Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005961

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61151/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUGHES

Between

HY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No representation.
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 20 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. For clarity, we refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The Respondent appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘The Judge’), promulgated following a hearing in the Virtual Region on 5 November 2024, in which the Judge allowed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his protection claim but to grant him humanitarian protection.
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Yemen born in 1993. The basis of his claim is recorded briefly by the Judge between [3-5] in the following terms:
3 The appellant worked as a contracting supervisor for the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Aden from February 2020 until June/July 2020. His role involved consumer protection, specifically monitoring traders to ensure they were not selling expired or substandard goods.
4 The appellant encountered significant resistance from traders involved in corrupt practices. These traders had attempted to bribe him to overlook their own violations. When he refused, he received threats through text messages from unknown numbers demanding that he accepts bribes or face harm.
5 On 15/06/2020 there was a shooting incident and the appellant’s car was attacked by shooters, although he was not injured his car was severely damaged by bullets. He reported these incidents to the police, but no action was taken.
4. A more detailed chronology had been set out in Secretary of State’s decision dated 30 October 2023, which set out that the Appellant’s fear was that if returned to Yemen he would be killed by the unknown individuals, as well as the general situation in the country.
5. In the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the Judge was invited to draw an analogy between a person working for the government of Yemen, upholding the government’s anti-corruption regulatory framework, and individuals adopting an anti-gang stance. Relying upon EMAP (Gang violence – Convention reason) El Salvador CG [2022] UKUT 00335 (IAC), it was argued that the Refugee Convention was engaged, that the Appellant had an imputed political opinion favouring the Yemen government, and that his return would expose him to a real risk of persecution and harm at the hands of corrupt individuals and militias.
6. The Judge’s findings are set out from [12] of the decision under challenge leading to it being found at [17-19]:
17. It is against this background that the Appellant worked as a contracting supervisor for the Ministry of Trade and Industry and his role involved consumer protection, specifically monitoring traders to ensure that they were not selling expired or substandard goods. It has been accepted that the Appellant encountered significant resistance from traders involved in corrupt practices and he received threats and an attempt on his life by the shooting incident.
18. I accept that because of the government’s stance on anticorruption as set out in the CMI U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre report, which I have set out above and the Appellant ensuring that the government’s position on corruption was adhered to, I accept that there is an imputed political opinion.
19. On the basis of my overall findings, I do accept that the appellant is a refugee.
7. In their application for permission to appeal the Judge’s decision, dated 11 November 2024, the Respondent alleges the following errors were made by the Judge:
a) It is respectfully submitted that the FTTJ has failed to provide adequate reasons for finding that the appellant’s claim engages the Refugee Convention and that he is entitled to protection on this basis, which causes their overall decision to allow this appeal to be flawed and amount to a material misdirection of law.
b) Although the FTTJ has cited the case of EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) [2022] UKUT 335 (IAC) [7], which concerns itself with the concept of how those deemed in opposition to gangs with significant influence can be viewed as having a political opinion, they have failed to reason how this applies in the appellant’s particular circumstances.
c) From his account, he worked on behalf of the Yemini government but experienced opposition from random traders involved in bribery/corruption. However, this fails to establish the power and influence of these individuals and whether the threat would persist upon return, considering he has left this role and there is no ongoing investigation or other that would lead to any retributive action being taken against him. These points were not addressed by the FTTJ.
d) Furthermore, there are no claims or findings that these individuals have ties to the Yemeni government/high profile political figures or the rebel groups and so if the appellant were able to return and relocate, there is no evidence that they would even be aware of this or that they could trace him to another area to enact persecutory treatment. The evidence, which post-dates the appellant’s exit from Yemen, points to anti-corruption laws and action being taken against those who break the law and so it is unclear why the appellant wouldn’t be able to benefit from this protection if he needed to approach the State for protection on return. The FTTJ’s findings have failed to adequately consider or reason against this.
e) The fact he cannot return due to the indiscriminate violence and turmoil in the country has already been considered, which led to a grant of humanitarian protection, so this is not an appeal that will result in his immediate return to Yemen unless the country conditions were to improve. However, as submitted above, even if he were able to be returned now, he has the option to relocate and seek protection.
f) It is therefore submitted that the FTTJ has failed to provide adequate reasons for their decision and that allowing the appeal amounts to a material misdirection of law.
8. Permission to appeal was considered by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal and granted in the following terms:
It is arguable that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for finding that the Appellant’s implementation of government policy as a civil servant imputed to him a political opinion. All grounds may be argued.
