Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005945

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57639/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 24 March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

SHAHID YAQOOB
[NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE]
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar, Counsel instructed by Abbott Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Thursday 6 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
BACKGROUND
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Phull dated 13 November 2024 (“the Decision”) dismissing his appeal on human rights grounds (Articles 3 and 8 ECHR) against the Respondent’s decision dated 16 November 2021 refusing him leave to remain in the UK.
2. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan. He came to the UK in August 2009 as a visitor. He thereafter overstayed. When encountered in July 2013, he made an application based on his Article 8 rights which was refused and certified as clearly unfounded under section 94 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). He then claimed asylum, but that claim was treated as withdrawn because he failed to attend his asylum interview. He again claimed in further submissions that he could not be removed to Pakistan due to a fear of ill-treatment and torture. Those further submissions were rejected but he was given a right of appeal which he exercised. However, he failed to attend his appeal hearing and the appeal was dismissed on the papers on 23 July 2018.
3. On 7 January 2021, the Appellant made a further application based on his private life in the UK which was refused by the decision under appeal.
4. The Appellant relies in large part on his medical conditions. He has had polio since a child. This has left him with some physical disability. He also suffers from mental health problems and is on medication. The Judge agreed that the Appellant should be treated as a vulnerable person on account of his mental health problems and should “be questioned in a sensitive manner, with time to process the question and respond” ([§5] of the Decision).
5. The Judge considered the Appellant’s case by reference to Article 3 ECHR and paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules (“Paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi)” of “the Rules”). She also considered the case outside the Rules.
6. The Judge took as her starting point the decision of the previous Immigration Judge in 2018. That is a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hembrough promulgated on 23 July 2018 (“the Previous Appeal Decision”). Judge Phull noted that at that time the threshold for an Article 3 claim was not met. Judge Hembrough had concluded that there were no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Pakistan.
7. The Judge’s findings appear at [§10-32] of the Decision. Having taken into account the findings in the Previous Appeal Decision, the Judge found that the Appellant did not meet the high threshold in relation to an Article 3 claim. She directed herself in that regard in accordance with AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 when reaching that conclusion.
8. The Judge also found that there would be no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Pakistan. She there took into account the Country Policy and Information Note entitled “Pakistan: healthcare and medical treatment”, version 3 published in July 2024 (“the CPIN”) which referred to a report published in 2020 in relation to mental health treatment in Pakistan. She concluded that the Appellant could be treated for his mental health in that country. She also found that the Appellant would be able to afford his medication with help from his family in Pakistan and his friends in the UK.
9. Outside the Rules, the Judge considered whether removal would have unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant. She directed herself to the five-stage test set out by the House of Lords in Razgar ([2004] UKHL 27) and other case law. She also had regard to section 117B of the 2002 Act (“Section 117B”). She took into account the Appellant’s length of residence but also that this had been precarious. She accepted that the Appellant could speak English and has not had recourse to public funds but considered both factors to be neutral. At [§31] of the Decision, she made mention of a submission by the Appellant’s advocate that there had been delay by the Respondent in making a decision in his case. She also recorded a submission that the Appellant’s length of residence which went part way to the twenty years recognised by the Rules was relevant to the proportionality balance.
10. At [§32] of the Decision, the Judge reached her conclusions. She repeated that the Appellant could not succeed under Article 3 ECHR or Paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi). She concluded that the Appellant’s rights did not outweigh the public interest. Removal would therefore be a proportionate response.
11. The Appellant appeals the Decision on three grounds, summarised as follows:
Ground 1: the Judge failed to consider certain features of the Appellant’s case, in particular his disability from polio and the impact of that disability on his everyday life. It is also said that the Judge failed to deal with the submission that there had been delay in the Appellant’s case which it is suggested is associated with his length of residence.
Ground 2: the Judge has made irrational findings, in particular in relation to the medical report of Dr Saima Latif and the finding that the Appellant could be supported in access to his medication by friends in the UK.
Ground 3: the Judge should not have given negative weight to the Appellant not meeting the Rules when considering his case outside the Rules.
12. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge I D Boyes on 31 December 2024 in the following terms so far as relevant:
“..3. Permission is granted for the reasons given in the application, particularly ground 1. The grounds need no further explanation or elucidation from me.
4. Permission is granted on all matters raised as they are arguable.”
13. The appeal comes before us to decide whether there is an error of law. If we determine that the Decision does contain an error of law, we then need to decide whether to set aside the Decision in consequence. If we set the Decision aside, we must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
14. We had before us a bundle running to 409 pages containing the documents relevant to the appeal to this Tribunal, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. We refer to documents in that bundle as [B/xx].
