Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005937

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59086/2023
LP/09083/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

SKB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Muman, instructed by Logan Kingsley Ltd, Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 11 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) promulgated following a hearing at Manchester on 14 November 2024, in which the Judge dismissed his appeal against rejection of his claim for international protection.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq, aged 19 before the Judge, who left Iraq in early 2021 and entered the UK in September 2021 by small boat. He claimed asylum on 3 November 2021 which was refused on 21 September 2023.
3. The Judge’s findings are set out from [38] of the decision under challenge. The Judge notes at [40] the central issue being whether the Appellant’s claim is credible. Having analysed the evidence, the Judge did not find the Appellant’s claim credible. His credibility was undermined in part by what the Judge describes as untruthful evidence about his mother and siblings [60].
4. In relation to documentation, the Judge finds the Appellant left his CSID in Iraq with his either his grandmother or the person named as ‘P ‘who could assist him when he returns in either passing him his CSID or taking him to his local office to obtain an INID within a reasonable period of time.
5. The Judge therefore dismissed the Appellant’s asylum claim [63], any entitlement under the Qualification Directive [64], Article 3 ECHR [65], and Article 8 ECHR for the reasons set out at [67 – 68].
6. The Appellant sought permission to appeal asserting the Judge had erred in law in (i) failing to have regard to relevant country information, (ii) erred in his approach to the issue of vulnerability by failing to have regard to or apply the principles/standards relevant to asylum claims from children, (iii) undertook a flawed approach to the Appellant’s vulnerability in failing to consider vulnerability holistically, and, (iv) in failing to make clear findings on the presence of family support, availability of documentation or prospects for reintegration in line with the applicable country guidance. For the reasons set out in the Ground dated 20 December 2024.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 31 December 2024, the operative part of which reads:
It is arguable that the Judge materially erred in his consideration of the medical evidence in relation to the Appellant’s credibility has asserted in ground 3.
Whilst I do not think any of the other grounds have much merit I do not limit the scope of the appeal.
8. The Secretary of State opposed the appeal in a Rule 24 response dated 6 January 2025, the operative part of which reads:
2. The respondent opposes the appellant’s appeal. In summary, the respondent will submit inter alia that the judge of the First-tier Tribunal directed himself appropriately.
3. As noted in the grant of permission, the grounds do not have much merit aside from ground 3. The findings of the FTTJ should be read as a whole, noting that the age of the A [1] and submissions made in relation to his age at the time of claimed events [35]. The FTTJ considered all the evidence in the round appropriately [38] and took into account any vulnerabilities and had regard to guidance and caselaw [39]. What is clear, and accepted by Counsel at the hearing was that the evidence given by the appellant was not consistent. Background information referring to the prevalence of kidnapping does not remedy this issue. The FTTJ gives clear reasons for attributing little weight to Dr Ghosh’s report, noting that the author relied on a statement that was not relied upon, and failed to consider other aspects of the evidence. The FTTJ was entitled to reject the diagnosis proffered by Dr Ghosh.
4. The grounds seek to apply and artificial separation in the consideration of the evidence at [49] when referring to ‘general credibility’. This seeks to ignore the self-direction at [41] where the FTTJ appropriately states that he must not look at the account in isolation of the medical evidence. This accords with the guidance set out in QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC) (12 January 2021). Contrary to what the grounds aver, it is clear that any cognitive issues relating to understanding and interpretation simply could not account for the significance discrepancies, for example, relating to whether his mother was alive or not at material times [50-51].
5. When the A has been so lacking in credibility in relation to his family circumstances, the FTTJ was entitled to find that the A had not made out a claim that he would not have a support network available to him and thus appropriate documentation- thus there was no breach of Article 3 or a case of very significant obstacles to integration [66].
Discussion and analysis
9. Ground 1 asserts a failure to consider country information when making findings without, it is claimed, having regard to pertinent background information which was supportive of/ or provided context to the Appellant’s history. This is by specific reference to UNHCR report 2018, OASC Report 2023, and CPIN, Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal violence, version 1.0 July 2024 referring to prolonged cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge with violent such as on confrontation, shootings, burning of homes, abductions and killings.
10. The assertion the Judge dismissed the kidnapping claim at [58] as not being credible without considering the objective information does not establish material legal error, as the Judge did. Whatever may happen in other circumstances in Iraq that does not mean that on the specific facts of this appeal the dismissal of the claim and finding that the claimed events did not occur is infected by legal error. It has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those available to the Judge.
