Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-006007
First Tier Tribunal No: PA/57134/2023
LP/05253/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HILLS

Between

ND (ZIMBABWE)
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Coerman, Counsel instructed by Henscott Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her, any of her witnesses or any member of her family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings

Heard at Field House on 15 August 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Zimbabwe born in 1989. She appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss her appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. This is a decision to which both members of the panel have contributed.
3. The central facts are not disputed. By her ‘reasons for refusal letter’ dated the 15 September 2023 the Secretary of State indicated that “none” of the evidence given by the Appellant in her claim is disputed. The agreed facts therefore are:

• That the Appellant is a national of Zimbabwe
• She is a lesbian
• She had a relationship with another girl (‘J’) whilst still at school
• That girl’s father was a high ranking officer in the Zimbabwean Army
• The school discovered the relationship and the girls’ parents were informed
• The Officer was “furious” and blamed the Appellant
• The Appellant’s parents felt “shame and ridicule” and forced her to undergo a ‘cleansing ceremony’ which involved the Appellant being made to drink the blood of a slaughtered hen and make a ‘confession’ as to her sexuality. The Appellant was left “humiliated” and “traumatised” by this ritual
• In 2011 the Appellant was subject to a forced arranged marriage. A child was born of this marriage, who remains in Zimbabwe today
• In approximately 2014 the Appellant could not take living with her husband any longer and left the matrimonial home
• She lived for some time with her Grandmother in her village
• When her grandmother died the Appellant was hounded from the village by relatives hostile to her because of her sexual orientation
• The Appellant ended up living alone in Harare, ostracised from her family
• During this time she rekindled her relationship with J, who was by then also married
• J’s husband discovered the affair and reported the matter to J’s father, who threatened that he would track the Appellant down
• In February 2021 the Appellant, fearing J’s father, decided to accept an offer to travel to Ireland for work. It was a trick. In fact she was being trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation
• The Appellant describes the people who trafficked her as a “mafia gang” well-connected in both Zimbabwe and Ireland
• She was taken from Zimbabwe to Ireland where she was forced into prostitution, under the threat of violence and the view of the traffickers that she had incurred a large debt to them because they had organised her passage to Europe
• The Appellant was brought to the UK by one of the traffickers’ clients, whereupon she managed to escape and claim asylum
4. Those matters having been accepted, the Secretary of State nevertheless refused the claim on the grounds that there was not a reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would come to serious harm in Zimbabwe because she is gay, or because she is a victim of trafficking.
5. It its decision dated 14 July 2023 the First-tier Tribunal agreed and the appeal was dismissed.
6. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the 15th November 2023.
7. We need not deal with all of the grounds of appeal since before us Mr Walker conceded that one was made out, which went to the heart of the appeal. We gratefully adopt Ms Coerman’s summary of that ground, as set out in her skeleton argument:
16. The FTTJ accepted that the Appellant is a lesbian (FTTJ §21) and that she was trafficked (FTTJ §24), the FTTJ accepted she was part of a PSG as a result of both characteristics (FTTJ §13 & 15). At § 27 – 29 and §30 – 32 respectively, the FTTJ considered whether she would be at risk due to being a member of each of these groups, separately, but never considered the combined risk factor. The FTTJ was invited to consider the risk to the Appellant in light of the fact that she is a lesbian, a survivor of trafficking and her personal circumstances combined, (FTTJ §10), but failed to do so. The combined factors place the Appellant at a heightened risk, such that she would be at risk of persecution on return.
17. The FTTJ accepted that the country guidance shows there is widespread discrimination and societal disapproval of lesbian relationships in Zimbabwe (FTTJ §22). He further accepted that her family’s treatment of her, following their discovery that she is a lesbian, amounted to harassment (FTTJ §23). He went on to accept that the Appellant has no supportive family and that she estranged from her family (FTTJ §31). Clearly the Appellant was isolated and vulnerable because she is a lesbian.
