Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000030

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/05192/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19 August2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUGHES

Between

KH
ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Litigant in Person (assisted by an interpreter in Kurdish Sorani)
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 1 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is our oral decision which was delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Williams (“the Judge”) dated 7 November 2024, dismissing his protection and human rights claim. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick.
3. The Appellant is a national of Iraq. He had claimed asylum on the basis that he had worked as Kolber who had been smuggling goods for a non-state actor referred to as Mala Ahmed (also referred to as “MA”). On one occasion a load was lost. When MA was told about the lost load, he said that the load had contained drugs and he said that the Appellant must locate the load. The Appellant said he was unable to locate the load and he feared retribution from MA who was very rich and influential with links to the PUK and so he fled the country.
Grant of Permission to Appeal
4. When granting permission, the learned Upper Tribunal Judge said as follows:
“The appellant challenges the decision of the FTT on four grounds:
(i) ‘failing to consider all the material facts of the case contained in the substantive interview’;
(ii) ‘giving too much weight to an immaterial matter’;
(iii) ‘misunderstanding the basic facts’; and
(iv) the FTT Judge ‘failed to [assess] plausibility correctly as he failed to pay close attention to the details of appellant’s account’.”
5. Permission to appeal has been granted on all grounds.
The Hearing Before Us
6. At the hearing before us, because the Appellant is a litigant in person, we took time to explain the procedure to him and we considered that fairness dictated that the Respondent ought to make submissions first.
7. Dr Ibisi maintained that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision and she invited us to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. We summarised Dr Ibisi’s submissions to the Appellant alongside summarising the Appellant’s own grounds of appeal, so as to enable the Appellant to respond. We note that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal are well-drafted. The Appellant informed us that he had had professional assistance in those being drafted and he confirmed he knew their contents. The interpreter and the Appellant understood each other well. We refer to the submissions made to us further once we consider the grounds in more detail.
Consideration and Analysis
8. We take each of the grounds of appeal in turn.
9. Ground 1 contends in summary that the Judge had materially erred by failing to note that the screening interview is a brief interview and so not an interview where all details are provided. It is said that it was a material error of law for the Judge to place such significant emphasis on the screening interview.
10. We turn to the Judge’s decision at paragraphs 23 and 24. This dealt with specifics in relation to the load that the Appellant said he had been transporting.
11. Dr Ibisi stresses to us, in effect, that there is a qualitative difference between paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Judge’s decision. Whereas paragraph 23 explains that the Appellant had not provided details that the load had contained drugs in the screening interview, there was a full opportunity for the Appellant to refer to the drugs in much more detail in the later Asylum Claim Questionnaire [ACQ].
12. Dr Ibisi said that the two were significantly different and she referred us to the end of paragraph 24. There in respect of the ACQ the Judge said, “His failure to mention such a significant feature is detrimental to his credibility.” Dr Ibisi reminds us that the ACQ was completed by the Appellant some 20 months after the screening interview and that the Appellant had set out in significant detail what he had said was that the basis of his claim.
13. Dr Ibisi also submitted that the Judge had in fact been careful to say in relation to the asylum screening interview that, “I accept that this was a brief overview of the Appellant’s account”. In addition, the Judge had also said, “…but he did not mention that the lost load contained drugs”. Dr Ibisi invites us to conclude that the Judge was well-aware of the difference in the treatment of the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility arising out of the screening interview compared with the ACQ.
14. We remind ourselves of the decision in YL (Reliance on SEF ) China [2004] UKIAT 00145, where it was said at paragraphs 19 and 20 as follows:
“19. When a person seeks asylum in the United Kingdom he is usually made the subject of a ‘screening interview’. The purpose of that is to establish the general nature of the claimant’s case so that the Home Office official can decide how best to process it. It is concerned with the country of origin, means of travel, circumstances of arrival in the United Kingdom, preferred language and other matters that might help the Secretary of State understand the case. Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later. However, it has to be remembered that a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum. It would not normally be appropriate for the Secretary of State to ask supplementary questions or to entertain elaborate answers and an inaccurate summary by an interviewing officer at that stage would be excusable. Further the screening interview may well be conducted when the asylum seeker is tired after a long journey. These things have to be considered when any inconsistencies between the screening interview and the later case are evaluated.
