Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005770

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57241/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUTH

Between

ES
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Georget of Counsel, instructed by Morgan Pearse Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. We have decided to make an anonymity order because the underlying claim involves international protection and trafficking issues. In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but are satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of her identity.
2. Both members of the panel contributed to this decision.
3. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 21 June 2024, of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bartlett (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
Background
4. The procedural background and immigration history which led to the appeal proceedings are not in dispute between the parties. The essence of the protection claim is that the appellant, having been accepted by the competent authority to be a victim of human trafficking in Albania and Belgium, asserts she remains at risk of serious harm in Albania, including from her past traffickers, and of re-trafficking by them or others.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her international protection claim was heard by the judge on 13 June 2024 and dismissed on all grounds in a decision dated 21 June 2024. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the decision:
6. The judge summarised the appellant’s factual claims at [6]. She identified the issues in dispute as relating to the availability of sufficient protection, the internal relocation and Article 8 ECHR. Credibility was not in issue in the appeal.
7. In relation to sufficiency of protection, at [8] the judge cited background country information extracted from a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (AD & Ors v Sweden, 22283/21), relying partially upon it to conclude sufficient protection was available and that the conclusions in that background information were consistent with the Home Office Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN).
8. In reaching that conclusion, between [10] –[16] the judge took the view that the police involved in the drug enterprise in which the appellant had been working in Albania were rogue state actors and not indicative of the entire police force in Albania. She also considered the allegation that a nephew of an MP was involved in the drug enterprise in 2015 did not suggest insufficient state protection now, and she took the view the money borrowed by her father from moneylenders twenty years before was not a relevant factor. The judge concluded that the passage of time, efforts by the Albanian authorities to improve their state protection mechanisms and fight against corruption and the fact that no serious harm had come to her family members, despite alleged threats, suggested protection was available to the appellant. The judge noted the appellant had not sought state protection and concluded she could do so and it would be sufficient.
9. In considering the availability of internal relocation and sufficient protection further, from [17] the judge noted that the appellant suffers from mental health problems and has experienced suicidal ideation. She took the view that the appellant would not be a lone female returning to Albania and that she does have family support. Relying on the key country guidance case of TD and AD (trafficked women) Albania CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), the judge, concluding that her enemies would not be able to trace her outside her home area, took the view there were a number of places to which the appellant could reasonably relocate.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on three grounds:
• Ground 1 – the judge did not provide legally adequate reasons to conclude the police involved in the drug enterprise and seen by the appellant were merely rogue state actors, such that she could seek protection from the authorities more widely. Particularly in the context of the apparent power of the traffickers, working across international borders, their links to an MP and the fact her own aunt was complicit in her trafficking, meaning she did not in fact enjoy family support, the findings of the judge to the contrary were said to be against the evidence and insufficiently reasoned.
• Ground 2 – the judge had failed properly to assess the risk of re-trafficking, particularly given the the flawed finding she enjoyed family support and the appellant’s undisputed mental health issues.
• Ground 3 – the judge had acted inappropriately in relying upon background country information taken from an ECHR decision to which she had not been referred by the parties and to which no reference had been made at the hearing. The appellant had not had an opportunity to make submissions on the background country information relied upon and the judge had not specified which of the country reports to which she had been referred at the hearing were relied upon. Had the appellant known of the information, she would have submitted it was not relevant to her claims and should not have been relied upon by the judge.
11. The First-tier Tribunal having refused permission to appeal on 4 December 2024, permission was granted on all grounds by Upper Tribunal Judge Meah on 17 January 2025.
