UI-2024-005957
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005957
First-tier Tribunal Nos: EU/50848/2024
LE/03517/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 11 August 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
Between
EVALDAS LAPICHINAS
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmed, Counsel, instructed by Bentley Law Ltd.
For the Respondent: Ms A Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 23 June 2025
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the FtT/the Judge’) dated 6th November 2024, in which the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 31st October 2023. The Respondent had refused the Appellant’s application under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules seeking leave to remain on the basis that he is a ‘joining family member’ of a relevant sponsor.
Factual and Procedural Background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Lithuania and he pursued his appeal before the FtT on the basis that the Respondent’s decision is in breach of his rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. On the day of his appeal hearing, the Appellant did not attend the Tribunal centre, nor was he legally represented. The Judge recorded at [4] as a preliminary issue that the Appellant was not represented at the hearing. The Judge also noted that on 28th August 2024, the Tribunal had issued directions for the Appellant to provide his hearing requirements by 4th September 2024. The Appellant duly did so through his solicitors on 3rd September 2024 uploading his response to the online MyHMCTS platform. The Judge then recorded that the Tribunal had issued the hearing notice on 4th September 2024, again through the online platform, notifying those representing the Appellant that the hearing would take place on 31st October 2024. The Judge was satisfied therefore that the Appellant had been appropriately notified of the hearing arrangements.
3. The Judge went on to consider that there had been no request for an adjournment and having regard to the Overriding Objective, the Judge determined to proceed in the absence of any representative for the Appellant. The Judge then checked with the representative of the Respondent, who indicated that they did not wish to make any further representations in support of their position. In light of this, the Judge considered that they could proceed to consider the appeal on the papers.
4. At [8], the Judge recorded that they must resolve whether the Appellant had demonstrated that they are a joining family member of a relevant sponsor in accordance with the requirements of Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules. The Judge’s findings on this issue are set out at [10]-[16]. As a result of a lack of evidence, the Judge found against the Appellant and went on to dismiss his appeal.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal raising essentially one ground of appeal against the Judge’s decision and findings. In summary, the Appellant, who seemingly represented himself in the application for permission appeal, argued that whilst he had been previously legally represented, when the notice of hearing was sent, he was no longer represented by that firm of solicitors. The Appellant submitted that the lack of an adjournment application should not be held against him as he was a litigant-in-person. The Appellant added that the Judge ought to have checked whether the Appellant was content to proceed with the hearing in his absence or whether the matter should have been adjourned to enable the Applicant to secure new legal representation. The Appellant submitted that due to this failure, there was a breach of fairness and natural justice principles.
6. In granting permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal noted that it is at least arguable that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to hear the appeal in the absence of the Appellant without considering of its own initiative whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the appeal. The Upper Tribunal added that it was not clear from the decision what enquiries were made by the Tribunal to find out why the Appellant was absent and whether the Appellant continued to be represented at the date of the appeal hearing.
7. In response, the Respondent did not file and serve a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.
8. At the hearing, Ms Arif, on behalf of the respondent indicated that she was in agreement with the Appellant’s appeal and that there has been procedural unfairness. Ms Arif was content therefore to concede that material errors of law had been made by the Judge in proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the Appellant. Further, that it was not clear what enquiries had been made by the FtT as to the Appellant’s absence and whether he remained legally represented at the date of the hearing. Ms Arif was also of the view that it was appropriate for the appeal to be sent back to the First-tier Tribunal for re-making afresh before a different judge considering the unfairness to the Appellant.
9. In these circumstances, it was not necessary for me to hear from Mr Ahmed, who had been instructed to represent the Appellant before me. I also indicated at the hearing that I was satisfied that Ms Arif’s concession was fair and appropriate. I also agreed with the parties’ positions that it was appropriate, in line with the relevant guidance and Practice Direction, to remit the matter back to the FtT.
10. For completeness, there was one further issue that arose from the Appellant’s appeal to this Tribunal and upon which the Upper Tribunal made observations when granting permission to appeal. This concerned whether the Appellant’s appeal to this Tribunal was out of time. The Appellant explained in his application for permission to appeal that he had not seen the decision of the FtT refusing him permission to appeal until 25th December 2024, as this had been directed to his ‘junk’ folder. The Appellant presented the appeal therefore on the basis that it was out of time but gave reasons for this and why his appeal should be admitted and permission to appeal granted.
11. Mr Ahmed was able to assist me with this issue at the hearing and confirmed that whilst the Appellant had been delayed in acting on the refusal of permission to appeal from the FtT, he had in fact lodged his permission to appeal application on 27th December 2024. The FtT decision refusing permission had been sent out to the parties on 17th December 2024, and thus, there is no question that the Appellant’s appeal was lodged in time. In light of this, I am satisfied that the appeal was received in time.
12. In light of the above, I am satisfied that the Judge made material error(s) of law and the FtT’s decision promulgated on 6th November 2025 shall be set aside, with no findings of fact preserved. As considered above, it is also appropriate that the matter be sent back to the FtT for re-making.
Notice of Decision
13. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 6th November 2024 contained material errors of law and is set aside.
14. The appeal is to be remitted back to the FtT for remaking afresh before a different judge.
Sarah Pinder
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12.07.2025