Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005710

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61319/2023
LP/08064/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 March 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SKINNER

Between

RI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Karim, counsel, instructed by Internations Legal LLP
For the Respondent: Ms S. Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Loughridge (“the Judge”) dated 9 October 2024 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 15 November 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes in a decision dated 13 December 2024. In short, the basis of the appellant’s protection claim was that he was at risk of return to Bangladesh by virtue of his support for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”).

2. The Judge anonymised the appellant in these proceedings “because this is a protection appeal”. However, it is well established that the mere fact of someone having made a protection claim is not, of itself, sufficient to justify the interference with open justice that an anonymity order entails: Kambadzi v SSHD [2011] UKSC 23 at [6]. Mr Karim did not make any application for the maintenance of the anonymity order. However, given (a) the incomplete evidential picture before me as to the risks faced by someone in the appellant’s claimed position in Bangladesh, and in particular as to the effect of return as a failed asylum seeker to that country, and (b) the fact that it might be thought that adverse publicity of the appellant’s case could extend the knowledge of his conviction beyond being, as the Judge found, a “local matter”, I consider it appropriate to maintain that order on a precautionary basis.

The Judge’s decision

3. After a summary of the appeal, the parties’ respective positions and the applicable legal tests (no criticism of which is made on this appeal), the Judge’s material reasoning began at para.13.

4. At paras.13-14, the Judge considered the expert report relied on by the appellant. As the Judge’s approach to the expert report is of central relevance to this appeal, it is worth setting out these paragraphs in full:

13. I will comment briefly on the expert evidence relied on by the Appellant. It is a report by a Mr S Tushar and begins at page 277 of the Appellant’s objective bundle. It is a lengthy report. Much of it is taken up by Mr Tushar confirming that he is aware of his duties as an expert, in citing numerous cases in which he has provided reports previously (and stating that his opinion has, to the best of his knowledge, been found reliable in those cases - without any explanation as to how he knows that), and in giving a lengthy explanation of his profile and qualifications. At the start of his report he sets out the questions he has been asked, many of which appear to be extremely broad and of little relevance to the issues to be determined in this appeal.
14. I do not find the report to be of any significant assistance. It includes vast amounts of historical information about the political system in Bangladesh and the country’s international relations. In contrast, unfortunately it does not address the personal circumstances of the Appellant. The report is also rambling in many places, unfocused and lacking in structure. It is also far from clear precisely what expertise Mr Tushar has - he is a qualified lawyer and has published a book about the Rohingyas and written numerous newspaper articles the vast majority of which appear to have nothing to do with Bangladeshi politics. He does not appear to hold any academic or other relevant position in relation to political matters in Bangladesh, and he simply asserts that he possesses “comprehensive knowledge, skillset, and experience concerning various aspects of Bangladesh, including but not limited to its political structure, media landscape, law enforcement mechanisms, family dispute Muslim Law, healthcare system, and the entire criminal justice system”. He states that he is recognised as an independent authority on subjects concerning Bangladesh's political landscape, but I do not consider his credentials to support that assertion.

5. At para.15, the Judge summarised his credibility findings, stating, “I find the Appellant to be a largely credible witness but whilst I accept most of the core elements of his claim there are certain aspects which I reject.” In particular, the Judge was concerned by: (i) the absence of mention at the appellant’s screening interview of being the subject of a false claim or an arrest warrant (para.18); (ii) the fact that the appellant said at his screening interview that he would provide documents relating to his involvement in his political party, but never then did so (para.19); and (iii) the fact that the documents that were provided after his screening interview (which related to a hospital admission in July 2019 and to the false claim said to have been brought against him by his political opponents) were of doubtful authenticity (para.20). At para.21, the Judge noted that the appellant maintained that he left Bangladesh on his own passport, whilst there was an arrest warrant for him, which, while possible, “calls into question why he would be detained on return, by the same reasoning”.

