Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005917
Extempore Decision
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01476/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

11th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

Adam Grzegorz Olszewski
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms Gilmour, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This decision is given orally after hearing from the appellant and Ms Gilmour on behalf of the Home Office.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Poland who has lived in the UK since 2011. He has a wife and children in the UK. One of his children is 12; the others are adults. In 2024 he was convicted of wounding his wife, for which he received a twelve-month prison sentence.
3. A deportation order was made against the appellant. In response, he made submissions arguing that removing him from the UK would breach the UK’s obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The appellant’s arguments relied primarily on his relationship with his wife and children. The respondent rejected the appellant’s submissions and made a decision to refuse his human rights claim. The appellant appealed against this decision to the First-tier Tribunal where his appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Easterman. In a decision issued on 18 November 2024 Judge Easterman dismissed the appeal. The appellant is now appealing against that decision.
4. Judge Easterman recognised (correctly) that he was required to consider the appeal through the framework provided by Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This provides that there are two exceptions to the public interest in deporting a foreign criminal subject to a deportation decision who has been sentenced to less than 4 years. The exceptions are as follows:

(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
5. The first exception can only apply where someone has lived most of their life in the UK. As the appellant only entered the UK in 2011 it plainly could not apply to him.
6. The second exception was potentially relevant. As such, it was the focus of the judge’s decision.
7. The judge considered evidence relating to the appellant’s relationship with his youngest child and his wife. That evidence included a witness statement and oral evidence from the appellant’s wife, as well as an OASys Report.
8. There was a clear contradiction between the OASys report and the witness evidence. In the OASys report the appellant is recorded as saying that he is no longer in a relationship with his wife and that they are currently just friends. However, the evidence of the appellant and his wife at the hearing was that they are in a loving relationship.
9. The judge considered the evidence concerning the relationship in some detail and, although there is some ambiguity in the wording used, it is clear that the judge reached the conclusion that the relationship between the appellant and his wife was no longer subsisting. The judge also found that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant to be separated from his wife (or from his children) and therefore that the “unduly harsh” requirement in exception 2 was not satisfied.
10. The grounds of appeal, which were drafted by the appellant himself, make a single argument, which is that the judge did not take into account the evidence given by the appellant’s wife about the damaging impact on her of the appellant’s deportation.
11. In his oral submissions the appellant stressed how close he is to his wife and family. He highlighted that they travelled from Wales for the First-tier Tribunal hearing. He observed that no marriage is ideal but that does not mean that he does not love his wife and he noted that his wife was clear at the hearing in the First-tier Tribunal that she loves him.
12. Ms Gilmore argued that the appellant is merely disagreeing with the judge’s findings. She submitted that there was strong evidence before the judge in the form of the OASys report indicating that the relationship was no longer subsisting. She argued that the judge was entitled to reach a conclusion consistent with this evidence about the relationship.
13. I agree with Ms Gilmour. There was evidence before the judge indicating that there is a genuine and subsisting relationship. However, there was also evidence indicating that the relationship was not subsisting. It was a matter for the judge, who had the benefit of considering all of the evidence (including oral evidence) as a whole, to form a view as to what he considered to be the true situation in respect of the appellant’s relationship with his wife. The judge undertook this assessment and gave clear reasons to explain why he reached the conclusion he did. Another judge might have reached a different conclusion, but that does not mean the judge erred.
14. I note that in the grant of permission a different point is raised: it is suggested that the judge arguably failed to reach a clear conclusion on exception 2 in respect of the appellant’s wife. I am satisfied that this is not the case. First, although not stated in terms, on a fair reading of the decision as a whole it is apparent that the judge did not accept that the relationship was subsisting. Second, and in any event, the judge made a clear finding (in para. 70) that the effect on the appellant’s wife of the appellant being deported would not be unduly harsh: see para. 70 of the decision.
Notice of Decision
15. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the make an error of law and therefore the decision stands.
16. The appeal is dismissed.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3.12.2025