Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005969

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53399/2023
LP/08247/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

HQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Khan instructed by Elder Rahimi Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 9 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Groom, (‘the Judge’), promulgated following a remote hearing on 2 October 2024 in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his claim for international protection and/or leave to remain in the United Kingdom and any other basis.
2. The protection claim was made on 7 June 2021 and refused on 25 May 2023.
3. The Appellant claimed an entitlement to a grant of international protection on two grounds being (i) that he will be at risk on return on the basis of being a member of a Particular Social Group (PSG), and, (ii) that he does not have valid documents making return to Iraq not feasible.
4. The Judge records the Secretary of State accepting:

a. The Appellant’s nationality and ethnicity.
b. That the Appellant had a relationship with a woman to whom he was not married, whom the Judge refers to as “S”.

5. The Judge’s findings are set out from [11] of the decision under challenge.
6. At [20] the Judge finds that on the basis of the Appellant’s claim he was never married to S, he was never a part of her family and could not be considered a member of that family group.
7. At [23] the Judge writes that having considered the authority of Fornah and the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN), the Appellant cannot be considered as a member of a particular social group on the basis of his claim that he had a 5 – month relationship with S as he has described. The Judge therefore finds his asylum claim is not based on a Convention reason and dismissed the appeal on asylum grounds.
8. The Judge refers to the CPN: Iraq blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq. July 2024 and two specific paragraphs of that document at [21 – 22] of the determination in the following terms:

21. I have considered the CPIN: Iraq Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq. July 2024 in particular as paragraph 2.2.3 which states “male potential victims of “honour “crimes (based on their involvement in a premarital or extramarital relationships with a female) are not considered to form a particular social group (PSG) within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. This is because while they do share a common background that cannot be changed in that they have compromised the familial ‘honour’ of the females family; they do not have a distinct identity. This is due to the differing notions of male and female honour, the patriarchal nature of Iraqi society and a lack of evidence to suggest that male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes are perceived as being different by the surrounding society.”

22. Paragraph 2.2.4 states “However, male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes based on their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression would form a PSG” and 2.2.5 “where a male is at real risk of serious harm as a result of a premarital or extramarital relationship they may qualify for Humanitarian Protection.”

9. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant had established an entitlement to a grant of international protection on any other basis.
10. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on the following grounds:

Grounds of Appeal

5. These grounds for permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s (‘FtT) Determination are made to the FtT further to Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 11(2), (3) and (4) and the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, SI 2008/2698, r 21(2). The grounds refer to the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument (‘ASA’), Appellant’s Bundle (‘AB’), Respondent’s Bundle (‘RB’), Asylum Witness Statement (‘WS’), Asylum Interview Record (‘AIR’), the Appellant’s Witness Statement (‘AWS’), and the Advocate’s Appeal Hearing Notes.

6. The grounds of appeal based on errors of law can be summarised as follows:

6.1 Failure to consider and resolve conflicts of opinion, namely whether men who had sexual relations with an unmarried woman and are potential victims of ‘honour crimes’ in Iraq can constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention;
6.2 Perverse or irrational findings about A’s evidence about S’s father and brothers;
6.3 Perverse or irrational findings about A's CSID card and contact with his Iraqi family; and
6.4 Perverse or irrational findings about A’s credibility regarding age, transit countries, and exit from Iraq.

Failing to Consider Conflicts of Opinion – PSG – Male Potential Victims of ‘Honour Crimes’

7. It is respectfully submitted that FTJ Groom failed to consider conflicts of opinion, holding that A was not a member of a Particular Social Group (‘PSG’) because he was not married to S and was never part of S’s family, but not explicitly addressing whether male potential victims of ‘honour crimes’ in Iraq can constitute a PSG if they are not married to the woman with whom they have an unmarried sexual relationship with, as per [18]-[23] of the Determination.
8. At [20] of the Determination, FTJ Groom held “the appellant was never married to S, he was never part of S’s family or can be considered a member of that family group”. At [21] of the Determination, FTJ Groom quoted the R’s CPIN ‘Iraq Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq’ dated July 2024, which states that male potential victims of ‘honour crimes’ are not considered PSG members because “they do not have a distinct identity” due to (1) “dihering notions of male and female honour”, (2) “the patriarchal nature of Iraqi society”and (3) a lack of evidence to suggest that male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes are perceived as being diherent by the surrounding society”. At [23] of the Determination, FTJ Groom dismissed the appeal on asylum grounds, holding that A cannot be considered a member of a PSG on the basis of a 5-month relationship with S, and thus that the asylum claim is not based on a Convention reason.

