UI-2024-005959

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 30 Sep 2026
• Promulgation date: 08 Oct 2026
• Publication date: 28 Oct 2026
• Last updated on: 28 Oct 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-005959
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/52152/2024
LP/09258/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MW
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Malik, instructed by Rayan Adams Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant had made a claim for international protection. I have not been asked to set that order aside. I consider that it is right that the order continue, because the public interest in the confidentiality of the asylum process and in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers outweigh the public interest in open justice in the circumstances of this case.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan, born in Lahore in 1968. He last entered the UK on 4 November 2008, on a visit visa valid from 12 June 2007 through 12 June 2009. He remained in the UK as an overstayer after his leave to enter as visitor expired. On 19 January 2023, he made an asylum claim. He said he feared persecution in Pakistan by an unidentified extremist group, which had targeted him because he is a Shia Muslim, and by non-state actors more generally, because of a false accusation of blasphemy the extremist group had made against him 2006.
3. The respondent refused the applicant’s asylum claim in a decision dated 16 January 2024. The appellant appealed and his appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal, but in a decision dated 24 August 2026, the Upper Tribunal set aside the FtT’s decision, with no findings preserved. The Upper Tribunals’ decision is contained in an annex below.
4. The appeal was retained for a fresh hearing on all issues before the Upper Tribunal, in accordance with section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Legal framework
5. Because the appellant claimed asylum after 28 June 2022, his asylum appeal is governed by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. This requires me to analyse the appellant’s asylum claim in two distinct stages. The five NABA questions are well-known and set out in the error of law decision below. I list them here as defined by the issues in this appeal.
6. First, I must determine two questions on the balance of probabilities:
(i) Question 1: does the appellant have a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to him by an actor of persecution)? and
(ii) Question 2: does the appellant in fact fear such persecution in Pakistan as a result of that characteristic?
These are contained at NABA section 32(2)(a) and (b).
7. If I answer both questions in the affirmative, I must then go on to determine three questions about what is reasonably likely to occur if the appellant were to return to Pakistan:
(i) Question 3: Would the appellant be persecuted as a result of the characteristic identified at Question 1? This is set out at NABA section 32(4)(a).
(ii) Question 4: This has two parts:
(a) Is it reasonably likely that the State of Pakistan provides protection from persecution, in that “takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution”? and
(b) would the appellant be able to access that protection?
This is set out at NABA section 32(4)(b), read together with section (34), to which it refers.
(iii) Question 5: Would internal relocation be available to the appellant, in that:
(a) There is a part of Pakistan in which he would not have a well-founded fear of persecution; and
(b) Taking into account the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country and the appellant’s personal circumstances (but disregarding any technical obstacles relating to travel to that part of the country), could the appellant be reasonably expected to travel to and remain there?
This is set out at NABA section 32(3), read together with section 35, to which it refers.
8. If the answer to either question 1 or question 2 is negative, NABA does not require me to answer questions 3-5. This is clear from the terms of section 32(3), which states that section 32(4) only applies if the answer to both of the questions asked at section 32(2) is affirmative.
9. In applying NABA sections 32-35, I have taken into account the guidance set out in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC), with the exception recorded below at [13].
10. If after applying the NABA framework to the appellant’s asylum claim, I find that he is not a refugee as defined by that act, I must then decide whether there is a real risk that he will suffer unlawful killing or inhuman and degrading treatment, such that removing him to Pakistan would contravene the UK’s obligations under article 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and would therefore be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. In deciding this question, I must continue to apply the decision-making framework established in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11 and applied to articles 2 and 3 in MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 at [12]-[13] (citing Vilvarajah & Ors v United Kingdom 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; [1991] ECHR 47 at [103] and Saadi v Italy 37201/06 [2008] ECHR 179 at [132]). See also SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15 at [27]. This requires applying the single standard of a reasonable degree of likelihood to all aspects of the determination.
The hearing
11. At the hearing before me, I had sight of a 190-bundle of evidence prepared by the appellant. This included all of the evidence that had been before the FtT, as well as an updating witness statement from the appellant, dated 10 September 2026, together with an application for the admission of the statement in accordance with Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I admitted that statement. There was no other evidence in the bundle that had not been before the FtT. I also had an updated skeleton argument from Mr Malik. During the hearing, the appellant produced a GP record dated 5 August 2026, which I admitted with Mr Nappey’s consent.
12. At the beginning of the hearing, Mr Malik informed me that there was no current Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) regarding the risk to Shia Muslims in Pakistan, and that the respondent had issued updated versions of two relevant CPINs in September 2026. These are Sufficiency of Protection, Version 5.0 and Internal relocation, Version 3.0. He said that the respondent’s general assessment remained substantially the same as in the versions that were before the FtT. In his submissions, Mr Malik also referred to the evidence about the risks to people accused of blasphemy contained in the respondent’s CPIN Christians and Christian converts, Version 6.0. Together with the articles contained in the appellant’s bundle before the FtT, this was the country evidence before me.
13. At the beginning of the hearing, I advised the parties that I understood NABA Question 1 as calling for a specific finding of fact about the appellant: does he have a characteristic that could cause him to fear persecution in Pakistan for a Convention reason? I would not be following the guidance set out in the final sentence of [13] and Headnote [3] of JCK and taking the facts at their highest for the purposes of answering question 1. This approach is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language, which requires a determination of fact about to the balance of probabilities.
14. I then advised the parties that my preliminary view was that the characteristic that the appellant relied on was his Shia faith, which he describes as being repeatedly insulted in the first unprovoked attack on him and a friend in December 2005. Although the respondent had never expressly accepted that the appellant was a Shia Muslim, nor had she ever disputed it. I therefore did not see this fact as in dispute. I asked the parties for their view about whether I should therefore proceed on the basis that the answer to question 1 was “yes”. After some consideration, this was agreed.
15. I then heard evidence from the appellant, with the assistance of an Urdu interpreter. I am satisfied that they understood each other.
16. The appellant adopted his statement of 10 September 2026 and, subject to the clarifications and amendments made in that statement, his earlier statement of 29 April 2024. He was then cross-examined by Mr Nappey before answering a few further clarifying questions from me.
