Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000010

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60155/2023

LP/07000/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
8th July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NAIK KC

Between

FO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at Field House on 17 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Sepulveda, Counsel instructed by Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Thapar (‘the judge’) dated 26 October 2024 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his fresh protection and human rights claim.

Anonymity

2. We maintain the anonymity order that was granted by the First-tier Tribunal. No party requested that the order be set aside.

Relevant Background

3. The appellant arrived in the UK on the 7th of September 2016 aged 19 and claimed asylum on the 8th of September 2016. His claim was refused on the 8th of August 2019.

4. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim. In a decision dated 4th of April 2020First tier Tribunal Judge Kemp dismissed his appeal. FtTJ Kemp accepted his account that he was at risk of honour-based violence in his home area in Iraq. However FtTJ Kemp was found that he could internally relocate. His application for permission to appeal was dismissed on 2 July 2020 by the Upper Tribunal.

5. The appellant made further submissions on the 1st of August 2022 which were refused with the right of appeal. He then lodged further submissions which were on the 24th August 2022 which were further refused on the 24th of August 2023.

6. The appellant maintained that he would be at risk from the family of his former girlfriend and their associates and he now submits that he would also be at risk on return on account of his political activities in the UK opposing the Iraqi government (namely the IKR Government, the KDP, the PUK and the Government of Iraq) and because of his membership of DAKOK.

7. The respondent accepts that the appellant is a national of Iraq and is of Kurdish ethnicity. In light of the previous determination of FtTJ Kemp it is undisputed that the appellant would be at risk of honour based violence on his return to Iraq and that there was an insufficiency of protection from the state in his home area, but that the appellant could internal relocate, and that the appellant could obtain the necessary documentation for his return to Iraq as he was able to gain possession of his CSID. The respondent accepts that the appellant is a member of DAKOK however the respondent does not accept that the appellant would be at risk on return due to his political activities in the UK and rejects the genuineness of his political belief.

The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

8. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim. The appeal came before the judge on 24 September 2024.

The Issues

9. The judge recorded that the parties agreed that the issues in dispute were as follows:

(a) Asylum
• Whether internal relocation is a viable option for the Appellant. It is undisputed that the Appellant is at risk of honour-based violence in his home area and sufficiency of protection is unavailable.
• Whether the Appellant is at risk due to his political opinion and sur place activities in the UK. Ms Qureshi confirmed the Respondent acknowledges the Appellant’s online activities, membership of DAKOK and attendance at meetings however, the Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s claimed political opinion is not genuinely held.
(b) Humanitarian protection – including the Appellant’s ability to redocument himself. (c) Articles 2 and 3 to stand or fall with the Appellant’s asylum claim.
(d) Whether there are very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into the IKR. (e) Ms Sepulveda confirmed Article 8 ECHR was not being pursued.

10. The respondent acknowledges the appellant’s online activities, membership of DAKOK and his attendance at meetings in the UK however the respondent's position is that the appellants claim political opinion is not genuinely held.

11. Hence key to the consideration of the issues in this appeal and in particular whether the determination whether the appellants political activities were based on genuine political belief.

12. In a decision dated 26 October 2024, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

13. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

14. The grounds of appeal assert that the judge provided inadequate reasons for not accepting the appellant’s claim to hold genuine political beliefs in their nature as he claimed. The grounds go on to assert that the judge failed to engage with and consider the contents of the appellants too detailed witness statements dated 1st August 2023 and 15th of September 2024 that provided significant details regarding the development of the appellants political opinion and of his political activities in the UK. It was asserted that the appellants witness statements warranted adequate consideration in the assessment of the appellants claimed to hold genuine political beliefs in the nature claimed given the contents explain how his political beliefs have developed and how he became involved in so plus political activities in the UK and why.

15. The grounds of appeal also assert that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the country background evidence did not support the appellant’s claim that he would be at risk on return.

16. In a decision dated 23 December 2024, the First tier Tribunal refused the appellant’s application for permission to appeal. However, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens in the decision dated 3rd March 2025, where it is stated “it is at least arguable that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellants political views were not genuine and all failed to explain why he rejected the balance detailed evidence at paragraph 14 to 27 of his witness statement dated the 1st of August 2023 where he explains how his political views and involve involvement developed. This arguable error may have fed into the assessment at risk”.

