter. Whilst the appellant had given subjective evidence as to why she had not sought protection from the authorities in the past, it is arguable that there was no assessment of whether that subjective fear was objectively well-founded by reference to the material.
3. It is further arguable that the FtTJ and did not assess the issue of internal relocation by taking into account all relevant characteristics including the level of education, ability to work, provision available and the sufficiency of protection.
4. Permission is therefore granted.
5. The appellant does not have a legal representative. However in the proceedings before the FtTJ the appellant was able to provide documentation for the appeal. In the circumstances, the appellant should provide a response to the grounds ( which is referred to as a “Rule 24 response”) in order to assist the Tribunal if that is possible.
Decision and reasons
10. Whether a person has access to a sufficiency of protection in their home state to the Horvath standard, in the event it is found there is a real risk of harm or persecution, and/or whether there is an internal flight alternative to another part of their home state, is of some importance for if it is found that the same exist that may prove fatal to an application for international protection.
11. In the Reasons for Refusal letter dated 7 December 2023 the Secretary of State, in addition to not finding that BND faced a real risk of harm on return to Liberia, considered there was an available sufficiency of protection and internal flight option.
12. Protection from persecution was said to be available for the following reasons:
It is considered that there would be sufficient protection from persecution in your country of origin despite the material facts of your claim having been accepted.
The police in Liberia are generally willing and able to provide protection in similar circumstances to you. See United Nations Development Article, Sexual Violence in Liberia: End the Silent Epidemic [June 2023], it states that in 2005 Liberia passed the Rape Act and the Domestic Violence Act in 2019. By 2020 Rape was declared a national emergency, prompting Liberia to establish a National Sex Offender Registry and a special anti-SGBV Presidential Task Force.
The police in Liberia are working towards ending sexual and gender-based violence all over the country, for example a commander in the Liberia National Police Force in Sanniquille, actively investigates cases of sexual and genderbased violence (SGBV) and gets survivors the help they need.
A third phase of the Joint Programme on SGBV which was deployed between 2021-2023, aimed at eradicating FGM across the country4 with it, as of 2023, becoming banned in Montserrado County.
The person you claim to fear are non-state actors and you have failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely they have sufficient power or influence over the authorities in Liberia. It is also noted that you have never reported the problems faced with your Stepfather to the police in Liberia and therefore it is considered that you have not given the authorities a chance to show that they can provide you with state protection.
Although you state that your Stepfather has means to bribe the authorities to locate your whereabouts and avoid prosecution, Liberia has an anti-corruption coalition which works closely with the anti-corruption commission to monitor corruption of any kind with corruption across the county falling in the last two years.
13. Miss Rushforth was unable to argue that the Judge failed to consider this issue as the Judge clearly did between [26] – [29] of the determination in the following terms:
Sufficiency of protection
26. The Appellant states that she informed her mother and aunt of the abuse, however, neither took any protective action. The Appellant states that she did not inform the police as she did not believe that any action would be taken.
27. In considering this issue, I find that the Appellant has provided an entirely consistent and coherent account within her evidence. I accept that her mother and aunt failed to take any action and I also accept that it was her firm belief that she would not be offered any protection by the state.
28. Although the Respondent refers to objective evidence within the RFRL, stating that the Liberian authorities are ‘generally’ willing to provide protection and therefore, there is sufficiency of protection, I find that there is no such sufficiency of protection for the Appellant in her specific circumstances. This is because, the Appellant is a victim of sexual and physical violence within her own home. I accept that despite informing her mother and aunt, the Appellant was not afforded any protection within her family. With regards to state protection, I do not find that the offer of protection ‘generally’ is sufficient for a lone, vulnerable female with no family support.
29. Overall, I find that there would be no sufficiency of protection for the Appellant in view of her specific circumstances.
14. Miss Rushforth’s submission that the Judge had failed to provide adequate reasons for the findings made requires consideration of whether an informed reader, properly aware of the relevant facts, is able to understand why the Judge found as recorded in the determination.
15. There is no challenge to the judge’s credibility finding or the acceptance of BND’s evidence that she told her mother and aunt of the abuse she was suffering at the hands of her stepfather but neither took any protective action. BND has to accept that she cannot establish or prove the police were not willing to help her if she did not tell them, but the evidence which was accepted by the First-tier Tribunal is that she did not tell the police as she did not believe that any action would be taken.