17. In response to questions from Mr Nappey, the appellant confirmed that he was attacked in December 2005 and May 2006, but he did not know who his attackers were or why they had attacked him. There had been a court case against him following the attack in May 2006, but he did not have any court documents or other evidence of it.
18. The appellant confirmed that, to his knowledge, blasphemy was a very serious crime and the punishment is “very harsh”. Mr Nappey then asked him why he had been released after only two weeks of detention. The appellant answered that this was because when he was presented to the magistrates’ court, he professed his Muslim faith and his respect for the Prophet and his companions and insisted that he had been wrongly accused. He was then released on bail.
19. Mr Nappey asked the appellant to confirm that he no longer had any fear in connection to the court case. The appellant’s response was
“The fear is that, as I have mentioned in my second witness statement, when I came out of the mosque, these people attacked me again and tore off my clothes and said we recognise you. My family was accompanying me. We had gone to do some shopping.”
20. Mr Nappey then asked the appellant if it was after this incident that he decided to leave Pakistan. He answered that he had moved to Faisalbad to stay with his cousin and then when he went out to do the shopping there, the “same thing” happened. Bearded men told him that they recognised him and would follow him wherever he went. They fired in the air, causing a lot of disturbance in the street. The appellant had managed to slip away amongst members of the public. He could not explain how the men had recognised him in Faisalbad. He was surprised about this himself.
21. Mr Nappey asked the appellant why he only left Pakistan for the UK in December 2006, given that he had been issued a visit visa in August. The appellant said that he had been hoping that his wife and children could get visas. He had not been attacked again between June and December 2006, although there was “too much stress”, he was unable to go out and “there were gossips around”.
22. The appellant confirmed that he had returned to Pakistan twice in spite of claiming to be in fear for his life. He said that this was for the sake of his children. He denied that there had been “no issues” while he was there. While coming out the mosque, the people had recognised him. He had spent his time in Pakistan “with great difficulty” and had come back to the UK “with great effort”.
23. He had not claimed asylum after arriving in the UK until 2023, but he had “made applications at different occasions”. When Mr Nappey asked him why he did not make an asylum claim in spite of making several different applications, the appellant said that it was because he feared being sent back to Pakistan.
24. Mr Nappey asked the appellant if it was correct that he had not received any threats while in the UK. The appellant answered that he had not received any direct threats, but “indirectly the situation is that they say that whenever he comes back, they will assassinate” him. Mr Nappey asked who was saying this, and the appellant replied,
I don’t know who they are. They keep their faces covered. They have beards. I don’t know whether they are from the Taliban or any other extremist group.
25. In answer to a further series of questions, the appellant said that he had heard about these threats from “distant friends”. They had said that his family was not safe and that if he came back to Pakistan, he would be shot. He had heard this from a friend, who had sent him a text message telling him what he had heard from another friend. He had not submitted a copy of the message because his phone had been stolen from him by a pickpocket when he was travelling to Manchester. He had reported the theft to Wembley Police but they said that there were so many pending cases like this that there was nothing they could do. In response to a later question from me, the appellant said that he had lost his phone around a year and a half ago. Mr Nappey pointed out to the appellant that he had not referred to this threat in his recent witness statement. He replied that he had previously said that his family was not safe and that he had been threatened that he would be shot if he returned. He also said that he suffered from stress, diabetes, low blood pressure and forgetfulness.
26. Mr Nappey asked the appellant how anyone would know if he returned to Pakistan. He answered, “Sorry. I would not go. I will live here.”
27. The appellant said he was in touch with his wife and sons indirectly, “through somebody”. When asked why he could not contact them directly, he said, “Since I have lost my mobile, I have lost all the contact numbers and since then there has been no contact”. He has brothers and cousins in Pakistan but he is not in contact with them. He has not tried to contact them via Facebook or any messaging apps. He does not know the reason he is not in contact with them.
28. He would not be able to work and support himself because of his health conditions and the threats to his life. Mr Nappey pointed out that there was no evidence of his medical conditions. The appellant responded by placing a number of boxes of prescription medication on the table, along with a recent record from his GP. After considering the GP record, Mr Nappey confirmed that he had no objection to it being admitted.
29. At the end of the cross-examination, I told the appellant I would like to clarify a few of his answers. I asked him,
“You mentioned the court case and then you mentioned coming out of the mosque and being attacked when you were with your family – was that before or after the court case?”
30. The appellant answered, “After the court case. I was released on bail, I came back home and these things started happening.” I asked him whether the time he was attacked with his family was after the court case and he confirmed that that was correct.
31. I also asked him about why he had not appealed against the refusal of his wife and children’s visa applications, and he could not remember whether or not he had done so. I then asked him why he had been afraid to claim asylum but had not been afraid to make other types of application to the Home Office, and he replied he was not sure, and nobody guided him on what steps to be taken. His first application had been on a human rights basis, and he did not remember the basis of the others.
32. There was no re-examination.
33. I then heard submissions from both representatives, for which I am grateful. I have taken them into account in making my decision.
Findings
34. As noted above, it is accepted that the appellant is a Shia Muslim and that the answer to NABA question 1 is yes.
35. NABA question 2 is whether the appellant does fear persecution on return to Pakistan because he is a Shia Muslim.
36. In order to identify what aspects of the appellant’s evidence are relevant to whether he has the fear he claims, I begin by identifying what he says the basis of his fear is. The appellant does not say that he fears persecution for reason of his Shia faith and identity alone, and he has adduced no country evidence speaking directly to the current the risk of persecution for Shia Muslims simply because they are Shia Muslims. The fear he describes is more focussed. He says that ever since the first unprovoked assault in December 2005, an unidentified group of bearded men have repeatedly threatened and assaulted him, as well as making a false blasphemy accusation against him. I find that he has been consistent in saying that in December 2005, the men who attacked him and his friend repeatedly referred to the fact that they were Shia Muslims as the justification for the attack. Therefore, the persecution that the appellant says he fears from these men arises out of the characteristic identified at question 1.