6. However, notwithstanding the above concerns, the Judge reached the following findings of fact:

23. The Appellant joined the JCD in 2019, his motivation being because the Awami League had been in power for 15 years and he did not agree with the discrimination and corruption which they had overseen.
24. On 15 July 2019 he attended a political rally and was attacked with sticks and other weapons by Chhatra League (the student wing of the Awami League) opponents. He was injured and taken to hospital where he remained for five days.
25. During this time the people who attacked him filed a false case against him saying that he had attacked them including firing a gun.
26. After leaving hospital he went to stay at his aunt’s house for his own safety. He didn’t go out for 6 months or so which had a negative impact on his mental health. He eventually managed to return home by paying a substantial bribe to the local police to drop the case against him and by promising his Chhatra League opponents at his college not to be politically active if they would let him complete his studies.
27. Despite his promise not to resume his political activities he did so. This did not lead to any further problems for him to begin with. He was appointed to a committee position of his local JCD branch and became involved in organising various events and publicity generally. Eventually however his Chhatra League opponents became angry at his continued involvement in politics and threatened to kill him if he didn’t stop. His father reported these threats to the police but was told there was nothing they could do.
28. Although the police were supposed to drop the case against him they didn’t do so. He and his family decided that the best option - to deal with both the ongoing case against him and also the increased hostility from his Chhatra League opponents - was for him to come to the UK where in addition to escaping these problems he would be able to continue his studies. He therefore applied for a student visa on 03 01 2022 and entered the UK a month later.
29. When his Chhatra League opponents found out that he had left Bangladesh they attacked and burned down his father's business.
30. The court case against him proceeded in his absence and a verdict was issued on 05 04 2022. He and his co-defendants were all found guilty and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. A further arrest warrant – described as a Punishment Warrant – was issued the same day.
31. His family left the family home after his father's business had been destroyed. His mother now lives with her parents and his younger brother. His father lives separately and moves around quite a lot.
32. When he arrived in the UK he genuinely intended to continue studying and enrolled at a university in Birmingham. It is not entirely clear how long he attended his classes for but at some stage he stopped and started working instead. That was for financial reasons, in particular his father no longer being able to support him. He has worked as a supervisor in a warehouse and as a waiter in a restaurant.
33. He has suffered some mental health difficulties including depression and anxiety, which are ongoing. He takes prescribed medication. He has tried talking therapies without any significant benefit. He does not have any ongoing thoughts of self-harm - although there was an incident in January 2024 when he took an excessive amount of medication and had to go to hospital. He struggles to sleep and has outbursts of anger.
34. He has not been involved in any political activities since arriving in the UK. He looks back on his involvement in politics with regret because it caused so many problems for him and his family. He now wants a peaceful life.

7. At para.35 the Judge turned to the question of whether the appellant would be at risk on return in light of these findings.

8. On its face, the Judge’s analysis of risk is structured in the following way: (i) whether the appellant would be at risk at the point of return, which the Judge assumed to be Dhaka airport (para.36); (ii) whether he would be at risk in his home area (para.37); (iii) whether he would be at risk because he would undertake further political activity on return (paras.38-39); and (iv) whether the appellant would be at risk away from his home area (para.40).

9. Before turning to this reasoning in more detail, it is convenient to deal here with the appellant’s submission that para.36 of the Judge’s reasons was directed to the situation in Bangladesh as a whole and not solely to the position on re-entry at Dhaka airport. The basis of this submission is that the paragraph begins “The key question is whether there is a real risk that this warrant will lead to the Appellant’s arrest on return to Bangladesh…”. However, that sentence ends “presumably to Dhaka airport”, and the remainder of the paragraph is then replete with reasoning that plainly relates to whether the Punishment Warrant would be known about by officials at Dhaka airport and it ends by concluding that the Punishment Warrant can be regarded as a local matter and “not something which gives rise to a real risk to the Appellant of detention at Dhaka airport.” I therefore reject the appellant’s submission and regard the correct analysis of the structure of the Judge’s reasons to be that set out in paragraph 8 above.

10. As to risk on entry at the airport, the Judge noted that the appellant had been able to travel safely through Dhaka airport on his way out of Bangladesh despite the existence of an arrest warrant for him. The Judge then recognised that there could be a difference in the effect of a Punishment Warrant and an ‘ordinary’ arrest warrant (i.e. a warrant for the arrest of someone pre-conviction), but considered that there was no evidence of this and it was a matter for the appellant to prove. In particular, there was no evidence as to the extent to which warrants were contained on any central database that would be available to officials at an entry point, such as Dhaka airport. The appellant’s punishment warrant identified the Officer in Charge at Golapganj Police Station as the person responsible for its execution and there was no evidence that it had been circulated more widely. The Judge therefore considered that it was therefore something which could be considered a local matter and would not give rise to risk at Dhaka airport.

