Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005989

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/52512/2024
IA/00756/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUTCHINSON

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Forrest, Advocate, instructed by Kas & Co Solicitors Limited
For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by video link to Scotland on 26 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan, born on 8 April 1984. The appellant claimed asylum on 28 May 2022, with the respondent refusing her claim on 20 December 2023. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Prudham (“the judge”) on 18 November 2024, after a hearing on 16 October 2024. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal T Lawrence, on 30 December 2024, on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier Judge had erred in law in failing to consider the evidence that the appellant suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder, when assessing the appellant’s credibility and her ability to relocate internally or to integrate into Pakistan.
2. The matter came before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law and if so whether any such error was material and thus whether the decision should be set aside.
Submissions – Error of Law
3. In the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions by Mr Forrest, it was argued in short summary for the appellant as follows.
4. The grounds contained only very limited particularisation; it was argued that the judge failed to consider the appellant’s evidence as credible and had failed to provide any detailed reasons or evidence to support his decision. It was submitted the judge had erred in failing to consider all the material facts. It was further submitted in the written grounds, that the judge failed to provide any facts or supporting evidence that the appellant’s oral evidence was not credible. It was submitted that the judge failed to consider the serious effects of past, political and emotional trauma that the appellant had suffered.
5. It was submitted that the judge erred in placing little weight on the significant obstacles to reintegration to the appellant’s country of origin, in Pakistan and that the judge had failed and erred in failing to consider the foreseeable serious risk of harm to the appellant if she was forced to return to her country of origin. It was stated that the judge had failed to consider how the appellant would have no other alternative but to return to the home of her abusers and this was a material consideration. It was further submitted in the grounds that the judge had erred in failing to take account of the significant trauma the appellant had endured from her family members and in failing to consider the foreseeable risk of harm to the appellant if she is forced to return to her country of origin. It was further submitted that the judge erred in failing to provide any evidence as to how the appellant could reintegrate to her country of origin and had failed to consider the private life the appellant had developed in the UK.
6. The wide-ranging grounds of appeal, as summarised above, amount in very large part to a restatement and attempt to reargue the case that was before the First-tier Tribunal. In distilling those unparticularised grounds, the permission judge identifies that the grounds do make reference to a claim that the judge had failed to consider the serious effects of the appellant’s past physical and emotional trauma when finding the appellant not credible. However, in further stating that it was arguable that the judge had failed to consider the appellant’s PTSD when assessing the appellant’s ability to relocate internally or integrate into Pakistan, the permission judge purports to add grounds of appeal not argued, as the grounds that reference relocation and integration make no reference to the appellant’s mental health, but rather restate the argument that the appellant was at risk of harm.
7. The permission judge does not identify as required by AZ (error of law: jurisdiction; PTA practice) Iran [2018] UKUT 245 (IAC) that the judge was satisfied that the ground identified is one which has a strong prospect of success for the appellant; or that the ground relates to an issue of general importance, which the Upper Tribunal needs to address.
8. In his skeleton argument, Mr Forrest helpfully attempted to further particularise the grounds of appeal. Although an application was made under Rule 15(2A) for submission of further evidence, that application was refused and Mr Forrest agreed that the further evidence would only potentially be relevant if an error of law was found.
9. Mr Forrest attempted to introduce a further ground of appeal that the best interests of one of the appellant’s two children had not been taken into account. Mrs Arif objected to the Tribunal considering that ground. I reserved my decision on both whether permission would be granted on the additional ground and on whether there was a material error under this ground.
10. In relation to the new ground, Mr Forrest’s written skeleton argument referenced Section 55 of the 2009 Act and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the duty to consider the best interests of the children
11. Mr Forrest drew the Tribunal’s attention to, in the written skeleton, to the fact that there appeared to be two refusal letters at pages 160 to 164 and 165 to 174 of the composite bundle (although I note the first document appears to relate specifically to the family asylum process). Both these decisions are dated 11 December 2023 with the parties identified as the appellant and her partner and also acknowledging that the two children AH and AS who are both dependants. Although Mr Forrest’s skeleton argument also references a separate appeal number PA/51043/2024 I note from the electronic case management system, MyHCMTS that this appeal was abandoned as it was a duplicate.
12. Mr Forrest’s skeleton argument argued that there was confusion as to how the judge had assessed the best interests of one of the children, which would appear to have been AS, at [31] but not the best interests of AH.
13. It was submitted that the appeal had proceeded without identifying the crucial issue as to the best interests of AH, with the judge silent as to the best interests of AH. Mr Forrest accepted that the first of what appeared to be two refusal letters contained a brief reference to Section 55. Mr Forrest also conceded that this matter had not been raised as an issue before the First-tier Tribunal or before the Upper Tribunal in the permission application, but submitted it was of such crucial importance that the Upper Tribunal could consider it, particularly having regard to the details before the First-tier Tribunal in relation to AH.