37. I further find that the appellant fears that the men who attacked him twice in Lahore and twice in Faisalbad are connected to each other. At his substantive interview, he said that he thought they belonged to an international organisation, which he described first as “similar to” the Taliban and Jamaat-e-Islami and then as “similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar to the RAW group in India”. In his most recent witness statement, he explains that when he referred to the group being similar to the Taliban, Jamaat-e-Islami and “also referred to RAW”, he was just “making comparison to organised and extremist groups as I understood them”. He does not know if they belong to any “formally named organisation”. Nonetheless, he has consistently said that they were linked to each other and that he realised this because of their beards and their similar clothing and face coverings, as well as because they said that they recognised him on the two occasions on which they assaulted him in Faisalbad.
38. I will refer to these men as “the extremist group”.
39. The appellant also says that the extremist group made a false claim of blasphemy against him, but as he clarified in his oral evidence, he does not fear any harm from the state because of that accusation. This is consistent with what he said at his interview and in his 2024 witness statement
40. The appellant has not been entirely clear about whether he also fears harm from other non-state actors because of the blasphemy accusation. In his 2024 statement, he said that the rumour of the false blasphemy accusation “spread rapidly in the public at large,” putting his life in danger. His 2026 statement is more equivocal. He clarifies that what he “meant” was that “the accusation was becoming known because of the public incident, my arrest and the attention I continued to experience”. In his oral evidence, he referred to “gossip” and stress. In light of the country evidence reporting numerous incidents of mob and vigilante violence against alleged blasphemers in Pakistan, I consider that the applicant has expressed a second fear: that the accusation of blasphemy made against him in 2006 is or could become known in the wider community and that this would put him at risk of violence from non-state actors beyond the extremist group.
41. The question I must answer to the balance of the probabilities is whether the appellant now fears persecution for the reasons he has expressed. That is not the same question as whether his account of the events of 2006-2008 is credible, but given the way the appellant presents his case, the assessment of the existence of the claimed fear cannot rationally be separated from the assessment of the credibility of that account. This is because those events are the sole reason he has given for the fear.
42. The appellant has not provided any court records, statements from friends or family members, text messages, photographs or other external evidence of the threats and violence he has been subjected to by the extremist group, or of the blasphemy charge. Obviously, he is not required to do so, but this means that my assessment of the credibility of his account is largely based on my assessment of his personal credibility.
43. I have reminded myself that I should:
(i) take a structured approach to credibility: KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) [2017] UKUT 491;
(ii) take into account the appellant’s personal characteristics, including his culture, level of education, and physical and mental health: AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [18]; MN v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1746 (“MN and IXU”) at [106]-[108] and [250];
(iii) assess credibility, and plausibility in particular, in the country context: Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 at [25]; HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at [27-30]);
(iv) not draw adverse inferences from the absence of corroborative evidence unless that evidence was reasonably available: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [86]; and
(v) not fall “into the trap of dismissing an appeal merely because the appellant had told lies”: MA (Somalia) at [32].
44. Before considering the appellant’s account, I have reviewed the evidence before me of his personal characteristics. In his most recent statement, the appellant says that he achieved three A-levels in Pakistan, in journalism, English and Islamic studies. He then ran a small fruit and vegetable shop in Lahore, before relocating to Faisalabad, where he worked as security guard. I conclude that he is a literate man, with a modest level of education and the ability to run his own small business. In his 2026 statement, he refers to suffering from a heart condition for which he takes medication, anxiety and back pain. According to the medical records from August 2026, he was diagnosed with congestive heart failure in March 2021 and essential hypertension and diabetes in 2025. His current prescriptions are for aspirin, atorvastatin, bisoprolol, eplerenone, nortriptyline, omeprazole and ramipril. There is no record of his having sought treatment for anxiety or any other mental health condition. I conclude that there is no medical evidence of a condition or treatment that would be likely to undermine his ability to recall past events or to understand and respond to questions.
45. I find that although the broad outline of the appellant’s account has been consistent, there are several material inconsistencies. One is with regard to the sequence and timing of his encounters with the extremist group. At his asylum interview, he said that on 13 December 2005, the extremist group attacked his friend, and when he intervened, they attacked him as well. They ripped of his clothes and stabbed him in the hand with a knife. He lost consciousness and was hospitalised. The next problem he had with them was in May 2006, when he went to the market with his wife and children. Men from the extremist group harassed and teased his family, and when he objected, they punched him and tried to rip his clothes off. The police intervened and took him to the police station, where he was charged with blasphemy. He was asked if he had any further problems “with this group of people” after his release on bail, and he answered, “Every couple of days I would see them loitering around so I moved to my cousin’s house in Faisalabad”. He said that in Faisalabad, when he went to the shops or the market, he would “see similar” people looking at him and one day three or four people came in a car to the marketplace, fired shots in the air and threatened him. He was asked, “Did you have any other issues with them whilst staying in this place?” and he answered, “One day I was going to the mosque and one of their men came towards me and pushed me and said we will abduct you.”
46. In his 2024 statement, by contrast, the appellant said the last attack occurred when he was returning home from the mosque in 2008. I consider that this is a material difference. It is not simply a question of the year a particular event took place but of whether it was one in a series of events leading up to the appellant’s decision to flee Pakistan, or whether it was a new assault, after he had already spent considerable periods of time in the UK. However, as this specific inconsistency was never put to the appellant, I put little weight on it.
47. A more striking inconsistency is about whether the attack on the appellant when he was at the market with his family preceded or followed the blasphemy charge. Until his oral evidence before me, the appellant had consistently described the attack in the marketplace as leading to the making of the blasphemy charge. In his oral evidence before me, however, he was clear that it followed it. I consider this to be a significant difference. In the initial account, the blasphemy charge grew out of the marketplace attack, in that it was the attackers who made the complaint to the police after the police arrived in response to the attack. It is fundamentally different to describe the marketplace attack as succeeding the blasphemy charge.