11. As to the risk in the appellant’s local area (Golpganj), the Judge accepted that the appellant would be at risk there. This was because, first, the officer in charge the local police station was an Awami League supporter and remained in post notwithstanding the change of government, and who was likely therefore to execute the Punishment Warrant against the appellant. Second, the appellant’s former political opponents likely remain there and also presented a risk of violence to the appellant in his local area.

12. As to the question of whether the appellant would re-engage in political activity on return to Bangladesh, the Judge concluded that he would not do so, in light of his repeated references to wanting a peaceful life and his suggestion that he got involved with politics because he was young and his blood was “hot”.

13. This left the question of whether the appellant would be at risk in Bangladesh but outside of his home area. While the Judge accepted that he would not have any family or other support in a new location and it would not be particularly easy for him, the Judge also considered that it would not be unduly harsh given that he is a young man who has spent the vast majority of his life in Bangladesh with experience of several types of work. The Judge noted the medical evidence in relation to the appellant’s mental health but concluded that his mental health difficulties were not more than at a modest level and would not pose a significant barrier to his reintegration in Bangladesh.

14. The Judge then turned, in para.41, to the question of Article 8, which the appellant pursued “without any detailed explanation given”. The Judge concluded that the appellant’s removal would be proportionate.

15. The Judge accordingly dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

Grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal

16. The grounds (not drafted by Mr Karim) are not well drafted. In large part they challenge the negative aspects of the Judge’s assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s evidence. Mr Karim however sought to abandon these aspects, and certain others, of the grounds at the hearing before me.

17. Somewhat unusually, Ms Ahmed, for the Secretary of State, sought to oppose this. She contended that it was an amendment to the grounds that should not be permitted. This appeared to be motivated by a desire for the appeal to be remitted to the FTT for a complete rehearing, in the apparent belief that the grounds challenging the credibility assessment were well founded, so that the Secretary of State could have a second attempt to show that the appellant’s evidence was to be disbelieved in its totality. Mr Karim took issue with whether this was an amendment application at all and submitted that, even if it were, it should be permitted.

18. I am inclined to the view that the withdrawal of grounds does, technically, constitute an amendment application. It is only by amending the grounds by removing or deleting them that the Tribunal is no longer required to determine those grounds, where permission has been granted to argue them and no direction given to limit the scope of the argument permitted. However, it is not necessary for me to reach a final view on this as it seems to me that for it to be in accordance with the overriding objective to refuse such an application, there would need to be some powerful reason to do so, especially when an appellant is represented by experienced counsel. No such reason has been identified. Certainly, a desire by the Secretary of State to have a second bite of the cherry in showing an appellant is not to believed is not a good reason, especially where, as here, no point has been taken in relation to the positive credibility findings by the FTT, whether by way of cross-appeal or in the rule 24 response. To the extent necessary, I therefore granted permission for these grounds to be withdrawn at the hearing.

19. Mr Karim helpfully indicated that the grounds that remained were those contained in paras. 12-15 on p.14 of the bundle, paras. 10-14 on p.15, and paras. 15-16 on p.16. Unhelpfully, there is duplication of the paragraph numbering in the grounds, hence the need to identify them by reference to both page and paragraph numbers.

