Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005765
UI-2024-005767
UI-2024-005768
UI-2024-005769

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/610405/2023_(LA/01355/2024)
PA/610406/2023_(LA/01351/2024)
PA/610408/2023_(LA/01350/2024)
PA/610409/2023_(LA/01352/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

FU
PIU
PKU
POU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss Celia Record, of counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Nicholas Wain, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

The parties may apply on notice to vary this Order.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellants are citizens of Nigeria. They had appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decisions dated 8 November 2023 to refuse their international protection claims made on 26 August 2021.

2. In a decision which was promulgated on 20 October 2024, following a hearing in the First-tier Tribunal on 1 July 2024, Judge Raymond (‘the Judge’) dismissed the Appellants’ appeals.

3. On 17 December 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Chowdhury granted the Appellants permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

Anonymity

4. We consider that it is appropriate to maintain the anonymity order made by the First tier Tribunal in light of the circumstances of the Appellants’ protection claims. No party asked for it to be set aside.

Background

5. The first Appellant (‘the Appellant’) entered the United Kingdom (‘UK’) as the holder of a tourist visa on 10 August 2021. She was accompanied by her two daughters (the ‘second Appellant’ and the ‘third Appellant’) and was pregnant with her third daughter (the ‘fourth Appellant’).

6. On 26 August 2021 the Appellant claimed asylum and listed the second and third Appellants as dependents. The basis of her asylum claim was that she came to the UK because of fears of, first, her mother-in-law (whom she does not name), who was threatening her in Nigeria because she wanted to make her undergo a form of spiritual healing that would enable her to have sons, and for her two daughters to undergo Female Genital Mutilation (‘FGM’). She also feared her former partner and father of her daughters, AU (whose date of birth she does not know), from whom she is separated and who was agreeable to his daughters undergoing FGM. The Appellant asserts that given the notoriously corrupt and inefficient Nigerian police, who were dismissive of her pleas for help because of considering it a family matter, and with this being representative of the lack of effective action by the authorities against FGM, she could not expect the authorities to offer her any protection against those she fears.

Refusal letter

7. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s application for reason that her account was not considered credible for the following reasons:
• While the Appellant claimed that her mother-in-law had been constantly threatening her by phone, there had not been any direct physical threats, and she did not say that she had tried to get help from the authorities.
• The Appellant’s claimed fears of her mother-in-law are inconsistent with her having another child with AU, and her having contacted her mother-in-law to attend a scan with the Appellant.
• It is inconsistent and not credible that the Appellant did not know the views of AU on FGM when they shared two female children.
• The Appellant claimed her mother-in-law is powerful because she is wealthy and will be able to find her anywhere, however the Appellant had had no contact with her mother-in-law since she had been in the UK, and she had not been found by her mother-in-law.
• It is inconsistent for the Appellant to claim she had received more than 20 threatening phone calls from her mother-in-law while she continued to attend family events with her.
• The Appellant’s claim of fearing her mother-in-law would perform FGM on her daughters is inconsistent with having visited her with her daughters.
• It is vague and inconsistent for the Appellant to have stated she had not been ‘cut’, but then claim she may have been, and to ask the interviewing officer how she would have known, when she had given birth to two children.
• The country evidence reports that the higher the level a woman is educated the more knowledgeable she is about FGM and its tradition and practices, and the Appellant’s account is inconsistent with her level of education.

First-tier Tribunal decision

8. The Appellants appealed against the Respondent’s decision and the appeal came before the Judge on 1 July 2024. In a decision dated 20 October 2024 (‘the Decision’) the Judge dismissed the Appellants’ appeal.

