Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000050

First-tier Tribunal Nos: DC/50137/2022
LD/00236/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM

Between

DHURATA LEKA
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar, Counsel, instructed by Oliver & Hasani Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Mr Badar made an application to anonymise the Appellant and her children. Having considered the Guidance Note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private I do not find that the Appellant’s human rights necessitate a departure from the principle of open justice of open justice. It is not necessary for me to identify the Appellants’ minor children in this decision.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Albania. Her date of birth is 18 December 1975. The matter came before me following the setting aside of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Harris.
3. The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in September 2004. She was granted asylum in in a false identity on 22 April 2010. She claimed to be Besa Leka from. She was granted British citizenship following her application in which she maintained the false identity.
4. After investigations by a status review unit (“SRU”) the Respondent wrote to the Appellant on 2 August 2021 to advise that it had been considered that she had used false details to obtain British citizenship. The Appellant accepted this. On 22 June 2022 the Respondent issued a notice of decision to deprive her of British national under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (“BNA 1981”). The Appellant appealed against the Respondent’s decision. Her appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Prudham) in a decision in 2023. The Appellant was successfully appealed and the decision was set aside by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Saini on 18 April 2023. It was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Judge Saini preserved the following findings:
(1) The Appellant gave a false name as well as a false nationality.
(2) The medical evidence submitted as part of the asylum claim was based on a false account of events.
(3) The Appellant received advice to a false identity and was prepared to countenance that advice. The Appellant was aware that the appeal had been lodged on her behalf.
(4) Had the Appellant declared her deception in her naturalisation form the Respondent would not have granted the application.
5. The appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Loke. She did not accept the Appellant’s argument that she should go behind the findings of Judge Saini. However, she allowed the appeal on Article 8 grounds. The Respondent successfully appealed. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Harris found that Judge Loke materially erred in her assessment of Article 8 ECHR. She said that the judge erred when attaching weight to the length of time that the Appellant has been in the UK in the context of the limbo period. The judge did not give adequate or any reasons how relevant this is to the assessment of proportionality in the context of the limbo period. The judge found that the First-tier Tribunal erred because although the Appellant said in her witness statement that she had always struggled financially her income exceeded her regular expenditure for herself and her family leaving a surplus each month of just over £890.
6. Judge Harris said that the surplus was a relevant consideration for the First-tier Judge to take into account that the Appellant as was that the Appellant had not stated that she was without savings. Judge Harris found that the First-tier Tribunal did not consider whether the Appellant’s eldest child, who is an adult and studying, would be able to provide financial support in the eight weeks of the prospective limbo period which was described as “short” by the First-tier Tribunal through working when she is not pursuing her studies.
7. The judge found that the First-tier Tribunal Judge erred in failing to consider Hysaj (Deprivation of Citizenship: Delay) [2020] UKUT 00128 upon which the Respondent relied in her review to support the submission that even if the Appellant and her dependants faced destitution during the prospective limbo period there can be other forms of support such as applying for local authority support under s.17 of the Children Act 1989.

Issue
8. The only issue for me to determined is whether the decision to deprive the Appellant of citizenship breaches her rights under Article 8. I am not concerned with the Respondent’s decision to exercise her power under s.40(3) of the 1981 Act. Judge Siani preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal as set out above and Judge Loke did not go behind these.
The Evidence
9. The Appellant relied on a consolidated bundle containing 513 pages. In addition the Appellant had served and filed further evidence ( “supplementary bundle”) which was the subject of an application under Rule 15 (2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (“the 2008 Rules”). I admitted this evidence which included up to date witness statements of the Appellant and her daughter, a schedule of the Appellant’s income and expenditure, the Appellant’s bank statements, evidence of Universal Credit payments and a sociology course outline (relating to the studies of the Appellant’s eldest daughter). There are in total three witness statements from the Appellant; dated 4 September 2022 and 3 May 2024 and 22 July 2025. There was an additional bundle from the Appellant entitled “Section 17 support bundle”. In the bundle there are letters from the Appellant’s other children which describe their feelings towards their mother and what she does for them.