20. In summary and with numbering added, the grounds which the appellant pursues submit that:

a. The Judge failed to provide adequate reasons why the accepted facts would not create a risk on return (Ground 1);
b. The Judge failed to engage with the expert evidence and recent country conditions (including that Awami League members had been retained in key positions) (Ground 2);
c. The Judge’s analysis of risk at the airport failed to: (i) distinguish between pre-conviction arrest warrants and post-conviction punishment warrants; (ii) consider evidence about computerised systems at ports of entry or current security protocols; and (iii) provide adequate reasons why a convicted person with an active punishment warrant would not face detention (Ground 3);
d. The Judge failed to address the differences between a pre-conviction arrest warrant and a punishment reference by reference to Country Guidance or objective evidence (Ground 4);
e. The Judge’s conclusion that the appellant would be at risk in his local area, but would not be at risk at Dhaka airport is inconsistent (Ground 5);
f. The Judge failed to assess whether the appellant’s political opponents may have a presence beyond his home area (Ground 6);
g. The Judge failed to consider whether the punishment warrant would be of national concern (Ground 7);
h. The finding of internal relocation is not supported by adequate reasons (Ground 8);
i. The Judge’s treatment of the expert evidence is inadequately reasoned and, in particular (as Mr Karim put it orally) failed to recognise that it did, contrary to what was said in para. 14, address the particular circumstances of the appellant (Ground 9).

21. The respondent filed and served a rule 24 response dated 19 December 2024, seeking to uphold the Judge’s decision, essentially for the reasons given by the Judge.

Error of law

22. It is convenient to address the grounds by reference to the aspects of the Judge’s decision which they seek to impugn in the order in which the Judge addressed them, i.e. expert evidence, then risk at Dhaka airport, then risk in Bangladesh outside the appellant’s home area. Ground 1 relates to all of these aspects of the decision, so I will address that last.

Expert evidence

23. Mr Karim focussed his fire at the hearing on the Judge’s treatment of the expert evidence. In particular, he suggested that the Judge’s statement in para.14 that “unfortunately it does not address the personal circumstances of the Appellant” is wrong, because the report does in fact address his personal circumstances.

24. It is worth noting, preliminarily, that the questions that were put to the appellant’s expert were (as recorded in para. 1 of the report) the following:

• What is the current situation in Bangladesh in terms of stability? Does there continue to be political unrest?
• Are Awami League members attacking BNP supporters?
• When are the elections to be held?
• Has the interim Government quashed any politically motivated criminal charges?
• Which parties are likely to contest the elections?
• What is the role of the army in Bangladesh?
• What is the history of Bangladesh in relation to the suppression of political opponents by Governments?
• Will Sheikh Hasina return to Bangladesh?
• What is the political background of the current president, and how was the president appointed?
• How many Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Jamaat-e Islami (BJI) members were injured or killed in the crackdown?
• A detailed account of the attacks by the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and the Bangladesh Students League (BSL) on the general population.
• Which key positions of the government (military, police, judiciary, civil service, etc) are currently held by the people appointed by the past Awami League government?
• Any other information that you think is useful?

25. It therefore is the case that no questions were asked of the expert directly about how the situation in Bangladesh would impact someone in the appellant’s claimed circumstances on return. The expert did not use the final catch-all question to address that issue.

26. Mr Karim however drew my attention to the section of the report dealing with the question of whether the interim government had quashed any politically motivated criminal charges. In this section, the report gave evidence that a government figure had stated that all cases based on the student movement between 1 July 2024 and 5 August 2024 would be withdrawn, that they had in fact then been dismissed, and that this had taken place first in Dhaka, and then across the rest of the country. The report then noted that “The interim government did not withdraw the criminal, political, or defamation cases filed against BNP-Jamaat and others from 2009 to 30 June 2024 till 25 September 2024” and it then opined that the changes in Bangladesh “do not have any impact on the case that was filed against the Appellant since the interim government did not withdraw this case.” It then, over the course of several paragraphs, considered the difficulties that the appellant would have as a result of the way in which the prosecution “will be conducted”. This section concludes with the view that “There are several legal difficulties for the Appellant if he returns to Bangladesh. The Appellant needs to surrender before the court. If the Appellant returns to Bangladesh and surrenders before the court, the court may send him to prison or may grant bail on condition.”

27. I accept Mr Karim’s submission that the Judge erred in stating that the expert does not address the personal circumstances of the appellant. It does, to the limited extent identified, address the question of whether the appellant’s conviction would have been quashed by the new interim government in Bangladesh and the difficulties that the author opines the appellant would face by way of legal process. The much harder issue for the appellant is whether this is material. In accordance with the ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 at [44], I will return to that question once I have considered whether any other grounds are made out.

