Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005779

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/59843/2023
LH/04422/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

YOTAM MICHAEL AHFEROM
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Bircumshaw, Solicitor, Central England Law Centre
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 1 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal promulgated on 25 October 2024, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of entry clearance of 14 July 2023. The decision of the First-Tier Tribunal was set aside by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Pickering by decision and reasons issued on 22 September 2025 (see annex below). A substantial number of the findings of the First-Tier Tribunal were preserved which for ease of reference I set out in the background below.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Eritrea born on 21 October 2005 and living in Ethiopia as a refugee. He was abducted by the Eritrean army in August 2021 and brought to Tigray, Ethiopia where he was made to cook for the Eritrean army. He escaped to a refugee camp and was registered by UNHCR as a refugee in December 2021. He applied by application of 9 June 2023, when he was 17, to join the sponsor, Muzit Michael, his half-sister, in the UK. The sponsor was recognised as a refugee in the UK, and no issue is taken about her eligibility in principle to sponsor the appellant under what was then Appendix CNP.
3. The respondent conceded that there was a valid TB certificate which had been an issue and the appellant conceded that the adequacy of maintenance requirements could not be satisfied. That latter meant that the requirements of paragraph CNP 3.2 could not be satisfied.
4. The issue so far as the immigration rules is concerned is whether CNP 3.3 or CNP 3.4 is satisfied. CNP 3.3 provides:
“CNP 3.3. Where an applicant does not meet the eligibility requirements of CNP.3.1. and CNP 3.2., the decision maker must consider whether a grant of permission to stay or entry clearance is appropriate based on exceptional circumstances which include where:
(a) the applicant has no parent with them; and
(b) the applicant has no family other than in the UK that could reasonably be expected to support them; and
(c) there is an existing, genuine family relationship between the applicant and the UK-based relative; and
(d) the applicant is dependent on the UK based relative.”
5. CNP 3.4 provides:
“CNP 3.4. Where the applicant does not meet the requirements in CNP 3.1. and CNP 3.2. and the decision maker is not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances under CNP 3.3. consideration must be given to whether refusal of the application would be a breach of Article 8 ECHR, because such a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family member, whose Article 8 rights it is evident from the information provided would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.”
6. The preserved facts found by the original First-Tier Tribunal Judge after hearing oral evidence were that:
a. The appellant’s father passed away in 2009;
b. The appellant does not have a parent with them in Ethiopia;
c. The appellant does not have contact with his mother;
d. The appellant had no family, other than his family in the UK who could support
him;
e. The appellant and sponsor had grown up together until the sponsor fled Eritrea
in November 2013. The Appellant was approximately 8 at the time;
f. The sponsor remained in contact with her family including the appellant by
telephone;
g. There was a period of approximately 3-4 months in 2021 when the appellant lost
contact with the sponsor because he was taken by the military;
h. Contact with the sponsor was re-established in October/November 2021;
i. In February 2022 the communication was through Viber.
The hearing
7. I heard evidence from the sponsor through an interpreter. I refer to the evidence as necessary below when analysing the case and coming to my conclusions.
8. After hearing evidence, I heard submissions from the representatives which I summarise.
9. Ms Simbi said that when considering whether Article 8 ECHR was engaged, I should consider IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 and find that there were no additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties. The sponsor had she submitted been quite open and honest and the appellant clearly had been dependent for the most part on the sponsor’s friend rather than the sponsor. There was contact between them, but they were normal enquiries, the appellant was in good health and did not need emotional support. The ties were simply the normal emotional ties between siblings. The sponsor had not elaborated on the appellant’s emotional ties with her children; there did not seem to be any particular evidence of a connective bond given the time they were apart. There were remittances, but they were few and far between. The sponsor was playing a part in his upkeep, but only a part. That did not show that there was family life between them. The appellant’s life in Ethiopia was not ideal, but that did not mean that there was anything beyond the normal emotional ties. Even looking from the perspective of the time of the decision, the appellant was a child but still living with the sponsor’s friend. The appellant and sponsor had already been separated, and dependency was still on the sponsor’s friend, rather than the sponsor. Ms Simbi submitted that Article 8 ECHR was not engaged.