9. The Determination does not explain why R’s country evidence that such men do not constitute a PSG – quoted at [21] of the Determination – is more convincing than A’s country evidence – quoted at [17]-[19] of the ASA and found, inter alia, at AB/60, 73- 74, 107, and 115. It is respectfully submitted that this amounts to an error of law, applying R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982.

Perverse or Irrational Findings – A’s Evidence about S’s Father and Brothers

10. FTJ Groom held at [25]-[26] that A’s evidence regarding S’s father and S’s brothers “is vague and lacks detail which would enable me to conclude that he is at risk from them”, based on, inter alia, (1) A’s interview answers that A believes S’s father is powerful based on what “people in his local area have said”, (2) that it is “surprising” 015 3 A was not able to provide more specific answers about what S’s father or S’s brothers do, (3) that A stating in his interview that S’s father and S’s brothers only wore ordinary Kurdish clothes, and that (4) A had not witnessed S’s father or brothers harm anybody.
11. It is respectfully submitted that the above finding is perverse or irrational because it does not recognise and overlooks the scope and substance of A’s evidence about S’s father and brothers, including the following points:

11.1 A gave the names of S’s brothers and S’s father (RB/102 WS[7], RB/71 AIR26, AB/2 AWS[9]);
11.2 A’s family did not go to the police due to S’s father’s high position (RB/105 WS[20]);
11.3 A described S’s father as being asked to intervene if people had problems with the government, that people called him a commander and that he was fighting Daesh (AB/2 AWS[7]);
11.4 A described S’s father taking over a piece of land that belonged to the local council (AB/2 AWS[8]);
11.5 A described S’s brothers driving a car with the inscription ‘ministry of Pashmerga’ (AB/2 AWS[10]); and
11.6 A corrects the asylum interview record, stating that A saw S’s brothers wearing uniforms, and that understood that high-ranking Pashmerga members only wore uniforms on special occasions (AB/2 AWS[11]).
11.7 A further ahirmed and explained his knowledge of S’s father and brothers in re-examination during the appeal hearing (Advocate’s Appeal Hearing Notes, pp8- 10), which is not recognised by the Determination at [24]-[26], despite the Determination referring to A’s answers in cross-examination at [15], [17], and [30].

12. Furthermore, A gives explanations for lacking details about S’s father and brother, including S’s family being rich and looking down on A’s lower-class family (RB/102 WS[7]; RB/85 AIR111) and A’s basic primary school education (RB/101 WS[3]).

13. A’s evidence went unchallenged in other areas despite lacking details, including that A’s father is part of the Peshmerga Kurdish Army despite A not knowing his own father’s army rank (RB/101 WS[4]).

14. A’s sexual relationship with S – a material matter – was accepted despite A not knowing whether S’s family was strict with S, or whether she was allowed out to socialise with friends (RB/82 AIR92-93), not knowing how S’s family discovered their sexual relationship (RB/83 AIR101), and not knowing the name of S’s school (RB/102 WS[7]).

15. In summary, it is respectfully submitted that FTJ Groom’s finding that A was not a risk from S’s father and brothers was perverse or irrational because it does not address or recognise A’s evidence about them, A’s explanation for lacking details, and why another material matter (i.e., A’s sexual relationship with S) was accepted despite A lacking details about it, applying R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982.

Perverse or Irrational Findings – A's CSID Card and Contact with Iraqi Family

16. FTJ Groom held at [27]-[28] that “it is open to the appellant to be able to get back in touch with any number of his family members who are still residing in Iraq to send him his CSID card” based on (1) A stating in interview that he has parents and 3 siblings in Iraq but does not have news about them, (2) that A stated he had approached the Red Cross but had not provided evidence of this, (3) that A stated in interview that he left his CSID card with his parents, (4) that regardless, A had not suggested A’s family had moved away from their home, (5) that A had made no mention of attempting to contact A’s uncle in Rania, and (6) that “there were no cogent reasons as to why he would be unable to contact any of his family members in Iraq”.