48. The appellant has also been inconsistent about how he was treated in detention after his arrest. At his asylum interview, he said that he had been interrogated and that there was “lots of torture”. He was not asked for any further details and did not volunteer any. In his 2024 statement, he said that “the conditions were tortuous. I was constantly interrogated by staff in a biased and prejudiced way.” His 2026 statement was similar:
“I was under great tension and was repeatedly questioned and interrogated. I described this treatment and the conditions as torture at my asylum interview”.
49. I consider that the appellant’s credibility is undermined by this gradual adjustment to his account, from “lots of torture” to “tortuous conditions” to “I described this treatment and the conditions as torture”.
50. I infer that the appellant has sought to resile from some of the more dramatic aspects of the account he gave at his interview, without attempting to explain why his account has changed.
51. A similar pattern is evident in the appellant’s account of the extremist group he fears. At his interview, although he did not name the group, he suggested that it was an “international group”, with a network “all over Pakistan”. He described it as similar to very high-profile and nationally powerful organisations, like the Taliban in Afghanistan or RAW in India, referring to the Research and Analysis Wing, the national foreign intelligence agency of India. In his 2024 statement, he said that although he could not identify the group, any reasonable person would have inferred that they were part of an extremist group from their appearance and behaviour. His account now is that he does not even know if the men he fears are part of a formal group at all. When he said at his interview that they were similar to the Taliban, Jamaat-e-Islami and “also referred to RAW”, he was merely “making comparison to organised extremist groups as I understood them”.
52. The appellant’s account of his contact with his family has also changed over time. At his asylum interview, he said he had no direct contact with his wife and children since leaving Pakistan in 2008. He struggled to explain why; when he was asked about this twice, he referred to the danger he had faced in Pakistan and his attempts to get visas for them to come to the UK. In his 2024 statement, he said that he had stopped contact with them for “safety purposes”. This is consistent with the slightly more expansive explanation in his 2026 statement, which was that he stopped contacting them because he believed that direct contact “could draw attention to them or reveal information about me”. In his oral evidence, by contrast, he said that he had not been in contact with them since he lost his mobile phone around 18 months ago.
53. I am aware that each of these specific inconsistencies was not put to the appellant in cross-examination. Taking into account the guidance in in Abdi & Ors v ECO [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 at [29], TUI v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 at [46] (citing Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67), and MR (Pakistan) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 473 at [74], I do not consider that fairness required this. The issues of inconsistencies in the basic sequence of events in Pakistan and the vague identity of the extremist group he fears were both raised squarely in the refusal letter. The appellant has twice responded to the respondent’s criticisms of these aspects of his account in witness statements prepared with the assistance of solicitors. In the decision of the FtT dismissing his appeal, the FtT judge found his lack of contact with his family unexplained, and he was also asked a series of questions about this at his substantive interview. There was no need for him to be given a further opportunity to respond to these credibility points in his oral evidence.
54. In addition, the appellant significantly embellished his evidence under cross-examination, when he mentioned for the first time that he had recently received a warning that he would be assassinated on return to Pakistan. The date was not specified, but it must have been more than 18 months ago, because he said that was when he lost the mobile phone containing the relevant text message. That was prior to his most recent witness statement, but as Mr Nappey pointed out to him, it was not mentioned there.
55. I further find that the appellant’s behaviour is not consistent with his having fled Pakistan in fear for his life as he claims. I consider it plausible that a person who was in genuine fear might nonetheless risk returning to Pakistan to be with his family and to establish the kind of travel record that might make it easier to obtain visit visas for them. What is not consistent with his claimed fear is his delay between the first grant of a visa in August 2006 and his departure in December 2006. Nor is it consistent with his purported motivation for returning that he did not seek to appeal the refusal of his wife’s and children’s visit visas; as recorded in the visa application records in the evidence before me, at the time these applications were made, they would have had a right of appeal.
56. Nor is it consistent with his claimed fear that he failed to claim asylum until 2023. He has been given several opportunities to explain this, but I find his explanations unconvincing. Given his level of education and his residence in the UK, on and off, since December 2006, it is implausible that he was unaware of the possibility of claiming asylum until 2023. He made an application for leave outside the rules in 2011 and for leave on the basis of his private life in 2020. I do not find it plausible that he did not seek either legal advice or advice from people he knew in the UK before making those applications. In either case, it is highly likely that he would have been made aware of the possibility of claiming asylum.
57. In his evidence before me, he said that he had not claimed asylum because he feared being returned to Pakistan. That might be a plausible explanation for not approaching the Home Office at all, but the appellant was unable to explain why he felt safe approaching the Home Office to make several other applications, but not to claim asylum.
58. I have noted the appellant’s medical records above, and I confirm I have borne them in mind when making these findings. There is nothing in those records that could help explain this level of inconsistency on material issues or his delay in claim.
59. I have also considered the country evidence relied on by the appellant. It describes vigilante violence against blasphemy suspects, carried out with impunity in courtrooms, public streets, shops and homes, and often with the active support of members of the public. This level of impunity is inconsistent with the appellant’s account of the extremist group repeatedly discontinuing their attacks or leaving the scene because of the presence of members of the public or the police, and with their making repeated threats to abduct or kill him but never acting on those threats. The evidence also suggests that courts are reluctant to release blasphemy suspects on bail, out of fear of mob violence. I recognise that independent reports are more likely to record the most extreme acts of violence, and that there is a possibility that less extreme violence and threats may be underreported. Nonetheless, I find that there is nothing in the country evidence that actively supports his account.
Conclusions
60. As set out above, I must assess the appellant’s evidence according to two different standards of proof. First, in determining the appellant’s asylum claim, I must consider the totality of the evidence underlying his claimed current fear and, after giving the evidence the weight I consider it is due, determine whether it is more likely than not that the appellant is in fear. If I find that he is, I must go on to consider whether it is reasonably likely that he would be persecuted on return and that neither state protection nor internal relocation would be available to him. If I find that he is not in fear, NABA does not require me to consider, in the alternative, whether he would be at risk of persecution on return if he were in fact in fear.
61. With regard to the appellant’s article 2 and article 3 claims, there is only a single question, to be determined at the standard of a real risk or a reasonable likelihood. This is whether the appellant would suffer a violation of his rights under article 2 or 3 ECHR on return to Pakistan.