10. Mr Bircumshaw submitted, following the case of Martinez Alvarado v The Netherlands (application no 4470/21) that I had to look at the position as if the appellant were still a child as he had been at the date of application and decision. Of course, as a young adult, dependency on the core family unit is assumed. In order for the case to succeed there needed to be some element of dependency, as clearly the relationship itself would not justify admission. Dependency, he submitted, needed to be understood widely, and in terms of the separation of the family. The sponsor and the appellant had been separated through no fault of their own, and the appellant had no family members to turn to but relied on his sister the sponsor. It was his sister who arranged for the family friend to support the appellant. He would submit that was the sponsor taking on the responsibility that the appellant was properly looked after. There was plenty of objective evidence which supported the contention that the appellant had good reasons for not feeling safe in Ethiopia. The only family the appellant could possibly live with was the sponsor and her family. We were required to think about the appellant as a minor child and in that context a very specific dependency should not be assumed. The question was really whether they formed a de facto family unit and had that core family relationship, particularly when there were no other family members able to provide support in the context of a sibling – adult/child context. Whilst he agreed he might be in some difficulty if I was considering family life in the context of a relationship between two adults, he submitted in the context of a child Article 8 (1) was engaged, and the test for dependency in the rules was met.
Discussion and findings
11. I found the evidence of the sponsor to be credible. She gave straightforward, clear answers to questions, and her answers were not exaggerated. She readily agreed that the last time she sent the appellant money was in May 2025 and that therefore it was her friend who had been the appellant’s predominant financial support since the summer.
12. I therefore am satisfied of the account the sponsor gave both in her witness statements and in oral evidence. I do not repeat the preserved facts; I find the other key details of the appellant and sponsor’s relationship are the following:
(i) The sponsor lived in the appellant’s family home in Eritrea with the appellant until she married in 2010. She returned to the family home (with her own children born in March 2012 and February 2013) to see her family regularly (as the family home was only 20 minutes away by bus) until she had to flee Eritrea in November 2013 to come to the UK where she obtained protection status;
(ii) The sponsor only discovered when making this application that the appellant is her half-brother rather than her full brother. On questioning her mother after the DNA test, she discovered that the appellant was the son of her father and her father’s mistress who abandoned the baby at the family home. At the time the sponsor’s mother was in hospital giving birth, but the baby died and so the sponsor’s parents decided to bring up the appellant as if he were the son of them both;
(iii) When the sponsor made contact with the appellant in October/November 2021 he was in the refugee camp in Tigray. He moved to Addis Ababa with other people in about January 2022 because of the fighting;
(iv) The appellant knew no-one to stay with in Ethiopia, so the sponsor asked around other Eritreans living in her area in the UK and a friend suggested a man named Haben who was 5 years older than the appellant. The sponsor then put Haben and the appellant in touch;
(v) The sponsor has remained in contact with a school friend Beriha. Beriha left Eritrea for Addis Ababa and when the sponsor discovered Beriha had reached Addis Ababa the sponsor put her in touch with the appellant and Haben. The appellant and Haben went to live with Beriha in 2022. Beriha is waiting for a visa to go to the USA to join her husband and meanwhile her husband sends money to support her. Beriha tells the sponsor that she does not need to worry about money for the appellant as her husband is sending money;
(vi) Haden left Addis Ababa for Uganda to avoid deportation to Eritrea. He left after he was caught by the authorities in September 2023 and was released only after payment of a bribe and told to leave Ethiopia;
(vii) The sponsor tried to send money to the appellant when she could but at the time of the application for entry clearance she was on benefits and had three children to support as a single parent. She is now working part-time. Up until the date of the application, she had sent £150 in June 2022, £200 in January 2023 and £200 in April 2023 for the appellant via friends travelling to Ethiopia. She sent £47 in September 2022 via Western Union to Haben for the appellant. After the date of the application, she sent £100 in September 2023, £100 in May 2024, £200 in January 2025 and £200 in May 2025 for the appellant via friends travelling to Ethiopia. At the date of the hearing £100 would usually last the appellant about a month;
(viii) The sponsor and appellant initially kept in touch using Haden’s phone and then Beriha’s phone, as the appellant did not have his own telephone until the sponsor sent him money to buy one. The appellant has had his phones stolen twice (most recently he was violently assaulted at the time his phone was stolen – the sponsor found out from Beriha as the appellant did not want to worry her) and the sponsor’s money has been used to replace them. The internet can be intermittent. The sponsor and the appellant communicate regularly, now it is daily or every other day depending on the sponsor’s work. The level of communication has been broadly the same since the appellant and sponsor got back in touch with each other;
(ix) In the past Beriha told the sponsor that the appellant was having nightmares. The sponsor has spoken to the appellant about the nightmares. She wished she could afford treatment for him, but she could not. Beriha has told the sponsor that the appellant is better now than he was before. The sponsor tries to boost the appellant’s morale and to support him emotionally. She tries to keep him positive. She tells him to stay at home and be safe. The appellant is well behaved, takes her advice and generally does what she asks of him. The appellant speaks to the sponsor about his case and asks when he will be joining her. He is longing to be reunited with her. He tells her that it is not easy always being at home and he wants to leave the house but he is scared to do so. The appellant finds being at home very stressful but he fears being arrested and he is not allowed to work or study.
