Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005722

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66378/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 12 March 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R FRANTZIS

Between
RA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Karnik (Counsel instructed by BHT Sussex)
For the Respondent: Mr Thompson (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 14 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the Appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the Appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 27th October 2024 (“the Decision”), of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) to dismiss his appeal on all grounds.
Background
3. The broad factual background to the appeal is not in dispute between the Parties. In brief summary, the Appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He claims to be have fled Iraq on 13th March 2015, arriving in the United Kingdom (“UK”) on 4th June 2017. He travelled through France and Sweden claiming asylum in both countries. Fearing, he claims, return to France the Appellant then absconded, ultimately pursuing his claim to international protection in 2022. The Appellant contends that he is at risk on return to Iraq owing to his religious and cultural beliefs which culminated in him writing, printing and circulating a booklet critical of Kurdish culture and aspects of Islam in December 2014. The Appellant claims that his family tried to kill him as a result in January 2015. The Appellant also maintains that without his CSID there is no possibility of internal relocation within Iraq and there is a real risk of a breach of Article 3 ECHR on his return. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on 4th December 2023.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The Appellant appealed against the refusal of his claim to protection. In the Respondent’s Review of the evidence it was submitted in respect of the country report of Dr Sheri J. Laizer, submitted by the Appellant that:
“57. The R submits that the report is based on the information provided by the A and the Expert and the A appear not to have met. The R therefore submits that little evidential weight can be placed on the report.

58. The R also refers to the ‘Conclusions’ section of the ER, in which the Expert states: “Mr Azad’s father as a successful business man will have good connections to the ruling elite or he cannot have prospered. He can plausibly have listed his son’s name on a blacklist or even just reported him as a missing person.” [AB;ER, Pg 27, Para 3] However, the R submits that this is speculative and the Expert has not evidenced the basis upon which she makes this claim.”
5. In the Decision the FtT makes the following observations and findings of fact when dismissing the appeal:
“Ms Laizer based her report on the premise that the appellant’s account was true. She is not able to comment upon the veracity of the appellant’s account. She says that it is plausible.”[32] … “I will consider what weight to put on her evidence in the light of all the evidence.”[33]

“Some of the late evidence uploaded was of emails between the appellant’s solicitor and the publisher. The solicitor asked if the document was genuine. The publisher replied that it was, and that the appellant had a book printed by them.” [39] … “This correspondence adds little. The solicitor had contacted the email address on the disputed email and had received a reply. The reply could just as easily have been from the appellant or one of his colleagues. The evidence may have been more cogent of (sic) the solicitor had made enquiries about whether the publisher existed, and if it did, contact had been made direct to the publisher at its address to make the enquiries. For whatever reason this has not been done.”[40] “I will decide what weight to put on this evidence in the light of all the evidence.” [41]
“I am not satisfied that the appellant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his asylum claim. Having entered the United Kingdom and claimed asylum in 2017 the appellant disappeared until 2018 and then disappeared again until he resumed cooperation in 2022. His explanation is that he did this deliberately to avoid being removed to another European country.” [47]

“The fact that he deliberately absconded to obstruct the asylum process is conduct to which section 8(2)(c) applies.” [51]

“I take into account all the above matters. I take into account that the standard of proof in an asylum claim is a low one. The appellant’s conduct in absconding, obstructing the asylum process, and his failure to claim asylum in safe countries, all damage his credibility.” [53]

“He has produced a book which he says that he has written. I accept that the appellant’s solicitors have had email correspondence with someone. I do not find that that it can reliably be said to be the ublisher. At best it is correspondence with an email address which the appellant has supplied.” [55]

“It is for the appellant, even on the low standard of proof, to establish that these documents are what they purport to be. I do not find that he has.” [56].

“Whether I accept his account depends upon whether I find him to be a credible witness. I do not find him to be a reliable witness as to fact.” [57]

“I do not find that the appellant had a disagreement with his family in Iraq. I do not find that family members have threatened to harm him. I do not find that he wrote the book which he claims to have written. I do not find that the emails said to be from the publisher are what they purport to be.” [57]

“I do not find that his (sic) not in contact with his family.” [58]