28. Mr Karim did not pursue with any real vigour the more general criticisms of the expert evidence set out in the grounds, namely that the Judge’s assessment of it was inadequately reasoned and that the Judge did not engage with particular aspects of the report. I consider that he was right not to do so. The Judge’s reasons for giving no significant weight to the report are adequate and intelligible. They properly enable the parties and this Tribunal to understand why the Judge reached the view on the report that they did. Likewise, having found that the report merited little weight, it was not in my judgment incumbent on the Judge to further engage with (which I take to mean expressly address in the decision) the expert’s views.

29. Grounds 2 accordingly falls to be rejected and Ground 9 succeeds, subject to the question of materiality below.

Dhaka airport

30. Grounds 3-5 criticise the Judge’s treatment of the situation the appellant would face on re-entering Bangladesh, at Dhaka airport. In these grounds, the appellant makes, it seems to me, four submissions.

31. The first submission made is that the Judge has failed to distinguish between punishment warrants and other types of warrants and to address the difference between them by reference to Country Guidance or objective evidence. I reject this submission. In para.36 of the decision, the Judge expressly noted that “It is possible, of course, that a Punishment Warrant might have different consequences compared with an ‘ordinary’ arrest warrant”. The Judge did distinguish between them. The Judge continued, “but this is a matter for the Appellant to prove and there is no objective evidence to support such a submission. It is not addressed in the Appellant’s expert evidence.” There was no objective evidence put before the FTT, nor was it suggested by Mr Karim that there was any relevant Country Guidance case, contrary to the premise of the ground, against which to assess the difference. It was not an error for the Judge not to do so. Indeed, I consider that the criticism made in the grounds is an unfair one where the failure for having adduced relevant objective evidence in relation to this issue rested on the appellant and his advisors.

32. The second submission made about Dhaka airport is that the Judge failed to consider evidence about computerised systems at ports of entry or current security protocols. The Judge did however consider the possibility of the punishment warrant being on a computerised system. He said, “There is no evidence which indicates the extent to which warrants of various kinds are recorded on a central database available to officials at such an entry point.” The grounds do not identify any such evidence in the bundle and Mr Karim did not take me to any. In circumstances where the appellant has not led evidence of computerised systems at ports of entry, it is again an unfair criticism to suggest that the Judge failed to consider such evidence.

33. The appellant’s third submission is that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons why a convicted person with an active punishment warrant would not face detention. I also reject this submission. The Judge’s reason was that the warrant itself identifies the officer in charge of the local police station as the person responsible for its execution and there was no evidence of it having been circulated more widely or being included on a central database. In other words, it would not be known about at the airport and so would not give rise to risk there. That is a perfectly adequate and intelligible reason.

34. The fourth submission is that there is an inconsistency between the finding that there would be no risk to the appellant at Dhaka airport and the finding that he would be at risk in his local area due to the warrant. I am afraid I do not understand what it is that is supposed to be inconsistent between those two findings. Dhaka airport is not in the appellant’s local area and there is no inherent reason why a risk to someone in place A means they are also at risk in place B. Here the Judge explained that the local police officer and the appellant’s former political opponents were a source of risk to him in his local area, but that the punishment warrant would not be known about at the airport (and it was not suggested that his political opponents would, for example, wait for him there). This submission also therefore falls to be rejected.

35. I therefore reject Grounds 3-5.

Risk in Bangladesh more widely

36. The appellant makes three submissions in relation to the risk he might face in Bangladesh outside of his home area and once he has passed through Dhaka airport.

37. First, the appellant submits that the Judge failed to assess whether his political opponents may have a presence beyond his home area. The difficulty with this submission is that, so far as I can see, there was nothing before the Judge to suggest that the appellant had any political opponents with presence beyond his home area. No evidence to this effect is referred to in the grounds and Mr Karim did not take me to any. The appellant’s witness statement refers to his having had a local role in the BNP and having suffered attacks at home but there is no suggestion that this was by anyone other than local opponents, and the appellant’s skeleton argument for the appeal before the FTT addresses the possibility of internal relocation only by reference to the fact that there was fear from the state, by reason of a lodged FIR and the punishment warrant. Notable by its omission was any reference to an inability to relocate because of any political opponents outside his local area. This was not therefore in my view a principle controversial issue before the FTT which the Judge was required to resolve.