16. The Judge at [28] refers to having considered the country material relied upon by the Secretary of State and does not dispute that generally the police may be willing to provide protection but specifically finds that in the particular circumstances of BND there will be no such protection.
17. The reference to the Judge failing to consider the evidence in the refusal letter is without merit as it was considered. It is also relevant that the Judge considered both the general and the individual claimant’s situation to ensure that protection is sufficient - see Horvath v. Secretary of State for The Home Department [2000] UKHL 37. A reading the determination shows that the Judge looked at both the general country conditions referred to in the refusal letter and BND’s individual situation.
18. The Secretary of State also asserts there is a reasonable internal flight option available to BND even if it was found she faced a real risk of persecution in her home area.
19. That area, Sinkor, is a suburb of the capital Monrovia. In the refusal letter it is written:
Internal relocation
It is considered that you could relocate to Ganta of Nimba County, Harper the capital of Maryland County or Zwedru the capital of Gedeh County within your country of origin despite the material facts of your claim having been accepted.
There is general freedom of movement in Liberia. See Response to an Information Request Liberia, Reference Number: 0420.048 [1 May 2020], State Protection and Internal Relocation (Freedom of Movement) paragraph. It states that the law provides for freedom of internal movement and the government respects these right, even though there are rogue actors, there had been an increase in freedom since large-scale violence ended.
The person you claim to fear is a non-state actor and you have failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely they have the means or ability to locate you throughout the entirety of Liberia. Even though you fear you’ll be found by your Stepfather (AIR 63), other counties, particularly Nimba, are active in their role in ending FGM and SGBV
Relocation is considered to be reasonable as you are well educated up to a further education level, have employment experience and you speak the major language spoken in Liberia. The Liberia Women Empowerment Project commenced in 2022 to support women and girls access public services, advance gender equality and realise their full potential.
20. The Secretary of State’s primary position is that BND’s claim to have suffered abuse from her stepfather in Liberia was not credible. That position was found to be unsustainable by the Judge.
21. There is no merit in claiming the Judge failed to consider whether internal relocation was available as this is specifically considered at [34] in which the Judge writes:
INTERNAL RELOCATION
34. In view of my findings above in relation to the issues in dispute, I find that the Appellant cannot relocate to other areas within Liberia. As discussed above, I accept that if returned to Liberia, eventually she would be required to return to her family home where her stepfather continues to reside. Also, I find that if the Appellant does not return to her family home, she will return as a vulnerable, lone female, and as stated above, in view of her specific circumstances, I am not satisfied that she will be afforded sufficient protection.
22. Ground two of the Secretary of State’s grounds to appeal assets:
Ground Two
It is further submitted, that the FTTJ fails to give any consideration to why the appellant would be unable to relocate should she choose to if she returned to Libera, to avoid any contact with her family. It is unclear how, in the first instance, they would know the appellant had returned, or secondly, why they would have any interest given the lack of indication that they have encouraged her to return or enquired as to her whereabouts following the end of her studies in the UK. Whilst the stepfather may be a businessman, this is not automatically indicative of any power outside his own business, nor is there any evidence presented to suggest that he would have any inclination to either find the appellant in another area or be able to influence the authorities in any way should he do so. It is further submitted, that the appellant has been able to relocate to another country in moving to the UK without any apparent issue, it is therefore respectfully asserted, that this is highly indicative of her being capable of, and it being reasonable for her to relocate within her own country, particularly given her already demonstrated ability to live independently of her family. It is respectfully submitted, that the determination is completely silent on the issue of internal relocation, ignores the objective evidence relied upon in the RFRL supporting a sufficiency of protection, and the fact the appellant, despite being placed on notice in the RFRL has failed to provide any evidence to support her contention that her stepfather is influential, and as such any conclusion in favour of the appellant must be flawed by lack of reasoning to the extent that it is unreliable.