Conclusion on the appellant’s asylum claim
62. I find that the appellant’s account of being threatened and assaulted by an extremist group in Pakistan and made the subject of a false blasphemy accusation is not credible. The appellant has given an inconsistent account of material aspects of his claim over time, and there is nothing in the appellant’s background or medical evidence that could explain the level of inconsistency. He has not given a coherent or persuasive explanation for having delayed his departure from Pakistan in 2006 or for not claiming asylum between 2011 – when he first approached the Home Office – and 2023. As this account is the sole basis of his claimed fear, I find that he has not established that it is more likely than not that he fears persecution as he claims, either from the extremist group or from members of the public as a result of the false blasphemy charge made against him by that group. The answer to NABA question 2 is negative.
63. I note the suggestion in JCK at [] that it may be a sensible belt and braces approach to assess whether state protection or internal relocation would be available to the appellant if I had accepted that he does in fact fear persecution. This assessment in the alternative is not required by NABA, and in this case, I consider that it would not be consistent with the overriding objective. It would involve expending more time and adding to the length of this decision in a purely speculative exercise.
Conclusion on the appellant’s article 2 and 3 claim
64. Having reviewed the inconsistencies noted above, as well as the appellant’s unexplained delay in seeking protection, I find that his account of having been targeted by an extremist group and being falsely charged with blasphemy is not reasonably likely to be true.
65. Although there are references in Karanakaran to the requirement to ask oneself, “what if I am wrong?”, these are taken from Australian jurisprudence. I do not consider that it is necessary for me to ask myself this question. For the avoidance of doubt, if I had found that the appellant faced ongoing threats of assassination from an extremist group that had been able to recognise him quickly after his relocation from Lahore to Faisalabad, I would have found that state protection would not have been sufficient. The country evidence before me contains numerous examples of extremists and extremist organisations operating in Pakistan within impunity, particularly when they claim to be targeting people who have committed blasphemy. However, I have found that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant has been threatened, assaulted and falsely charged as he claims.
Conclusion on article 8
66. The appellant does not raise an article 8 claim in his most recent witness statement or in the skeleton argument prepared for this appeal. He has provided no evidence of any private life he may have formed in the UK since his last arrival in 2008. Mr Malik made no submissions on article 8 at the hearing before. I conclude that there is no article 8 claim for me to determine. If there were, in the absence of any evidence regarding his private life in the UK or of significant obstacles to reintegration in Pakistan (other than the risks of persecution by extremists and of gossip or worse from his local community due to the false blasphemy allegation, which I have rejected), any private life claim would be bound to fail.
Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed on all grounds


E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 October 2026





ANNEX
Error of law decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-005959
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/52152/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

The Hon. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MW
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Swain, instructed by Rayan Adams Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr T. Lindsay, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. This case turns on whether the First-tier Tribunal judge (“the Judge”) correctly applied the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) in determining the appellant’s asylum claim.
2. Section 32 of NABA provides that:
“(1) In deciding for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention whether an asylum seeker’s fear of persecution is well-founded, the following approach is to be taken.
(2) The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities—
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.
(See also section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (asylum claims etc: behaviour damaging to claimant’s credibility).)
(3) Subsection (4) applies if the decision-maker finds that—
(a) the asylum seeker has a characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a) (or has such a characteristic attributed to them), and
(b) the asylum seeker fears persecution as mentioned in subsection (2)(b).
(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).”
3. As was recognised in the reported decision of the Upper Tribunal in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) section 32 poses five questions, which are to be answered sequentially, and which we will term:
(1) question 1 (section 32(2)(a));
(2) question 2 (section 32(2)(b));
(3) question 3 (section 32(4)(a));
(4) question 4 (section 32(4)(b)); and
(5) question 5 (section 32(5)).
4. Questions 1 and 2 fall to be determined in what we will call Stage One and Questions 3, 4 and 5 fall to be determined in what we will call Stage Two. (These stages were referred to in JCK as the first and second limbs of section 32.) Questions 1 and 2 must be answered on the balance of probabilities, while questions 3, 4 and 5 must be answered to the “lower standard” of a “reasonable likelihood”. A decision-maker is required to carry forward their answers to questions 1 and 2 when deciding whether and, if so how, to answer questions 3-5.
5. For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that the FtT Judge erred in this case by making inconsistent findings about the answer to question 2, as well as by making specific findings that were either not open to her on the evidence before her or not adequately explained.
(2) The Appellant’s Immigration History and his Asylum Claim
6. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who was born in Lahore in 1968. He travelled to the UK with entry clearance as a visitor on three occasions: on 12 September 2006; in 2007; and on 4 November 2008. On the first two occasions, he returned to Pakistan before his visit visa expired, but on the third he remained in the UK and became an overstayer. He subsequently made two applications for leave to remain: in 2011, for leave outside the rules; and in 2020, for leave on the basis of his family and private life. The respondent refused both applications and certified them as clearly unfounded under section 94 of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002.
7. On 19 January 2023, the appellant claimed asylum. In his substantive asylum interview on 9 January 2024, he said that he feared persecution on return to Pakistan for reason of his Shia faith, which he claimed had led to him being violently assaulted by Sunni extremists in December 2005 and again in May 2006:
(1) On the first occasion, the appellant claimed that he and a friend were assaulted in the street by bearded men with covered faces who “kept saying” that he and his friend were Shias. The men left after people “came running towards us” and he and his friend were taken to hospital. The police came to the hospital to take a report, but no action was taken.
(2) On the second occasion, the appellant claimed that men with a similar appearance harassed him when he was at the market with his wife and children. When he confronted them verbally, the men began assaulting him and trying to tear his clothes off. The police intervened, but instead of arresting the men assaulting the appellant, they arrested the appellant on suspicion of blasphemy. He was detained for two and a half weeks before being brought before a magistrate and granted bail on condition that he should “be respectful towards my religion and the Prophet”.