20. The Statement of Evidence Form – SEF Self Completion is an entirely different document. It is the Appellant’s opportunity to set out his case. The asylum seeker has to return the form by a specified date, usually about a fortnight after the form is given to him. However, the asylum seeker is allowed to choose his own interpreter and obtain all the assistance he wants in order to complete the form.”
15. Things have moved on a little since that case was reported in 2004 in that the “SEF” is now referred to as the “ACQ” but the established point remains precisely the same. Namely the screening interview is the initial opportunity for an Appellant to give, as it were, the headlines in respect of who he is and why it is that he is claiming asylum. But there need not be the detail.
16. It is later in the SEF or the ACQ where significant detail is provided by the applicant in a protection claim. The applicant is able to do this, as it were, in his own time and sometimes with the assistance of others.
17. In our judgment, paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Judge’s decision had carefully considered the two difference pieces of evidence. As the decision in YL explains, the Judge ensured that there was a difference in terms of the expectation of what a screening interview would contain and what a later ACQ might contain.
18. In our judgment Dr Ibisi is entirely right that the Judge considered at paragraph 23 the screening interview and he specifically noted that the screening interview was a “brief overview”. It is in respect of the more detailed and later ACQ at paragraph 24 that the Judge concludes that the failure to mention the drugs was a significant omission or feature and which was thereby detrimental to the Appellant’s credibility. The Judge was perfectly entitled to reach such a decision. In the circumstances, we conclude, having considered the matter carefully for ourselves, that there is no material error of law which arises out of Ground 1 because the Judge had been well aware of the limited nature of the screening interview and he had therefore considered all of the material facts of the case. That therefore disposes of Ground 1.
19. Ground 2 contends that the Judge gave too much weight to an immaterial matter and in respect of credibility whereby the Appellant had provided different names for the relative of an assailant. The different names are, Mohamed Watban, Mohammed Watman and Mohamed Osman.
20. The Judge said at paragraphs 25 and 26 of his decision that the Appellant had been inconsistent when providing the name of the person to whom Mala Ahmed was related.
21. We note that importantly the Judge made very clear at paragraph 26 of his decision,
“I accept that differences in translation may give rise to different versions of the same name. However, the name that has been advanced has been done so by the Appellant himself on each occasion. Certainly, during the hearing and in his email, the Appellant has had ample opportunity to provide the name in the manner that he wished to do so. Yet the name has not remained consistent. The inconsistency in this central and important aspect of the Appellant’s case is a matter which undermines the credibility of the account that he provides.”
22. During the hearing the Appellant explained to us that the name Mohammed Watman and Mohamed Watban, (the difference being an M and a B for the surname) are very similar. Reflected perhaps by a different hearing of the name or indeed simply by a different spelling. We accept that. Names can be slightly differently spelt. ‘Watman’ and ‘Watban’ are indeed very similar. We agree with the Appellant about this. That is not the end of the matter though.
23. We are unable to accept the Appellant’s explanation about the name ‘Osman’. The name ‘Osman’ is clearly nowhere near the same as ‘Watman’ or ‘Watban’. We conclude that the Judge was perfectly entitled to consider that many different names were provided by the Appellant and that this was an aspect which had the potential to undermine the Appellant’s credibility. It was a central feature of the Appellant’s case that the connected names of his assailants would be known by the Appellant.
24. Ultimately this was a matter that was before the Judge. He had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and he had noted these different names. The Appellant explained to us that Mr Mala Ahmed is entirely different to the other names but that still does not deal with the very different names which have been provided.
25. Although the Appellant sought to provide us with a new explanation today, we can not now take that into account in any event. Even if we were able to accept the new version of matters provided to us today by the Appellant, it simply does not get around why the Appellant’s account in respect of names was not provided in a consistent manner. We conclude that the Judge did not permit himself to be persuaded by immaterial matters when assessing credibility. The Judge was perfectly entitled to hold against the Appellant the different names that he had provided of his assailants and others. That therefore disposes of Ground 2.
26. Ground 3 contends that the Judge misunderstood the basic facts. Paragraph 27 of the Judge’s decision is referred to in the grounds. As has been pointed out by Dr Ibisi though, it is necessary to consider the subsequent paragraphs of the Judge’s decision too for the fuller explanations. There were numerous other inconsistencies and/or credibility findings against the Appellant which either have not been challenged or which clearly explain why it is that the Judge came to the conclusions that he did.