12. At the error of law hearing, we heard oral submissions from both parties, during which Mr Georget provided some additional nuance to the grounds as initially advanced. We address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
13. Taking grounds 1 and 2 together, we do not find there is any merit in Mr Georget’s submissions that the judge’s reasoning was irrational or inadequate as to the availability of state protection or the risk of re-trafficking, either in relation to the question of rogue state actors, the alleged power of the criminal gang or the appellant’s family support. We deal also with the question of her mental health in the context of a risk of re-trafficking, and the risk from moneylenders, as set out in the written grounds.
14. As for the question of whether or not the evidence suggested the police involved in the cannabis farming operation and the links to an MP meant that the officials so involved were more than rogue state actors, or their involvement suggested a particularly powerful criminal gang from which the appellant could not expect sufficient protection, as suggested by Mr Georget in submissions, we do not agree.
15. The key country guidance case, TD & AD, which the judge was bound to follow absent any cogent body of evidence requiring her to depart from it, clearly sets out the context in which the accepted facts had to be assessed, for example at paragraph [119]. Even in the context of official corruption and links between police, other state actors and criminal elements in Albania, significant steps have been taken to address those issues. In general, subject to the risk factors identified, the criminal justice system, including the police force, does function to a level sufficient to provide a reasonable level of state protection for victims of trafficking and those at risk of re-trafficking to the standard established in Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37.
16. In those circumstances, the fact that the appellant saw close police involvement in the cannabis farm and that there may have been a link to the family member of an MP, as well as the international links of this particular gang, does not displace the guidance in the country guidance case. It was open to the judge to conclude the police involved in the cannabis farm where the appellant worked were indeed rogue state actors, despite links to an MP and international reach. In reaching her finding, the judge took into account that despite the appellant’s claim that police officers had been involved with the criminal gang, it was also the appellant’s case that she had escaped from the gang after the police stopped one of the gang’s vans which was transporting drugs: see [10]. This, the judge found, suggested that not all of the police were involved. Furthermore, she took into account that these events had taken place nine years earlier and the objective evidence suggested that Albania had made considerable strides since then to tackle corruption. We also note that the appellant’s claim as recorded at [14] that her mother and sister had not come to any harm because her sister was under house arrest for hitting a pedestrian further suggests that the police were a deterrent to the gang.
17. We do not accept the criticisms of the judge at paragraphs [8] and [9] of the grounds. These were that recent developments could not shed light on the credibility of the appellant’s concerns about police corruption in 2015 or the reasonableness of not seeking protection more widely, given the power of the criminal gang. The judge at [10] was not making credibility findings, but commenting upon the availability of sufficient protection in the light of the undisputed account put forward by the appellant and the background country information.
18. We are therefore satisfied that it was open to the judge to conclude, particularly in the light of the country guidance case, that sufficient protection could be available from the police and criminal justice system more generally. Her decision was not irrational and was one open to her on the evidence before her (putting aside our discussion on ground 3 below).
19. We are also satisfied that the judge made reasoned and rational findings about why the money lenders would no longer pose a risk to the appellant. Contrary to what the grounds of appeal assert, the judge did not make that finding solely on the basis of the passage of time. As well as the fact that the money was borrowed 20 years previously, which in our view was a valid point to take, the judge took into account that the appellant’s brother had been abducted in 2012 at [6(a)] but that he had been released without harm and with no ransom having been paid; at [6(b)] that the appellant had given “imprecise” evidence about the threats she claimed her family received in Tirana; and, at [6(e)], the judge took into account that the appellant was able to live in Albania for four years and go to university after she escaped from the drugs gang. While [13] notes the lack of problems faced by the appellant during that time, and the lack of harm that had come to her mother and sister, from the drugs gang, it is implicit that there was also no problem from the money lenders.