15. Having heard from Mr Badar and Mr Tufan we indicated that we would reserve our decision and provide our reasons in writing which we now turn to do.
DISCUSSION
Ground 1
16. The first factor which the Appellant says that the Judge has failed to consider is the impact of his polio disability on his everyday life. He says that this is relevant to his Article 3 claim, whether there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Pakistan under Paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) and Article 8 outside the Rules. The Appellant relies in this regard on medical evidence.
17. At [B/201] is a letter from the Appellant’s GP, Dr N A Mirza dated 17 February 2020. Amongst the medical conditions dealt with in that letter is the Appellant’s polio. Dr Mirza says the following about that condition:
“He has a history of polio. He has a wasted right leg which causes him chronic pain and difficulty in walking. He has had physiotherapy, and the pregabalin 75mg twice daily is also used for pain control. Due to his difficulty in walking he also has chronic lumbar back pain. His wasted leg is an irreversible condition, and he is likely to experience chronic pain indefinitely.”
18. The Appellant also relies on the report of Dr Saima Latif. The citation included in the grounds is taken from her addendum report dated 27 March 2024 at [B/224-237] (“the Addendum Report”) at [§3.3]. We will have to return to that report later in this decision. For now, we note that what is said at [§3.3] of that report is much the same as is said in her original psychological report dated 26 June 2018 at [B/64-84] (“the Psychological Report”) at [§3.2]. As a psychologist, comment on the extent of that physical disability is beyond her expertise. However, it is not disputed by the Respondent that the Appellant has suffered from polio and has a continuing disability from that disease. However, as Mr Tufan pointed out, the Appellant suffered from this disease when aged ten years and therefore for many years before he came to the UK (aged thirty-two years).
19. As Mr Tufan also pointed out, the Appellant’s disability resulting from polio was dealt with in the Previous Appeal Decision. That decision is at [B/399-408]. As appears at [§41] of the Previous Appeal Decision, Judge Hembrough had before him the Psychological Report. The Judge made the following finding about the Appellant’s physical disability:
“64. The Appellant has some health issues and has in the past suffered from polio. Although he claimed to have some resulting mobility problems he was not taking any medication for this other than occasional paracetamol and it is clear that this has not present [sic] a significant obstacle to his ability to get around in Pakistan or the UK.”
20. Other than the evidence of Dr Mirza as set out above and what is said by Dr Latif in the Addendum Report, the other evidence which the Judge had on this occasion was from the Appellant. At [§2-3] of his statement dated 29 August 2024 ([B/47-49] and [B/220-222]), he refers to suffering from polio which he says was never properly treated. He says he has pain when climbing stairs, trouble walking for a prolonged period and generally when he puts weight on his right knee. He says that he has visited a physiotherapist in relation to his right foot but that nothing can be done due to his polio. His oral evidence recorded at [§7] of the Decision is that his polio has never been properly treated, that he has pain in his right knee and that he takes medication for pain relief.
21. Although we accept that the Judge does not set out the medical evidence in relation to the Appellant’s polio, Dr Mirza’s letter provides no different evidence from what the Appellant himself says about his condition which the Judge does consider. Dr Latif in the Addendum Report does not add to that evidence. She says simply that “as a result of his deteriorating condition, he suffers from weakness and problems with his mobility and transfer”.
22. As we have already pointed out, this Judge’s starting point was the Previous Appeal Decision. We accept that the Appellant’s pain relief may have moved on in terms of frequency and type since that decision. However, Judge Hembrough there notes [§64] the Appellant’s claim to have mobility problems but that the only treatment he receives is pain medication and he has been able to get around the UK and Pakistan in the past.
23. At [§15] of the Decision, the Judge notes the previous finding that the Appellant’s “conditions” (plural) were not so serious as to meet the threshold for an Article 3 claim. He could also seek treatment for those conditions in Pakistan (as Judge Hembrough found at [§65] of the Previous Appeal Decision) which would preclude an Article 3 claim.
24. As above, Judge Hembrough also found that the Appellant’s mobility problems did not present a significant obstacle to his ability to get around. At [§18-19] of the Decision, Judge Phull said this:
“18. Ms Edwards submitted the Appellant’s medical treatment was considered by the previous judge and found it was insufficient to meet very significant obstacles. There is no significant change in the medical evidence now compared to 2018 to depart from those findings. I note the judge found the Appellant’s claimed fear of persecution and or serious harm from individuals in Pakistan on return not to be objectively well founded.