Submissions at the Hearing

17. Ms Sepulveda for the appellant developed these submissions in her oral submissions and in particular identified the passages from the witness statements which she submitted had been overlooked and to which there is no reference in the determination. She referred us to paragraphs 9 to 39 of his witness statement dated 1 August 2023 addressing in detail his role, activities and motivation in engaging in political activity against the Iraqi government since being in the UK. Second, she referred us to his paragraphs 7 to 9 of his witness statement dated 15 September 2024 submitted shortly before the appeal heard on 24 September 2024, where he maintains the earlier position as to political activity in the UK. Ms Sepulveda submits that there is no reference to the appellant’s detailed witness evidence by the judge when reaching his conclusions as to at paragraphs 31 and 32.

18. Mr Lawson on behalf of the Home Office submitted that the judge confirmed that he had had regard to all the relevant documents before him at paragraph 10 and had made clear findings in regarding the appellants attendance at demonstrations, his social media activity and his claimed involvement with DAKOK. He submits it is clear why the judge reached the conclusion set out in the determination at paragraphs 31 and 32 having considered all of the evidence in the round to the appropriate standard. Mr Lawson adopted the reasoning of the First tier Tribunal Judge in the decision dated 23 December 2024, refusing permission to appeal.

Consideration

19. In our view whilst the judge is not required to record all of the evidence that was before him, he is required to give adequate reasons for rejecting the core issue in the appeal, namely the credibility of the appellant’s political beliefs.

20. The appellant gave oral evidence before the judge and was cross-examined. In his findings the judge records his oral evidence in cross-examination at paragraph 25 of his determination, but not the relevant aspects of the appellant’s detailed written evidence going to that issue.

21. In his witness statement dated 1 August 2023 (which was contained in the Respondent’s FTT Court bundle) which he adopted, the appellant articulated in some detail not only his activity (paragraphs 9 to 12) but also his reasons as to why his political opinion has developed in the UK (paragraph 13). He stated that the reason why his political opinion has developed during his time in the UK because that information critical of a government is not widely published in Iraq and accessible as it is in the UK. He observes the Iraqi government censor a lot of news and media in Iraq and therefore information about the human rights abuse is not so readily available and accessible there (paragraph 14). The other reason he states why this is, is because people in Iraq are afraid to talk about these topics because of their fear of persecution by the state and because of the government censorship of the information (paragraph 15). The appellant further states that he was too young [he is now 28] to understand politics before he fled and that he has become interested during his time in the UK (paragraph 16). The appellant’s evidence was that he has learned a lot about human rights abuses committed by the Iraqi governments during his time in the UK from news reports and social media and through engaging in conversations including with members of DAKOK (paragraph 17). He now follows the news more closely now since he has been here and that he has learned a lot that he did not know about the Iraqi governments’ involvement in corruption, human rights abuse and their ill treatment of civilians of those who criticise them or speak out against them (paragraph 18). One of the main reasons the appellant gave as to why he opposes the Iraqi governments is because of the way they punish people who speak out against them (paragraph 19). The appellant then set out in detail from paragraph 20 onwards as to why he used Facebook as a tool to express his political beliefs (in particular that if one posts political content in public view it will reach a wider audience which was important to him). He said that his he and his friends are helping to raise awareness of human rights abuses against civilians by the Iraqi governments. He articulates that his friends explained to him that the more attention and support is attracted to the situation and act, the more likely it is that it will make a difference for Iraqi people and pressure the international population and governments to encourage the Iraqi governments to change their behaviour for the better (paragraph 25). It is for these reasons he gives for posting political posts on his Facebook newsfeed (paragraphs 26 to 28). He also stated that he attends as many demonstrations as he can but due to his financial difficulties cannot afford the public travel costs to attend all the demonstrations that he would like to (paragraph 30). He also observed that there were relatively few demonstrations during the coronavirus pandemic (paragraph 31). He confirms the active role that he played at the demonstrations he attended: he holds banners and placards to reflect his own political beliefs and how he wishes to portray them (paragraph 33. He also encourages other to join in with chanting slogans against the government (paragraph 33). He has also volunteered as a marshal at some of the demonstrations that he attended for DAKOK. The senior members of the organisation had asked members to volunteer as marshals to keep the demonstrations under control and to look out for trouble (paragraph 34). There are photographs of him undertaking this role at demonstrations (paragraph 35). He states at paragraph 36 that attending demonstrations is very important to him because the demonstrations attract attention from the public, international governments and the media and when the media reports on the demonstration, news of the demonstration and their purpose reaches a wider and diverse audience both nationally and internationally which subsequently raise awareness of the human rights abuses of the Iraqi governments. He further states the demonstrations are very important to him because they give him the opportunity to express his feelings to towards the Iraqi governments directly and that he believes that awareness of and support for demonstrations gain support for his political goals from the public, the British government and other international government, will encourage international governments and the international population to put pressure on the Iraqi governments to change their behaviour for the better. At paragraph 39 he sets out the political meetings he has attended in the UK held by DAKOK and the discussions about human rights abuses in the IKR and how they can help to improve life for Kurds. He also sets out that if he were to be returned to Iraq, he would not conceal his political opinions in order to avoid persecution by the authorities because this is part of his identity. Finally he states at paragraph 41 that he fears that the Iraqi governments are also now aware of his political activities in the UK.