17. It is respectfully submitted that the above finding is perverse or irrational because it does not address A’s evidence about his CSID card and contact with his family:

17.1 A states that on arrival in Turkey, the agent took his mobile, “erased all”, and took his SIM card, that A’s no longer had his family’s numbers after that, and thus had no contact with his family since leaving Iraq (RB/106 WS[27], AB/3 AWS[17]), RB/73 AIR37-39);
17.2 A describes trying and failing to find his family members on social media (AB/3 AWS[14]); and
17.3 A addressed these points in re-examination during the appeal hearing (Advocate’s Appeal Hearing Notes, pp8-10), which is not recognised by the Determination at [24]-[26], despite the Determination referring to A’s answers in cross-examination at [15], [17], and [30].

18. FTJ Groom’s Determination does not address why the above reasons do not amount to ‘cogent reasons’ as to why A cannot contact his family to obtain his CSID card. It is respectfully submitted that this amounts to an error of law, applying R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982.

Perverse or Irrational Findings – Credibility – Age, Transit Countries, Country Exit

19. FTJ Groom held at [29]-[30] of the Determination that A’s credibility was further undermined by (1) A disagreeing, without evidence, with the local authority age assessment that he was an adult, (2) that A stated in cross-examination that he only knew he passed through Turkey before arriving in the UK, (3) that A “gave no indication” of any difficulties encountered at any checkpoints during his exit from 017 5 Iraq, given his claimed lack of documentation”, and (4) that A not claiming asylum in France or Belgium engaged section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.

20. A gave evidence on the above points – not recognised by FTJ Groom’s determination – namely (1) that he could not obtain evidence of his age (e.g., CSID, passport, or birth certificate) because he had no contact with his family in Iraq (RB/67 AIR8-10), (2) that he only knew he was in Turkey because that is the only country name the agent mentioned, and the A’s lack of further geographic knowledge was explained by his only having primary school education (RB/105 WS[23]; RB/101 WS[3]), (3) that he explained that an agent drove him out of Iraq avoiding checkpoints (RB/105 WS[23]), and (4) that he did not claim asylum before the UK because he was under the agent’s control (RB/105-106 WS[23]-[25]).

21. The Determination not engaging with or addressing A’s evidence makes the credibility findings on these matters perverse or irrational, amounting to an error of law, applying R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982.

Conclusion

22. For the above reasons, it is respectfully requested that permission to appeal the FtT’s Determination dated 7 October 2024 be granted.

11. Permission to appeal was refused by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal and renewed to the Upper Tribunal where it was granted on the 5 March 2025, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:

It is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal erred in its approach to whether the appellant faced persecution as member of a particular social group, it being arguable that there was a failure to engage with the evidence contrary to the CPIN report. Further, given that this is appeal where the claim was made prior to the entry into force of section 30(5) of Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022, the judge may have erred in the approach to this issue and as to whether it was necessary as the CPIN appears to suggest that male victims of ‘honour’ violence need to show an identity within Iraqi society.

It is also arguable that the judge erred, as is averred, in his approach to the evidence in particular what was said in re-examination, is flawed as is averred. Permission is granted on all grounds.

12. The Secretary of State opposed the appeal in rule 24 response dated 19 March 2025, the operative part of which reads:

1. The respondent opposes the appeal. In summary, the respondent will submit inter alia that the judge of the First-tier Tribunal directed themself appropriately.
2. 2. Ground One asserts that the judge erred in failing to provide adequate reasons for preferring the Respondent’s objective evidence over the Appellant’s. The Respondent submits that, although the judge did not explicitly provide a comparative analysis of the objective evidence, this omission is immaterial given the nature of the evidence the Appellant sought to rely upon.
3. The Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) Iraq: Honour Crimes, March 2021, cited in paragraph [17] of the Appellant’s ASA, is no longer publicly available. It is unclear whether it was accessible at the time of the hearing in October 2024, raising questions about its reliability as an up-to-date source. More significantly, paragraph 1.2.2 of that CPIN explicitly confines its scope to honour crimes against women, making it of limited relevance to the Appellant’s claim as a male alleging persecution on this basis.
4. The Respondent submits that it was open to the judge to take into account a more recent and publicly available CPIN than the one relied upon by the Appellant. It is a well-established principle that decision-makers should base their findings on the most up-to-date and reliable country evidence. Given that the Appellant’s argument relies on a document that does not address male victims of honour crimes, there was no obligation on the judge to depart from more recent and directly relevant sources.
5. Furthermore, the Appellant has failed to cite cogent objective evidence demonstrating that male victims of honour crimes in Iraq constitute a Particular Social Group (PSG) within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. a PSG must be defined by an immutable characteristic or one so fundamental to human dignity that it should not be required to be changed. However, no authoritative evidence has been presented to show that male victims of honour crimes in Iraq meet this threshold.
6. In relation to the remaining grounds, the Respondent submits that they amount to no more than a mere disagreement with the FTTJ’s findings rather than identifying a material error of law.
7. The Respondent submits that requiring the judge to provide extensive reasoning and address every piece of the Appellant’s evidence runs contrary to the principles set out in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC) (1 July 2014). In Budhathoki, the Upper Tribunal confirmed that judges are not required to engage in a “minute examination” of every aspect of the evidence but should provide sufficient reasoning to justify their conclusions.
8. To successfully argue perversity or irrationality, the Appellant must demonstrate that no reasonable judge could have reached the same conclusion. This high threshold is not met in this case, as the judge’s reasoning is adequate, coherent, and supported by the evidence.
9. Consequently, the respondent submits that there has been no material error of law. FTTJ Groom delivered a thorough and reasoned decision in rejecting the appellant’s claim for protection.
10. The respondent is content for the appeal to proceed to a hearing.

Discussion and analysis

13. The Secretary of State in her Rule 24 reply raises the question of whether the March 2021 CPIN, which is no longer publicly available, was accessible at the date of the hearing in October 2024. Ms Khan submitted that that was the relevant CPIN at that date and I was not referred to anything that enables me to find otherwise.
14. Ms Khan submissions were in line with the grounds seeking permission to appeal, claiming that the evidence given in detail pointed to the level of risk the Appellant will face if returned to Iraq. It was submitted the Judge’s findings are flawed.
15. It was also submitted that the sur place age assessment was not before the Judge even though the issue of age was raised in the reasons for refusal letter.
16. Ms Khan was asked if the matter of age was in the refusal letter and the Appellant did not agree with the assessed age, why he did not produce evidence to deal with that for which there was no satisfactory reply.
17. The Appellant’s age was assessed following a compliant age assessment. A person’s age is a question of fact and there was nothing to indicate any reason why the Judge was not entitled to place the weight upon the local authority age assessment that he did in the determination.
18. In relation to the Conventional reason point, it was submitted by Ms Khan that a person transgressing social norms, such as having a sexual relationship with a person outside marriage as it is accepted the Appellant did, may face persecution for reasons of a membership of a particular social group based on their common background which cannot be changed, that of past behaviour, and/or a shared characteristic and of the experience that they have compromised family and social norms and have a distinct identity that is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
19. It was also submitted that such may be considered as having a distinct identity in the context of Iraq because they may be perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
20. The Secretary of State’s position, as recorded in the CPIN is that the Appellant had not established that he falls within a particular social group.
21. Reference was made to [23] of the determination by Dr Ibisi in support of her case. It was submitted the Secretary of State’s position before the Judge is that set out at [21] – 22] of the determination.
22. At the hearing I referred to a further document of which I have notice entitled “Honour Crimes against men in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), published by the Danish Immigration Service dated 23 March 2010.
23. The issue of honour crimes in males claiming a grant of international protection on the basis of extramarital relationships appears to be a rising topic amongst those claiming asylum from the Kurdish area of Iraq.
24. The report arises from of a fact-finding mission to Erbil and Sulemaniyah and Dahuk in the IKR from January 6 to the 20, 2010 to gather information on the protection and assistance provided to male victims of honour related crimes in the IKR.
25. The report records the views of a number of interlocutors who were consulted as part of the fact-finding process. In relation to honour crimes against men in the Kurdish region of Iraq, section 1 of the report, the views of the interlocutors are recorded as follows:

Khanim R. Latif, Director, Asuda for Combating Violence against Women (Asuda), Sulemaniyah, stated that the perception of honour is firmly entrenched in traditional Kurdish society.