8. The appellant said that in June 2006 he relocated from his home in Lahore to his cousin’s home in Faisalabad out of fear of further attack. Shortly after he arrived, he was again approached by extremists from the same group. On one occasion, they saw him in Faisalabad market, fired shots in the air and told him that they recognised him and would not “let him off”. On another occasion, one of the extremists encountered him when he was on his way to the mosque and punched him and threatened to abduct him. In his appeal statement, he said that this second assault in Faisalabad had occurred during his return visit to Pakistan in 2008.
9. As we have said, the appellant travelled to the UK on a visit visa on 12 September 2006, returning to Pakistan before his visa expired. He claimed that he had travelled to the UK out of fear but had returned to Pakistan in the hope of obtaining visit visas for his wife and children which would enable them to join him here. He claimed that he had returned to Pakistan for a second time for the same reason. He said that it was after his wife and children had been refused visas that he entered the UK again on 3 November 2008. He said that he had not been in contact with his wife and children since then, but that he did receive news about them through a friend who travelled to Pakistan regularly. When he was asked at his asylum interview when he had first claimed asylum, he pointed to his applications for further leave to remain. He said he had not applied earlier because he was scared of being returned to Pakistan and that this fear had led to him developing “heart issues”.
(3) The Respondent’s Decision
10. In a decision dated 16 January 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim. She accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality but rejected his account of events in Pakistan in 2005 and 2006 as internally inconsistent, lacking in detail and “unreasonable”. She also found that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by his returns to Pakistan in 2006 and 2007 and by his long delay in claiming asylum.
11. In the alternative, the respondent found that state protection and internal relocation would be available. By the appellant’s own account, his family was living safely in Faisalabad and the evidence in the Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”) on Pakistan: Shia Muslims was said to establish that state protection was, in general, available to Shia Muslims, there were large Shia communities in major urban centres in Pakistan and “[m]any communities are integrated and live alongside the majority Sunni Muslims”.
(4) The Appellant’s Appeal Evidence
12. The appellant appealed. In support of his appeal, he submitted a witness statement in which he repeated most of the account given at his interview, with some further detail, and responded to the reasons for refusal letter. He also submitted a skeleton argument which asserted that he was at risk for reasons both of his Shia faith and of the false accusation of blasphemy. He relied on excerpts from the respondent’s CPIN on Pakistan: Shia Muslims which described acts of sectarian violence against Shias and a rise in blasphemy charges, 70% of which were brought against Shias. The appellant also relied on two Wikipedia articles and three news reports about the grave consequences of being accused of blasphemy in Pakistan.
13. The respondent conducted a review and maintained her decision.
(5) The FtT Judge’s Decision
14. In the challenged decision, the Judge described the basis of the appellant’s claim, at [4], as being that he feared being “attacked by extremist groups, accused of blasphemy and/or perceived to be a Shia Muslim”. The Judge set out: at [5], that the hearing was recorded; at [6], that the appellant and the Urdu interpreter understood each other; and at [10], that she had heard evidence from the appellant and submissions from the parties.
15. The Judge set out the issues in dispute, as agreed between the parties, as follows, at [7]:
“(a) Whether the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of serious harm on return to Pakistan.
(a) [sic] Whether there would be sufficiency of protection for the appellant and/or whether internal relation [sic] within Pakistan is viable and reasonable.
(b) Whether return to Pakistan breaches Article 2 or Article 3 or Article 8.”
16. Under the heading “Legal Framework,” the Judge directed herself as follows, at [11]-[13]:
“11. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well- founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
a. whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
b. whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality as a result of that characteristic.
12. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic, and fears persecution as a result of that characteristic, I must go on to determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:
a. the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return.
b. that there would be insufficient protection; and
c. they could not internally relocate.
13. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.”
17. The Judge’s findings are divided into three sections, entitled: “Appeal on Asylum Grounds”; “Appeal on Article 2 and Article 3 Grounds”; and “Appeal on Humanitarian Grounds”. The section entitled “Appeal on Asylum Grounds” is subdivided into sections entitled: “Refugee Convention”; “Well-founded Fear of Persecution”; and “Protection and Internal Relocation”.
18. The section entitled “Refugee Convention” consists of the following two paragraphs:
“14. In the decision letter, the respondent accepts that the appellant’s fear that he will be persecuted does constitute the Convention reason of religion in accordance with the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. This is based on the actual or imputed perception of the appellant as a Shia Muslim. I therefore determine on the balance of probabilities that the appellant does have a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for reasons of religion and that the appellant does in fact fear such persecution in Pakistan as a result of that characteristic.
15. I am therefore to consider whether applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return, whether there would be insufficient protection, and whether the appellant could internally relocate.”
19. Under the heading, “Well-founded Fear of Persecution”, the Judge set out, at [16], a summary of the appellant’s account. At [17], she considered whether the appellant’s credibility was damaged because of his delay in claiming asylum, in accordance with section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (“section 8”). She found that it was. The appellant had only claimed asylum after he had been in the UK for more than 14 years and after being notified of a series of adverse immigration decisions, namely the refusal of his applications for leave to remain in 2013 and 2020 and the service of a notice of liability for removal in January 2014. At the hearing before the Judge, the appellant had claimed that this delay was caused by his being “unaware of the procedure to claim asylum.” This was not plausible.
20. At [19], the Judge set out the respondent’s reasons for finding the appellant’s account internally inconsistent and lacking in detail. At [20], she set out the appellant’s response to these findings.