9. The Appellant has not filed or served a Rule 24 reply.
The hearing before us
10. The Appellant was assisted by the services of Mr Baker, an Arabic interpreter. At the outset we established that they could communicate without difficulty.
11. The only issue the First-tier Tribunal had been called upon to decide was whether the appellant fell within the Refugee Convention on the grounds of his imputed political opinion. We explained that to the Appellant when explaining the procedure for the hearing before us, and reassured him that there was no question of his existing grant of Humanitarian Protection being affected by these proceedings, or indeed the decision that had already been taken by the Respondent to enable him to be reunited with his family members.
12. We heard submissions from Mr Lawson, on behalf of the Respondent, and then we heard from the Appellant. Whilst the Appellant, perhaps understandably, did not address the issue of there being a Convention reason, he re-iterated his fear of returning to Yemen.
Discussion and analysis
13. A person challenging a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26], and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30-31], which we have.
14. When analysing a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, is important to read it sensibly and holistically, and to guard against the danger of simply substituting one view for the legitimate view of another. Perfection is not being sought, there is no obligation to provide the best possible reasons (or indeed reasons for reasons), and an irrationality challenge imposes an elevated threshold.
15. However, we find the Judge erred in this case. We are satisfied that the Judge’s reasoning in finding that a Convention reason exists is wholly inadequate. We can identify no cogent reasoning to support the finding that simply the Appellant’s implementation of a government policy as a civil servant somehow imputed to him a political opinion. Furthermore, whilst the Judge cites EMAP, and by implication appears to accept the Appellant’s submission that an analogy may be drawn with his case, there is no reasoning to support this. Clearly, these material errors go to the heart of the sole issue the Judge was called upon to decide.
16. It follows that we set aside the First-tier Tribunal decision.
17. Applying AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), we have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. There was no unfairness in this case at first instance, and given the absence of any further fact-finding required, we do not consider it appropriate for this matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Having had the benefit of the entirety of the documentary evidence, written submissions and oral submissions, we propose to re-make the decision.
Analysis and remaking
18. In remaking the protection decision, the burden of proof is on the Appellant. It is for him to establish that returning him to Yemen would expose him to a real risk of persecution for a Convention reason. The standard of proof is real risk or reasonable likelihood and is often referred to as the lower standard.
19. We bear in mind there is no challenge to the credibility of the Appellant’s account, and that the sole issue for us to decide is whether the Appellant’s (accepted) fear of persecution in Yemen is for one or more of the reasons outlined in the Refugee Convention.
20. The reason that has been asserted by the Appellant is his imputed political opinion, for the reasons that have already been identified.
21. The Appellant’s case, set out briefly in the undated and unattributed Appeal Skeleton Argument before the First-tier Tribunal, is that his employment in Yemen imputes a political opinion to him. It is submitted that those activities were “inherently political in the context of Yemen’s volatile environment.” This assertion was not supported by any reference to any of the Country evidence at pp.103-199 of the consolidated Upper Tribunal bundle, which documents were similarly before the First-tier Tribunal.
22. The Respondent’s position, apparent from the decision letter dated 30 October 2023, the Review dated 23 October 2024, and the oral submissions of Mr Lawson, is that the evidence relied upon by the Appellant does not discharge the burden of demonstrating that the threats against the Appellant were as a result of his imputed political opinion. It was not accepted therefore that the Appellant’s fear on return was for a Convention reason.
23. We acknowledge that the Appellant had encountered his previous threats and as a result of his work as a contracting supervisor for a government ministry, however there is no cogent basis for the assertion that, in effect, that attributed to him a profile that aligned him to the political opinions of the Yemen government. He was a contracted employee in a modest role for a period of 5 months between February and July 2020.
24. Furthermore, the ambitious analogy sought to be drawn between the Appellant’s case and the facts, or principles, in EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) [2022] UKUT 335 (IAC) cannot withstand scrutiny. Whilst EMAP is a country guidance decision about particular gangs in El Salvador, it does serve to illustrate that something needs to be known about non-state actors of persecution before the conclusion can sensibly be reached that those whom the applicant fears function as part of the political landscape. Such detail, necessary to add the political dimension to what are otherwise simply criminals and rogue traders, is markedly absent from the evidence before us. Corrupt trading practices may be widespread in Yemen, and may often involve criminal conduct, but there is no satisfactory evidence to demonstrate that the motives of the non-state actors whom the Appellant fears is anything other than increasing their own profits from selling expired or substandard goods. We find it manifestly artificial to frame Appellant’s fear of harm as persecution for reasons of his imputed political opinion.
25. It follows that we are satisfied that the basis of the Appellant’s claim does not invoke the Refugee Convention.

Notice of Decision
1. There was an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and we set it aside.
2. We remake the decision and dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds.

Leighton Hughes
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 May 2025