Mahdi M. Qadr, Manager, and Fakhir Ibrahim, Coordinator, Public Aid Organization (PAO), Erbil, concurred that the conflicts related to honour [that exist in KRI], are rooted in the tribal mentality of society.

Edrees Salih, Erbil (see Introduction and disclaimer), informed that illegitimate sexual relationships are offenses that are dealt with according to Kurdish tradition and “Islam principles”. An offense against a family’s honour is serious, and conflicts can mainly arise between the two families directly involved and in some cases, other families could be involved depending on the linkage of those families to the clans.

Dr. Jwan Ihsan Fawzi, Researcher/Lecturer, University of Sulemaniyah, explained that it is the norm in Kurdish society that men embark on illicit sexual relationships. Society in KRI is male-dominated and many men are ready to take on the risk that is associated with illicit sexual relationships.

Hassan Berwari, Country Representative, Diakonia, Dahuk, stated that women, as well as men, are victims of honour crimes, and both are being killed for honour offenses. It was emphasized that men are equally at risk of becoming victims of honour crimes as women.

Honour crimes against men are common in KRI. It was added that conflicts arising from sexual relationships between young men and women are not as numerous [as earlier].

Edrees Salih, Erbil, stated that honour crimes have been significantly reduced in KRI during the recent years. However, still, in some cases, the threat posed to such men involved in offenses, exists up until a reconciliation being reached.

Dr. Jwan Ihsan Fawzi, University of Sulemaniyah, informed that she had heard of men being victims of honour crimes.

Mahdi M. Qadr and Fakhir Ibrahim, PAO, Erbil, stated that the concern of a wrong-doing against a family’s honour does not diminish over the years. Wrong-doing against honour is considered unforgivable.

Sardasht Abdulrahman Majid, Director, and Aree Jaza Mahmoud, Lawyer, Democracy and Human Rights Development Center (DHRD), Sulemaniyah, emphasized that honour is not a short-term matter. Honour is eternal in the sense that the offended family may seek retribution for years to come, or even for generations.

Ari Rafiq, Director, and Huda S. Zangan, Member of Advisory Committee, Directorate to Follow-up Violence against Women (DVW), Erbil, informed that the risk of falling victim to revenge because of an honour-related offense is real and can be long-term. Reference was made to an incident in Sulemaniyah where a man still fears for his life 18 years after he wronged a family’s honour. It was added that the offended father or husband would often prefer imprisonment for having committed an honour crime rather than face society and the shame associated with not having re-established the honour of his family.

Dr. Jwan Ihsan Fawzi, University of Sulemaniyah, emphasized similarly that an affronted honour can be an on-going issue, and it may even survive generations.

According to Sardasht Abdulrahman Majid and Aree Jaza Mahmoud, DHRD, Sulemaniyah, violence committed against men in KRI is a sensitive issue, and therefore accurate information on this question is hard to find.

Kajaw Jamal Jalal, Deputy Chief Editor, Hawlati newspaper, Sulemaniyah, explained that Hawlati newspaper has reported on honour crimes against men on a few occasions. However, it is very difficult to get someone to speak out on honour-related matters. Kajaw Jamal Jalal referred to a recently published article in the newspaper Rudaw concerning an honour crime committed against a young couple that had eloped. The article, as well as an unofficial English translation, is included as Annex 1

26. The Respondent relied upon the CPIN which reads:

2.2 Honour crimes

2.2.1 Female victims or potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes form a particular social group (PSG) in Iraq within the meaning of the Refugee Convention because they share a common background that cannot be changed – the experience that they have compromised or have been accused of compromising the family or tribal ‘honour’ - and have a distinct identity in Iraq because the Page 7 of 74 group is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.

2.2.2 Although female victims or potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes form a PSG, establishing such membership is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question to be addressed is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their membership of such a group.