19. I find other than medication, the Appellant is not on any other treatment for his mental health. I find the Appellant has friends and extended family in the UK, they can support him in Pakistan as they do in the UK, so he can access medication in Pakistan. He claims he has no contact with his family, following an argument. He claims his family moved, 7-8 years ago and knows this because he spoke to them. I find on balance he knows their whereabouts because either they have kept him informed or he has heard from other relatives. I find on balance that he is contact with his family, and they can also support him to integrate back within their community, access medications and support. I find the Appellant can turn to family and friends in Pakistan for support albeit for a temporary period, to help him integrate on return. Having lived most of his life in Pakistan, he would have retained knowledge of his culture, language and way of life.”
25. It is not clear to us why the Appellant does not consider the findings made at [§19] of the Decision to refer also to the obstacles which the Appellant claims in relation to his physical disability when read in the context of the submission recorded at [§18] and the findings in the Previous Appeal Decision nor why what is said at [§15] referring back also to the Previous Appeal Decision is insufficient as a finding in relation to Article 3 ECHR.
26. As the grounds also accept, at [§21] of the Decision, when dealing with Article 3 ECHR, the Judge does refer to “difficulties in everyday life” when expressing her views about the evidence provided by Dr Latif. We will come back to that paragraph below in relation to the second ground. However, this reference shows that the Judge did not ignore the evidence about the Appellant’s polio when reaching her findings.
27. Although we accept that the Judge has not expressly mentioned the Appellant’s physical disabilities in her findings, it is implicit in those findings that these are considered, particularly when read alongside the Previous Appeal Decision.
28. Even we are wrong about that, on the basis of the evidence before the Judge, such error could not make any difference to the outcome.
29. The Appellant has suffered from this condition since he was a child and then an adult in Pakistan. His own evidence shows that it is not treatable other than with pain medication which the Appellant was able to access when previously in Pakistan. There is limited evidence about the impact of his disabilities on his everyday life, beyond what is said by Dr Mirza and in the Appellant’s own statement which only indicates that he is in pain when climbing stairs, walking for long periods or putting weight on that leg. Indeed, what is said by the Judge about the condition is on all fours with the reference to polio in the Appellant’s skeleton argument at [§3-4] ([B/32]).
30. We therefore conclude that even if there were an error made by the Judge failing to make an express finding in relation to the Appellant’s physical disability, on the evidence before her and in light of the findings in the previous Appeal Decision, that error could not make any difference to outcome and is therefore not material.
31. The second issue raised in the Appellant’s first ground relates to what is said to be a delay. At [§31] of the Decision, the Judge records the following:
“Counsel submitted the Respondent had delayed making their decision which impacts on proportionality. At the date of application, he had lived in the UK for 11 years 4 months. He has not left the UK and has now lived here for 15-years. The rules say that if someone reaches 20-years then removal is disproportionate even where someone has family and friends in the country of origin. I find that the Appellant has not lived in the UK for at least 20 years.”
32. The grounds suggest that the Judge has failed to make a finding on the “delay” argument. We are unsurprised by that failure if the Appellant’s barrister was indeed intending to make a freestanding submission that there had been a delay by the Respondent such as to impact on the proportionality balance. Mr Badar was unable to point us to any delay in decision-making by the Respondent.
33. Based on the immigration chronology which we set out above and which the Judge set out at [§2-3] of the Decision, there is no delay. The application made in July 2013 was refused in October 2013. The asylum claim made in December 2013 was not progressed due to the Appellant’s own failure to attend interview (which led to it being implicitly withdrawn in 2015). The further submissions made in April 2018 were refused in May 2018. The decision under appeal now was made on 16 November 2021 in response to an application made in January 2021. Even the application for fee waiver which preceded the current application was dealt with in a matter of days.
34. Although Mr Badar in the pleaded grounds refers to EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41 and the three categories of case where delay may be relevant, he was unable to explain to us how any of those impacted on this case. The only delay to which he was able to point was between the decision under appeal and the date of the hearing before Judge Phull. Whatever the reason for that delay (as to which there is no evidence), it is not suggested that the Respondent was responsible for it.
35. The Judge has made a finding in relation to the Appellant’s period of residence which appears to be associated with the submission as to delay. However, as the Judge points out, the period of residence has been as an overstayer and falls short of the period laid down in the Rules by a considerable margin.
36. For those reasons, no error is disclosed by either of the two matters raised under ground one. Either those factors were adequately considered or any failure to do so could not make any difference to outcome on the evidence before the Judge.
Ground 2
37. The Appellant’s second ground similarly focusses on two matters. The first is the Judge’s treatment of the evidence of Dr Latif. The second is the finding at [§23] of the Decision regarding the Appellant’s ability to purchase his medication in Pakistan.
