Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005778

On appeal from PA/50268/2024
LP/02958/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

EL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant before the
First-tier Tribunal

Claimant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent before
the First-tier Tribunal

Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Wain, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr J Gajjar, instructed by Sediqui & Sediqi Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 14 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Claimant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Claimant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Claimant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

The parties may apply on notice to vary this Order

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. Even though it is the Secretary of State who brings this appeal, we shall refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal and refer to EL in our decision as the ‘Claimant’.
2. The Claimant had appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 20 December 2023 to refuse her international protection claims made on 16 April 2021.
3. In a decision which was promulgated on 29 October 2024, following a hearing in the First-tier Tribunal on 29 July 2024, Judge Lewis (‘the Judge’) dismissed the Claimant’s appeal.
4. On 17 December 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes granted the Claimant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
Anonymity
5. We consider that it is appropriate to maintain the anonymity order made by the First tier Tribunal in light of the circumstances of the Claimant’s protection claim. No party asked for it to be set aside.
Background
6. The Claimant is a citizen of Albania and is aged 30 years. After completing a degree and a Masters degree, and having struggled to find a job, the Claimant began work as a seamstress, arranged by a person, ‘E’, to whom she had been introduced by friends. E subsequently offered the Claimant a job in Italy, and on 22 June 2018 she flew to Florence. In Italy she was made to work as a cleaner in a hotel and otherwise locked in her accommodation at night. After a few weeks, E began to organise fake Italian identification documents with a view to the Claimant travelling to the United Kingdom (‘UK’). On 11 July 2018 the Claimant flew to the UK using a forged Italian identification document. Fearing that she was being trafficked for the purposes of prostitution, and having befriended two Italians on the flight, the Claimant left the airport with them instead of meeting associates of E as arranged.
7. On 16 April 2021, the Claimant was served with Illegal Entry: Entry Without Leave papers. On the same day she lodged an application for international protection. On 19 April 2021 the Claimant was referred under the National Referral Mechanism to the Competent Authority to assess whether or not she was trafficked.
8. On 6 July 2021, the Claimant gave birth to twin daughters.
9. The Claimant’s claim for international protection was refused by the Respondent on 23 December 2023. In evaluating her claim, the Respondent accepted that the Claimant was a victim of trafficking.
First-tier Tribunal decision
10. The Claimant appealed against the Respondent’s decision and the appeal came before the Judge on 29 July 2024.
11. It was common ground between the parties that the Claimant was deceived in Albania so as to induce her to travel to Italy where she was exploited as a cleaner, and further that she was coerced into travelling to the UK where she reasonably likely would have been further exploited.
12. The basis of the Claimant’s protection claim was summarised in her Skeleton Argument as follows:
“The [Claimant] fears the traffickers that brought her to the UK and being re-trafficked again. She fears the stigma of being a single parent as she is not married and the stigma of having been trafficked to the UK.”
13. The Judge made the following findings at [21]:
(i) In general terms, I do not accept that it is reasonably likely that the [Claimant] is at risk of being re-trafficked in a similar manner to what happened in the past. I recognise that her apparent intelligence (a Masters degree) did not act as a prophylactic against being duped into exploitation the first time around. However, it seems to me virtually inconceivable – at least to the extent of not being remotely reasonably likely - that the [Claimant] would allow herself to be duped in a similar manner for a second time: I quite simply do not accept that it is remotely likely that she would be so naive in light of the experiences that she has had including, in her perception, a very near scrape with being forced into prostitution. Moreover, as a mother of two children, and having had the experiences that she has had, it seems to me wholly unlikely that she would set off on the sort of adventure to work abroad that might have been appealing to a recent graduate with no such ties.
(ii) Neither fearing the stigma of being a single parent, nor fearing the stigma of having been trafficked, is tantamount to a fear of persecutory treatment. Such matters may be relevant to issues such as relocation in a protection claim, or in respect of obstacles to integration in the context of an Article 8 claim, but I do not find anything in the evidence that supports the notion that any such stigmatisation crosses the threshold into persecution or Article 3 prohibited treatment.
14. The Judge noted the Claimant’s evidence that, although her parents are disapproving of the fact that she had children outside of marriage, they would not leave her ‘on the streets’. The Judge found at [22]:
“all other things being equal … the [Claimant] would have an effective support network to which to return that would provide both her and her twins with a basic standard of living as the base from which she can reintegrate into society. There is no reason to think that she cannot resume some old friendships.”
15. The Judge accepted that the Claimant may face difficulties on return and, having regard to subparagraph (b) of the headnote in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) (‘TD and AD’), he was mindful that the Claimant had experienced anxiety and had sought treatment in the UK. However, there was no up-to-date medical evidence to suggest that she was ‘in any way significantly limited in cognitive or physical function.’ Given the Claimant’s intelligence and the ‘likely acceptance and support of her family’ the Judge was ‘not persuaded that it ha[d] been shown that there would be any insurmountable obstacles to integration’ (at [23]).
