Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-005953
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01453/2023
PA/54739/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

MY
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr McGarby, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Rushforth, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 21 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 1 September 2024, of a judge of the FtT (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.

3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant’s claim to be at risk on return to Iraq because of the political opinions he had expressed both before and after he left the country. He further claimed that he no longer had access to the documents he would need to avoid conditions and treatment which would breach his Article 3 human rights.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on two overlapping grounds. Firstly, it was suggested that the judge had not lawfully explained himself in rejecting his case on whether he had the necessary civil documentation and, secondly, that the findings which were reached on this point did not account for the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note addressing the practicalities of the returns process.

5. In a decision dated 19 March 2025, a judge of the Upper Tribunal granted permission for both grounds to be argued.

6. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Discussion

7. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide the analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:

[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:

“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).

[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:

“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”

8. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (I have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  

[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
 
[…]
 
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  

(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  

(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  

9. With the above authoritative observations in mind, I turn to whether the judge’s reasons were defective in law. The focus of the grounds of appeal was on paragraphs [32]-[33]:

The appellant, I am satisfied, still has his passport and he can return with that. I do not believe it was taken from him. In order to get a passport in the first place he must have had a CSID and given how important it is, I am satisfied that he still has it or it is with family. They can either send it to him, or they can meet him at the airport and vouch for him at any checkpoint until such time as he achieves a replacement or his original.

The appellant can be returned to any airport and as such can be met in the KRI by his family whom no doubt will offer him help and assistance as he settles back into life in the KRI.

10. I must exercise caution not to strip these findings of their context. In the preceding comprehensive assessment of the core protection claim, the appellant was roundly disbelieved about the events he claimed had preceded his departure from Iraq. None of these findings were the subject of challenge. This emphatic rejection of the appellant’s credibility is the backdrop against which the judge came to assess his credibility about his professed inability to return to Iraq with the documents he would need to avoid Article 3 conditions. The judge was more than entitled to approach with caution his narrative evidence about what had become of his CSID card. It was further open to the judge to point to the admitted fact that the appellant had left Iraq with his passport to infer that this could only have been obtained if a CSID card was held. Having rejected the core protection claim which involved actors of persecution said to be connected to his father, the judge legitimately found that the CSID card must still be held by the appellant’s family in Iraq. The appellant is not in a state of uncertainty about why these findings were reached. It is perfectly clear why the judge found that he had the necessary documents constructively available to him through his family.

11. A further, more principled, complaint made against the judge’s assessment of this element of the appellant’s case is the finding, at [33], that the appellant could be returned to any part of Iraq, including the IKR. This was said to be out of step with authoritative guidance in SA (Removal destination; Iraq; undertakings) Iraq [2022] UKUT 00037 (IAC) and SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC). The decision was also said to be deficient in failing to assess the respondent’s CPIN on the subject. The difficulty with all of these points is that they fail to engage with the materiality of any error. Even if the judge was mistaken to find on the available country background information and country guidance that the appellant could be returned to any part of Iraq, there was no reason to think that the appellant’s family could not, while holding the documentation he left behind when he departed, meet him on arrival in Baghdad. From Baghdad, the CSID card could be used to facilitate passage through checkpoints on the journey to the IKR. If there was an error, it was demonstrably immaterial to the outcome. Effectively, the appellant was lawfully found to continue to have constructive access to his CSID card. His appeal could not succeed on the strength of an absence of the necessary civil documentation.

Notice of Decision

The judge’s decision did not involve material errors of law. I therefore dismiss the appeal.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2026