18. LZ (homosexuals) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 487 (§116) confirms; some homosexuals suffer discrimination, harassment and blackmail from the general public and the police; police do not provide protection; lesbians, living on their own or together, may face greater difficulties than gay men; personal circumstances place some gays and lesbians at risk; although not decisive on its own, being openly gay may increase risk. All these listed factors apply to the Appellant; she faced harassment, lived on her own, she is ‘out’ as a lesbian and she is unable to seek protection from police. Her risk is further heightened by the fact that she has received adverse attention from a state actor; a Major General in the Zimbabwean Army. The Appellant’s sexuality, together with her personal circumstances, means she is at risk. That risk is confirmed, and heightened, by the fact that she was trafficked.
19. The FTTJ himself suggested that HD (Trafficked women) Nigeria CG [2016] UKUT 00454 would be useful to consider in this case. HD confirms that a woman who was previously trafficked is likely to have been identified by traffickers as someone disclosing characteristics of vulnerability such as to give rise to a real risk of being trafficked. As per §18, the FTTJ identified a number of characteristics that rendered the Appellant vulnerable in Zimbabwe. Further personal characteristics that place her at risk are listed at §19. On balance it is likely that, and this is supported by HD, her traffickers picked up on these vulnerabilities and targeted her because of those vulnerabilities. The Appellant confirms at §22 of her witness statement she agreed to the take a job in Ireland so as to escape her situation. Quite surprisingly however the FTTJ went on to find that the Appellant has “no characteristics of vulnerability” (FTTD § 31), when it is clear that her vulnerabilities, owing to the fact that she is a lesbian, made her a target to her traffickers. This means, that she is at a continued risk of being trafficked, should she return.
20. To that end, it was wrong for the FTTJ to consider whether there was a continued risk from her former traffickers alone (FTTJ 30 – 31). The FTTJ should have considered whether there is a future risk of being re-trafficked by any traffickers. HD confirms there is little risk being trafficked afresh by original traffickers, but there is a risk of being trafficked afresh, depending on the personal circumstances of the individual who was trafficked (headnote HD § 3 &4). The fact the Appellant is a lesbian means that she will not be able to seek protection from family, police, or other state actors if she finds herself in danger again, especially as it is a state actor she fears. Her inability to seek protection increases her vulnerability.
21. The combined risk factors set out above place her at a heightened risk
8. For the avoidance of doubt, we consider the Secretary of State’s concession to be entirely proper. The Tribunal did omit to consider all of the risk factors cumulatively, and in particular how the Appellant’s sexual orientation, her past experience of sexual abuse, exploitation and estrangement from her family could render her particularly vulnerable to harm, including the risk of being trafficked again. We therefore set the decision of the First-tier Tribunal aside.
9. Before we proceed to re-make the decision it is appropriate that we address one of the remaining grounds. The Tribunal below proceeded on the basis that the Appellant would ‘choose’ to live discreetly should she return to Zimbabwe, basing that conclusion on the Tribunal’s own understanding that this is what she did whilst last there, and that this is what she does in the UK. Ms Coerman is right to say that here the Tribunal has, with respect, misunderstood the facts. The Appellant did not ‘choose to live discreetly’ in Zimbabwe. She was ‘outed’ as a schoolgirl; her entire family, and that of her then partner J, were well aware of her sexual orientation. That is why she ended up having to live on her own, why she was threatened by J’s father and how she ended up in a trafficking situation. Nor has the Appellant ‘chosen’ to live discreetly in this country. She has simply not engaged in any sexual relationships. We accept Ms Coerman’s submission that this ‘choice’ has to be understood in the context of the Appellant having survived a trafficking experience in which she was repeatedly raped, and her continuing to suffer the emotional and physical consequences of that ordeal.