16. Accordingly, the Judge found that ‘the real issues in the case become the extent to which the [Claimant] is at risk of harm from E or any of his associates, or otherwise of forced trafficking’ which given the Judge had rejected the notion that the Claimant would be ‘duped again’, ‘would necessarily involve abduction’ (at [24]). In this regard, the Judge stated at [25]:
“As regards forced abduction, I am not persuaded that anything in the country information indicates that there is not in place mechanisms of state protection against such conduct. Whilst such mechanisms of protection cannot guarantee safety – just as an effective law enforcement system in the UK does not guarantee that some persons will be victims of violent crime – they do operate to defeat a claim for international surrogate protection in accordance with the principles in Horvath. In this context it is to be noted that the country guidance provided by TD and AD in respect of re-trafficking is very much premised on whether or not an individual is going to be vulnerable to exploitation and/or coercion – for example by reason of vulnerabilities relating to mental health or economic circumstances – and are not in anyway predicated on there being a reasonable likelihood of being kidnapped.”
17. The Judge stated that he was ‘troubled’ by what the Claimant had claimed in respect of her risk of harm from E (at [26]). He explained at [27]:
“It is accepted by the Respondent that the [Claimant] was trafficked by E and his associates. As such, even if E perhaps does not have much financially invested in the [Claimant], and as such may not have made any particular loss beyond the cost of arranging her documents and travel to the UK, the [Claimant] is somebody who has evaded E (and as such might need to be made an example of), and is a witness to E’s criminal activity - which E might perceive as potentially damaging to him. I cannot dismiss entirely the possibility that E might wish to visit harm on the [Claimant].”
18. The Judge noted that the Claimant’s evidence was that she had made contact with her parents since she had been in the UK (at [28]) and they had reported her circumstances to the police on one occasion (at [29]). He noted however that it was ‘to some extent unsatisfactory’ that she had not provided any supporting testimony from her parents (at [30]). Despite this, the Judge was ‘inclined to take the [Claimant’s] observation in this regard at face value’ and noted that the Respondent had ‘otherwise in substance treated the [Claimant] as a credible witness – in accepting that she was indeed a victim of trafficking’ and found ‘the likelihood of E making contact with the [Claimant’s] family seems entirely possible’ (at [30]).
19. The Judge found it ‘entirely plausible that the [Claimant’s] parents would only have reported E’s visits to the police once, ‘notwithstanding that there had been repeated visits’ (at [31]). He considered that it would not be remarkable ‘either E or any of his associates being canny enough to make no more than a simple enquiry’ as to the Claimant’s whereabouts which ‘might carry an unspoken element of threat or intimidation without crossing over into any form of criminal behaviour’ and, in the absence of any other evidence and the Claimant being abroad, ‘there would be nothing for the police to act upon’ (at [31]). He considered it ‘understandable’ that the Claimant’s parents ‘having … been offered no meaningful assistance from the police’, might not approach the police again as ‘they would have nothing concrete to report to the police beyond somebody visiting asking after their daughter’ (at [31]). In these circumstances the Judge found (at [32]) that he could not
“… put out of consideration that there is a real prospect that E and/or his associates might seek out the [Claimant] with a view to doing her harm - whether for reasons of punishment, vengeance, or intimidation. Further, given what was said in AM and BM (trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) at paragraphs 186-187 … with regard to the ability to trace people in Albania … that such a risk to the [Claimant] would continue even if she were to relocate away from her family home.”
20. The Judge further noted ‘the evidence of interlinking between criminal gangs and some parts of the apparatus of state protection’ and found he could not ‘put out of consideration the possibility that there would be no effective state protection were E to assault or threaten the [Claimant]’ (at [33]).
21. Accordingly, the Judge found ‘on this narrow basis’ that the Claimant had established her protection claim and allowed the appeal (at [34]). The Judge also allowed the Claimant’s appeal under Article 8 (at [35]).
Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal
22. The Respondent applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the following grounds:
(1) Findings on protection appeal - Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters / Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter.
(2) Article 8 - Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters / Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter.
23. Permission to appeal on both grounds was granted by the First-tier Tribunal.
Upper Tribunal hearing
24. We had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Claimant. We heard oral submissions from Mr Wain for the Appellant and Mr Gajjar for the Claimant, which we have fully taken into account.
Appellant
25. Mr Wain for the Appellant submitted that the Judge provided contradictory findings throughout the decision, finding no very significant obstacles, no fear of re-trafficking, that there is family support available, and a lack of evidence the Claimant’s parents have been threatened as claimed.
26. The Judge found that the Claimant would have the support of her family on return and an ‘effective support network’ that would provide her and the twins with ‘a basic standard of living as the base from which she can reintegrate into society’ (at [22]). This finding is at odds with the Judge’s findings that he could not ‘dismiss the possibility that E might wish to visit harm on the [Claimant]’ (at [28]), and that ‘there is a real prospect that E and/or his associates might seek out the [Claimant] with a view to doing her harm’ (at [32]). This relies on hypothetical scenarios and lacks the clarity expected of the Tribunal. Further, the Judge’s own conclusions rule out the possibility of forced abduction [24]-[25] and find the Claimant would have sufficiency of protection in the unlikely event such a situation may arise. In relation to sufficiency of protection, the Judge did not refer to the CPIN in the background materials.
