Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005761

On appeal from PA/63135/2023
LP/08458/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
13 March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL GLEESON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

M M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Asad Maqsood, Counsel instructed by Brit Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Nick Wain, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity and will be referred to in these proceedings as M M.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision on 3 October 2023 to refuse him international protection pursuant to the Refugee Convention or leave to remain on human rights grounds. He is a national of Bangladesh.

Background

2. The appellant claimed to be a Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) activist, having joined its student wing, the Jatiotabadi Chatro Dol (JCD). He claimed to have been attacked in Bangladesh on 8 May 2019 by Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) activists, resulting in his having to go to hospital and have four stitches in a wound to his head. The BAL was then in government in Bangladesh.

3. The appellant did not leave Bangladesh for almost two years after that incident. He came to the UK on a student visa in March 2021. While in the UK, the appellant claimed to have continued his BNP protest activities against the BAL. He posted regularly on Facebook against the BAL and was photographed attending demonstrations.

4. The appellant says that a false case was lodged against him on 1 January 2023 and that on 5 January 2023, an arrest warrant was issued against him.

5. The BNP fell from power in Bangladesh in August 2024. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India. An interim government, headed by Nobel Peace prize winner Mohammed Yunus, took over pending future elections.

First-tier Tribunal decision

6. The First-tier Tribunal hearing was on 15 October 2024, the decision being promulgated on 30 October 2024. The First-tier Judge noted that in her refusal letter on 22 October 2023, the respondent had accepted that if the appellant’s account were fully credible, he was entitled to refugee status in the UK.

7. In a decision promulgated on 30 October 2024, following a hearing in the First-tier Tribunal on 15 October 2024, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The First-tier Judge noted significant discrepancies in the appellant’s account, that documents produced on his behalf were internally inconsistent and unreliable (applying Tanveer Ahmed).

8. The First-tier Judge had regard to the changed circumstances in Bangladesh and to recent country evidence, including an Information Request Response obtained by the respondent: Bangladesh: Resignation of Sheikh Hasina and formation of the interim Government (22 August 2024).

9. The First-tier Tribunal concluded that:

“69. …While a Bangladesh court may have found the appellant guilty of having defamed Sheikh Hasina while she was still Prime Minister and while the BAL were still in power, there are not substantial grounds for believing that a Bangladesh court would make such a finding now, in the transformed political climate.

70. The respondent conceded that there would be no state protection for the appellant if all the material facts he relied upon were made out. Only some of the material facts asserted by the appellant have been made out, and in any event the concession was based on the premise that the Awami League remained in power. As they have fallen from power, the concession falls away. It is not reasonably likely that the appellant will be unable to access sufficient state protection if the need arose.”

10. The appellant’s claims under Article 8 ECHR were rejected at [72]:

“72. Turning to an Article 8 claim outside the Rules, I accept that Questions 1 and 2 of the Razgar test should be answered in the appellant’s favour with regard to the establishment of private life in the UK. Questions 3 and 4 of the Razgar test must be answered in favour of the respondent. On the crucial issue of proportionality, none of the public interest considerations arising under section 117B of the 2002 Act militate against the proportionality of the appellant’s removal. There are no exceptional circumstances in the case which justify the appellant being granted Article 8 relief outside the Rules. Requiring the appellant to return to Bangladesh is proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved, which is the maintenance of firm and effective immigration controls and the protection of the country’s economic well-being.”

11. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal.

Permission to appeal

12. Permission to appeal was granted on the following basis:

“2. Ground One: The Judge's reliance on the lack of corroborative evidence appears inconsistent with the principles outlined in MAH (Egypt), which state that corroboration is not a legal requirement. Additionally, the failure to put critical points, such as the meaning of "RTA," to the Appellant may constitute procedural unfairness, an arguable error of law.

3. Ground Two: Failure to Give Reasons or Implicit Requirement for Corroboration- the Judge found that the documents demonstrated the historical existence of the false case but noted internal inconsistencies in the evidence, such as the timing of the arrest warrant and summonses. The Judge concluded that the Appellant did not prove the case was ongoing or that the warrant remained active. The reasoning for accepting part of the court documents while rejecting others arguably lacks clarity and consistency. By requiring additional evidence to prove the ongoing status of the case, the Judge may have implicitly required corroboration in violation of established principles. Permission to appeal on this ground is granted.