38. The second submission the appellant makes is that the Judge failed to consider whether the punishment warrant would be of national concern. I reject this. The Judge did consider whether the warrant would be of national concern. He noted expressly in para.36, that there was no evidence that the warrant had been circulated more widely than the appellant’s local area or been included on a central database. While, as noted, that paragraph is dealing with the situation at Dhaka airport, the Judge in my view plainly still had it in mind when considering internal relocation in para.40. There is no legal requirement for the Judge to simply repeat findings he had already made.

39. The third submission made by the appellant is that the finding that the appellant could internally relocate was not supported by adequate reasons. I also reject this. The reasons given by the Judge, namely that the warrant was a local matter, he would not pursue his political activities on return and while it would not be easy for him, it would not be unduly harsh, given that he is a young man who has spent the majority of his life in Bangladesh, with experience of several types of work, were legally sufficient. The Judge also explained why he did not consider that the appellant’s depression and anxiety meant he could not relocate. This was because they were at a modest level. This reasoning is entirely adequate.

40. It follows that Grounds 6-8 fall to be dismissed.

Ground 1

41. By ground 1, the appellant submits that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons why the accepted facts would not give rise to a risk on return. I cannot accept that. First, of all, the Judge did not find that the accepted risks would not give rise to a risk on return. He found that they would do so, but only in the appellant’s local area. The Judge’s reasons as to this are in my judgment intelligible and adequate. They amply explain why, notwithstanding that the appellant’s account was considered to be credible on a number of issues, the findings that result from that did not give rise to a risk on the appellant’s return outside of the appellant’s local area. He considered that question and gave adequate reasons by reference to the appellant’s arrival in Bangladesh (at Dhaka airport), to his local area, to the question of whether the appellant could continue with his political activities on return and on whether there would a risk in Bangladesh other than in the appellant’s home area. Ground 1 therefore also falls to be dismissed.

Materiality

42. In light of the above, the question arises whether the single error of law established, namely that the Judge was wrong to find that the expert report did not address the particular circumstances of the appellant, is material.

43. The threshold for immateriality is a high one. It has been expressed in a number of different ways in the appellate authorities. An error will not be material if the FTT “would have been bound to”, “must” or “would inevitably” have reached the same conclusion, or if, “on the materials before the FTT any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion”: Detamu v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 604 at [14] and [18]; Sadovska v SSHD [2017] UKSC 54, [2017] 1 WLR 2926 at [31]; AJ (Angola) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 at [49]; ASO, cited above, at [44]. Conversely, an error will be material if, in its absence, a different conclusion “might properly” have been reached: Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58, [2018] 1 WLR 5536 at [58].

44. Notwithstanding this high threshold, I have concluded that the error identified was not material to the outcome of this appeal. Firstly, the issues to which the evidence on the appellant’s particular circumstances went were (a) whether his conviction would have been quashed (or similar) since the change in government and (b) the legal difficulties that this could cause him. However, as to (a) the Judge proceeded on the basis that the appellant’s conviction was extant and had not been quashed, and as to (b) the report does not opine on the extent to which a punishment warrant would be known outside the appellant’s local area (whether because of being distributed, because it is recorded on some centralised database, or otherwise) or the publicity that may have surrounded the appellant’s conviction, and so the Judge’s assessment of whether the appellant would face difficulties (including those of the nature described in the report) outside his home area therefore cannot rationally be affected by the error. Second, and more generally, to the extent that the error might be suggested to undermine the Judge’s conclusion that significant assistance could not generally be derived from the report, I am satisfied that no rational Tribunal could have reached a different conclusion as to this. The Judge’s (unchallenged) criticisms of the expert’s credentials qua expert are in my view fatal to any significant weight being given to this report. This is a fortiori in light of the other unchallenged criticisms (e.g. that it is rambling, unfocused and lacking in structure) that are made of the report by the Judge, which, as well as being unchallenged, are all amply justified. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that even if the Judge had not wrongly stated that the report did not address the appellant’s own circumstances, the same conclusion would inevitably have been reached by any properly directed FTT acting rationally.

45. In light of the above, the appeal falls to be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Loughridge dated 9 October 2024 does not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Paul Skinner

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 March 2024