38. Dealing first with the evidence of Dr Latif, at [§21] of the Decision, the Judge says this:
“I find on balance the Appellant does not meet the high threshold as required by the case of AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17. Ms Edwards submitted that treatment and medication would be available to him on return to Pakistan. I note the Appellant’s GP records are dated March 2021 as most recent. He has provided some prescriptions for later dates. I find that what is said by the psychologist, Dr Latif, is not mirrored by the GP. It is asserted that the Appellant suffers with difficulties in everyday life however I find this is not set out in the GP notes, and I would expect him to have informed his GP of the difficulties he was having. Counsel submitted the Appellant has suicide [sic] ideation however I find Dr Latif is clear that the Appellant has not acted upon this.”
39. The point made in the grounds is that Dr Latif could not have had regard to the GP records in the Addendum Report as that post-dates the GP records which end in March 2021 by some three years.
40. The earlier Psychological Report dated 2018 (which was before the Judge at the time of the Previous Appeal Decision) makes reference to having seen the Appellant’s Medical Records at [§4.2] but there is no analysis of these records at all. As Mr Tufan pointed out, that is relevant to weight given to that report in light of the guidance given by this Tribunal in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC) (“HA”) as follows:
“(4) Notwithstanding their limitations, the GP records concerning the individual detail a specific record of presentation and may paint a broader picture of his or her mental health than is available to the expert psychiatrist, particularly where the individual and the GP (and any associated health care professionals) have interacted over a significant period of time, during some of which the individual may not have perceived themselves as being at risk of removal.
(5) Accordingly, as a general matter, GP records are likely to be regarded by the Tribunal as directly relevant to the assessment of the individual’s mental health and should be engaged with by the expert in their report. Where the expert’s opinion differs from (or might appear, to a layperson, to differ from) the GP records, the expert will be expected to say so in the report, as part of their obligations as an expert witness. The Tribunal is unlikely to be satisfied by a report which merely attempts to brush aside the GP records.
(6) In all cases in which expert evidence is adduced, the Tribunal should be scrupulous in ensuring that the expert has not merely recited their obligations, at the beginning or end of their report, but has actually complied with them in substance. Where there has been significant non-compliance, the Tribunal should say so in terms, in its decision. Furthermore, those giving expert evidence should be aware that the Tribunal is likely to pursue the matter with the relevant regulatory body, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the failure.”
41. At [§4.2] of the Addendum Report, Dr Latif again makes mention of having seen the Appellant’s “Updated Medical Records”. She herself says at [§7.7.2] that the Appellant’s “updated medical records were reviewed to confirm this information” being the information contained in the previous paragraph which reads as follows:
“Mr Yaqoob reported no psychological and psychiatric history prior to his problems in Pakistan and up until the time he had to depart from Pakistan in 2009. He alleges that he had been attacked by neighbours who has attempted to take over his family land. A previous report by myself in 2018 reported that he had a diagnosis of PTSD, Depression and Anxiety with flashbacks, heart palpitations, headaches and insomnia. He also had a diagnosis of Polio in his leg since birth and he was treating this with medications and it is affecting his mobility and movement and transfer. He also has a history of psoriasis and diabetes.”
42. We observe that Dr Latif did not apparently have sight of the Previous Appeal Decision since she appears to accept the Appellant’s account of what happened to him in Pakistan which found that claim not to be credible (contrary to the guidance at [§1] of the headnote in JL (medical reports-credibility) China [2013] UKUT 00145 which advises those preparing medical reports to study where possible any earlier assessments of credibility formed by an Immigration Judge). Leaving that aside, Dr Latif does not engage with what occurred after her report in 2018 when considering the extent of the Appellant’s mental health problems. Nor does she explain why, given her diagnosis in 2018, the GP records make no reference to the Appellant having any mental health problems before that report. There is, once again, a failure to engage with the GP records, contrary to the guidance in HA. Although the Judge did not expressly refer to the guidance in HA, it is implicit in what she says at [§21] of the Decision that she had in mind that guidance.
43. Whilst we accept that Dr Latif could not refer to GP records if she were not provided with them, it is not clear why she did not seek those records if indeed the only ones she had were up to March 2021. If she did have records after March 2021, to which she has in any event made no reference, those should have been included in the GP records before Judge Phull but they were not.
