Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000009

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68027/2023
LP/09772/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 16th of June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

BQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Aziz, counsel, instructed by Lei Dat and Baig Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant brings this appeal against FTJ Mill’s determination of 4 November 2024, in which he dismissed BQ’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 11 December 2023 to dismiss to his claim for asylum in the United Kingdom.
Material Background
2. BQ is an in Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity. He claims to have been discovered in an adulterous relationship with his paternal uncle’s wife and to fear return to Iraq on the basis that his uncle will kill him for having an affair with his wife, his father will kill him for bringing dishonour on the family, and that his wife’s family will “target” him for having had an affair (BQ’s witness statement at para. 7).
3. BQ claims that his affair with his uncle’s wife began in February 2018 and that his aunt discovered him having sex with her in 2019. BQ claims to have fled to sisters house. He claims he was advised to leave the country immediately and taken to the Turkish border by his brother-in-law. He then claims to have travelled through Turkey, Greece, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia, Austria, Germany and France, before reaching the United Kingdom by boat in December 2020. He claimed asylum on 10 December 2020.
4. The Secretary of State refused BQ’s asylum claim by decision of 11 December 2023. BQ appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. As set out above, his appeal was dismissed by decision promulgated on 5 November 2024.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. BQ sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on five grounds. These can be summarised as follows:
6. Ground 1: The Judge held at para 20 that BQ had given inconsistent answers as to his relationship status (single or married) in his asylum screening interview and his substantive asylum interview. The Judge held this against BQ’s credibility. BQ argued that the Judge erred in doing so as BQ had not been provided with a copy of the screening interview record during the course of his asylum application (see BQ’s witness statement at para. 20).
7. Ground 2: The Judge failed to take account of photographs of BQ with his wife, which constituted “material evidence showing the appellant was indeed married” and supported BQ’s assertion that the errors in the screening interview “were simply down to a misunderstanding of the question”.
8. Ground 3: At paras. 20 and 21 of his judgment, the Judge found BQ’s credibility to be affected by his having stated in his screening interview that he worked as a security guard but in his asylum interview his having stated that he was a taxi driver. The Judge did not accept BQ’s explanation that he worked as a security guard between 8am and 4pm and a taxi driver in the evening to earn extra money. (The Grounds of Appeal refer to the Judge’s failing to take into account BQ’s explanation that he worked as a “security guard” in the evening. This is plainly a typographical error). BQ complained that the Judge failed to take the guidance in YL (Rely on SEF) [2004] UKIAT 0145 at [19] into account and failed to take into account the fact that BQ had not been provided with a copy of his screening interview record when reaching his conclusion.
9. Ground 4: At para. 22 of his judgment the Judge noted that BQ’s statement that he was able to have an affair with his aunt because he was working as a taxi driver could not be reconciled with BQ’s saying that his uncle was only absent from his home during the day when working as a rug seller (question 83). However in his appeal witness statement at para. 10, BQ recorded that his uncle would be away from home for “days at a time”. BQ complains that this was not adequately addressed by the Judge.
10. Ground 5: BQ’s case was that his sister sold some gold and his brother-in-law sold a car to help pay for his journey. BQ argues that the Judge erred in three ways in his findings in relation to this point.
a. First the Judge found that, as BQ had stated that his sister and brother-in-law did not know about his affair with his aunt, they would not sell assets to assist him. But, BQ argues, he had explained at question 41 of his interview that he had informed his sister and brother-in-law about these events after he was discovered.
b. Second BQ argues that the Judge erred in finding that there was an inconsistency in his evidence as to whether his sister and brother-in-law knew about his affair.
c. Third, BQ argues that the Judge failed to take into account his claim that the gold and the car were sold to people who were within the family or a known to them or the agent who assisted the appellant when considering the credibility of the timeline.
11. On 3 March 2025, UTJ Blundell granted permission to appeal on all 5 grounds. In granting permission the Judge noted that “the common law principle of fairness requires the tribunal to consider with care the extent to which reliance can properly be placed on the answers given by the applicant in his screening interview: JA. (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 450; [2014] 1 WLR 4291.”
12. I remind myself that the role of the Upper Tribunal in an error of law hearing is to consider whether or not the Judge at first instance erred in law and, if so, whether any such error was material.
Discussion
Ground 1: Inconsistencies in Screening and Asylum Interviews
13. At para. 20 of the judgment, the Judge noted that “… at the time of his screening interview (SCR1.19) [BQ] stated that he was single. Subsequently, at the time of his substantive asylum interview (Q6) he stated that he was married.” The Judge relied on this to support his conclusion at para. 20 that BQ had been “materially inconsistent about basic aspects of his personal profile”. And he relied on this further conclusion to support his overall findings at para. 19 that he did “not find the Appellant’s account of the core issue upon which his protection claim is based to be plausible or credible.”