9. The Judge found that the Appellant’s credibility suffered from ‘a series of obscure and inconsistent features’ (at [97]). He noted that the Appellant is an educated professional person ‘who it can reasonably be inferred would have appreciated the importance of supporting evidence … in establishing the credibility of her asylum narrative.’ He found the following inconsistencies and obscurities in her claim:
• There is no evidence of the Appellant’s marriage to a person named AU (at [98]). There is no marriage certificate for the marriage which she claims occurred in 2014, and no birth certificates recording AU as the father of the three children (at [99], [115], [124]). Nor is there evidence that AU ever had a role in the lives of the Appellant and her daughters (at [103], [110], [124]).
• The role of AU and the ‘baleful influence’ of his unidentified mother (at [98]) is important because the ‘climate of fear’ the Appellant claims was created for her ‘over a form of spiritual healing tantamount to witchcraft that would be inflicted upon her’ and FGM inflicted upon her two daughters, depended on the prospect her mother-in-law feared the Appellant and AU were in a long-term relationship, and she would be deprived a grandson as the Appellant could only have daughters (at [100]). There is uncertainty around when the unidentified mother-in-law ‘started to play an influential and malevolent role in the destruction of the marriage’ (at [125], [130]). That the Appellant has never identified the mother-in-law calls into doubt her ‘malevolent role’ (at [132]-[133]). The mother-in-law’s ‘malefic presence’ in the lives of the Appellant and her daughters is also rendered doubtful by the evidence that she socialised with her mother-in-law at family events (at [134]-[137]). Also made doubtful is the Appellant’s evidence that she invited her mother-in-law to attend the scan when she was pregnant which contradicts her assertion she was ‘forced’ to have a scan (at [140]).
• The Appellant asserted that AU could return from the USA where he is said to be residing so as ‘to help his mother punish her for having daughters, and because he does want his daughters to be cut’ (at [101]). Yet she stated in her interview that she did not know AU’s position on cutting which is a clear contradiction to this assertion (at [102]). Further, the Appellant’s claim that by 2020 AU had deserted her makes any fear of spiritual healing and FGM for her daughters ‘seem very far-fetched’ (at [131]).
• The Appellant gave inconsistent evidence in relation to when she and AU separated (at [119]-[122]).
• The Appellant is from a social and economic background that would not accept FGM (at [155]), yet she claims she did not know anyone in Nigeria who had been cut and that she and AU had never discussed it (at [149], [155]).
• There are obscure features related to the Appellant’s visit to the UK and her stay with ‘in-laws’ who must refer to relatives of AU, who she claims to fear as well as his mother and other family members who treated her with derision and humiliated her as a woman who could not produce sons (at [157]-[163]).

10. The Judge concluded at [142], [144], [146]-147], [163]:
“[the] very substantial cumulative weight of the preceding flaws to the evidence relied upon by the Appellant for her claimed fears of her mother-in-law, lead me to conclude that AU, and his unidentified mother, are fictitious characters in a fabricated asylum narrative. Even if the Appellant may well be married to someone, who has fathered one or more of her daughters, and have a mother-in-law resulting therefrom.
…
I find such a conclusion reinforced by the evasive and vague evidence of the Appellant on her own position, as an educated professional woman from the Christian community in Nigeria, on FGM, and that also of her claimed partner.
…
I find it incredible that the Appellant, given her social and educational background, and AU, are supposed to have not formed, so far as the substantive interview is concerned, a view on FGM, which is the core element upon which the asylum narrative pivots.
I find it to be seriously damaging to the credibility of the Appellant that it is only in her appeal statement, that she purports to know that AU agrees with and would want her daughters to be cut.
…
I find that the Appellant has deliberately kept this feature of her family connections in the UK in obscurity, in support of her fabricated asylum claim.”

11. In dismissing the Appellants’ asylum human rights claims, the Judge stated at [164], [173]-[175], [177]:

“I therefore find that the Appellant does not have a well-founded and genuine fear of persecution in Nigeria, and that she can be safely returned there with her daughters.

…

I have not accepted the core asylum account of the Appellant, and therefore do not consider that she would need to internally relocate in Nigeria to avoid her mother-in- law.

But if I had, I would have considered that, as a professional educated woman from the Christian community in Lagos, the Appellant would have had access to the family and social support that would facilitate her calling in aid sufficiency of protection from the authorities.

I note in this context that the CPIN states (6.2.1) that it is possible to turn to state actors and civil society organizations, as well as religious institutions as a means of protection, with women seeking recourse against a forced FGM procedure being able to seek assistance from the police, the Lagos State Ministry of Social Welfare, the Office of the Public Defender, numerous NGOs, churches/mosques, and community leader, and with it being possible to seek counselling from traditional rulers, priests, and pastors. As the Appellant lives in Lagos I also accept in her regard, from the CPIN (2.5.1), which states that the police in Nigeria are generally willing and able to provide protection in similar circumstances to the Appellant.

…

I find, in a context where the Appellants remained in the UK under the false cover of a fabricated asylum claim, that the (sic) such private and family life as the Appellants have established since 2021 in the UK would not suffer a disproportionate interference upon their return to Nigeria as could amount to a breach of Article 8.”