11. The Judge was not required to set out the evidence considered, as First-tier Tribunal judges are accepted as being experts in the field of immigration and asylum law and taken to know and apply the law unless it is established otherwise. The Appellant’s claim that the rejection of the subjective elements of the appeal is somehow wrong, based upon objective generic country material, fails to address the fact the Judge clearly considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny, and has made a finding supported by adequate reasons which have not been shown to be outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
12. A person challenging a decision of the judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462, Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26] and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWAC Civ 888 at [30-31], which I have taken it into account.
13. Apply that guidance the findings in relation to issue challenged in Ground 1 have not been shown to be plainly wrong.
14. Ground 2 asserts a failure to apply principles relevant to children’s asylum claim claiming that notwithstanding the Judge at [39] stating account has been taken of the Appellants vulnerability and the Presidential Guidance of relevant case law, the Judge’s reasons for dismissing the claim do not adhere to the Presidential Guidance nor case law relating to vulnerability.
15. The Judge was aware of the appellant’s age, which is described as 19 in the determination, meaning the Judge would have been aware that the Appellant was a child at the time of the material events.
16. It is not an error of law by the Judge not to set out relevant parts of the guidance and case law in relation to vulnerable appellants, which the Judge clearly says was taken into account. The Judge was aware the issue was credibility that had to be assessed in light of the facts as a whole, including the medical evidence which the Judge refers to extensively at [43].
17. The Judge at [48], although placing little weight upon the medical report, for which reasons are given, records accepting the Appellant has cognitive issues, especially with a short-term memory, and at [49], when considering the Appellant’s credibility, the Judge confirms having considered all the information contained within the bundle.
18. At [50] the Judge refers to evidence which undermines the Appellant’s claim which the Judge was entitled to give proper weight to, which contradicted the Appellant’s claim that his mother had died when he was in Italy and his two siblings had been killed in 2018. That is not evidence that was in any way undermined by the Appellant’s early events and would have been clearly a matter within his personal knowledge, upon which weight could be placed if true despite his age at the relevant dates, but which was contradicted by subsequent claims made by the Appellant. The Judge’s finding that the points discussed at [50] suggests the Appellant is prone to lying and that these issues undermined his claim about his family is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
19. It is also the case, as recorded at [52], that the inconsistencies were put to the Appellant during the course of the hearing, when he was an adult, which would have given him the opportunity to comment upon the same. Despite there being clear inconsistencies the Judge records the Appellant refused to acknowledge such inconsistencies which the Judge notes is something noted by others. The finding of the Judge that the fact the Appellant does not recognise the untruths he is telling but is persisting with them as he believes they bolster his claim, is a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
20. The Appellant’s attempt to explain inconsistencies as misinterpretation and/or misunderstanding was not accepted by the Judge. At [53] the Judge makes such a finding even having taken into account the Appellant’s cognitive issues.
21. At [54] the Judge refers to three issues the Appellant claimed shows that he could not return to live in Iraq. The Judge in that paragraph, in relation to the first of these issues - namely blaming his uncle for a family dispute and the Appellant’s claim that his uncle had killed his father, albeit he must have been a baby when that incident took place, is given appropriate weight by the Judge who records that it is understandable that the Appellant has no recollection of the incident although it is noted he did tell his doctor about his father’s death when telling the doctor that his mother and siblings were alive in January 2022. This illustrates that the Judge clearly took into account and was aware of the need to treat the Appellant’s evidence with caution in relation to matters that occurred when he was a minor in Iraqi.
22. At [55] the Judge refers to further inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence, in which the Judge records a small inconsistency, again not taking an irrational view of the particular issue, but properly finds it was a further example of an inconsistency in his account.
23. At [60] the Judge specifically writes:
60. Assessing his claims in the round and whilst acknowledging cognitive issues I did not find his claims credible. His credibility is undermined in part by what I would describe as untruthful evidence about his mother and siblings.
24. The Judge was therefore exercising an appropriate degree of care in relation to the weight to be given to the evidence but, notwithstanding, concluded that the Appellant was not telling the truth. That has not been shown to be a rationally objectionable conclusion when considering the evidence as a whole.
25. I find no legal error made out in relation to Ground 2.
26. Ground 3 asserts an error in the Judge’s approach to vulnerability which is, in effect, disagreement with the weight the Judge gave to the report from Dr Ghosh. The Judge clearly considered the report and accepted the point about the Appellant’s cognitive issues but gives good reasons for why the weight that was given to the report was given.
27. Contrary to [21] of the Grounds seeking permission to appeal, the Judge does explain how the Appellant’s cognitive impairment bears upon the weight to be given to the evidence. An informed reader is able to understand that in light of the cognitive issues and vulnerability the Judge took care to ensure that the evidence was weighed up with the required degree of anxious scrutiny.