14. In YL (Rely on SEF) China the Immigration Appeal Tribunal considered the approach that should be taken to inconsistencies between answers given in Statement of Evidence Form [‘SEF’] and later evidence. The Tribunal held as follows at [19]:
When a person seeks asylum in the United Kingdom he is usually made the subject of a ‘screening interview’ (called, perhaps rather confusingly a “Statement of Evidence Form – SEF Screening–). The purpose of that is to establish the general nature of the claimant’s case so that the Home Office official can decide how best to process it. It is concerned with the country of origin, means of travel, circumstances of arrival in the United Kingdom, preferred language and other matters that might help the Secretary of State understand the case. Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later. However, it has to be remembered that a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum. It would not normally be appropriate for the Secretary of State to ask supplementary questions or to entertain elaborate answers and an inaccurate summary by an interviewing officer at that stage would be excusable. Further the screening interview may well be conducted when the asylum seeker is tired after a long journey. These things have to be considered when any inconsistencies between the screening interview and the later case are evaluated.
15. At para 6 of her Rule 24 submissions, Mrs Arif for the Secretary of State drew attention to paras. 20 and 22 of YL (Rely on SEF) China which make clear that where an appellant fills out an SEF “Self-Completion” Form, the “the starting point must be that the form SEF is a complete and accurate statement of a case.” That is, however, of limited relevance here given that the screening interview record was not such a form and was not completed in this manner.
16. Further, I note that the Court of Appeal came to similar conclusions to the IAT when considering discrepancies between various records of an asylum seeker’s interviews in JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 450 at [24]:
[The Tribunal] does, however, have an obligation to consider with care how much weight is to be attached to [the record], having regard to the circumstances in which it came into existence. That is particularly important when considering the significance to be attached to answers given in the course of an interview and recorded only by the person asking questions on behalf of the Secretary of State. Such evidence may be entirely reliable, but there is obviously room for mistakes and misunderstandings, even when the person being questioned speaks English fluently. The possibility of error becomes greater when the person being interviewed requires the services of an interpreter, particularly if the interpreter is not physically present. It becomes greater still if the person being interviewed is vulnerable by reason of age or infirmity. The written word acquires a degree of certainty which the spoken word may not command. The “anxious scrutiny” which all claimants for asylum are entitled to expect begins with a careful consideration of the weight that should properly be attached to answers given in their interviews. In the present case the decision-maker would need to bear in mind the age and background of the applicant, his limited command of English and the circumstances under which the initial interview and screening interview took place.
17. In my judgment the Judge did not consider the weight that should be attached to the record of BQ’s screening interview and, in particular, the record that BQ was single, as he was required to do. Further, the Judge did not address BQ’s claim that he had not been provided with a copy of the record of his Screening Interview record during his asylum process and so could not correct what he now states was an error in the form. I note that the Judge did consider BQ’s witness statement and did reject BQ’s proposed explanation in that witness statement for the error in the asylum screening record: “I do not find as credible the Appellant’s explanation that he was designated as being single simply because he was claiming asylum alone” (see Judgment at para. 21 and BQ’s appeal witness statement at para. 20). This does not, however, cure the errors identified above.
Ground 2: Failure to take account of photographs
18. BQ argues that the Judge failed to take account of the photographic evidence provided when assessing his claim to be married. There is no merit in this ground. The Judge addressed the photographic evidence in terms at para. 24 of the Judgment, as follows:
The Appellant has provided photographs of himself and other relevant family members. There is a photograph found at page 49 of the stitched bundle which the Appellant states is himself, his wife, his aunt he had the affair with, and her husband (the Appellant’s uncle). Firstly, the photograph of those four individuals establishes nothing. Secondly, it is not possible to identify the Appellant as being one of the individuals in the photograph. I cannot reconcile the image of the Appellant in the photograph (or other photographs said to be of him) and the manner in which he presented himself on the video hearing.
19. Before me, counsel for BQ argued that the Judge also erred in failing to put his concerns about BQ’s being pictured in the photographs at all to BQ at the appeal hearing. This was not a pleaded ground of appeal and BQ did not seek leave to amend his grounds. In any event, in light of the Judge’s finding that the photographs did not support BQ’s claim to be married, this point is not material and I do not consider it further.
Ground 3: Inconsistencies in Claimed Work
20. Insofar as is material the Judge found as follows at paras. 20 and 21 of his Judgment:
[20] … at the time of his screening interview (1.14) he stated he was a security guard but, in contrast, at the time of his substantive asylum interview (Q22/75) he stated that he was a taxi driver.
[21] … He has attempted to explain the discrepancy over his occupation by latterly claiming that he was a security guard by day (8.00 am to 4.00 pm) and additionally as a taxi driver in the evening to earn more money. I find that this later attempt to explain his two occupations has been concocted to explain away the former difficulties in his inability to be consistent.
And the Judge relied on this to support his conclusion that BQ’s account was not credible.
21. BQ complains that the Judge failed to apply the guidance contained in YL (Rely on SEF) China (as cited above) and that he failed to take into account the fact that BQ had not been provided with a copy of his screening interview record “until the appeal was in process”.
22. However, in my judgment, BQ’s argument that the Judge failed to apply YL (Rely on SEF) is well founded. The Judge’s principal concern was with BQ’s having sought “latterly” to add detail to his claimed occupation and that this change of position undermined BQ’s credibility. The Judge did not, however, specifically consider the weight that he should give to an account provided by BQ at his screening interview (especially in circumstances where BQ had not been provided with that record and afforded an opportunity to correct it) and whether BQ’s adding further detail to such an account could properly be indicative of his having “concocted” an account to “explain away former difficulties”. In my view this failure constituted an error of law.