13. Bearing in mind the preserved findings, the provisions of paragraph CNP 3.3 (a) and (b) were clearly met and the contrary was not suggested. The issue was whether CNP 3.3 (c) and (d) were met.
14. I discussed with the representatives what the approach to paragraph CNP 3.3 (c) should be. I said that looking at the relevant policies, I considered this was not the same test as for Article 8 (1) ECHR, rather that there was just a genuine family relationship (i.e. the appellant and sponsor are genuinely related) and the relationship is existing (so the fact of being related is itself not sufficient). The guidance in force at the time of application (“Child staying with or joining a non-parent relative (protection))” of April 2023 does not expand on the meaning of CNP 3.3 (c), although when referring to exceptional circumstances under Article 8 and relevant factors for the purposes of CNP 3.4, it refers to the evidence that the applicant and sponsor have a “genuine family life” together (p 17), a different phrase from “family relationship” which suggests that different concepts are in play in CNP 3.3 (c) from the concept of family life under Article 8 ECHR.
15. The immigration rules changed post-decision. The current guidance in force (of November 2025) relates to Appendix Child Relative (Sponsors with Protection). The wording of the similar paragraph in the current rules (CRP 4.1) is now “the decision maker must be satisfied that the applicant has an existing, genuine family relationship with their close relative in the UK.” The same phrase “existing, genuine family relationship” is used as in the immigration rules concerned in this appeal. The policy explains (at p 22):
“This requirement seeks to safeguard children by ensuring that the relationship with the close relative in the UK has not recently begun or fabricated for the purposes for facilitating an application submitted under Appendix CRP as well as ensure that the child is joining genuine family, rather than a stranger. For example, a child may be seeking to stay with or join a genuine close relative, their aunt, but not have a relationship with them. Conversely, a child may have a relationship with someone who they consider to be their aunt, but this may not be a genuine close relative relationship”.
16. With this interpretation in mind, I am satisfied that the requirements of paragraph CNP 3.3 (c) are met. The appellant and sponsor are genuinely family members, and I am satisfied that they have an existing relationship and had an existing relationship at the time of the application and decision. Against the background of having lived in a shared household and always being in contact except for a few months around the time of the appellant’s abduction, they are now communicating frequently, calling each other, sending each other messages and voice messages, and sending photographs.
17. There is no definition of dependency in the policies I have referred to. The only assistance is as to the relevant time I am looking at – the “child staying with or joining a non-parent relative (protection)” policy (p 16) makes clear that where a child reaches the age of 18, but is still not leading an independent life, the child must be considered as being under 18 as they were at the date of application.
18. It is entirely right that the appellant is not completely financially dependent on the sponsor and was not at the time of application. The sponsor frankly admitted that she was not meeting all his financial needs. However the immigration rules do not say “wholly dependent” or “wholly or mainly dependent”. They could have done. I consider that all the circumstances must be taken into account and the relationship must simply be one which fits the description of a relationship where the appellant is dependent on the sponsor.
