UI-2024-005897
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005897
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64099/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
15th May 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE
Between
CHAMAN SHAHZAD
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Khan, Parkview Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 8 April 2025
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. She applied for entry clearance to come to the UK as her children lived in the UK with their father. The entry clearance application was treated as a human rights claim. This claim was refused, and she appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. Her appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated 18 October 2024. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
2. The appellant applied for entry clearance under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules as a parent of children settled in the UK. The application was refused as the respondent decided that the appellant did not meet the eligibility financial requirements, and did not accept that there were exceptional circumstances that would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or her children.
3. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Mack on 9 October 2024. It was agreed by the parties before Judge Mack that the issues to be resolved were:
(i) Are the requirements of paragraph E-ECPT.3.1. of Appendix FM met?
(ii) Is the refusal decision a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR?
4. Judge Mack found against the appellant on both issues and dismissed the appeal.
5. The appellant appealed and First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner granted permission on the following terms:
The grounds assert that the Judge erred in misdirecting themselves in the application of GEN.3.1 of Appendix FM and failing to adequately address EECPT.3.1 in relation to whether third party can be considered when assessing adequate maintenance.
The Appellant refers to the reading of E-ECPT.3.1 and GEN.3.1 in conjunction with the Family Migration: Appendix FM and adult dependent relative – adequate maintenance and accommodation version 11.0. This indicates that third party support can be considered. As such, the Appellant has identified an arguable error of law and permission to appeal is granted.
6. Thus, the matter came before us to determine whether Judge Mack’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
The Hearing
7. Mr Khan relied upon the grounds and the skeleton argument. He focussed his submissions on the respondent’s guidance Family Migration: Appendix FM and Adult Dependent Relative - Adequate Maintenance and Accommodation (Version 11.0, 1 June 2023). He relied upon the reference in that document to “other sponsor”. Mr Khan submitted that the appellant was not relying upon third-party support, but on permitted financial support from an “other sponsor”, in this case the appellant’s cousin. Mr Khan also submitted that the judge’s Article 8 assessment was flawed as it was brief and unreasoned.
8. Ms Newton submitted that the judge had adequately dealt with Article 8. She highlighted that the appellant had not referred to Article 8 in the Appeal Skeleton Argument before the judge. She submitted that the appellant could not meet the Immigration Rules and so the appeal should be dismissed.
9. After hearing the submissions, we reserved our decision.
Discussion and Analysis
10. The Immigration Rule in dispute in this case states:
E-ECPT.3.1. The applicant must provide evidence that they will be able to adequately maintain and accommodate themselves and any dependants in the UK without recourse to public funds.
11. The appellant relies almost exclusively on the respondent’s guidance on this matter. The relevant section of Family Migration: Appendix FM and Adult Dependent Relative - Adequate Maintenance and Accommodation (Version 11.0, 1 June 2023) states:
The following sources of income of the applicant (in respect of employment or self-employment, only if they are in the UK with permission to work) or (as appropriate) their partner, parent, parent’s partner or other sponsor can be counted where an application under Appendix FM or Appendix Adult Dependent Relative has to meet the adequate maintenance requirement:… [emphasis added]
12. The appellant’s case is that “other sponsor” includes her cousin who will be financially supporting her if she were to come to the UK. Mr Khan submitted that we should interpret “other sponsor” in the guidance flexibly to allow parents from overseas to join children in the UK. It was his position that any other interpretation would lead to absurdity.
13. For the reasons we provide below, we are not able to agree with Mr Khan.
14. Appendix FM-SE of the Immigration Rules states:
12A. Where the financial requirement the applicant must meet under Appendix FM or under Appendix Adult Dependent Relative, Appendix HM Armed Forces, Appendix International Armed Forces and International Civilian Employees, Appendix Adoption or Appendix Child Relative (Sponsors with Protection), relates to adequate maintenance, paragraphs 2 to 12 apply only to the extent and in the manner specified by this paragraph. Where such a financial requirement applies, the applicant must provide the following evidence:
(a) Where the current salaried employment in the UK of the applicant or their partner, parent, parent’s partner or sponsor is relied upon:…
15. Thus, the Immigration Rules refer to “sponsor” and not “other sponsor.” However, there is no material difference in this regard. It is clear that the guidance is merely clarifying the difference between “partner, parent, parent’s partner” and others who may come within the Immigration Rules definition of “sponsor.”
16. Indeed, the Immigration Rules provide the following in the interpretation section:
“Sponsor” and “family sponsor”, in relation to a family member, means the person in relation to whom an applicant is seeking leave to enter or remain as their spouse, fiancé(e), civil partner, proposed civil partner, unmarried partner, same-sex partner or dependent relative, as the case may be, under paragraphs 277 to 295O or 317 to 319 or the person in relation to whom an applicant is seeking entry clearance or leave as their partner or dependent relative under Appendix FM.
17. This clearly demonstrates that, within the Immigration Rules, there is no “sponsor” in a parent application under Appendix FM.