Ground 4: Failure to address Para. 10 of BQ’s witness statement
23. At para. 22 of his Judgment, the Judge held as follows:
The Appellant stated at the time of his substantive asylum interview (Q75) that he was able to have an affair with his aunt because he was working on the taxis. However, this cannot be reconciled with the Appellant stating that his uncle was only absent from his family home during the day when working at his shop as a rug seller (Q83). By the Appellant’s own admission he was working as a security guard during the day and could not have attended at his aunt’s home to participate in an affair with her. These two difficulties undermine the Appellant’s credibility.
24. However, at para. 10 of his appeal witness statement, BQ stated the following:
I would go to see [my aunt] around once a week when my uncle was not home, due to his job he would be away from home for days at a time, and as my family were aware of my uncle's wife's situation and as we were related no one questioned no one who question me if I was seen at my uncle's house. Regardless we were careful not to be seen.
25. In my judgment BQ’s account of the circumstances in which he claimed to visit his aunt was highly material to the Judge’s consideration of the plausibility of BQ’s account and was a matter which the Judge was required to address. Indeed, had the Judge considered BQ’s account at para. 10 and accepted it, then the inconsistency identified by the Judge at para. 22 of his judgment would fall away.
26. In my judgment, the Judge’s failure to consider BQ’s account at para. 10 of his appeal witness statement constituted an error of law.
Ground 5: Errors in relation to the raising of funds
27. BQ makes a number of arguments in relation to this ground of appeal.
28. BQ argues that the Judge erred when he held at para. 27 of the Judgment that: “…The Appellant stated at the time of his substantive asylum interview (Q40) that his sister and brother in law did not know about the affair. On that basis they would hardly sell valuable assets of their own to assist him. Otherwise, the Appellant’s witness statement at paragraph 12, states that he went into the house and told them about the difficulties he faced. This inconsistency also undermines the evidence of the Appellant.”
29. In my judgment there is merit in BQ’s Ground 5.
30. First, BQ clearly states that he did tell his brother-in-law and sister about the affair post discovery (see BQ’s asylum interview at (Q41)). There is no inconsistency with para. 12 of BQ’s witness statement.
31. Second, the Judge’s reasoning suggests that BQ’s relatives could not have known to sell their assets to assist him as they did not know about the affair. But, at (Q40-42) of the asylum interview BQ appears to state that his sister had already sold some gold to buy a car before being informed about his affair and that further transactions took place thereafter. Further, on BQ’s account, he his sister and brother-in-law about the affair (indeed the Judge himself notes this in the penultimate sentence of para. 27). The Judge’s reasoning that, as BQ’s sister and brother-in-law did not know about the affair, they could not have sold assets to support BQ’s flight, is not sustainable.
32. Third, contrary to BQ’s submission, the Judge was aware of BQ’s claim that the car was sold to a neighbour of the agent (see para. 28 of the Judgment) and, while he does not explicitly mention BQ’s claim that his sister sold her gold to her husband’s sister, the Judge’s reasoning is clear and I do not consider that he was required to address this point. However, this does not cure the errors in the Judge’s reasons identified above.
33. In my judgment the Judge’s findings on the fundraising point rest on a misapprehension as to what BQ’s case on how his funds were raised actually was. Alternatively the Judge’s findings on this point were not sufficiently clear to demonstrate what he understood BQ’s case on fund-raising to be and which parts of that account he accepted/rejected and why. In either case I find that to constitute an error of law.
Materiality
34. In his judgment, the Judge relied on a number of discreet points when coming to his conclusion that BQ’s account was not credible. I have therefore carefully considered whether the Judge would have reached the same conclusions in any event, but for the errors of law identified above.
35. In that regard I note Mrs Arif’s submission that the Judge’s core conclusion is set out at para. 34 of his judgment (i.e. “On the basis of my primary findings that the Appellant left Iraq through choice for a better life and as an economic migrant, leads me to the firm conclusion that he maintains contact with his family in Iraq”) such that any errors identified by BQ are not material. However, it is not clear to me that the Judge’s comments at para. 34 of his Judgment were intended as a complete and free-standing conclusion and I do not consider that the Judge’s findings at, in particular, paras. 20-31 were irrelevant to his conclusions.
36. As such, in light of the number and significance of the errors identified, I cannot be confident that the Judge would have reached the same conclusion even if he had not erred in the ways identified above. I accordingly find that the errors identified above are material.
Conclusion
37. In my judgment the Judge at first instance erred as alleged in Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5 and these errors of law were material to the outcome of his determination. As such, I do not accept Mrs Arif’s submission that any rehearing of this appeal will turn on a narrow point and so should be retained by the Upper Tribunal. Further, I note that the errors identified in Grounds 1 and 3 go to the fairness of the decision. I therefore consider it to be appropriate to set aside the decision and remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for re-hearing.
Notice of Decision
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Matter remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a different Judge.

ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 July 2025