“I find that the appellant’s account is fabricated. He is not at risk from anyone in the IKR. He does not succeed as a refugee.” [59]
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The Appellant’s grounds for permission to appeal contend that the FtT has erred in law in the following ways:
a. Ground 1 argues that the FtT failed to make a finding on the Appellant’s beliefs with reference to HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31;
b. Ground 2 argues that the FtT erred in consideration of the booklet including by failing to take into account the evidence of Dr Laizer;
c. Ground 3 argues that the FtT erred in approach to the assessment of credibility. In respect of s.8 AITC 2004, it is submitted that the FtT has treated the behaviour provisions, in particular s.8(2)(c), to be automatically damaging.
d. Ground 4 argues that the FtT erred in approach to the issue of re-documentation.
7. In a decision dated 13th December 2024 First tier Tribunal Judge Dieu granted permission to appeal on all grounds.
8. At the error of law hearing, Mr Karnik relied upon the Grounds of Appeal and his Skeleton Argument dated 6th February 2025 which he expanded upon in his submissions.
9. Mr Thompson in response submitted that the Decision must be read as a whole and that the FtT had come to reasoned and sustainable findings, demonstrably informed by the expert evidence.
Discussion
10. For the reasons that I set out below, I shall deal with Ground 2 first.
11. The core of the Appellant’s factual claim is that he wrote a booklet as a means of raising awareness of the lack of freedom for women in his society and in Islam and that this was triggered by his family’s reaction to his beliefs over many years. Once he had printed and distributed copies of the booklet, his family attempted to harm him.
12. Correspondence said to be from the printer of the booklet written by the Appellant, provides that they, Zeyhar Press, printed several hundred copies of the booklet and returned them to the Appellant. This goes to the core of the Appellant’s claimed fear.
13. Ground 2 complains that the FtT failed to take into account the report of Dr Laizer which it is said:
a. Confirmed the Appellant’s account of the process of publishing such material (pdf 52-54 of the Upper Tribunal’s Consolidated Bundle ); and
b. Reached a conclusion that the publisher was genuine (pdf 52).
14. In her report, Dr Laizer, opines that:
a. “I consider the letter from the publisher to be genuine based on its content and giving its name” (pdf 52);
b. “The KRG controls all media and publishing, including radio, television and the print press and permission has to be sought to publish printed matter like books and booklets. Anything critical of the regime itself or of Islam will not be permitted. As with media, so with publishing” (pdf 52);
c. “The Home Office refusal letter makes a surmise that is not based on any country evidence about a “small bookshop.” It is a printer, a print press and not a bookshop. Zheyar Press has also attached their stamp and an ID card in evidence. The letter has an email address and phone number. The vowel can shift to be transliterated in English as Zhiyar or Zhyarpress as written there. Q.28 makes this clear. It was a print job” (pdf 54);
d. “Zhyar means, variously wisdom, intelligence, civilised and is also a popular male name bestowed in the hope a boy will grow up to be knowledgeable – a good name for a publisher therefore” (pdf 54).
15. Taken at its highest that is evidence capable of supporting the core factual element of the Appellant’s claim to international protection. The FtT acknowledges the importance of evidence going to the existence of the publisher [40].
16. The Respondent took no issue with the credentials of Dr Laizer in the Review nor is she recorded as doing so at the hearing before the FtT. The points that were taken by the Respondent are set out at paragraph 3 above. The FtT does not find that Dr Laizer is not appropriately qualified to give the opinions she does.
17. I am persuaded that the FtT has erred in coming to the conclusion that “He has produced a book which he says that he has written. I accept that the appellant’s solicitors have had email correspondence with someone. I do not find that that it can reliably be said to be the publisher. At best it is correspondence with an email address which the appellant has supplied” [54] such that the Decision cannot stand. That is because the FtT makes no reference to the opinions of Dr Laiser at [14] above when coming to that finding. Whilst I accept Mr Thompson’s point that the FtT does refer to Dr Laiser’s report at [30-33] and that the Decision must be read as a whole, there is simply no reference by the FtT to the opinions provided in respect of the printer of the booklet as set out. Whilst the FtT concludes at [33] by saying that “I will consider what weight to put on her evidence in light of all the evidence” the FtT does not return to make findings as to the weight to be attached to the opinions recorded at [14] above or indeed at all.
18. Whilst the Respondent took points in respect of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation in the refusal letter, those points were not considered by the FtT in light of the findings adverse to the credibility of the Appellant’s account.
19. In light of the fact that the error I have identified goes to the heart of the Appellant’s factual claim to international protection and is fundamental to the credibility of his account overall, I am satisfied that for the reason contented for in Ground 2 alone, the Decision of the FtT cannot stand. In those circumstances, I need not go on to consider Grounds 1, 3 & 4.
Disposal
20. It was common ground between the Parties that the appropriate disposal, should I find for the Appellant on any of Grounds 1-3, was for the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined de novo because a full and extensive fact-finding process is required.
Notice of Decision
I set aside the decision of the FtT as it involved a material error of law. I preserve no findings of fact. The matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided de novo by a differently constituted FtT.

Roxanne Frantzis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7th March 2025