14. In relation to the appellant’s credibility, which was the core of the First-tier Tribunal decision at paragraphs [19] to [30], the judge found there to be a lack of consistency [23], embellishment and exaggeration [24], failure to refer to important matters to which her sister referred [25] and several other matters.
15. However, it was submitted that the judge had left out of his account the appellant’s medical condition and particularly the fact that from the early stage of her account the appellant has been suffering from PTSD, with the only acknowledgment in the findings in relation to the appellant’s mental health at [13] and [29] which makes a reference about the availability of medical facilities in Pakistan.
16. Mr Forrest took the Tribunal to the evidence that had been before the First-tier Tribunal, including in particular a report by a licenced psychologist in Sweden and further evidence, including from the appellant. Mr Forrest submitted that the difficulties experienced as a result of her PTSD may have affected the appellant’s ability to give evidence before the First-tier Tribunal and the judge erred in law in failing to take this into account.
17. Although the First-tier Tribunal stated that there are facilities at home in Pakistan to treat the appellant’s condition, it was submitted that this did not mean that there would not be any problems encountered if the appellant was forced to return and that the test is whether, having regard to all of the circumstances, including that the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence, her well-publicised journey from Pakistan to Sweden and the best interests of both the children, and exercising a broad evaluative judgment (Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 [14]), the appellant can reintegrate into Pakistan. Mr Forrest submitted that the appellant’s PTSD condition would impact her ability to do so.
18. In relation to the new ground Mr Forrest submitted that it was a R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929 (Robinson) obvious point. However, Mr Forrest was unable to say why, given the now claimed centrality of the best interests of the older child, AH, neither this nor Article 8 had been argued in the grounds before the First-tier Tribunal or the appeal skeleton argument (ASA).
19. In respect of the ground on which permission was granted, Mr Forrest drew the Tribunal’s attention to the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal including the report dated December 2021, in relation to the appellant’s mental health and that she has PTSD. Mr Forrest submitted that whilst it would not be material to ‘ignore’ this evidence individually, cumulatively it was an error. Mr Forrest submitted that the appellant’s mental health may have affected her ability to give evidence. Although Mr Forrest was not aware that the appellant had been recognised by the judge as a vulnerable witness at [9], he noted that this stated that the appellant did not take any breaks and there was no other application made. Mr Forrest further agreed that the fact that the judge had designated the appellant as a vulnerable witness would suggest that the judge would have been aware of the relevant guidance in relation to the treatment of vulnerable witnesses (Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance) including that this addresses consideration of evidence.
20. Mr Forrest maintained however, that if the judge took a dim view of the appellant’s credibility, he was required to say why he had not taken into consideration the evidence from the psychologist that the appellant had PTSD and the other reports and the judge needed to make this clear and this was material.
21. Mr Forrest agreed that the grounds of appeal did not specifically argue that the judge had erred in failing to consider the appellant’s mental health and consider her ability to integrate or relocate but relied on his skeleton argument, and that this appeared to have been added by the permission judge.
22. Although there was no Rule 24 response, in oral submissions by Mrs Arif for the respondent, it was argued in short summary as follows:
23. Mrs Arif submitted that there was evidence throughout the determination that the judge considered the appellant’s mental health. At paragraph [9] of the decision, the judge referenced the appellant’s mental health as the judge treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness and it was evident that the judge had in mind that the appellant had suffered from mental health conditions and recognised that she should be treated as a vulnerable witness. However, the judge also noted that no specific adjustments were sought. The judge set out at [13] that the appellant suffers from anxiety and took medication. It is clear that the judge was acknowledging that the appellant had mental health issues from the outset.
24. At [20] the judge also indicated that he considered all of the evidence even if not referred to specifically in the decision, including oral evidence and submissions. It was submitted that this was a very important paragraph when considering the mindset of the judge and the evidence taken into account. Mrs Arif relied on relevant jurisprudence including Volpi v. Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022], in relation to the judge having regard to all of the evidence.
25. At paragraph 2(iii) the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi indicated that courts are to assume that the trial judge has taken into account the whole of the evidence and the absence of specific consideration does not mean it has been overlooked. Just because the judge did not specifically state that he had taken into account the appellant’s mental health condition when considering her credibility did not mean it had been overlooked.
26. At paragraph [29] Mrs Arif submitted that the judge had set out that the appellant had failed to establish that treatment was not available in Pakistan for mental health issues. In terms of integration the onus is on the appellant to set out what issues would be facing her. The judge had considered this and concluded that treatment for mental health was available. The judge had further considered Article 8, although this was not argued before the First-tier Tribunal.