10. The parties relied on skeleton arguments.
The Appellant’s Evidence
11. The Appellant adopted her witness statements as evidence-in-chief. She was asked cross-examined Mr Tufan. Her evidence can be summarised.
12. If the Appellant loses British citizenship she will have no status in the UK which will mean she will not have the right to work, claim benefits or rent privately through the local authority. She is a single mother of four children three of whom are minors. Her children are aged 10, 16, 17 and 20. She has a part-time job. She cannot work full-time because she has to look after her children. Her wages are not sufficient to provide for the family. She is also in receipt of welfare benefit. She is able to provide for her family from her wages and state benefits. She has not been served with any notice to leave accommodation because she has not yet been deprived of citizenship.
13. Any income from her adult daughter would be insufficient to provide for the family. She cannot support a family of five with her wages and in any event employment would also interfere with her studies.
14. The Appellant was asked why her daughter did not attend the hearing. She said that she was in Albania. Mr Tufan asked her what she was doing there and the Appellant said she does not know. She said that now that her daughter is a student she does not ask the Appellant for permission. She said that she is tired from studying and she needed a rest. The Appellant said that her daughter left on Monday or Tuesday (before the hearing) and that she will be returning on 14 or 15 August 2025. The does not know where her daughter was staying. She said that she might be staying with friends. The Appellant said that she had not funded the trip and she does not know how it has been paid for. She was asked how her daughter can afford to go away and she said that she went with someone else by car and it did not cost her anything. She said that she is staying in the countryside where it is cheap.
15. The Appellant said she does not have savings. She has not made enquiries in relation to funding pursuant to s.17 of the Children Act 1989.
16. The Appellant was re-examined by Mr Badar. She was asked about periods when she is not working and how she meets her expenses. She said that during periods she spends little on food and groceries so that she can pay the bills. She said that her daughter receives a student loan of about £9,000. She does not pay for accommodation because she lives with the Appellant and she eats with the family. The Appellant gives her daughter travel expenses to university. Her daughter does not have a job and she does not have any income. She goes out in the evenings sometimes but the Appellant does not know who pays for her. She pays only for her daughter’s food and travel expenses .
The Evidence of Besarta Leka
17. Ms Leka gave evidence over video link from Albania. She adopted her witness statement. Her evidence is that her mother continues to struggle financially as she is all alone and has to juggle many things between looking after the family and working part-time. She is currently attending university and unable to work full-time. The maximum she could do would be to work part-time but this would not earn sufficient funds to enable the family to pay their rent and bills and other daily expenses. It is unlikely that anyone would agree to rent a house to her because she has no financial or credit history. She would not be in a position to earn enough to satisfy landlords or agencies that she would be able to pay rent.
18. The decision and the legal proceedings have had massive impact on her mother’s mental health. She takes medication Citalopram (20 mgs) and Co-Codamol (30 mgs). She struggles sleeping at night and she has nightmares. All she can do to help her is look after the younger children. Their father is absent does not give any support.
19. Ms Leka confirmed that she receives £9,250 a year in a student loan and that this goes towards tuition fees. She travelled to Albania on 26 July 2025 by car with friends. She is staying with friends. She studies three days a week at university. She cannot work. Work is not her priority. Her priority is her studies. She has too much work to do for the university. She graduates in a year.
20. In cross-examination she was asked where she is staying in Albania. She said that she does not know, but it was somewhere in the north. Her mother gives her travel expenses and she thinks she pays for her clothes. She said that they are connected to one bank account. This was clarified as meaning that she spends from her mother’s bank account directly. She described how when she buys clothes the money comes from her mother. She was asked how much she received from her mum on a monthly basis and she said she did not know. She said that her mother gives her as much as she can. She was asked for an estimate and said that it was less than £200.