27. Paragraphs 28 to 33 set out in the clearest terms what the Judge’s conclusions were in respect of the Appellant’s credibility. The Judge said, for example, at paragraph 28:
“In isolation, the inconsistency in relation to how he obtained a photograph of his CSID could perhaps be described as innocuous and of little importance. However, it carries greater weight and relevance when considered in the light of the various other inconsistencies which are present in the Appellant’s account and is a further example of the Appellant providing differing accounts at differing stages in the asylum claim.”
28. That succinctly summarises the way in which the Judge set out matters in respect of that aspect of the case but the Judge also noted that various other aspects were intertwined. In reality, Ground 3 amounts to an attempt to reargue the case and is a mere disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions. That disposes of Ground 3.
29. Ground 4 is split into three subparagraphs with the heading that the Judge’s assessment was wrong because he had failed to play close attention to the details of the Appellant’s account.
30. Paragraph 4(a) contends that the Appellant’s account of not checking his cargo before transporting it was something that would occur in the circumstances and it was something that the Appellant would have to do. Paragraph 4(b) contends that the wider context of kolbar activity need to be considered and paragraph 4(c) contends that the Judge had failed to appreciate the wider context in relation to the Appellant to assess plausibility with relevant country conditions.
31. Again, as pointed out by Dr Ibisi, each of these aspects was fully and clearly dealt with by the Judge. We conclude that the Appellant’s grounds amount to mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision.
32. By way of example at paragraph 27 the Judge referred to the inconsistency in relation to whether or not the Appellant had received any further threats following him leaving Iraq. This was a reasonable and proper consideration of the case by the Judge. Paragraph 28 of the decision, to which we have referred, dealt the CSID documentation. Paragraph 29 related to the inspection of the load itself. At paragraph 30, the Judge dealt with the journey in respect of the smuggling and having to sleep. At paragraph 31 the Judge dealt with Mala Ahmed becoming aware of the load having become lost. At paragraph 32, the Judge referred to the four photographs which the Appellant had brought to the hearing and which he had sought to rely on. The Judge concluded there was simply no weight which to support what was being alleged by the Appellant. We conclude that the Judge provided adequate reasoning why he was coming to each of those conclusions.
33. Ultimately the Judge had said with clear and sound reasoning as a summary,
“I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that the person whom he fears in Iraq, namely MA, is a person of influence who has connections to other influential and powerful persons within the PUK and KDP. The appellant has not established that MA exists, that MA has any familial links to a PUK leader, that any uncle of the appellant is known as Mohammed Watman or any variation of that name, that Mohammed Watman is a man of power or influence within the IKR, and that he faces any risk from MA or any affiliate or associated person to MA in the IKR.”
34. Finally, at paragraph 34 the Judge dealt with Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 and said that the Appellant had failed to claim asylum en route to the United Kingdom. The Judge referred to the correct test to be applied in the subsequent paragraphs and concluded that the appeal had to be dismissed, including in respect of CSID and other documentation issues.
35. That disposes of Ground 4.
Conclusion
36. We remind ourselves that there has to be appropriate judicial restraint in relation to the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. We note too that the authorities date back to Baroness Hale’s clear judgment in AH Sudan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; ]2009] 1 AC 678 in respect of that expertise.
37. In the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in MH (Bangladesh) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 (9 June 2025) Lord Justice Arnold, with whom Lord Justice Singh and Lady Justice King agreed, said as follows:
“The role of an appellate court or tribunal
29. There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirection simply because they have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
38. Because the Appellant is a litigant in person, we explain this further. We are not hearing this appeal for the first time at the Upper Tribunal. This is an appeal against a decision where a specialist judge at the First-tier Tribunal had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant. Oral evidence was provided by the Appellant and tested during cross examination. The Judge had then come to the decisions that he did. Our task is not to rehear the case afresh, but we have to evaluate whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. We conclude that the Judge dealt lawfully and adequately with each of the matters which are raised in the grounds of appeal before us.
39. We are not able to discern any material error of law in the Judge’s decision, despite a careful consideration by us, noting that this is a protection claim which requires the most anxious scrutiny and noting that the Appellant is a litigant in person who may not have been able to advance things as easily as those who have legal representation.
40. Because there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision, we dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds, stands.
The anonymity direction continues.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 July 2025