27. Similarly, Mrs Arif submitted that the children’s best interests were not at issue before the First-tier Tribunal nor argued in the grounds of appeal and submitted that permission to appeal should be refused.
28. In the alternative that the ground was admitted, there was no material error. The judge considered one of the children and that essentially the best interests of the child was to remain with their parents. It was submitted that there was no material error and no argument that the same considerations would not apply to the second child. The judge had dealt with Article 8 in detail despite it not being argued and there was no error in those findings with the new ground amounting to no more than a disagreement.
29. In reply, Mr Forrest submitted that any ambiguity has to be resolved in favour of the appellant In terms of Volpi v Volpi Mr Forrest submitted that this was not a human rights case and this Tribunal has to apply anxious scrutiny.
Conclusions
Additional Ground
30. In relation to the application made to consider a new ground of appeal, I refuse permission. As conceded by Mr Forrest, no best interests argument was made in either the appellant’s statements or the appeal skeleton argument, or in the submissions made before the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant’s representative was seeking to retry the appellant’s case before the Upper Tribunal including in raising issues not before the First-tier Tribunal.
31. In any event, there is no material error in any claimed omission by the judge in referencing only the appellant’s younger child, rather than also referencing her older daughter in considering best interests. It would appear from the judge’s findings at paragraph [18] that the judge was only asked specifically to consider the best interests of one of the children. Whilst both the respondent and the Tribunal has a duty to consider the best interests of all the children, in a comprehensive decision where the judge considered and made findings on issues not raised by the appellant, including Article 8, it is evident that the judge would have had in mind the best interests of both children. The judge specifically highlighted, at [20] that he had considered all the evidence, even if not specifically referenced in the decision.
32. Whilst the older sibling is a number of years older than the child mentioned in the decision, at the date of decision she would have been approximately 8 years old and there is no evidence before the First-tier Tribunal or otherwise to suggest that her best interests lie in anything other than returning with her mother and sibling to Pakistan, as the judge found in relation to her brother.
Error of Law Discussion
33. In terms of the substantive grounds that were before the Upper Tribunal, the judge took into consideration that the respondent accepted the appellant was physically abused by her ex-husband. The judge also took into account that the appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness and in doing so the judge will have had in mind the relevant guidance on vulnerable witnesses. This includes both how the hearing is run, but also how an appellant’s evidence is considered.
34. The judge also took into account the appellant’s evidence as highlighted at [13] that she suffered from anxiety and was on medication and that she had undergone counselling. The lack of specific reference to the PTSD is not a material error, including as it has not been identified how that condition, rather than anxiety, would have led to a materially different consideration by the judge of the appellant’s credibility.
35. The judge recorded submissions on behalf of both parties and it was not specifically argued that the appellant’s credibility, which was at issue before the respondent in the refusal letter, had been affected by her mental health difficulties.
36. There is no material error in the judge not specifically highlighting in his reasons, that his treatment of the appellant as a vulnerable witness necessarily extended to both his consideration of the evidence, as well as the manner in which the hearing was run.
37. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert Tribunal and it is probable that in understanding and applying the law, the tribunal will have got it right (AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49) and it mustn’t be assumed too readily that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself
38. The judge made robust findings, including in relation to the appellant’s credibility and the background evidence, that the appellant would not be at risk on return from either her ex-husband and his family or the authorities.
39. The judge found in the alternative, in relation to the claimed risk from her ex-husband, that the appellant would be in a position to seek protection or to relocate. It is clear that these are alternative findings.
40. Whilst the judge did not specifically reference the appellant’s vulnerability and her mental health in each and every finding reached, nor was he required to do so. It is also clear that the judge had the appellant’s specific circumstances in mind including in referencing, at paragraph [27], when considering the appellant’s ability to seek protection and internally relocate, that she would have the assistance of her current partner on return.
41. In a comprehensive decision, the judge considered all the pertinent issues, including the Article 8, and Christianity, where such were not raised prior to the hearing. Although the grounds of appeal, which in effect seek to reargue the appellant’s case, rather than identifying any material error, the judge provided more than adequate reasons for his findings, including on Article 8. The judge found that the appellant did not meet the Immigration Rules, which is a weighty factor and then went on to consider other factors including section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004. The judge also took into consideration that the appellant failed to establish that medical treatment was not available for any mental health issues in Pakistan (paragraph [29]).
42. When considered fairly and holistically, the judge’s findings cannot be properly criticised, both in terms of the consideration of the appellant’s mental health issues, which clearly was factored into the judge’s consideration throughout both in considering the appellant’s ability to relocate and reintegrate in Pakistan; and also in terms of the consideration of the best interests of her children.
Notice of Decision
43. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
44. I do not set aside the decision.

M M Hutchinson

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 April 2025