Re-making the decision
10. The parties are in agreement that this is a case which may be re-made on the basis of the evidence before us. The material facts, as summarised above, have all been accepted. The only development has been that the Competent Authority has, since the First-tier Tribunal decision, found ‘conclusive grounds’ to accept that the Appellant was trafficked from Zimbabwe to Ireland/the UK in the circumstances she claims. The Respondent has consequently granted the Appellant one year of ‘VTS’ (Victims of Trafficking or Slavery) leave to remain. The human rights grounds of appeal therefore fall away. Against that background we proceed to assess whether the Appellant faces today a real risk of persecution in Zimbabwe for reasons, in whole or in part, of her membership of a particular social group (gay women).
11. Although now relatively old, LZ (homosexuals) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 00487 (IAC) remains the operative country guidance:
(i) There has been much public expression of extreme homophobia at the highest levels in recent years.
(ii) Male homosexual behaviour is criminalised, but prosecutions are very rare. Lesbianism is not criminalised.
(iii) Some homosexuals suffer discrimination, harassment and blackmail from the general public and the police. Attempted extortion, false complaints and unjustified detentions are not so prevalent as to pose a general risk. There are no records of any murders with a homophobic element. “Corrective rape” is rare, and does not represent a general risk.
(iv) There is a “gay scene,” within limitations.
(v) Lesbians, living on their own or together, may face greater difficulties than gay men.
(vi) GALZ (Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe) takes a realistic view: Zimbabwe is “not the worst place in the world to be gay or lesbian even though the President, government officials and church leaders have whipped up a climate of hysterical homophobia.”
(vii) Applying HJ & HT [2010] UKSC 31, [2010] Imm AR 729, there is no general risk to gays or lesbians. Personal circumstances place some gays and lesbians at risk. Although not decisive on its own, being openly gay may increase risk. A positive HIV/AIDS diagnosis may be a risk factor. Connections with the elite do not increase risk.
(viii) The police and other state agents do not provide protection.
(ix) A homosexual at risk in his or her community can move elsewhere, either in the same city or to another part of the country. He or she might choose to relocate to where there is greater tolerance, such as Bulawayo, but the choice of a new area is not restricted. The option is excluded only if personal circumstances present risk throughout the country.
12. The appellant in that case, LZ, was a gay woman. In the course of submissions the Secretary of State had accepted that there is in Zimbabwe “ingrained anti-homosexual prejudice and discrimination, often more severe against women because of their lower social status” [§26]. The evidence from the main gay rights group operating in the country, Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), was that it is much more difficult for lesbians to come out. The Tribunal found that whilst there is no general risk of persecution, each case had to be decided on its merits, bearing in mind that gay Zimbabweans cannot expect any protection from the state if they do face serious harm. Having reviewed the evidence on harassment, discrimination and violence, the Tribunal concluded that lesbians, living on their own or together, may face greater difficulties than gay men [§116]. We note that despite the generally positive tenor of the findings about the position of gay people in Zimbabwe, the appeal of LZ was allowed.
13. Neither party sought to persuade us to depart from that country guidance. More recent evidence shows the picture largely unchanged. GALZ continues to operate, it is possible for gay people, in particular gay men, to live without fear of persecution, but each case must be determined on its merits. As the Country Policy and Information Note Zimbabwe Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression (July 2024) sets out:
3.1.9 Societal homophobia and transphobia remain widespread. For example, an Afrobarometer survey from March/April 2022 noted that almost 80% of people would strongly dislike or dislike having a ‘homosexual’ neighbour. LGBTI people may face discrimination, violence, verbal and sexual harassment, and extortion by community and family members. LGBTI persons are particularly vulnerable to blackmail of being ‘outed’. Some LGBTI persons are forcibly subject to conversion therapies – practices that are believed to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity – usually by family members. However, due to stigma and the criminalisation of same-sex sexual activity incidents may go unreported. GALZ collated a small sample of 38 incidents of violations against LGBTI people in 2021. The most frequent incidents were sexual assault (25%, 10 cases), and blackmail (15%, 6 cases), sexual assaults materialized in the form of corrective rape. In their report covering 2022, GALZ identified 28 cases of violations. GALZ also acknowledge that in some cases the general population came to the defence of LGBTI people (see Societal attitude and State treatment).