20. The appellant also argues that the judge erred when finding that she has a family support network in Albania by failing to take into account her evidence that her aunt collaborated with the drugs gang. Again, we are not satisfied that the judge’s findings are irrational or unreasoned. At [6(c)], the judge had regard to the appellant’s evidence that because of her family’s financial problems, she “decided to become involved in cannabis farming”. We note that the appellant does not appear to disagree with that description. Furthermore, the judge notes that the appellant’s “aunt arranged for her to work with a criminal enterprise who carried out this farming.” The judge was therefore aware that the aunt had links to the gang. At [19(g)], the judge found that the appellant’s support network in Albania includes “her mother, some siblings but also wider family which includes her aunt who supported her while she was at university”. There was a brief debate at the hearing before us as to whether this is the same aunt who arranged for the appellant to work for the drugs gang. It remains unclear. Nevertheless, we find that whether it is the same aunt is immaterial. If it was the same aunt, then given that the appellant was able to live with her following her escape from the drugs gang and while she went to university suggests that the aunt did not pose a risk of re-trafficking her. Alternatively, if it was a different aunt, then the appellant was able to safely live with her in the past. In either event, the judge was rationally entitled to find that she could turn to the aunt, amongst other relatives, for support again in the future.
21. In relation to the risk of re-trafficking and mental health, the judge specifically set out the risk factors identified in the leading country guidance case of TD & AD, from [19] and directly addressed the appellant’s mental health concerns at [19(c)], concluding that although this would make her access to sufficient protection more difficult, it was not an ”over riding inhibiting” factor.
22. In the light of the appellant’s evidence regarding her mental health, including that she had previously been able to access treatment for this in Albania, and the risk factors set out in TD & AD, this was a finding open to the judge and well within the range of reasonable conclusions she could reach on the issue.
23. In relation to the ground 3, Mr Georget argued, essentially, that there had been procedural unfairness in this matter because the judge had relied on AD & Ors v Sweden, not as caselaw setting a legal precedent, but cited as evidence relating to country conditions which had not been provided to her by the parties, and which had been relied upon without giving the parties an opportunity to make submissions on it. Indeed, the country background information set out in AD & Ors v Sweden was the only such information directly cited by the judge, who did not specify which passages of the CPIN reports, to which she had been referred at the hearing, she had considered and why they were consistent with the information she had cited. Mr Georget submitted that the appellant should have had the opportunity to distinguish the country information relied upon, since it dealt with the situation of a police officer who did not know who his enemies were, rather than a victim of trafficking who did. Denying her that opportunity was, it was argued, unfair and material to the outcome.
24. It is in paragraph [8] of the decision that the judge refers to background country information taken from a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, published on 7 May 2024; AD & Ors v Sweden. She cites seven paragraphs of the ECHR decision, which include country background information relevant to the availability of sufficient state protection. She acknowledges that the parties were not made aware of it or given an opportunity to comment upon it, but takes the view they would be expected to know about it in any case.
25. While there could be absolutely no objection at all to the judge citing a decision of the ECHR providing persuasive legal guidance on a point of law, Mr Georget’s point was that it is another thing to rely on evidence as to the situation on the ground in Albania and the availability of sufficient state protection, which was unknown to the parties and on which they did not have an opportunity to make any submissions. We note, however, that the judge did make reference to the ‘objective reports to which I have been referred’ at paragraph [9] and these included at least two CPIN documents at the hearing: CPIN: Actors of Protection, December 2022 and CPIN: Human Trafficking, February 2023. The judge was also referred to other background reports, including the US State Department Human Rights Report on Albania of 2022 and several country guidance cases. The fact that the judge did not quote these reports extensively does not mean that she did not take them into account and we note again that she clearly dealt with risk factors set out in the leading country guidance case of TD and AD.
26. Furthermore, even if referring to country background information cited in a decision of the ECHR without given the parties an opportunity to address it was an error, it was not a material error in our view. Given our conclusions above, the consideration of the availability of internal relocation by reference to the relevant factors in TD & AD at [19] was adequate. Any error by the judge in relation to her assessment of the availability of sufficient state protection does not undermine the reasoning in relation to the availability of internal relocation. On that basis, any error by the judge in assessing sufficiency of state protection was not material to the outcome.

Notice of Decision
We find that the decision of Judge Bartlett did not contain a material error of law.
We dismiss the appeal brought by the appellant.
The original decision stands.

Evan Ruth

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 April 2025