22. In his 2024 witness statement (which was contained in the Appellant’s FTT Court bundle) the appellant, addressing the reasons for refusal letter in respect of his political activity, referred back to his first witness statement, stating at paragraphs 7 to 9:

7. Regarding paragraphs [30] – [70] of my RFRL, I reaffirm that my political opinion, as
explained in my WS1, is genuine, and that I continue to participate in political activities in
the UK, in support of my political cause and the DAKOK Support Centre (DAKOK).

8. I reaffirm that my political activities include, assisting in the organising and running of
political demonstrations held by DAKOK, using social media to gain awareness and
support for my political cause and for DAKOK, and attending DAKOK meetings to provide
my contributions of ideas and assistance to DAKOK’s political cause and the future of
DAKOK.

9. My work in assisting in the organising and the running of political demonstrations that are
held by DAKOK include, contributing to discussions on the arrangements of political
demonstrations, promoting scheduled political demonstrations on social media, setting up
the area before demonstrations, and tidying up the area after, handing out DAKOK flyers
at the demonstrations and speaking to attendees and passers-by, directing and safe-guarding
the crowds at the demonstrations, and providing attendees assistance, for example, if they
have lost the people they attended with, or have lost property, or if they need directions to
public transport, or somewhere else to get home, etc.

23. The judge at paragraph 31 found the appellant did not have a political profile in Iraq and found that it had not been established that the authorities would have any reason to be aware of or monitor the appellant’s social media account. He found that the appellant’s political activities and membership of DAKOK started after his previous asylum appeal was dismissed and shortly before his further submissions were made to the respondent. He found that there was nothing before him to demonstrate that members of DAKOK were persecuted in Iraq. He found that the appellant had sought to bolster his asylum claim through his claimed political activism and he was not persuaded that his political opinions were genuinely held or that he would continue to be politically active in Iraq. At paragraph 32 in reaching his conclusions that the appellant's political activities in the UK are of a low level the judge brought forward his findings from paragraph 31 and concluded that it had not been established that the appellant’s political opinions were genuinely held or that his political activities in the UK had come to the adverse attention of the Iraqi authorities. On that basis he found that the appellant had failed to establish that he would be at risk on account of his claimed political opinion and that it would not be unreasonable for him to delete his Facebook account to mitigate any perceived risk and the appeal was dismissed.

24. There was no reference to the detailed reasons given by the appellant as to his political motivation set out his first witness statement in particular. In light of the detail of the witness evidence set out above which the judge did not address, and the paucity of reasons he gave at paragraphs 31 and 32 in rejecting the appellant’s claim to be undertaking genuine political activity, we find that his conclusions are inadequately reasoned. The appellant is entitled to know why his account has been rejected. The Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions dated 4 June 2024 at paragraph 5 states “where reasons are given, they must always be adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focused upon the principal controversial issues on which the outcome of the case has turned. To be adequate, the reasons for a judicial decision must explain to the parties why they have won and lost[1]. The reasons must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute[2]. They must always enable an appellate body to understand why the decision was reached, so that it is able to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law[3]. These fundamental principles apply to the tribunals as well as to the courts”.

25. This error goes to the heart of the Judge’s credibility assessment and in turn relates to risk on return. In SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC) to which our attention was drawn by Mr Lawson, and which is still guidance on the issue, with reference to the risk categories at para 293 which were still valid. Those include: “(v) Persons opposing (perceived or real) the government/KRG or those so affiliated”.

26. Hence in the circumstances the judge’s findings of fact in relation to the appellant’s claimed political opinion are unsafe. We find that the error infects the entire decision. Accordingly, we are not required to address the appellant’s submission that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the country background evidence. We set aside the decision in its entirety
27. Applying the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), given the issues and the amount of fact-finding that will be required to do, we are satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by another Judge with no findings of fact preserved.

S Naik KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 July 2025