The Respondent’s Submissions
21. Mr Tufan relied on the Respondent’s skeleton argument. The Respondent does not accept that the Appellant would lose her current accommodation or that her family would be destitute during the limbo period. The Respondent relies on s.17 of the Children Act 1989 which places a statutory duty on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need within their area including families with no recourse to public funds. No evidence has been provided of any notice from the local authority to move the Appellant or that they would cease providing accommodation during the limbo period.
22. It is not accepted that the Appellant’s daughter would not be able to assist the family during a short limbo period. There is no evidence of the study requirements of her course or details of her attendance at university. The Appellant is working sixteen hours a week. She has never been employed on a full-time basis. It is not accepted that the Appellant’s daughter cannot support her mother through employment on a part-time basis. The length of residence is not sufficient to tip the scales in favour of retaining the benefits of citizenship that have been fraudulently secured when considering the heavy weight to be attached to the public interest. The issues raised by the Appellant do not advance anything other than disruption to her day-to-day life for a limited period and the impact on her children will be minimal. Little weight to the Freedom of Information Request (FOI) because the results pertain to the period during the pandemic.
23. Mr Tufan relied on Hysaj. He contended that the limbo period without more cannot possibly tip the balance in the Appellant’s favour. He submitted that not all the evidence was clear or credible, it was not apparent how the Appellant’s daughter’s needs were met or if the Appellant can afford to provide for her daughter. Moreover, it is open to the Appellant to ask the Secretary of State for the right to work.
The Appellant’s Submissions
24. Mr Badar made submissions in the context of his skeleton argument. He relied on SSHD v Daci at paragraph 42. Reference to Daci was made in the case of Aziz & Ors v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1884 and more recently Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769. It is accepted that there is some friction in the reliance on Laci, as DUTJ Harris did not accept or engage with the arguments and found that the Appellant could not rely on length of residence. However, it is clear considering [51]–[56] and [54] that the Court of Appeal found that the Appellant could do so. The Appellant relies on Nasim and others (Article 8) Pakistan [2014] UKUT 25 to support that Article 8 has a wide scope.
25. The Appellant’s children are all reliant on her. She receives Universal Credit and lives in temporary council accommodation. She works as a cleaner part-time for sixteen hours a week which at times has been put on hold. In support her children have provided handwritten letters setting out the circumstances of the family. The consequences of deprivation would be that the Appellant would no longer be able to work with reference to s.24B of the Immigration Act 1971. The Appellant relies on Balajigari v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673 at [81].
26. The family may face destitution if permission to work is taken away along with any support. The FOI is the most recent document providing an average (mean) of 303 days for the SRU to grant leave/make a decision following when a person’s appeal rights are exhausted. It is not accepted that the limbo period will be eight weeks as claimed by the Respondent.
27. The Appellant’s eldest daughter Is a full-time student. With reference to paragraph 109 of Hysaj in terms of any safety net as envisaged by the Tribunal the Respondent is invited to set out amount, duration and how the Appellant would be able to access this. It is submitted that given the fragile financial situation of the Appellant and her family any application for funding would be detrimental to her and her children’s welfare considering the delays.
28. The Appellant has lived in the UK for more than twenty years which carries significant weight. An analogy is drawn to the Immigration Rules at 276ADE(1)(iii) which permit those who have overstayed and entered the UK illegally to remain after twenty years. It permits periods of imprisonment to be discounted which shows the importance of such a lengthy period of time in the UK. The Appellant has offered her unreserved apologies and accepted responsibility when confronted with the allegations.
29. Her underlying reasons for giving false information due to the situation in Albania, this further aggravated by her mental health conditions and the factors raised in her statement should be given weight. The guidance (Deprivation of British Citizenship version 4.0) at page 15 is relevant:-
“The following may be considered to be mitigating factors:
• where there is evidence of some form of mental or physical impairment that can clearly be shown to have impacted on the subject’s judgement at the time the material fraud took place
• where there is evidence of some form of coercion that indicates that the subject was not able to make independent decisions at the time the material fraud took place”.