21. At [21], the Judge gave her reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account:
“The appellant does not bring forth any documentation to support his claim. I did not find the appellant’s account to be credible. I have already found that the previous applications by the appellant together with the significant delay in making this claim for asylum has damaged the appellant’s credibility in accordance with [section 8]. First, I find that the appellant gave contradictory evidence about facing an outstanding false blasphemy charge. The appellant’s evidence at the hearing before me was that this was concluded in 2006, he was able to explain himself at the court hearing in Pakistan and was released on condition of being respect [sic] of his Muslim religion. The appellant’s evidence was also that he was distressed by this as it affected his standing in the community, and so he decided to leave for the United Kingdom. While this may be, so I do not find this to be sufficient to amount to a fear of persecution on return to Pakistan. Second, the appellant has been inconsistent about his contact with his family, and I did not find credible his evidence that he cut ties with his family in Pakistan in 2008 to avoid risk. In his evidence the appellant was unable to give a plausible explanation as why [sic] he no longer contacts his wife and children in Pakistan. I found the appellant’s evidence about this to be incoherent. Third, the last incident was in 2006, some 18 years ago and I do not in any event find it reasonably likely that that these non-state actors would continue to have an interest in the appellant and/or have such power with the authorities to lead the appellant to fear persecution. Fourth, the appellant returned twice to Pakistan from the United Kingdom before he arrived in the United Kingdom for the last time in 2008. That he was able to do so without difficulty and that he decided to do so undermines the credibility of the appellant’s account that he feared and fears that he would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return to Pakistan. For these reasons I do not find the appellant to be credible witness. I find to the lower standard that the appellant has not established that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would be persecuted for a convention reason on return. I therefore dismiss the asylum appeal for this reason.”
22. At [22]-[23], the Judge considered the issues of state protection and internal relocation. She referred to the respondent’s CPIN, Pakistan: Actors of Protection, and to AH (Sufficiency of Protection, Sunni Extremists) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 05862 for the proposition that “In general, the state is both willing and able to offer sufficient protection to persons fearing non-state, including ‘rogue’ state actors”. She continued:
“I have had regard to the individual circumstances of the appellant’s case. It was the appellant’s evidence that following the first incident the reason the police were unable to pursue the perpetrators was because the appellant was unaware of their identity. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the state would be willing and able to provide effective protection.”
23. At [23], the Judge found that the appellant would be able to relocate safely because he had twice returned to Pakistan without difficulty following the “incidents in 2005-2006”. Internal relocation would be reasonable because the appellant was an adult without significant health problems, he had a wife and children in Pakistan who would be able to assist him and he would be able to find work. The asylum appeal was dismissed for this reason as well.
24. Under the heading “Appeal on Article 2 and Article 3 Grounds”, the Judge said, at [24], “I bring forth [sic] my findings above. For the same reasons I dismiss the appeal on Article 2 and Article 3 grounds”. At [25], the Judge dismissed the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds because, “for the reasons set out above”, the appellant was not at real risk of suffering serious harm in Pakistan. Nor did the evidence suggest that there was an armed conflict or indiscriminate violence in his home area.
(6) The Grounds of Appeal
25. The appellant applied for permission to appeal. The FtT refused the appellant permission to appeal and the appellant renewed his application before the Upper Tribunal. An Upper Tribunal Judge granted permission to appeal. Regrettably, the appellant’s grounds were not numbered. For ease of understanding, we use the numbers assigned by the Upper Tribunal Judge in her decision granting permission to appeal.
26. We deal with each ground in turn below, addressing the ground of appeal and what, if anything, was said about it in the respondent’s Rule 24 response, the respondent’s skeleton argument dated 19 March 2006 and/or the appellant’s skeleton argument submitted on 26 March 2026. We then set out our decision on that ground.
27. At the hearing, we heard submissions from the parties about both the individual grounds of appeal and the broader question of what section 32 requires. We also received written submissions filed after the hearing, in relation to the proper interpretation and application of section 32. We confirm that we have taken those oral and written submissions into account in making our decision and we mean no disrespect by not rehearsing them here.
(6)(a) Ground One: The Judge’s Decision was Internally Inconsistent
(6)(a)(i) Ground One: Submissions
28. As we have said, at [14] of her decision the Judge found on the balance of probabilities that the appellant did in fact fear persecution in Pakistan for reasons of religion. By ground one, the appellant contended that there was a disconnect between that finding and the rejection of his claim. The appellant highlighted in particular the contradiction between the finding that the appellant held a genuine fear of persecution and the specific finding at [21] that his distress at the effect of the blasphemy charge on his standing in the community did not amount to a fear of persecution.
29. In her Rule 24 response, the respondent said with regard to ground one:
“It is submitted that the FTTJ did not err at [14] he was merely accepting there was a convention [sic] reason ie religion he was not accepting there was a risk to the appellant. At [15] the FTTJ states that he would consider the risk to the appellant on return and whether there was a reasonable degree of likelihood he would be persecuted on return. This is not in my respectful submission the FTTJ accepting the appellant would be persecuted. There is no error in this but a disagreement with findings.”
30. In her skeleton argument, the respondent repeated and expanded on her opposition to ground one. The appellant, in his skeleton argument, expanded on ground one, by relying expressly on section 32 of NABA.
31. At the hearing, after Mr Swain’s submissions, Mr Lindsay accepted that ground one was made out because the positive finding about subjective fear made at [14] was irreconcilable with the findings at [21]. He pointed out that the appellant’s returns to Pakistan in 2007 and 2008 could be considered to undermine his claim to have a subjective fear of persecution in Pakistan, but he took the position that, in accordance with the respondent’s published policy, any positive findings made at Stage One of the NABA analysis had to be carried forward to Stage Two. In this case, this included the finding that the appellant had a genuine fear of persecution. The Judge’s error in failing to carry forward the positive finding from Stage One then infected the findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. As a result, he suggested that the decision be set aside in its entirety.
(6)(a)(ii) Ground One: Decision
32. Having heard from the parties, we agree that ground one is made out. It was clearly inconsistent for the Judge to find, on the one hand, that the appellant did in fact fear persecution for reasons of religion in Pakistan, but then, on the other hand, to find that:
(1) his distress at the effect of the blasphemy charge on his standing in the community did not amount to a fear of persecution on return to Pakistan; and
(2) his returns to Pakistan undermined the credibility of his account that he feared and fears that he would be persecuted for a Convention reason.
33. Such an inconsistency would amount to an error of law regardless of NABA, but it is relevant to note that it arose in a judgment in which the Judge, rightly, was considering, in order, questions 1 to 5 posed by NABA. In effect:
(1) in [14], the Judge gave a positive answer to question 2; but
(2) in [21], when considering question 3, the Judge twice gave what was, in effect, a negative answer to question 2.