…
13.1.5 The USSD report 2023 stated that ‘Civil society organizations described instances in which families and communities implemented psychological “therapies” to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. These included family members pressuring the person to have intercourse with an arranged person of the opposite sex, arranged marriages, “corrective rape,” and exorcisms performed by traditional healers.’
14. The response of the Appellant’s family, and that of J’s father, is consistent with what the Tribunal in LZ (Zimbabwe) found to be a climate of “extreme homophobia” in Zimbabwe, with particularly harmful consequences for women. Their response can be measured on a scale of increasingly oppressive and harmful measures: the forced separation of the Appellant and J, subjecting the Appellant to a “humiliating and traumatic” cleansing ritual, and ultimately to the Appellant’s marriage, contracted under duress and against her will. We are satisfied that this is a situation to be distinguished from those women who, according to LZ (Zimbabwe), are “willing to present a heterosexual narrative”. We are satisfied that the evidence here unequivocally suggests that the Appellant was not “willing” to do so. She is a gay woman, who did not want to get married to a man. She did not want to have sexual intercourse with a man. We are satisfied that she did so under pressure from her family, and in fear of the consequences if she did not do so. We consider her to have here suffered harm of sufficient severity to constitute persecution. Once she managed to escape that marriage she availed herself of internal flight by relocating to a rural area to live with her paternal grandmother; upon her death she was chased out by the villagers because of her sexuality. It was in these circumstances that the Appellant found herself living alone in Harare, facing renewed threats from J’s family and receiving no support from her own, and in the end falling into the hands of traffickers.
15. The Appellant’s experiences are, we find, consistent with the findings in LZ (Zimbabwe) that the position for gay women is worse than that faced by men. They face more severe and ingrained social prejudice and discrimination, in part because of their generally lower social capital and status. Quite simply, they have far fewer choices. We are satisfied that her experiences amounted to persecution for a Convention reason. We must now consider whether there are good reasons to believe that such experiences would not be repeated.
16. We are satisfied that there must remain a real risk from the “mafia gang” who trafficked the Appellant. We know that this gang operates to recruit vulnerable people like the Appellant in Zimbabwe (in this regard her witness statement describes another woman being trafficked at the same time). This gang knew where the Appellant lived in Harare and given the relatively small population of that city, should the Appellant try to reconnect with anyone that she knew before she left, there is in our view a real risk that the traffickers would become aware that she had returned. We note the accepted evidence that this gang perceive the Appellant to owe them a large ‘debt’. On the lower standard of proof we are satisfied that in these circumstances it would not be safe for the Appellant to return to live in Harare, her last place of residence in Zimbabwe.
17. We are further satisfied that it would be neither safe nor reasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate somewhere else in Zimbabwe away from Harare. The Appellant remains ostracised from her family. On the basis of past events it seems to us to be wholly unlikely that these relationships can today be repaired. The only ‘support’ she might receive from them should she return to Zimbabwe would be an insistence on her resuming her marriage, or marrying again in order to ‘mask’ her sexuality. That being the case the Appellant is very likely to end up alone. Even in a city such as Bulawayo, where society is more tolerant, she would be taking a real risk by trying to live as she once did, enjoying a full and consensual relationship with another human being of her choice. Given her impact on J’s life, we think it unlikely that the anger and hostility of J’s father will have diminished. Even if the objective risk from him has dissipated, the Appellant is still terrified of him. She would therefore be in essentially the same position that she was in at the point that she left Zimbabwe the last time. Isolated, frightened and extremely vulnerable to the predations of traffickers. Applying the lower standard of proof we are satisfied that the cumulative risks she faces as a lesbian, and as victim of trafficking are ‘real’ and that she is a refugee for that reason; in the alternative these factors combined are of sufficient gravity to mean that it would be ‘unduly harsh’ to expect the Appellant to live on her own anywhere other than Harare, where we have found there to be a real risk of persecution.

Decision and Directions
18. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
19. We remake the decision in the appeal by allowing it on protection grounds.
20. There is an order for anonymity in this appeal.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
20 August 2025