18. Therefore, we find that the appellant’s reference to “other sponsor” in the guidance is erroneous and has no application to her claim.
19. Further, we conclude that, by relying on the financial support of her cousin, the appellant was seeking to rely on third-party support. It was accepted that the appellant was precluded under the Immigration Rules from relying on third-party support. The Exceptional Circumstances section of Appendix FM, GEN.3.1.(1), which permits third-party support in certain limited situations, does not apply to parent applications such as these (i.e., those relying on E-ECPT.3.1. to 3.2.).
20. The fact that there is no “sponsor” in a parent application and that the applicant can only rely on income earned in the UK makes entry clearance applications in this category difficult is no basis to permit third party support. In any event, as we pointed out to Mr Khan, cash savings can be relied upon. In addition, a suitably evidenced gift of cash savings if they have been held by the applicant for at least six months prior to the date of application and are under their control can also be used.
21. Furthermore, there also remains the possibility of reliance on Article 8 ECHR which will apply where there are exceptional circumstances that would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for an applicant or their child(ren).
22. Therefore, we find that the judge did not err in law in relation to her interpretation of the Immigration Rules, and we conclude that the appellant does not meet the requirements of paragraph E-ECPT.3.1. of Appendix FM.
23. We also find that the judge did not err in her assessment of Article 8 as to whether they were exceptional circumstances that would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or her children.
24. The judge’s decision in relation to Article 8 is contained in paragraphs 24 to 26. It clearly and succinctly dealt with matters adequately.
25. It is of note that the Appellant Skeleton Argument that was before the judge did not identify Article 8 as an issue (the only issue listed is “Eligibility Financial requirement E-ECPT 3.1 TO 3.2”) and there are no submissions made within it as regards Article 8. Contrary to this, the respondent did address Article 8 in the decision letter and in the Review. Therefore, the judge having dealt with Article 8 in a succinct manner is wholly appropriate.
26. We note too that the appellant’s witness statement before the judge amounted to just the following six paragraphs:
1. I am Ms Chaman Shazad resident of Pakistan. My date of Birth is 08 September 1993.
2. I am a Pakistani national.
3. I make these statements in support of my appeal against the decision to refuse my application for entry clearance to the UK as the parent of children who are in the UK.
4. My application was refused on the basis of relying on third party support to meet the financial requirement.
5. I confirm that my cousin, Azmat Ali is my financial sponsor and is able to adequately maintain me in the UK for as long as required.
6. My sponsor has provided all the necessary documentation to evidence he is able to maintain me financially and accommodate me.
27. There was no real evidence and certainly no argument before the judge that the appellant was relying on any exceptional circumstances to demonstrate that the refusal of entry clearance would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for her or her children.
28. The appellant had submitted that she met the requirements of E-ECPT.3.1.. Therefore, once the judge rejected the appellant’s arguments regarding the Immigration Rules consequently it was entirely permissible for her to deal with the Article 8 issues in suitably succinct terms.
29. It is of note that the Article 8 challenge in the grounds to the Upper Tribunal are as follows:
By focusing incorrectly on GEN.3.1, the Tribunal failed to properly apply the correct legal framework in assessing proportionality under Article 8. The Appellant's relationship with her settled child in the UK, and the financial and accommodation support provided by a close family member (not her ex-husband as wrongfully stated in the determination), should have been assessed under E-ECPT.3.1. The misdirection led to an incorrect conclusion that the Appellant failed to meet the requirements of the rules, and the proportionality assessment under Article 8 was therefore flawed.
30. Once again, the focus is on the basis (which we have rejected) that the judge misdirected herself in relation to the Immigration Rules, with the assertion that the appellant meets Immigration Rules and so the proportionality assessment under Article 8 was thereby said to be flawed. However, the appeal was dismissed (correctly) in respect of the Immigration Rules.
31. There is no submission in the grounds that there are exceptional circumstances or that there would be any unjustifiably harsh consequences. There is no submission in the grounds that the judge failed to address all the material factors relied upon by the appellant.
32. Mr Khan’s skeleton argument submitted in brief terms that the judge failed to properly weigh the best interests of the children under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 and that the judge to failed to properly engage with the separation impact on the child.
33. However, the judge specifically considered section 55 and made clear that she had weighed all the relevant factors. Mr Khan’s skeleton argument is therefore incorrect. The judge was well aware that this was an entry clearance application with the appellant in Pakistan and the children in the UK. Aa situation seemingly consented to by the appellant as the children had left the appellant in Pakistan and joined their father (the appellant’s ex-husband) in the UK. There was no evidence presented about any possible impact on the children of their continued separation from the appellant. Therefore, Mr Khan’s submissions in his skeleton argument are wholly without foundation.
34. Overall, the judge dealt correctly with the Article 8 issue on the basis that it was put before her. She adequately, dealt with all the material issues. The judge’s decision does not demonstrate any error of law in respect of the Immigration Rules or in respect of Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal shall stand.
No anonymity direction is made.
C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12 May 2025