34. We consider that this inconsistency can also be seen as an impermissible failure to carry forward the positive answer to question 2 when deciding questions 3-5.
(6)(b) Ground Two: Insufficient Reasoning
(6)(b)(i) Ground Two: Submissions
35. By ground two, the appellant criticised the parts of [21] which began “First” and “Second”, i.e. those which concerned the alleged blasphemy charge and the appellant’s lack of contact with his family. The appellant contended that the Judge did not specify how the appellant’s evidence on these issues had been “inconsistent” and that the Judge gave insufficient reasons for her conclusions on these matters.
36. With regard to ground two, the respondent submitted that:
“The Reps [sic] state regarding [21] that the FTTJ gave no reasons for the inconsistencies when in fact at [19] the FTTJ highlights the many inconsistencies he had with the appellants [sic] evidence. He explained in great detail what the appellant had said in his screening interview against what he now says, he highlights he was bailed in may [sic] 2006 but the alleged attack occurred in June 2006. This is nothing more than the Reps complaining about a very detailed cogent determination.”
37. The skeleton arguments did not add anything of substance to ground two.
(6)(b)(ii) Ground Two: Decision
38. We consider that ground two is also made out. We can identify no inconsistency between what the Judge recorded the appellant as saying at the hearing in relation to the alleged blasphemy charge and what he had said previously, either at his substantive interview or in his appeal statement. On the contrary, the appellant said in his witness statement of 29 April 2024 that he was “released through bail on 15 May 2006, under the conditions of being respectful of my religion and our Prophet”, while in answer to questions [45]- [47] of the substantive interview, he said:
“I was bailed in 2006 … the conditions on my bail was I should be respectful towards my religion and profit [sic] and I said I hadn’t done anything wrong it is a trumped up charge against me. I have always respected my profit [sic]. … I had to go in front of the magistrates …”
39. The Judge’s finding that appellant’s evidence about his contact with his family was inconsistent and incoherent was fatally vague, in that neither the inconsistency nor the incoherence was identified. We note here that the inconsistencies to which the respondent pointed in her Rule 24 response were those raised in the refusal letter. The Judge recorded them, at [19], but did not rely on them. In any event, they did not concern the appellant’s evidence as to his lack of contact with his family.
40. Despite the Judge’s understandable concerns about the appellant’s returns to Pakistan and the appellant’s very long delay in making his claim, we consider these errors to have been material, especially given that our conclusion in relation to ground one amounts to a finding that there was a flaw in the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
(6)(c) Ground Three: Irrational Finding on Sufficiency of Protection
(6)(c)(i) Ground Three: Submissions
41. The appellant contended that it was irrational for the Judge to conclude that sufficiency of protection was available for the reason given at [22], which was that:
“It was the appellant’s evidence that following the first incident the reason the police were unable to pursue the perpetrators was because the appellant was unaware of their identity.”
42. The appellant contended that this evidence showed, at the least, that police protection had been ineffective. Moreover, the Judge had failed to take into account the appellant’s evidence that, on the second occasion when he had been attacked, the police had arrested him on a blasphemy charge. This undermined the finding that the police were willing to offer him protection.
43. The Rule 24 response did not address, and the skeleton arguments added nothing of substance on, ground three.
(6)(c)(ii) Ground Three: Decision
44. In our judgment, ground three is also made out. It was clearly material to the assessment of sufficiency of protection that the appellant claimed that on the second occasion on which he was attacked by Sunni extremists, he was arrested on false blasphemy charges. It is also clear from the country evidence that the appellant’s case was in part that, as a Shia Muslim, he was at increased risk of such false blasphemy charges. When considering, in the alternative, whether state protection would be available if the appellant’s account were true, it was not open to the Judge to ignore this aspect of his claim.
(6)(d) Ground Four: Inadequate Consideration of Internal Relocation
(6)(d)(i) Ground Four: Submissions
45. By ground four, the appellant contended that the Judge erred by considering only whether internal relocation would be reasonable, and not whether it would be safe
46. In granting permission on this ground, the Upper Tribunal Judge commented:
“It is arguable that the FTT erred in determining the internal relocation question by considering only whether internal relocation would be reasonable, and not whether it would be safe. The difficulty here is that it is impossible to tell why the appellant claimed that he would be at risk throughout Pakistan, because it is not clear from the decision why he claims he was repeatedly accused of blasphemy/being a Shia Muslim (was it, for example, because of a genuinely held belief or for some other reason that he could not or should not be expected to change) or why he says he would be at risk throughout Pakistan (the “extremist group” is not identified, making it impossible to know whether the appellant had put forward a claim that the group had a nation-wide reach).”
47. The Rule 24 response did not address, and the skeleton arguments added nothing of substance on, ground four.
(6)(d)(ii): Ground Four: Decision
48. We consider that ground four is made out. On the one hand, while it is true that most of [23] addresses reasonableness, the first sentence concludes with the words “without there being a real risk”, which indicates that the Judge considered and made a finding on the issue of safety. On the other hand, the Judge gave no reasons for her finding on safety, which indicates that the decision contained inadequate consideration of the issue of safety.
(7) Disposal
49. We have considered whether the appeal should be remitted to the FtT or retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking. We have taken into account the guidance set out in Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 159, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, and we consider it appropriate to retain this appeal for remaking in the Upper Tribunal. There is a strong presumption in favour of retaining the appeal in the Upper Tribunal, and although the FtT’s factual findings have been set aside, the factual matrix of the appellant’s claim is straightforward, which limits the amount of fact-finding which will be required. Nor does the appellant say that he was denied a fair hearing before the FtT.
50. We also express our gratitude for the parties’ submissions on the proper interpretation and application of section 32 of NABA, although we ultimately decided that we did not need to reach that question in order to determine this appeal. We have addressed it instead in our decision in DS v SSHD UI-2025-004745.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 15 October 2024 is set aside with no findings preserved.
The appeal will be retained for remaking before the Upper Tribunal.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


14 August 2026