28. The assertion of artificial separation at [22] to the grounds by reference to Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367 (IAC) and JL (Medical reports: credibility) China [2013] UKUT 00145 (IAC) is without merit. In those cases there was clear evidence that the Judge had not factored all relevant issues into account when assessing the weight to be given to the evidence which is contrary to the approach adopted by the Judge in this appeal.
29. I find no legal error made out in relation to Ground 3.
30. Ground 4 asserts that following on from the other grounds, the Judge’s approach to the issue of the Appellant’s ability to obtain replacement documents or to reintegrate on return is flawed.
31. The first problem with this submission is I do not find the Appellant has established material legal error in relation to any of the previous grounds. Also, the Judge was entitled to make findings on the basis of the evidence that the Judge accepted was credible. The finding at [62] amounts to an adequate assessment of what family support the Appellant has on return in the absence of sufficient credible evidence to enable a more succinct finding to be made. It is also important to read [60 – 62] as a whole. In these paragraphs Judge writes:
60. Assessing his claims in the round and whilst acknowledging cognitive issues I did not find his claims credible. His credibility is undermined in part by what I would describe as untruthful evidence about his mother and siblings.
61. His mother may well have now died as he described to his social worker but the last comment he made about his siblings was they were alive and well. His other uncle, Phstiwan, helped him to leave and given I have rejected his claimed fears it follows he has family to whom he can turn to for support.
62. He left his CSID in Iraq with either his grandmother or Phstiwan and the latter can 11 assist him when he returns by either passing him his CSID or taking him to his local office to obtain an INID within a reasonable period of t
32. The core finding is that the Appellant’s claim is not credible. This included evidence about family support and whether family members had died, or not. The Judge does not find the Appellant’s mother has died, but suggests it may have happened, but refers to the fact that the Appellant’s siblings are alive and well in Iraq as was another uncle who helped him leave Iraq to come to the UK, in relation to whom the Judge rejected any claimed fear. The Judge’s finding at [61] that in light of such findings the Appellant has family whom he could turn to for support is clearly a finding within the range of those available to the Judge on the evidence.
33. Although the Appellant’s evidence was that his paternal grandmother who was responsible for raising him has also died, who was the person he claimed he left his original CSID document with, the Appellant’s claims have been shown not to be true. It is also not made out that even if his documents were left with one family member they would have been lost if she had passed. The problem from the Appellant’s perspective is his claims were shown to be a lie, which is relevant to the Judge’s finding that on the evidence to which weight could be given the Appellant did have family support and could accesses identity documents if returned to Iraq.
34. At paragraph [25] of Ground 4 it is asserted the Judges made no findings in relation to the issue of “very significant obstacles to integration”, but the Judge notes at [4] the issues the Tribunal were asked to decide are as follows:
4. The issues to be decided are as follows:
i. Does a Convention reason apply to his claim?
ii. Is his account of ill-treatment and threats credible?
iii. Does he face a real risk of harm on return in his home area and/or is there sufficiency of protection?
iv. Would he have access to his CSID which he left in Iraq or would he be able to obtain an INID within a reasonable period of time?

35. On the face of it the Judge has therefore been criticised for not considering an issue that the First-tier Tribunal was not asked to consider. Proceedings within the First-tier Tribunal are now very much issue based as all parties and legal representatives are aware. It is not legal error for the Judge not to consider a matter that was not identified as a relevant issue by the parties on the facts of this appeal.
36. In any event, even if it had been an issue, in light of the Judge’s sustainable adverse credibility findings, the findings in relation to family support and documentation, and the content of the evidence before the Judge, there was nothing to support a claim that there are very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration into Iraq.
37. The Grounds also assert the Judge had failed to apply [33 – 34] of SMO [2022] UKUT 00110(IAC) regarding the prospect of integration in the absence of family support in the IKR, but such claim is without merit as it is a sustainable finding of the Judge that the Appellant does have family support available to him on return.
38. I find no material legal are made out in relation to Ground 4.
39. The Grounds are, in reality, no more than disagreement with the Judge’s findings, and an attempt to reargue points considered and dismissed by the Judge, assertions that the Judge did not do things the Judge clearly did, and which fail to identify anything within the evidence which could be accepted as being credible that would warrant a different outcome. The findings made are clearly within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge and supported by adequate reasons. They have not been shown to be rationally objectionable. Whilst the Appellant disagrees with them, and would prefer a more favourable outcome, as no material legal error is established there is no basis for the Upper Tribunal interfering any further in relation to this appeal.
Notice of Decision
40. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law.
41. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 April 2025