30. Mr Badar relied submitted that the witnesses are credible and that the Appellant’s evidence is corroborated by her daughter’s. He referred me to the schedule of income and expenditure in the supplementary bundle to support that the Appellant’s income is made up of Universal Credit, child benefit and part-time employment and it amounts to £1,953.92. Her expenditure (utility bills, food for a family of five, broadband, mobile phone bills and travel) amounts to £1,612.72. There is an excess of £341.20. The table is not challenged by the Secretary of State. The Appellant has sufficient funds to give her daughter ad hoc amounts of money in accordance with the daughter’s evidence. Their evidence is not inconsistent. Her daughter said that her mother does not give her a fixed amount and that money is given to her on an ad hoc basis. The Appellant is a good citizen and she has a considerable length of residence in the UK.
31. Mr Badar said that paragraph 107 R3 at does not say anything new. He referred me to the letters from the children and their father and stated that this evidence is unchallenged.
32. The Appellant will be exposed to the “hostile environment” with all that follows from that.
Case Law
33. The Upper Tribunal in Hysaj specifically engaged with “the limbo period”. The relevant paragraphs are found at [105]–[110]:-
105. ‘Limbo’ is convenient shorthand for the appellant's concern that he faces an uncertain period awaiting a decision. Though he has enjoyed lawful presence in this country for many years through his fraud, he is being returned to the position he would have been in at the time the respondent considered his application for international protection if he had been truthful as to his personal history. He has no identifiable claim for international protection and his wish is to remain here on the basis of established private and family life rights. There is no requirement that he enjoy temporary leave whilst a decision is made on possible deportation action.
106. We are satisfied in this matter that the short time-period identified by the respondent within which the appellant will be required to make representations and for a decision to deport or a grant of leave to then be made cannot require the grant of leave to remain pending the respondent’s ultimate decision as to deportation.
107. The appellant’s articulated concern is that deprivation will adversely impact upon not only his life, but also that of his wife and children. He contends that the expected ‘upheaval’ in their lives will be accompanied by financial and emotional concerns. Such upheaval is a consequence of the appellant losing rights and entitlements from his British citizenship that he should never have enjoyed.
108. The Court of Appeal has confirmed that article 8 does not impose any obligation upon the State to provide financial support for family life. The ECHR is not aimed at securing social and economic rights, with the rights defined being predominantly civil and political in nature: R. (on the application of SC) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] EWCA Civ 615; [2019] 1 WLR 5687, at [28]-[38]. The State is not required to grant leave to an individual so that they can work and provide their family with material support.
109. The time period between deprivation and the issuing of a decision is identified by the respondent as being between six to eight weeks. During such time the appellant’s wife is permitted to work. She accepted before us that she could seek employment. She expressed concern as to the impact her limited English language skills may have on securing employment but confirmed that she could secure unskilled employment. She confirmed that her husband could remain at home and look after their children. The appellant accepted that his wife is named on the joint tenancy and will continue to be able to lawfully rent their home upon his loss of citizenship and status. In addition, the children can access certain benefits through their citizenship. Two safety nets exist for the family. If there is an immediate and significant downturn in the family’s finances such as to impact upon the health and development of the children, they can seek support under section 17 of the Children Act 1989. If the family become destitute, or there are particularly compelling reasons relating to the welfare of the children on account of very low income, the appellant’s wife may apply for a change to her No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) condition.
110. There is a heavy weight to be placed upon the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the system by which foreign nationals are naturalised and permitted to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship. That deprivation will cause disruption in day-to-day life is a consequence of the appellant’s own actions and without more, such as the loss of rights previously enjoyed, cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of his retaining the benefits of citizenship that he fraudulently secured. That is the essence of what the appellant seeks through securing limited leave pending consideration by the respondent as to whether he should be deported. Although the appellant’s family members are not culpable, their interests are not such, either individually or cumulatively, as to outweigh the strong public interest in this case.
