Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000020

First-Tier Tribunal No: PA/65231/2023
LP/10043/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TIER JUDGE KUDHAIL

Between

RM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Kerr, Counsel instructed by Shawstone Associates
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. By his decision sent to the parties on 28 October 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Woolley ("the Judge") refused the appellant's asylum appeal. The asylum claim was made on 15 May 2021, based on fear of persecution from the Iranian authorities due to imputed political opinion and ethnic group as a Kurd.
2. The appellant sought permission to appeal from the First Tier Tribunal, which was refused. He renewed those grounds to the Upper Tier Tribunal who granted permission on all grounds except ground 5.
Anonymity
3. The Judge granted the appellant anonymity by an order dated 28 October 2024. The representatives before us did not submit that the order be set aside. The appellant seeks international protection. We observe UTIAC Guidance Note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, particularly its introduction and paragraphs 27 and 28. At this time we consider that on balance the appellant's right to a private life as protected by article 8 ECHR outweighs the right of the public to know that he is a party to these proceedings, the latter right protected by article 10 ECHR.
Grounds of Appeal
4. The grounds are somewhat prolix and as a consequence overlapping. Mr Kerr (who did not draft the grounds), categorised them as follows:
(a) Grounds 1-4, the Judge’s failure to put material matters to the appellant resulted in procedural unfairness;
(b) Grounds 6-7, there was a material misdirection in the law as the Judge failed to apply relevant country guidance cases.
Discussion and reasons
Grounds 1-4
5. With respect to Grounds 1-4, Mr Kerr submitted they could be summarised in three procedural errors (a) the Judge’s failure to put a material point not previously raised to the appellant, given the absence of the respondent; (b) failure to take into account the appellant’s age and vulnerabilities at the time of the core event and (c) assessment of hearsay evidence.
6. Turning to the first point, the parties agreed in the absence of the respondent at the First-tier Tribunal hearing, the Judge as bound to follow the Surendran guidelines. Ms Leconte accepted the issue about escape routes was not put to the appellant but submitted this was not a material error of law as the respondent had raised the appellant’s credibility about past events, thus this was in issue. She accepted the respondent had not raised the escape issue specifically in the challenged decision. She argued the finding on escape routes [paragraph 24], in and of itself, did not materially infect the entirety of the credibility findings.
7. At paragraph 24, the Judge identified the event leading to the appellant leaving Iran arose by virtue of a raid by the Iranian authorities at his place of employment. The Judge found this account incredulous due to the appellants inability to explain how he was able to escape from the authorities given background evidence. The issue of the escape was not specifically raised by the respondent within her decision and he was not cross examined in the respondent’s absence. In WN (Surendran; credibility; new evidence) DRC [2004] UKIAT 00213 (Ouseley), the Tribunal clarified the Surendran guidelines on a number of points and, in essence, said that it is not necessary for obvious points on credibility to be put to the appellant, where credibility was generally an issue in the light of the refusal letter or as a result of later evidence. However, the Tribunal said that where the point was important to the decision but it was not obvious, or where credibility had not been raised or did not obviously arise from new material, or where the appellant was unrepresented, it was generally better to raise the points and this could be done by direct questioning of the witness. We are satisfied, that the point was not obvious as it was not raised by the respondent within her decision or her review. The Judge attached significant weight to the issue as it relates to the core of the claim. We are satisfied, that this should have been put to the appellant given the weight attached to this within the decision. The appellant has not been given an opportunity to address this issue, thus the failure to allow him to address it, we find unfair and a procedural error.
8. Mr Kerr further submitted that the Judge in making findings about the appellant’s past persecution, did not take into account his age. This he argued was significant given it is accepted the appellant was a minor at the time. He accepted the Judge directed himself to the appellant’s vulnerabilities due to his mental health issues and age at paragraph 20. However, he submitted when making his findings at paragraph 24-25, the Judge was not alive to these vulnerabilities when assessing credibility of events that took place when the appellant was a minor. Ms Lecointe submitted the self direction was sufficient and demonstrated the Judge had the vulnerabilities in mind when making findings. She submitted he was not required to set them out with every finding. We have considered the Judge’s approach in this regard and whilst he does give a self direction at the outset before making any findings, we find it was incumbent upon the Judge to have directed himself to the appellant’s age and vulnerabilities before making findings that his core account was incredulous.
9. The final point regarding procedural unfairness is that the Judge’s approach to the hearsay evidence of the appellant’s mother and uncle was unfair as it was not speculative but based on accounts given to the appellant. The appellant’s grounds submit there is no legal basis to disregard the evidence based on it being hearsay. At paragraph 25, the Judge finds the account of risk is purely speculative as it was derived from the accounts which could not be verified. The evidence before the Judge was that the appellant had been informed by his uncle that the family home had been raided. The Judge’s reason for rejecting the evidence of the family is the lack of verification. We are mindful that there is no requirement for corroboration (paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules) and the standard of proof is low, a reasonable degree of likelihood. We are satisfied that the conclusion as to inconsistency erroneously conflates hearsay evidence with speculation. Adequate consideration as to weight is to be given to hearsay evidence and though it may have been open to the Judge, with reasons, to reject hearsay evidence advanced in this appeal, such rejection could not be solely founded upon a conclusion that it was mere speculation.
10. We have considered whether these procedural errors cumulatively infected the overall credibility assessment and are satisfied they do as these findings pertain to the core event leading to the appellant leaving his home country. Thus, we find the errors of law are material.
Grounds 6-7
11. As to the Judge’s claimed misdirection of the law, specifically the Judge’s lack of application of relevant country guidance cases, Mr Kerr took the Tribunal to the accepted facts namely:
a) The appellant’s young age
b) His ethnicity as a Kurd
c) His illegal exit
d) He has engaged in political activity in the UK as a low level attendee
e) The appellant has a Facebook account which contains material derogatory to the Iranian regime.
12. He argued the above accepted facts have not been considered holistically in line with country guidance in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC) and BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36. He submitted the Judge assessed each fact as not being a risk factor but did not consider them cumulatively. This he argued was a material error of law as the Judge did not follow country guidance particularly given guidance that low level activity can be perceived as political and the Iranian regime operates a “hair trigger” approach.
13. Ms Lecointe accepted the Judge did not consider the facts cumulatively but argued this did not amount to a material error of law as the Judge’s assessment engaged with country guidance as he set this out and applied it to each risk factor. She argued it remains the respondent’s position that the appellant’s accepted profile as a failed asylum seeker, with low-level political attendance, would not raise suspicion sufficient to warrant questioning upon arrival.
14. We are mindful of the guidance of the Court of Appeal in SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940; [2013] 1 WLR 41, as considered in Roba (OLF members and sympathisers) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 1 (IAC), namely that as a general proposition Judges in the First-tier Tribunal are required to follow country guidance cases unless there is sufficient reason to depart from them.
15. In HB (Kurds) Iran, the Tribunal set out various risk factors and we note: “(5) Kurdish ethnicity is nevertheless a risk factor which, when combined with other factors, may create a real risk of persecution.” We also consider guidance regarding the hair trigger approach is material in the context of Iranian nationals as country guidance stipulates that “ ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.” Accordingly, we find the Judge failed to properly measure the appellant’s circumstances cumulatively against the risks set out in relevant country guidance. This we find is a material error of law.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 28 October 2024 involved the making of a material error of law.
We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in its entirety
The decision in this appeal will be remade in the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Manchester IAC. To be heard by a Judge other than Judge Woolley.

S K Kudhail
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
23 October 2025