Permission to appeal to Upper Tribunal

12. The Appellants applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

13. Permission was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on the following grounds:
1. Credibility Assessment and Reference to Background Evidence (Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, and- The grounds highlight that the Judge failed to adequately reference and consider the background evidence, particularly the 2022 CPIN on FGM in Nigeria. The appellant’s account appears on the face of it detailed and consistent with the background evidence, but the Judge arguably inadequately links his findings to the broader context provided in the CPIN. This could be considered a failure to assess credibility holistically, as required by R (Iran), which mandates a structured and rational approach to credibility that accounts for the wider factual matrix.
2. Risk of FGM and Police Protection (Grounds 3, 8, and 9):- The CPIN acknowledges that Nigeria’s legal framework against FGM is inconsistently applied, with police often treating it as a private family matter and rarely intervening. It is arguable the Judge dismissed the appellant’s claim of insufficient protection without properly engaging with this evidence. In addition the appellant’s claim that relocation would be difficult, especially as a single mother with limited support, aligns with the CPIN’s findings on the challenges women face when attempting to flee FGM, including lack of shelters and economic support.
3. Inadequate Consideration of the Appellant’s Vulnerabilities (Grounds 9 and 10):- The Judge’s findings on relocation and sufficiency of protection arguably overlook the vulnerabilities highlighted in the CPIN, particularly for single mothers with children at risk of FGM. The appellant’s evidence of cultural and societal pressures, as well as the lack of practical support mechanisms in Nigeria, arguably was not adequately addressed.
4. Potential Error of Law in Approach to Credibility and Risk Assessment:- The grounds argue persuasively that the Judge placed undue weight on perceived inconsistencies in the appellant’s narrative without adequately engaging with the background evidence that supports her claims. This may amount to a material error of law, as the approach undermines the credibility analysis and the risk assessment.
Rule 24 response

14. On 9 January 2025, the Respondent filed a Rule 24 response which stated:

…

2. The Respondent opposes the Appellant’s appeal. It submits that the Judge of the First-tier Tribunal directed himself appropriately.

3. The grounds of appeal cite several passages from the background evidence relating to the risk of FGM faced by young females in the event of their return to Nigeria. The appellant claimed the children’s father was in the USA and his mother, who is said to have malicious intentions towards the appellant and her daughters, is unidentified.

4. Evidence of the prevalence of a practice which is harmful to children does not establish a risk of FGM in an individual case. In this case, the potential threat of infliction of FGM on the appellant’s daughters comes from her claimed husband and/or his unidentified mother. Neither of these parties can be said to pose a real risk of the infliction of harm on the appellant or her daughters.

5. The grounds of appeal do not identify an error in law in the determination.

…

Upper Tribunal hearing and submissions

15. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. We had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellant.

16. We heard submissions from Miss Record for the Appellant and Mr Wain for the Respondent, which we have fully taken into account.

17. Miss Record argued that the Appellant gave a detailed account of her circumstances at the hearing despite being ‘distraught’, and any inconsistencies are a consequence of her failing a ‘memory test’. She pointed to the ‘strong language’ used by the Judge at [112] and [178] of the Decision and argued that it appears that the lower standard of proof had not been applied.

18. Mr Wain contended that the Judge properly assessed the credibility of the Appellant’s account and concluded that her asylum narrative was fabricated. The Judge noted that the Appellant could have provided evidence to substantiate her claims in relation to AU being her partner and father of the children, for example, a marriage certificate and birth certificates, but did not do so. Further, the Judge referred to and considered the Country policy and information note: female genital mutilation (FGM), Nigeria, July 2022 (‘the CPIN’) throughout the Decision in assessing the Appellant’s claim. He was not satisfied that the Appellant was in a relationship with AU and rejected the claim that the children were at risk of FGM from AU’s mother. These findings were open to the Judge to make on the evidence before the Tribunal.