19. I am satisfied that the appellant was at the date of the application and decision dependent on the sponsor so that the requirements of paragraph CNP 3.3 (d) were met for the following reasons taken together:
(i) Their relationship must be seen against the background of the appellant’s early childhood spent in the same family home as the sponsor, the sponsor visiting frequently even after she was married and keeping in contact even when she herself fled Eritrea and became a refugee. It is significant that the sponsor is 15 years older than the appellant; the sponsor’s two children born in Eritrea, the appellant’s first cousins, are closer to him in age than the sponsor;
(ii) Against that background the sponsor has directed the course of the appellant’s life much as a parent would since he has been in Addis Ababa. She found a suitable young man (Haben) to look out for him, and then organised for them to live with a friend of hers (Beriha);
(iii) The appellant and sponsor are in very regular communication. I find the appellant is emotionally dependent on the sponsor. The sponsor gives the appellant emotional support; she does her best to try to boost his morale and to keep him positive. He listens to her and in the main takes her suggestions. She is aware of what is stressing him. The sponsor has not visited the appellant, but I am satisfied this is simply due to her lack of funds and that she is a single parent rather than to the lack of bonds between them. It is right that the appellant does not tell the sponsor everything; for example, he did not tell her that he had been assaulted when his phone was stolen but I consider that this does not mean he is not emotionally dependent on the sponsor. It is like a relationship an older teenager might have with his mother; he is growing up and so does not tell her everything because he does not want to worry her, but that does not preclude there still being emotional dependency;
(iv) The sponsor provides money for the appellant to go towards his living costs (even though they are mainly met by Beriha via her husband) and to buy him items such as a phone. That Beriha provides most of the financial support for the appellant does not mean that he is only dependent on Beriha.
20. I am therefore satisfied that the requirements of CNP 3.3 are met. Although the wording of CNP 3.3 is ambiguous as to whether there might be other exceptional circumstances, the policy indicates (see p 16) that if the specific features of CNP 3.3 are met, that positively counts as exceptional circumstances within the meaning of paragraph CNP 3.3.
21. That means on my findings that the immigration rules are satisfied.
22. Although I found it helpful to consider CNP 3.3 first and I have found that the test for existing, genuine family relationship is different from the definition of family life under Article 8 (1) ECHR, I must consider whether there is family life between the meaning of Article 8 (1) between the appellant and sponsor. This is because the only ground of appeal is that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the first part of considering whether it is unlawful is to consider whether Article 8 (1) is engaged in a case such as this one where it is in dispute.
23. I conclude that I must look at the relationship at the time of the application and decision when the appellant was a minor rather than at the date of the hearing. I consider this follows from the decision of the Court of Human Rights in Martinez Alvarado at [45] – “when one of the family members was a minor at the time the request for family reunification was lodged, the Court will assess the question on the existence of “family life” based on the situation as it obtained on that date in order to avoid that a child ‘ages out’ pending the proceedings (see, for instance, El-Ghatet v. Switzerland, no. 56971/10, § 51, 8 November 2016, and Tanda-Muzinga v. France, no. 2260/10, § 74 in fine, 10 July 2014)”.
24. IA, on which Ms Simbi relied, held that to establish family life between adult siblings, they must demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties.” This contrasts with the test which it had been previously thought applied, of real, committed or effective support. Although the test is relevant to adult siblings and would not necessarily be appropriate for minor siblings who live together in the family home, it is difficult to see what other test could be used where one of the siblings is adult and the two do not live together.
25. I have explained above the elements of dependency. I consider that these are more than the normal emotional ties between siblings. Context is important. The sponsor would have continued the relationship she maintained with the appellant in Eritrea even after marriage had she not been forced to flee Eritrea as a refugee. Even then she still maintained contact with the appellant and the two were only out of contact for the few months when the appellant was abducted by the army. The sponsor has not just kept in regular contact with her brother, sent him money and given him emotional support, she has taken over the role of a parent in the appellant’s life, organising and directing whom he lives with and expecting him to behave as she tells him to. The sponsor is naturally extremely worried at the position the appellant finds himself in, living in precarious circumstances in Addis Ababa where despite being accepted as a refugee by UNHCR, background material shows that Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia can be refouled to Eritrea, a country where the appellant would be at risk of being abducted by the military as he was previously.