4. Ground Three: Analysis of Country of Origin Evidence - submits the Judge misinterpreted the objective evidence by equating the release of political detainees with the treatment of individuals with pending criminal cases. The Judge relied heavily on the country information report, which highlighted significant political changes in Bangladesh following the fall of the Awami League government. The Judge dismissed the risk of persecution for individuals with pending cases, citing the removal of Awami League influence and the likelihood of fair treatment under the interim government. It is just arguable the Judge’s reasoning appears to oversimplify the implications of the regime change and fails to adequately address the specific risks associated with pending criminal cases. The Appellant’s arguments about the court system and police actions under the new regime remain unaddressed, raising an arguable error in the interpretation of country evidence.”

Rule 24 Reply

13. There was no Rule 24 Reply on behalf of the respondent.

14. That is the basis on which this appeal came before us today.

Upper Tribunal hearing
15. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. We had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellant.
16. For the appellant, Mr Maqsood relied on the grounds of appeal and argued that the Judge’s concerns about the abbreviation RTA in describing the harm suffered by the appellant in Bangladesh (which the Tribunal equated to ‘road traffic accident’) should have been put to the appellant, and that the same was true of the discrepancies in the applications by the appellant’s father in 2019 and 2021 for a General Diary Entry (the first step in instituting criminal proceedings in Bangladesh).
17. Mr Maqsood relied on MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [86] and SB (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 160 at [46]. The appellant would have addressed the matters at [43]-[53] of the First-tier Tribunal decision, had they been put to him.
18. The First-tier Judge’s decision that the court documents were unreliable and to place no weight on the March 2024 report from the Bangladeshi lawyer were inadequately reasoned and should not stand. It was reasonably likely that the arrest warrant existed and was live. The First-tier Tribunal should have accepted that the appellant would be arrested on return.
19. Mr Maqsood argued that the change of government was not as determinative as it appeared and that the First-tier Tribunal’s treatment of the country evidence at [67]-[69] was not dispositive. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings were unsafe. The appeal should be allowed.
20. For the respondent, Mr Wain argued that the First-tier Tribunal had not required corroboration unlawfully or at all. The Judge had assessed the evidence advanced at the hearing: it would have been an error of law not to have done so. The hospital discharge report did not state how the injuries had been caused. The Judge’s speculation about the meaning of ‘RTA' was not determinative.
21. The same applied to the General Diary Entry reports in 2019 and 2021. The Secretary of State would rely on QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC) (12 January 2021) [2021] UKUT 00033 at (2)-(3) in the judicial headnote. At [38]-[39] of the First-tier Tribunal decision, it was clear that the evidence had been considered in the round.
22. Ground 2 was not made out. The Judge’s reasoning at [38]-[39] regarding the appellant’s pre-flight JCD activities was adequate. The First-tier Judge dealt properly with the social media evidence at [40]-[44] and at [53] set out anomalies in the evidence, but indicated that as the appellant had not been cross-examined thereon, he accepted that the appellant had discharged the burden of proving that the court documents could be relied upon: see Tanveer Ahmed. The First-tier Judge was not, however, satisfied that the arrest warrant was still outstanding or the case still ongoing, given the changed circumstances in Bangladesh. The burden of proving that, to the lower standard, was on the appellant. There was no error in the First-tier Tribunal’s approach to that evidence.
23. The appellant’s supplementary bundle did not address the position after 2024. At [68]-[69], the First-tier Judge had considered the evidence regarding the change, and the actions of the interim government. The conclusions reached were open to her and should not be disturbed.
24. Mr Maqsood did not seek to reply to Mr Wain’s submissions.
25. We reserved our decision, which we now give.
The legal framework
26. QC (China) gives guidance on the proper approach to credibility:
“The Mibanga duty
(2) Credibility is not necessarily an essential component of a successful claim to be in need of international protection. Where credibility has a role to play, its relevance to the overall outcome will vary, depending on the nature of the case. What that relevance is to a particular claim needs to be established with some care by the judicial fact-finder. It is only once this is done that the practical application of the “Mibanga duty” to consider credibility “in the round” can be understood (Francois Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367). The significance of a piece of evidence that emanates from a third party source may well depend upon what is at stake in terms of the individual’s credibility.
(3) What the case law reveals is that the judicial fact-finder has a duty to make his or her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence and needs to show in their decision that they have done so. The actual way in which the fact-finder goes about this task is a matter for them. As has been pointed out, one has to start somewhere. At the end of the day, what matters is whether the decision contains legally adequate reasons for the outcome. The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater is the need for the judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to that evidence; and, if the fact-finder’s overall conclusion is contrary to the apparent thrust of that evidence, the greater is the need to explain why that evidence has not brought about a different outcome. ”
27. The passage from MAH (Egypt) quoted at paragraph 4 of the grounds of appeal does not support the appellant’s assertion that corroboration can never be expected: Singh LJ stated at [86] that:
“…On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight.”
28. See also paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules:
“339L. It is the duty of the person to substantiate the protection claim or substantiate their human rights claim. Where aspects of the person’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects will not need confirmation when all of the following conditions are met:
(i) the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate their protection claim or substantiate their human rights claim;
(ii) all material factors at the person’s disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been given;
(iii) the person’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the person’s case;
(iv) the person has made a protection claim or made a human rights claim at the earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and
(v) the general credibility of the person has been established.”
Discussion
29. We remind ourselves of the grounds of appeal. Grounds 1 and 2 are reasons challenges: the appellant seeks to challenge the First-tier Tribunal’s findings of fact and credibility. He contends that the First-tier Judge unlawfully required corroboration of his account and challenges the judge’s reasoning on the ongoing risk now from the libel case against Sheikh Hasina. Ground 3 contends that the First-tier Judge erred in his analysis of the country evidence, regarding the changed circumstances in Bangladesh.
30. Dealing first with the challenges to the judge’s reasoning and his findings of fact and credibility, we remind ourselves that the First-tier Tribunal is recognised as a specialist fact-finding Tribunal and that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning: see Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26] in the judgment of Lord Justice Green, with whom Lord Justices Lewison and Andrews agreed.
31. We further take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal: see Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 (05 April 2022) at [2]-[5] in the judgment of Lord Justice Lewison, with whom Lord Justices Males and Snowden agreed, which held that the Upper Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’.
32. In ground 1, the appellant challenged the First-tier Judge’s finding that he was not a student leader for the JCD when in Bangladesh, and that his profile was not such as to cause the attack which he claimed occurred at the hands of the BAL in May 2019. For the reasons given in his decision, we consider that such finding was open to the Judge.
33. Dealing with the evidence of an attack on the appellant in May 2019, the First-tier Judge preferred the contemporaneous account in the General Diary Entry request by the appellant’s father dated 10 May 2019 to that filed on 26 July 2021, after the appellant had come to the UK and about a month before the present asylum claim was made. In the first version, the appellant’s father ascribed the attack on his son to ‘unknown miscreants’ and in the second to ‘activists of a political party’. The party was not specified. At [37], the First-tier Judge observed that neither of the General Diary Entry requests stated that the appellant was targeted by BAL activists, nor did either version mention him having held a leadership role in the JCD.
34. The First-tier Judge had regard to the terms of the contemporaneous medical discharge document of 10 May 2019, which used the initials RTA without explanation, but did not indicate how the injury to the appellant’s head had been caused. The appellant contends that the First-tier Judge’s observation that the initials RTA probably meant ‘road traffic accident’ was erroneous. Even if that was an error, it was not determinative: at [36], the First-tier Judge made a finding in the alternative: “Even if I am wrong about this, the report does not state how the appellant’s injuries were caused”.
35. At [39] the First-tier Judge confirmed that he had considered the evidence in the round.
36. Ground 2 argued that having accepted that there were proceedings against the appellant and others for libelling Sheikh Hasina, the First-tier Judge should also have accepted that there was still a live arrest warrant against him and that the libel case was ongoing. It is not an error of law to accept part of an account while rejecting other parts of it: see Chiver (Asylum; Discrimination; Employment; Persecution) (Romania) [1994] UKIAT 10758 (24 March 1994). The contention that the First-tier Judge failed properly to explain why he accepted that the false case had been issued, but not that the warrant remained outstanding, is unarguable. The First-tier Judge’s explanation of his analysis at [53] is properly, intelligibly and adequately reasoned.
37. Regarding the appellant’s claimed social media profile, he relies on his Facebook posts but has not produced the evidence required by XX (PJAK-sur place activities – Facebook) (Iran) CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC). The First-tier Judge gave cogent and proper reasons for placing little weight on the alleged social media posts and the appellant’s sur place activity.
38. As regards ground 3, the First-tier Judge’s reasoning is at [55]-[66] of the First-tier Tribunal decision and is careful, thorough and sustainable. All the material is considered, including that in the appellant’s supplementary bundle. The third ground of appeal is really no more than a disagreement with the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the changed country circumstances.
39. In conclusion, we find that no proper reason has been shown for interfering with the First-tier Judge’s findings of fact and credibility; that no unlawful corroboration was required of the appellant and the interpretation of the medical discharge note was not determinative; and that overall, the grounds of appeal are really no more than a vigorously expressed disagreement with findings which were open to the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence.
40. We dismiss the appeal and uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

41. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of no material error of law. We do not set aside the decision but order that it shall stand.

Linda Kirk
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 12 March 2025