2.2.3 Male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes (based on their involvement in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female) are not considered to form a particular social group (PSG) within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. This is because while they do share a common background that cannot be changed in that they have compromised the familial ‘honour’ of the females’ family, they do not have a distinct identity. This is due to differing notions of male and female honour, the patriarchal nature of Iraqi society and a lack of evidence to suggest that male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes are perceived as being different by the surrounding society.

2.2.4 However, male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes based on their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression would form a PSG. See the CPIN Iraq: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression.

2.2.5 Where a male is at real risk of serious harm as a result of a premarital or extramarital relationship, they may qualify for Humanitarian Protection.

27. It is not disputed that honour killing has been practised in patriarchal societies over the generations as a means of demonstrating male dominance. Traditionally honour killing is the murdering of a female member of the family by another family member, usually male, in the name of honour, the basis for such action being the claim that the victim brought dishonour on the family.
28. The majority of victims of honour-based violence are female in societies in which it appears they have lower social status than men on the basis the structure of patriarchal society gives men the right to control women at all levels.
29. There are numerous examples of women being killed by family members who are accused of having sex with someone other than their husband.
30. It is also important to remember that in Kurdish society the majority would say they are Muslim. That is important as it is established by Islamic law when punishing the parties involved in adultery that both men and women are equally guilty and consequently suffer the same punishment.
31. Whilst it cannot be disputed that the majority victims of honour-based violence are female it is not made out that males do not suffer abuse, including honour killings.
32. I find the statement in the CPIN that males who commit honour crimes do not have a distinct identity to be too simplistic, and not adequately sourced or reasoned.
33. Whilst the patriarchal structure of Iraqi society is accepted, in urban areas such as Erbil for example, which has female MPs and organisations representing female members of society with influence, different views may prevail, and such a traditional notion may not have such much purchase.
34. I find in each case it is therefore necessary in the first instance for a specific finding to be made in relation to whether the profile of the individual concerned is sufficient to enable it to be found they are a potential victim of an honour crime and whether on the fact as found, and applying the correct legal test, they fall within the definition of a particular social group.
35. For claims made prior to 28 June 2022 it is the disjunctive test is found by the Upper Tribunal in DH (Particular Social Group: mental health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC). For claims decisions made after this date section 33 Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the conjunctive test applies.
36. The Appellant’s argument is that he has transgressed social norms and will face persecution as a member of a particular social group based upon his common background which cannot be changed, namely perceived past behaviour and/or shared characteristics of the experience that they have compromised family or societal norms and have a distinct identity that is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
37. The Judge’s reasoning as to why the Appellant did not fall within a Convention reason is very brief and fails to engage with the Appellants evidence that is said to contradict the Respondents position to be found in the CPIN. The expert’s testimony to the Danish immigration service report shows that it is not unarguable that males who transgress in the way this particular Appellant did might fall within the definition of a potential victim of an honour crime in the same way that a female victim may.
38. That does not mean the Appellant is bound to succeed with the claim. An individual may not necessarily face ill-treatment sufficient to amount to persecution even if they fall within a particular social group, as in many honour cases reconciliation takes place involving non-violent solutions through the social committees in an individual’ home s area, can involve settlement involving marriage in appropriate cases, as well as settlement by killings.
39. I also find the Appellant has established an informed reader is unable to understand what findings the Judges made upon the evidence as a whole. The Grounds refer to evidence that was provided in support of the appeal to which there appears to be no reference in the determination. That gives rise to a fairness issue and the question of whether the Appellant had the merits of his claim properly considered on the basis of all the available evidence.
40. I find for the reasons set out in the Grounds seeking permission to appeal, grant of permission to appeal, submissions, and for the above reasons, that the Judge has materially erred in law. I set the decision aside.
41. Having considered the joint presidential guidance on the issue of remittals and the Upper Tribunal decision in the case of Begum, I find it in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective for the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh on the basis the Appellant has not had a fair hearing on the basis of the evidence provided.

Notice of Decision

42. The First-tier Tribunal has been shown to have materially erred in law. I set that decision aside with no preserved findings.
43. The appeal shall be remitted to the First-tier tribunal sitting at Manchester to be heard de novo by a different Judge.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 May 2025