26. It is not fatal to the existence of family life that the appellant was not completely dependent on the sponsor at the time of application but was financially dependent on Beriha. In Martinez Alvarado, the Court of Human Rights explained that it did not follow from the case-law that exclusive dependency was always required in order to find that family life exists [49].
27. Of course if the appellant were looked at as an adult then as a person without any major health problems he would be seen as quite capable of organising his affairs himself now even though his sister sends money and provides emotional support and it would be more relevant that they last lived together when the appellant was a small child. However considering the appellant as he was at the date of application I find it highly significant, against the background of the appellant and sponsor retaining regular contact, that the appellant was on his own in Ethiopia in the sense of not having a parent or other family member with him, and he had no other family members who could support him. Against that background it was the sponsor who organised the appellant’s life as a parent would and provided emotional support and some financial support. In those circumstances I am satisfied that at the date of the application and decision, the appellant and sponsor had family life together within the meaning of Article 8 (1) ECHR.
28. There being family life between the appellant and sponsor at the relevant time, the decision being a significant interference with family life because it means the appellant and sponsor cannot live together, and the appellant satisfying immigration rules, following TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, the appeal is allowed.
29. I make no fee award as much more evidence has now been produced than was before the decision-maker and hearing from the sponsor was central to my findings.
Notice of Decision
On remaking the appeal is allowed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 February 2026

Annex

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005779

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/59843/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

YOTAM MICHAEL AHFEROM
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, of counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Thompson, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 9 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is an Eritrean Citizen born on 21 October 2005. He appeals with permission of the Upper Tribunal against the First-tier Tribunal dismiss his application for entry clearance to join his half sister in the UK who is a recognised Refugee.
Basis of the Appellant’s case
2. The Appellant is an Eritrean national living in Ethiopia as a refugee. He applied as a child under Appendix CNP to join his half sister who has protection status in the UK. At the time of the application the Appellant was 17 years old.
3. The Appellant’s father is deceased and his mother’s whereabouts is unknown. He was raised by the Sponsor’s mother as if he were her own child. In August 2021 the Appellant was kidnapped by the military and taken to a camp. The Appellant fled travelling to Hitsats Refugee Camp and registered with the UNHCR and then to Addis Ababa.
4. The Appellant has no income. He relies on handouts from friends and financial support from the Sponsor. He has no right to work or study in Ethiopia. He is living in shared accommodation with people he met on his journey.
5. By way of background the Sponsor fled to the UK from Eritrea in 2013. She was granted Refugee Status. The Sponsor has three child of her own. Two joined her through Family Reunion and a third child who is British, born in the UK.
The Respondent’s case
6. The Respondent’s position in the initial refusal decision was that the Appellant could not be accommodated adequately, that there were not suitable arrangements of the Appellant’s care and there were not serious and compelling circumstances that made exclusion undesirable. There were said not to be any exceptional circumstances that justified a grant of entry clearance.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
7. By the time the appeal had reached the First-tier Tribunal, the issues had been narrowed considerably.
8. It is recorded at §5 of the First-tier determination First-tier Tribunal [‘DFTT’] that it was agreed that the appellant is an Eritrean national (currently in Ethiopia) and related as half-brother to the sponsor, who had protection status and now has ILR in the UK. The suitability requirements are met; however, the appellant cannot meet the maintenance requirements at CNP3.2(a).
9. At §6 of the DFTT it records the A39 of the Immigration Rules [IR] had been conceded in relation to their being a valid TB certificate. It was also conceded that the Appellant could not satisfy the adequacy of maintenance requirements, that being CNP3.2.(a). The Respondent also accepted that the Appellant could not return to Eritrea and the decision was to maintain the status quo.
10. It was agreed between the parties that the issues that the First-tier Tribunal would need to resolve were at CNP3.1 to CNP3.3 of the IR.