27. The Judge’s reasoning at [27] is inadequate to support his finding that the Claimant is at continuing risk of harm from the previous trafficker, E. The Judge accepted the Claimant would have the support of family and friends on her return, has the right to seek sufficiency of protection from the authorities from future threats, and would have no need to avail herself of the sheltered accommodation provided by the authorities for former victims of trafficking. The Judge found at [27] that E does not have much financially invested in the Claimant, and as such may not have incurred any particular loss beyond the cost of arranging her documents and travel to the UK. The Judge’s subsequent findings fail to provide adequate reasons why E or his associates would seek to pursue the Claimant or wish her harm given such minimal losses are accepted.
28. The Judge’s findings at [31] are speculative and unclear and rely on the Claimant’s own evidence, unsupported by evidence which the Claimant could have readily obtained.
29. The Judge accepted the narrow basis on which the appeal succeeds and clearly found at [36] an application under Article 8 alone would not have been successful. This is a further example of the inconsistent and contradictory findings throughout the Decision.
30. The Judge erred materially in law in allowing the Claimant’s appeal and the Decision should be set aside.
Claimant
31. Mr Gajjar for the Claimant contended that the Judge’s decision is adequately reasoned. The grounds of appeal are an attempt to reargue the case.
32. The assessment relevant to TD and AD is not limited to whether a woman is likely to be re-trafficked by the same people who were responsible for the initial trafficking.
33. The Judge did not accept at [27] that E had no financial interest in wishing to harm the Claimant, and there are other reasons why E may wish to harm her.
34. The Judge’s findings on relocation at [32] were open to him.
35. The Judge found the Claimant’s account to be credible at [30]. She was honest about her parents going to the police and that the frequency of the visits by E decreased but did not cease.
Findings on error of law
36. We remind ourselves of the limited circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge, who saw and heard the Claimant give her evidence. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48, Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]-[5]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
Ground 1
37. Ground 1 relates to the Judge’s findings on the protection appeal and contends that he failed to give adequate reasons for findings on material matters, specifically to support his finding that the Claimant is at continuing risk of harm from the previous trafficker, E.
38. We have had regard to the authorities in relation to the adequacy of reasons and interference with factual findings. We refer to the observations of Dingemans LJ in Terghazi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm. A.R. 461 at [45]:
“A further principle which it is relevant to note is that, even if an appellate court is entitled to hear an appeal because of an error of fact (because the appeal court has jurisdiction to hear appeals on facts) appellate courts should be very cautious in overturning findings of fact made by a first instance judge. This is because first instance judges have seen witnesses and take into account the whole “sea” of the evidence, rather than indulged in impermissible “island hopping” to parts only of the evidence, and because duplication of effort on appeal is undesirable and increases costs and delay. Judges hearing appeals on facts should only interfere if a finding of fact was made which had no basis in the evidence, or where there was a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence so that the decision could not reasonably be explained or justified.”
39. The Judge found at [27] that E did not have much financially invested in the Claimant, and as such may not have incurred any particular loss beyond the cost of arranging her documents and travel to the UK. However, the Judge found that E and/or his associates may nevertheless seek the Claimant out with a view to causing her harm ‘whether for reasons of punishment, vengeance, or intimidation’ (at [32]). He also had regard to the guidance in AM and BM that the risk to the Claimant would continue even if she were to relocate away from her family home (at [32]).
40. We remind ourselves of the comments of Carnwath LJ in Mukarkar v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1045; [2007] Imm. A.R. 57 at [40] approved by the Supreme Court in MM (Lebanon) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 10; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 771 at [107] that:
“… It is of the nature of such judgments that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case … The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law, so as to justify an appeal under the old system, or an order for reconsideration under the new… However on the facts of a particular case the decision of a specialist tribunal should be respected”.
41. We are satisfied that the findings of fact were grounded in the evidence, adequately reasoned and rational and the Judge applied the law correctly. This ground of appeal amounts to no more than a disagreement with the decision.
Ground 2
42. Ground 2 relates to the Judge’s findings on material matters relevant to the Article 8 claim and contends that he failed to give adequate reasons for his finding in relation to obstacles to the Claimant’s reintegration in Albania.
43. The Judge found that the Claimant’s parents would accept her and her children ‘notwithstanding any disapproval’ in relation to her having children outside marriage, and there was no reason why she could not resume old friendships. He was therefore satisfied that she ‘would have an effective support network to which to return that would provide her and her twins with a basic standard of living’ and there was the base from which she could ‘reintegrate into society’ (at [22]). It followed that the Judge was ‘not persuaded that it ha[d] been shown that there would be any insurmountable obstacles to integration’ (at [23]).
44. We are satisfied that the findings of fact were grounded in the evidence, adequately reasoned and rational, and the Judge applied the law correctly. This ground of appeal amounts to no more than a disagreement with the decision.

Notice of Decision
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 29 October 2024 which had allowed the Claimant’s appeal did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Linda Kirk
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 11 April 2025