Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005728

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56215/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
DEPUTY UPPER TIRBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

MT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Heywood, Counsel instructed by Specter, Constant & Williams Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 2nd September 2024, dismissing MT’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 24th August 2023, refusing his protection claim.
Background to the appeal
2. MT is a national of Chad. He arrived in the UK on 18th July 2020 and claimed asylum on the same date.
3. MT states that, in 2014, he stopped believing in Islam. He states that, on 13th March 2015, he informed his family that he had left the Islamic religion. MT states that his family threatened him and said that he had two weeks to start believing in Islam or they would report him to the police. He states that he did not do this and his family therefore reported him to the police. MT states that the police raided his home as a result and that he subsequently left Chad and travelled to the UK. He states that there is an outstanding arrest warrant against him in Chad as a result of his conversion.
4. The Secretary of State accepted that the appellant was a national of Chad and that he had stopped believing in Islam and had become an atheist. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was at risk from the government in Chad. In her review decision, the respondent considered the documents which the appellant had provided and stated that she did not find them to be reliable documents. She further stated that the appellant had not shown that he would not be able to access effective protection and had not shown that there was no internal flight alternative available to him.
5. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge did not find the appellant to be credible regarding his account of converting from Islam to atheism. She found that there were ‘many credibility issues’. The judge rejected the expert report submitted on behalf of the appellant and found that that it was of limited assistance.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal. Permission to appeal was granted on 16th December 2024 by Resident Judge Feeney on all grounds.
7. The appeal came before us at an error of law hearing on 10 February 2025. There were two issues:
a. Whether the judge had erred in her assessment of the appellant’s credibility, particularly in light of the concession by the respondent that the appellant had abandoned Islam and had become an atheist
b. Whether the judge had erred in her assessment of the background evidence, in particular with regard to the judge’s rejection of the expert report.
The error of law hearing
8. At the hearing before us, the appellant was represented by Mr Haywood, Counsel instructed by Specter, Constant & Williams Solicitors. The respondent was represented by Mr Wain, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
9. The parties were in agreement that the appeal should be remitted to be heard afresh by the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Haywood said that there was a common position between the parties that there was a material error of law in the appeal decision as disclosed by both grounds. He said that the parties agreed that the appeal should be heard afresh by the First-tier Tribunal.
10. Mr Wain was in agreement and stated that the judge appeared to proceed on an incorrect basis believing that it was disputed by the respondent that the appellant had converted from Islam to atheism. He said that this had been accepted in the reasons for refusal letter. Mr Wain submitted that the judge had also failed to address the expert report’s analysis of the evidence upon which the judge relied in stating that there would be no risk to the appellant. He said that the judge also failed to address the withdrawal of the concessions, in the respondent’s review decision, regarding internal flight and sufficiency of protection.
Error of law decision
11. We bear in mind that an appellate tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so we apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. We further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
12. However, we find that there is a material error of law in the judge’s decision. The judge did not appear to have noted that the respondent had accepted that the appellant had left Islam and had become an atheist. Instead, the judge has spent a number of paragraphs considering the credibility of the claim and finding that the appellant’s claim to have converted is not a credible claim, when this was not an issue between the parties.
13. At [16] the judge makes reference to the background evidence, specifically the report on International Freedom of Religion in Chad. The judge rejects the expert report primarily because she states that it reads as advocacy for the appellant and believes the appellant’s account [17]. The respondent had accepted that the appellant had converted from Islam to atheism so the expert was entitled to proceed on the basis that this part of the appellant’s account was not in dispute. The judge finds that the expert report is incorrect in stating that there is no state protection available when other background evidence stated that there was state protection available. The expert report made specific reference to the US State Department report and gave an analysis of why, in the expert’s opinion, that report did not address all relevant factors when assessing state protection. It was incumbent on the judge to consider the conflicting background evidence before her and to give cogent reasons for rejecting the expert report. The judge has not done this other than to state that she considered the expert report to be partisan and therefore rejected the whole of the report.
14. We note, too, that there are a number of typographical and other errors in the judge’s decision. For example, at [4], the judge makes reference to Pakistan when the appellant is from Chad and at [6], [7] , [14] and [16] there are typographical errors such as ‘she’ instead of ‘he’ and ‘the appellant’s and adopted’. These errors, on their own, would not necessarily undermine a decision but considered as a whole alongside the failure of the Judge to take note of the concession regarding the appellant’s account of conversion, suggest that the judge has not properly applied the anxious scrutiny that is required in a protection appeal.
15. We concur with the agreement of the parties that the decision contains material errors of law in consideration of the appellant’s account and in consideration of the background evidence. We are further satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard again afresh by a different judge.

Notice of decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and we set it aside.
2. We remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge. For the avoidance of doubt, none of the findings of fact are preserved.

F Beach

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2nd March 2025