35. In Laci Underhill LJ endorsed what the Tribunal said in Hysaj at paragraph 110 concerning the limbo period. The appellant in that case was informed by the UKBA on 17 February 2009 that the Secretary of State had reasons to believe that he had obtained status as a British citizen by fraud and she was considering whether he should be deprived of his nationality under Section 40(3) of the 1981 Act. The appellant’s solicitors replied to UKBA on 17 March 2009 admitting on the appellant’s behalf what he had done and advanced mitigating circumstances. The appellant heard nothing from the Home Office for nine years during which time he married an Albanian national. In 2018 she was granted ILR following an application in which she gave the appellant’s correct date and place of birth. On 28 February 2018 the Home Office wrote to the appellant out of the blue notifying him again that the Secretary of State was considering depriving him of his British citizenship on the basis that it had been obtained by fraud. There was no reference to UKBA’s letter of 17 February 2009 or of the appellant’s solicitors’ response.
36. The Court of Appeal in allowing the appellant’s appeal and restoring the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to allow his appeal on Article 8 grounds emphasised the following at paragraph 83:-
“83. I should emphasise that this decision should not be interpreted as meaning that an indulgent view can be taken towards migrants who obtain British citizenship on the basis of a lie. On the contrary, in all ordinary circumstances they can expect to have it withdrawn. It is only because of the exceptional combination of circumstances in the present case that the FTT was entitled to come to the decision that it did”.
34. Underhill LJ accepted that the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to regard the Secretary of State’s inaction which was wholly explained at the time and for so extraordinarily long as sufficiently compelling when taken with all other circumstances of the case to justify a decision that the Appellant should not be deprived of citizenship. At paragraph 73 of Laci Underhill LJ said as follows:-
“73. I have not found this aspect of the case easy. In all ordinary cases deprivation of citizenship will indeed be the inevitable outcome of a finding that it was obtained by deceit: see para. 37 above. The Appellant can muster a number of points in his favour, but most of them could not, whether by themselves or cumulatively, outweigh the obvious strong public interest in depriving him of a status of fundamental importance to which he was not entitled”.
35. The Court of Appeal attached significant weight to what was described as exceptional and that was the state’s unexplained inaction for almost a decade (see [74]). The judge considered the House of Lords decision in EB (Kosovo) 2008 UKHL 41. He said that there was some analogy between the case and point 2 made by Lord Bingham which reads as follows:-
“(2) that the more time goes by without any steps being taken to remove an applicant the sense of impermanence which will imbue relationships formed early in the period will fade ‘and the expectation will grow that if the authorities had intended to remove the applicant they would have taken steps to do so’, which may affect the proportionality of removal”.
36. Underhill LJ observed at paragraph 70 that the loss of the right to work was a factor of “real significance” whether or not the analysis claimed in Article 8 ECHR terms are addressed pursuant to a review of the Respondent’s exercise of discretion.
37. In SSHD v Daci [2025] EWCA Civ 18 the Court of Appeal did not go on to consider the Appellant’s Article 8 claim but the court said about Article 8 claims the following:-
“42. It was common ground that deprivation of citizenship, as contrasted with deportation, had a more limited impact on human rights for the reasons given in Aziz v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1884; [2019] 1 WLR 266 at paragraph 26 and Laci at paragraph 25. That said Mr Daci contended that the Secretary of State’s decision to deprive him of citizenship was unlawful pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights Act because it infringed his rights protected under article 8 of the ECHR. It was common ground that this issue needed to be determined if the Secretary of State’s appeal against the decision of the UT was allowed.
43. In my judgment it would be appropriate to allow the Secretary of State’s appeal against the decision of the UT, and remit Mr Daci’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State to the UT to determine the issue of the compatibility of the decision with Mr Daci’s rights protected by article 8 of the ECHR and the lawfulness of the decision pursuant to the Human Rights Act. This is in circumstances where the decision was remade by the UT and it is only the article 8 ECHR issue which remains to be determined”.