Decision on error of law

19. Having carefully considered the oral submissions made to the Tribunal and the relevant parts of the Decision, we have concluded for the reasons that follow that the Decision does not contain a material error of law and shall stand.
20. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of its reasoning: In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055 (‘Ullah’) Green LJ, with whom Lewison and Andrews LJJ agreed, stated at [26]:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
21. We remind ourselves of the limited circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge, who saw and heard the Appellant give her evidence. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48 (‘Volpi’) Justice Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]-[5]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Ground 1 - Credibility Assessment and Reference to Background Evidence
22. The Judge’s reasons for rejecting the appeal turned on his assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s asylum narrative which he found to be ‘fabricated’ largely for reason that AU and his mother are ‘fictitious characters’. The Judge listened to the Appellant give her oral evidence, including under cross-examination, and we accord due deference to his findings, including in relation to the credibility of the Appellant’s account. In SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160, Green LJ explained at [44]:
“All of this explains why first instance judges need carefully to assess credibility and why appellate courts will accord due deference to the fact finder who is experienced in sifting evidence of this sort. But it also explains why an appellate court needs to be able to satisfy itself that the fact finder has at least identified the most relevant pieces of evidence and given sufficient reasons (which might be quite concise) for accepting or rejecting it. “
23. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713 at [58], the Court of Appeal cited these observations with approval.
24. Having carefully considered the Decision, we find the Judge’s reasoning is intelligible and adequate to support his negative credibility findings and his rejection of the Appellant’s core account.
25. The Decision contains cogent reasons based on the evidence for the overall conclusion he reached that the claim put forward by the Appellant could not be believed to the lower standard of proof. In assessing the credibility of the Appellant’s account, the Judge references the CPIN and notes that the Appellant is not from a social and educational background that would support FGM (at [145] and [155]). Further reference is made by the Judge to the CPIN which states that grandmothers can be instigators of FGM. However, having found that both AU and his mother were ‘fictious characters’, it was open to the Judge to conclude that the Appellant’s asylum narrative had been ‘constructed around this isolated feature in the objective evidence’ (at [156]).
26. We conclude that there is no material error of law identified in respect of Ground 1. The authorities that we have cited make clear that mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision is not sufficient to enable us to do so. Whilst Miss Record made submissions to us which were clear, we are unable to agree that such submissions show any discernible error of law in the Judge’s decision. The Judge was unarguably entitled to reach the decision which was reached.
Ground 2 - Risk of FGM and Police Protection
27. The challenge to how the Judge considered this evidence amounts to the suggestion that he was bound to engage with certain parts of the CPIN, and that his reasoning in rejecting the existence of risk was inadequate and therefore vitiated by unlawfulness.
28. The Judge was not required to subject the CPIN to a line-by-line analysis. The touchstone for considering adequacy of reasoning as an error of law is the Court of Appeal’s judgment R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 192; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535. Brooke LJ emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached at [13]-[14]. It follows that reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which were material to the reasoning have been articulated.
29. We are satisfied that the Judge’s reasons were perfectly clear in setting out why he was not satisfied that the Appellant’s account lacked credibility, and why he reached the conclusion that there was a not a reasonable degree of likelihood or real risk that the second, third and fourth Appellants would be persecuted or suffer serious harm on return to Nigeria. As the Judge did not accept the Appellant’s core asylum narrative, he did not need to consider internal relocation. Although it was unnecessary for him to do so, the Judge considered whether the Appellant would have access to family and social support to facilitate her accessing protection from the Nigerian authorities. He referred to the CPIN which states that it is possible for women seeking protection from forced FGM ‘to turn to state actors and civil society organisations, as well as religious institutions’ and that ‘the police in Nigeria are generally willing and able to provide protection’ (at [175]). This unarguably shows that the correct legal test and correct background material were properly considered by the Judge in coming to the decision that was reached.
30. We find that this ground of appeal does not reach the standard for interference with findings of fact and credibility outlined in Ullah and Volpi.
Ground 3 - Inadequate Consideration of the Appellant’s Vulnerabilities
31. As the Judge did not accept the Appellant’s core asylum narrative and found that there was a not a reasonable degree of likelihood or real risk that the second, third and fourth Appellants would be persecuted or suffer serious harm on return to Nigeria, he did not need to make findings on relocation and sufficiency of protection. It follows that he was not required to consider the vulnerabilities for single mothers with children at risk of FGM detailed in the CPIN. In any event, there was a sufficiency of protection and internal relocation was a viable alternative.
Ground 4 - Potential Error of Law in Approach to Credibility and Risk Assessment
32. For the reasons outlined above in relation to Ground 1, we find the Judge’s reasoning is intelligible and adequate to support his negative credibility findings and his rejection of the Appellant’s core account, and his conclusion that there was a not a reasonable degree of likelihood or real risk that the second, third and fourth Appellants would be persecuted or suffer serious harm on return to Nigeria. There is simply no discernible material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
33. Therefore, whilst Miss Record has said all she could on behalf of the Appellants, we are unable to agree with her. There is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
34. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 14 October 2024 did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decisions dismissing each of the Appellant’s appeals shall therefore stand.

Linda Kirk
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 7 April 2025