23. There is no merit in the submission the Judge failed to give any consideration to why BND will be unable to locate to she chose to return to Liberia and avoid any contact with the family as the Judge clearly considered whether the suggestion BND could avoid any contact with the family was plausible. Whilst BND may have been able to come to the UK, where she has worked with permission in the care sector, is educated, and is likely to be a highly capable individual, the Secretary of State does not challenge the Judge’s finding that she will be returned as a vulnerable single female who is likely to have to seek the assistance of her family to survive on return.
24. Country information relating to Liberia speaks of the difficulties following two tragic civil wars, male dominated society, and difficulties for women generally, without the fact specific difficulties BND has faced.
25. The Judge was not considering whether BND has successfully relocated to the UK but whether if she was returned to Liberia she could reasonably move to another part of the country.
26. The refusal letter refers to a number of other areas available in Liberia. Ganta of Nimba County is an area about 200 miles north of Monrovia in northern Liberia, often described as one of the fastest growing cities in Liberia and is a mining town. It was not made out BND has any connection with that area and indeed none is suggested in the grounds seeking permission to appeal or the reasons for refusal letter. Her stepfather is said to have connections to the mining industry.
27. Harper, the capital of Maryland County, is a coastal town in south-east corner of Liberia whose main economic activities farming. It is not made out the BND has any connection with this area or the ability to own land or experience of working in agricultural or off the land sufficient to enable her to properly establish herself in that area.
28. Zwedru the capital of Gedeh County is also located in the south-eastern part of the country near the border with the Côte d’Ivoire and is described as a stronghold for the Krahn Tribe. There is no evidence BND has any connection with this town or region or ability to establish herself there.
29. The UNHCR guidelines refer to the need for a holistic assessment which was accepted by the Court of Appeal in AS (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 873.
30. The ultimate question as set out in Januzi v Secretary States the Home Department & Ors [2006] UKHL 5, is that of the reasonableness of the proposed place of relocation. The test accepted by the House of Lords was reflected in what was then rule 343 of the Immigration Rules HC 395 as follows:
“If there is a part of the country from which the applicant claims to be a refugee in which he would not have a well-founded fear of persecution, and to which would be reasonable to expect him to go, the application may be refused”.
31. The findings on the Judge on the issue of the reasonableness of relocation are in accordance with the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in E and Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 1032 at paragraphs [23 – 24] where the court stated:
23. Relocation in a safe haven will not provide an alternative to seeking refuge outside the country of nationality if, albeit that there is no risk of persecution in the safe haven, other factors exist which make it unreasonable to expect the person fearing persecution to take refuge there. Living conditions in the safe haven may be attendant with dangers or vicissitudes which pose a threat which is as great or greater than the risk of persecution in the place of habitual residence. One cannot reasonably expect a city dweller to go to live in a desert in order to escape the risk of persecution. Where the safe haven is not a viable or realistic alternative to the place where persecution is feared, one can properly say that a refugee who has fled to another country is 'outside the country of his nationality by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution'.
24. If this approach is adopted to the possibility of internal relocation, the nature of the test of whether an asylum seeker could reasonably have been expected to have moved to a safe haven is clear. It involves a comparison between the conditions prevailing in the place of habitual residence and those which prevail in the safe haven, having regard to the impact that they will have on a person with the characteristics of the asylum seeker. What the test will not involve is a comparison between the conditions prevailing in the safe haven and those prevailing in the country in which asylum is sought."
32. The challenge the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in E was rejected by the House of Lords at [20] of its judgement.
33. It does not matter that to some this may appear a generous judgement. The Court of Appeal have made it clear to appellate judges that they must not interfere with a decision of a Judge below unless it is ‘plainly wrong’.
34. The Judge clearly considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny, both documentary and oral. The Judges set out findings supported by adequate reasons. While some aspects of the determination may be justifiably criticised by the Secretary of State, she has not established that the overall finding of the Judge that the appeal should be allowed is a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
35. The Judge sets out the stepping stones of reasoning which led to that conclusion. As the Secretary of State has not established that whatever faults she considers the determination may have they are material to the decision to allow the appeal, the current appeal must be dismissed.
36. The finding that internal relocation is not reasonable having taken into account the country material and specific facts in the required holistic assessment has not been shown to be a rationally objectionable conclusion.
Notice of Decision
37. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law.
38. The determination shall stand.
C J Hanson
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
23 July 2025