11. The Judge heard oral evidence from the sponsor in addition to the submissions from the Parties. The Judge ultimately dismissed the appeal albeit they made the following findings:
a. The Appellant’s father passed away in 2009 [DFTT §14 (a)];
b. The Appellant does not have a parent with them in Ethiopia [DFFT §14 (a)];
c. The Appellant does not have contact with his mother [DFFT §14 (a)];
d. The Appellant had no family, other than his family in the UK who could support him [DFFT §14 (b)];
e. The Appellant and Sponsor had grown up together until the Sponsor fled Eritrea in November 2013. The Appellant was approximately 8 at the time [DFFT §14 (c)];
f. The Sponsor remained in contact with her family including the Appellant by telephone [DFFT §14 (c)];
g. There was a period of approximately 3-4 months in 2021 when the Appellant lost contact with the Sponsor because he was taken by the military [DFFT §14 (c)];
h. Contact with the Sponsor was re-established in October/November 2021 [DFFT §14 (c)];
i. In February 2022 the communication was through Viber [DFFT §14 (c)];
12. The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The Judge found that the Appellant had not demonstrated that there was an existing, genuine family relationship because there was very little documentary evidence of communication prior to 2022. The Judge was particularly concerned about the period of October/November 2021 when contact was reestablished. The Judge was troubled by the fact that the Sponsor had not visited the Appellant in Ethiopia. The Judge was not persuaded that the relationship between the appellant and sponsor is anywhere close to being beyond normal emotional ties between siblings [DFFT §14 (d)]. The Judge was not also satisfied that the Appellant was dependent upon the Sponsor.
Grounds of appeal
13. The grounds advanced ran to 6 paragraphs although the Upper Tribunal in the grant of permission synthesised application for permission to appeal into two grounds. I have adopted this structure for clarity.
14. Ground 1 advances that the Judge did not given sufficient reasons for concluding that the Appellant and the Sponsor did not have an existing, genuine family relationship. The grounds highlighted the failure to take into account material facts when coming to this conclusion and/or reconcile this finding against the other positive findings/unchallenged evidence.
15. Ground 2 advances that the Judge failed to take into consideration evidence when concluding that the Appellant had not demonstrated dependency.
The Error of Law Hearing
16. In relation to ground 1 I agree with Mr Thompson’s submission that it cannot be said that the determination does not contain reasons for findings. However, I was persuaded that in light of the positive findings made [recorded in my determination at §8, 9 and 11], the Judge has not sufficiently explained why they came to the conclusion that there was not an existing, genuine family relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor. There is no requirement, as other parts of the IR prescribe for specific evidence to be produced. I also accept that there was no attempt to impugn the Sponsor’s credibility on a fair reading of the determination and it it was not sufficiently articulated why the Judge was troubled by the lack of documentary evidence regarding contact in light of the evidence of the Sponsor. Therefore whilst this is a careful determination I accept that there finding made by the Judge that it had not been demonstrated that an existing, genuine family relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor is not sustainable. This is due to there not being sufficient reasons and/or a failure to reconcile this finding against the positive findings about the relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor.
17. In relation to ground 2 and the failure to take into account evidence that was relevant to the resolution of the issue of whether the Appellant was dependent on their UK based relative, it is well rehearsed within the jurisprudence that there is no requirement for a Judge to cite each piece of evidence in explaining why they have reached the findings that they have. However, in light of the positive findings made about the Appellant’s circumstances and the other evidence including the background information the Judge has not given sufficient reasons for concluding that the Appellant has not demonstrated dependency. The Sponsor had explained the circumstances of the Appellant in that he was unable to work/ineligible for support and that there was a risk of deportation [§17 of the Sponsor’s witness statement] which was supported by further background information it i
Disposal
18. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside due to an error of law.
19. I determination is set aside however with findings preserved. These are recorded at §8,9 and 11 of my determination. I did so as they are unchallenged.
20. I have directed myself to 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and this is not an appeal which would cause me to depart from the usual practice of the Upper Tribunal being the venue for the remaking of the decision.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved material errors of law. I set aside the decision with findings of fact preserved.
I make the following directions:
i. The matter is to be listed for a half a day on the first available date.   
ii. Within 14 days of the resumed hearing, the parties must upload to CE-File and directly serve on the other party any further evidence they intend to rely upon.  
iii. A Tigrinya interpreter is to be booked for the hearing. 

RA Pickering

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 September 2025