44. We can discern no irrationality in the Judge’s treatment of the Addendum Report. Particularly in light of the Tribunal’s guidance in HA, the Judge was entitled to disregard Dr Latif’s comments about the impact of the Appellant’s mental health on his everyday life. The Judge was entitled to find based on the CPIN that treatment would be available to deal with the Appellant’s mental health problems on return and accordingly that the Appellant’s health conditions did not present very significant obstacles to his integration in Pakistan.
45. The second matter raised under the second ground relates to the Judge’s finding at [§23] of the Decision as follows:
“Counsel submitted the Appellant has no money to buy medications however I find that he has family in Pakistan and friends in the UK. They can support him so that he is able to continue taking his medication. I do not accept that there would be a serious decline in his health as claimed and his current mental health condition does not reach the high threshold as held in the settled case law.”
46. The Appellant relies on a letter from the Red Cross which is said to show that the Appellant is destitute and unable to meet his essential living needs. We have considered that letter (at [B/203]). We note that this letter is dated October 2020 and there does not appear to be any updating evidence from Red Cross. The Appellant suggests that in light of this letter there was no evidence upon which the Judge could base her finding that friends in the UK who are supporting him here could or would support him financially in Pakistan such that he would not be able to access medication as he would not be able to afford it.
47. In this regard, we have already set out the Judge’s finding at [§19] of the Decision where the Judge found the Appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family not to be credible. That finding is not challenged. Irrespective of the position as regards friends, therefore, the Judge was entitled to find that the Appellant could look to his family in Pakistan for support on return.
48. Further, in any event, the Judge’s finding at [§23] is based on evidence from the Appellant himself. At [§12] of his statement, the Appellant says this:
“..I currently have a network of friends in the UK, of whom I rely on for both emotional and financial support, and I am not sure how I would survive without them. I am terrified at the thought of returning to Pakistan, whereby I will have nobody to turn to for support when I am in need.”
At [§13] of his statement, the Appellant says:
“..I rely on my current network of friends for financial support, alongside emotional support. As such, I am worried that without much to my name, and with nobody to help me in Pakistan, that I will end up homeless.”
49. Based on that evidence and the previous finding about contact with his family in Pakistan, the Judge was entitled to reach the finding she did about support on return to Pakistan.
50. For those reasons, the second ground does not establish any irrationality on the part of the Judge. The Judge considered the evidence before her and her findings were open to her based on that evidence for the reasons she gave.
Ground 3
51. The third ground as we understand it is a submission that the Judge’s reference to the Appellant not meeting the Rules when conducting the proportionality balance, in particular at [§31] of the Decision (as set out above), should not have taken into account the Appellant’s inability to meet the Rules as this amounts to double-counting.
52. In essence, the Appellant relies on case law to the effect that if an appellant meets the Rules that is relevant in his favour to the proportionality balance as undermining the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control. We do not therefore understand why the converse should not be the case.
53. The submission made also runs counter to Section 117B. Section 117B only comes into play when one is considering Article 8 outside the Rules. Section 117B (1) requires a judge to have regard to the maintenance of effective immigration control which is largely linked to whether an appellant can meet the Rules. Put another way, simply because a proportionality balance is conducted outside the Rules does not mean that the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control which incorporates an inability to meet the Rules is to be ignored.
54. Mr Badar also submitted that the constant reference to the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control at [§24-32] of the Decision indicated an excessive weight given to the public interest and a corresponding disregard for the Appellant’s rights.
55. We cannot accept that submission. The Judge rightly had regard at [§26] to Section 117B (1) and the maintenance of effective immigration control being in the public interest. Thereafter, she referred to the interference with the Appellant’s rights. She was however required to give little weight to the Appellant’s period of residence as an overstayer as that period was based on precarious (or rather unlawful) residence. The reference at [§29] to the maintenance of immigration control and the public interest explains why only little weight would be given. The Judge had regard to other factors in Section 117B but explained why they were neutral. The reference to the Appellant not meeting the Rules at [§31] of the Decision is a response to the point that the Appellant had been in the UK for fifteen years and that the Rules would permit him to stay if he had been here for twenty years. The Judge was simply making the point that he did not meet the Rules as he had not been here for twenty years.
56. There is no error in the Judge’s proportionality assessment. The Appellant’s third ground is not made out.
CONCLUSION
57. Overall, we can find no error in the Judge’s findings or reasoning. As above, even if there may be an error in the Judge not dealing expressly with certain matters, those are dealt with implicitly in her other findings and in any event could make no difference to the outcome on the evidence.
58. We therefore uphold the Decision with the result that the Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Phull dated 13 November 2024 does not involve the making of an error of law which is material to the outcome. We therefore uphold the Decision with the result that the Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

L K Smith
Upper Tribunal Judge Smith
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 March 2025