Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005931

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/50587/2023
LE/03849/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

SHAMIM AKHTAR
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Ahmad, Counsel instructed by Farani Taylor Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 August 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of Judge Beg of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 13th November 2024, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 15th June 2023, refusing her application under Appendix EU.

Background to the appeal
2. The appellant is a national of Pakistan who applied, in June 2021, for a Family Permit under Appendix EU (FP) as the dependent parent of a relevant EEA citizen. She was granted a Family Permit and entered the UK on 1st March 2023.
3. On 8th March 2023, the appellant applied for status under Appendix EU as the dependent parent of a relevant EEA citizen. That application was refused on 15th June 2023 and the appellant appealed against the decision.
First tier Tribunal decision
4. Judge Beg of the First-tier Tribunal (“the judge”) dismissed the appeal. The judge outlined the history of the appellant’s applications and noted the requirements of Appendix EU [8] [10].
5. The appellant’s position was that she was the dependent parent of a relevant EEA citizen; the sponsor, Azhar Kurshid, who is an Italian national with pre-settled status in the UK. The judge summarised the evidence of the sponsor and the appellant [9] [11]. The judge noted that the appellant must show that she was dependent on the sponsor in order to fulfil the requirements of Appendix EU and summarised the relevant case law [12] [13] [14] [15].
6. The judge considered the documentary evidence before her noting that the tenancy agreement named both the sponsor and the appellant [16]. She also took account of the medical evidence but found that there was no credible evidence that the appellant suffered from mobility problems which required the assistance of the sponsor with the appellant’s daily activities [16]. The judge went on to consider the sponsor’s employment documents and the sponsor’s evidence that he worked full time. The judge found that it was unclear how the sponsor was able to assist the appellant if he were working full time [17].
7. The judge noted that the appellant had not provided any bank statements to show transfers of money from the sponsor to the appellant and took account of the documents from when the appellant lived in Pakistan. She found that there were no additional documents relating to dependency in the UK [18].
8. In conclusion, the judge found that there was limited evidence of the appellant’s financial and social circumstances and that there was insufficient evidence to show that the appellant was in a situation of ‘real dependency’. She accepted that the appellant and the sponsor lived together but found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the appellant was reliant on the sponsor to meet her essential living needs [19].
Upper Tribunal proceedings
9. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the following grounds:

(i) The judge failed to make adequate findings of fact or made perverse findings by failing to take account of the relevant medical evidence regarding the appellant’s mobility issues
(ii) The judge failed to expressly state why she did not find the sponsor’s evidence to be credible evidence
(iii) The judge erred in finding that bank statements were required when the appellant lived with her sponsor who met the appellant’s essential living needs
(iv) The judge’s sentence at the end of paragraph 17 of her decision is unfinished and the meaning is therefore unclear
(v) The judge failed to consider relevant evidence regarding the assistance given by the sponsor and the appellant’s daughter to the appellant
(vi) The judge failed to give reasons for finding that the appellant living with the sponsor did not amount to dependency
10. All of the grounds appeared under a catch all heading of Ground 1 but they were subsequently separated into different arguments. We have therefore numbered the grounds from 1-6 in our decision and reasons.
11. The grounds submitted that there had been no dispute between the parties that the sponsor was a relevant EEA citizen, that the appellant applied for a Family Permit under Appendix EU(FP) in 2021 and entered the UK with a Family Permit on 1st March 2023, that the Family Permit was granted on the basis of the appellant’s dependency on the sponsor and that the appellant made an application on the basis of her continued dependency on the sponsor.
12. Permission to appeal was granted on 27th March 2025 by Judge Barker of the First-tier Tribunal.
13. We have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but we will refer to any relevant arguments in our decision.
14. We bear in mind that an appellate tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower tribunal. In doing so we apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. We further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
Decision and reasons
Ground 1
15. The appellant submits that the judge erred in finding that there was no credible evidence of the appellant’s mobility problems and refers to the medical evidence which was before the judge. However, the finding of the judge was that there was ‘no credible evidence however that she has mobility problems which require the sponsor to assist with her daily living activities’. The judge was not finding that there was no credible evidence of any mobility problems but rather that there was no credible evidence of mobility problems which required the sponsor’s assistance on a day to day basis.
16. We were referred to the medical evidence on behalf of the appellant and we accept that this shows that the appellant has some mobility issues. We also accept that she has been accompanied to at least some of those medical appointments by either her daughter or the sponsor. There was reference to numbness in toes and hands [P.167], lower limb fatigue and stiffness after sitting for prolonged periods [P.168]. The medical records record that the appellant ‘lives with family, independent ADLs, uses stick sometimes, short walks outside’ [P.168]. She was encouraged to increase walks and was offered physiotherapy which she declined. That evidence related to September 2023. There was no updating medical evidence before the First-tier Tribunal.
17. The definition of dependency contained with Appendix EU allows for dependency as a result of health. However, the judge noted that the medical evidence did not show that the appellant was dependent on the sponsor as a result of her health. The mere fact of some health problems does not automatically mean that an individual is dependent on others. The medical evidence did not disclose any way in which the appellant was dependent on the sponsor; indeed, it noted that the appellant had ‘independent ADLs’ (ADL meaning activities of daily living). An analysis of the medical evidence does not show that it supported the account given by the appellant and the sponsor of the appellant requiring daily assistance as a result of her mobility issues or that it evidenced a dependency of the appellant on the sponsor for health reasons. We find that the judge made adequate findings regarding the medical evidence.
Ground 2
18. The appellant submitted that the judge failed to give clear reasons why she did not accept the sponsor’s evidence as credible evidence. The appellant had elected to have a paper hearing and so no oral evidence was heard. The fact that an appellant and her witnesses do not give evidence as a result of having a paper hearing does not mean that a judge must automatically accept the written evidence before her.
19. The judge outlines the sponsor’s evidence in his witness statement [9] which includes the sponsor’s account of the appellant having health problems which require daily support and the appellant being financially dependent on him. The judge does not make specific findings on the details set out in the witness statement of the sponsor and the appellant but she does consider each aspect of dependency put forward by the appellant and the sponsor and gives reasons for rejecting it. She had already considered the medical evidence which was before her and found that it was not supportive of the evidence of the sponsor and the appellant that the appellant required assistance with her daily living activities.
20. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. We find that the judge gave sufficient reasons for her findings and that her analysis of the evidence displayed an assessment of the evidence as a whole including the witness statements of the appellant and the sponsor.
Ground 3
21. Ground 3 related to the treatment by the judge of the lack of bank statements. The provision of bank statements can assist in evidencing dependency but in this particular case, the appellant lives with the sponsor, as was accepted by the judge [19] and the provision of bank statements would not necessarily assist. The sponsor’s evidence in his witness statement was that the appellant did not have a bank account in the UK [5]. That explanation has not been expressly considered by the judge and we find that there should have been a consideration of this by the judge when finding that there were no bank statements before her. Nevertheless, we find that it is not a material error of law given the other findings by the judge and the consideration of the documents which were before her and which she clearly considered as part of her decision. The judge did not give undue weight to the absence of bank statements. We also note that the judge correctly identified that there were no other additional documents from the UK demonstrating dependency.
22. The lack of evidence is particularly notable given the sponsor’s letter [P.288] in which the sponsor stated that the appellant’s initial application for a Family Permit was on the basis of assumed dependency and dependency documents were not required. It is clear from the sponsor’s letter that no evidence of dependency was required at the time of the application for a Family Permit under Appendix EU (FP) but it is also clear from a reading of the appellant’s and sponsor’s witness statements as a whole that they were aware that dependency was the issue to be decided by the judge and that some evidence was required.
23. Annex 1 of Appendix EU (FP) confirms that where an application was made before 1st July 2021, the dependency of a parent of a relevant EEA citizen was assumed. The definition of dependent relative is set out within Annex 1 which states:
‘(a) the direct relative in the ascending line of a relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, of a qualifying British citizen) or of their spouse or civil partner; and
(b) (unless sub-paragraph (c) immediately below applies):
(i) dependent on the relevant EEA citizen or on their spouse or civil partner:
(aa) (where sub-paragraph (b)(i)(bb) or (b)(i)(cc) below does not apply) at the date of application and (unless the relevant EEA citizen is under the age of 18 years at the date of application) that dependency is assumed; or
(bb) (where the date of application is after the specified date and where the applicant is not a joining family member) at the specified date, and (unless the relevant EEA citizen was under the age of 18 years at the specified date) that dependency is assumed; or
(cc) (where the date of application is after the specified date and where the applicant is a joining family member) at the date of application and (unless the relevant EEA citizen is under the age of 18 years at the date of application) that dependency is assumed where the date of application is before 1 July 2021’
24. The date of the appellant’s application for a Family Permit under Appendix EU (FP) pre-dated 1st July 2021 which is why the dependency was assumed. However, by the date of her application under Appendix EU, the appellant had to show dependency as defined within the definition in Annex 1 of Appendix EU which states:
‘‘dependent’ means here that:
(a) having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the applicant cannot, or (as the case may be) for the relevant period could not, meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, of the qualifying British citizen or of the relevant sponsor) or of their spouse or civil partner; and
(b) such support is, or (as the case may be) was, being provided to the applicant by the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, by the qualifying British citizen or by the relevant sponsor) or by their spouse or civil partner; and
(c) there is no need to determine the reasons for that dependence or for the recourse to that support’
25. It was therefore necessary for the appellant to provide evidence of dependency. The judge noted the absence of any corroboratory evidence of that dependency. The sponsor and the appellant provided witness statements and medical evidence but that was the extent of the evidence provided to show dependency in the UK. The judge rejected the medical evidence as evidence of dependency and we have found that she has not materially erred in so doing. The appellant and the sponsor chose not to have an oral hearing where their evidence could have been tested. They did not provide any other documentary evidence of dependency and the evidence before the judge was therefore extremely limited. The burden of proof is on the appellant to show that she meets the requirements of Appendix EU. The judge cannot be criticised for her findings with regard to the evidence before her; it was extremely limited and she gave it due consideration giving cogent reasons for rejecting the evidence.
26. Whilst the appellant’s skeleton argument submitted that the dependency should continue to be considered to be assumed dependency such that there would be no need for evidence of dependency in the UK in the application which led to the current appeal, this was not argued in the grounds of appeal for permission to appeal and in any event, does not accord with the terms of Appendix EU.
27. We find that the judge has not materially erred in her assessment of the evidence which was before her.
Ground 4
28. The appellant complains that the last sentence of paragraph 17 of the decision is disjointed and unclear. The sentence reads:
‘It is unclear if he works full time. How he would be able to assist his mother with her daily living activities’
29. It is unfortunate that this disjointed sentence was not picked up when the judge proof read the decision but a reading of the paragraph as a whole and that sentence strongly suggests that the full stop before ‘How’ should have been a comma and the ‘H’ in ‘How’ then autocorrected as a result of the full stop. There is nothing in the grounds of appeal to explain why there is a material error of law as a result of the mistake.
Ground 5
30. The appellant submits that the judge has failed to take proper account of the support provided by the sponsor and her daughter accompanying the appellant to medical appointments. The medical evidence does record the sponsor or the appellant’s daughter translating at some medical appointments but the daughter is mentioned more often than the sponsor and she is not the relevant EEA citizen. Furthermore, occasional translation at a medical appointment does not evidence dependency without more. The judge has taken account of the evidence which was before her which was extremely limited. She has given cogent reasons for rejecting that evidence as evidence of dependency.
Ground 6
31. The appellant submits that the judge failed to give sufficient reasons for finding there was no dependency when she found that the appellant and the sponsor lived together. The judge has made a finding that the appellant and the sponsor lived together but also finds that there was insufficient evidence of dependency. Whilst under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, being a member of the same household would be sufficient to show that an individual was an extended family member, that is not the same for Appendix EU. There must be an element of financial, social or health dependency to fulfil the requirements of Appendix EU. It is clear that the judge was aware that the appellant and the sponsor lived together; she makes this finding at the end of her decision but also references the tenancy agreement [16]. Living together may be evidence of dependency but it is not automatically evidence of dependency and the judge has clearly set out the deficiencies in the evidence which have led her to find that the appellant has not shown that she is dependent on the sponsor. The judge has not materially erred in failing to find that simply because the appellant and the sponsor live together, the appellant must be dependent on the sponsor. There could be any number of scenarios where people living together, even an older relative with their adult child, are not dependent.
32. Although the judge did not refer to this evidence, we note that other evidence in the bundle referred to the appellant’s husband, Khurshid Pervez. The appellant’s ID card issued on 29th August 2019 records him as her husband. The sponsor’s birth certificate records him as his father. The DNA report prepared in June 2022 also recorded that the appellant and her husband had been tested and that they were the sponsor’s parents. In light of this evidence, it was not obvious that the mere fact that the appellant was living with her son in the UK showed that she was in a situation of real dependency upon him. The evidence before the First-tier Tribunal was silent in relation to her husband’s position. It was incumbent on the appellant to prove her case and the judge has clearly set out that the appellant has failed to do this, making reasoned findings on the very limited evidence which was before her.
32. For the reasons given above, we conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
Notice of decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law
The decision shall stand

F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28th August 2025