38. In Muslija the Upper Tribunal at [19] said as follows:-
“19. We deduce the following propositions from the above analysis concerning the limbo period, the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation and proportionality under Article 8 ECHR:
a. The reasonably foreseeable consequences of the deprivation of citizenship are relevant to an assessment of the proportionality of the decision, for Article 8(2) ECHR purposes. Since the tribunal must conduct that assessment for itself, it is necessary for the tribunal to determine such reasonably foreseeable consequences for itself.
b. Judges should usually avoid proleptic analyses of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the deprivation of citizenship. In a minority of cases, it may be appropriate for the individual concerned to demonstrate that there is no prospect of their removal. Such cases are likely to be rare and are likely to be restricted to where the sole basis for the individual’s deprivation under section 40(2) is to pave the way for their subsequent removal on account of their harmful conduct, in circumstances where the Secretary of State places no broader reliance on ensuring that the individual concerned ought not to be allowed to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship generally, quite apart from their removal.
c. An overly anticipatory analysis of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation will be founded on speculation. The evidence available and circumstances obtaining at the time of making of the deprivation order (and the appeal against that decision) are very likely to be different from that which will be available and those which will obtain when the decision regarding a future application or human rights claim is later taken.
d. Exposure to the ‘limbo period’, without more, cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of an individual retaining fraudulently obtained citizenship. That means there are limits to the utility of an assessment of the length of the limbo period; in the absence of some other factor (c.f. ‘without more’), the mere fact of exposure to even a potentially lengthy period of limbo is a factor unlikely to be of dispositive relevance.
e. It is highly unlikely that the assessment of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a deprivation order could legitimately extend to prospective decisions of the Secretary of State taken in consequence to the deprived person once again becoming a person subject to immigration control, or any subsequent appeal proceedings”.
Findings and Reasons
39. The case law establishes that deprivation of citizenship has a more limited impact on human rights as contrasted with removal or deportation. It is not appropriate for a court when considering deprivation in the context of Article 8 ECHR to conduct a “proleptic assessment” of the likelihood of a lawful of a lawful removal. There is no conflict in the approach to Article 8 in the case law.
40. The Appellant will have no income from employment or state benefits during the limbo period. I find that it is likely that there will be some income coming into the household. The Appellant’s evidence was very vague about the situation of her eldest daughter. The evidence of the Appellant and her daughter about the latter’s employment situation and expenses was not consistent. I find that both were evasive when questioned on the issue. The Appellant says that she gives her daughter money for travel expenses only. She was vague about how her daughter lives on a day to day basis. The Appellant’s daughter said that her mother pays for her clothes and that she has access to her mother’s account. She said that her mother gives her less than £200 every month. Her evidence supports that her mother gives her more than just travel expenses. The evidence suggests that the Appellant’s daughter works. She is a student and therefore likely to be working part-time during term time. I find that what she is capable of earning will not cover all the family’s expenses. There will be a deficit. The schedule of the Appellant’s income and expenditure was not challenged by Mr Tufan or the change in figures from the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. I therefore accept that it accurately represents the Appellant’s income and the expenditure.
41. Whilst there is nothing on the schedule relating to motoring costs, I accept that during the limbo period the Appellant will not be able to drive and this will inconvenience the younger children in so far as she will not be able to do the school run.
42. I have considered the likely length of the period of limbo. Mr Tufan maintains that it will be no more than eight weeks. Mr Badar relied on a FOI which he said supported that the mean time it took SRU to grant temporary leave following an earlier decision was 303 days. I do not attach significant weight to this because it is dated 31 August 2021. The statistics were extracted on 30 March 2021. It is reasonable to infer from this that the figure given may have been skewed by the pandemic. Moreover, there is no indication of the type of cases dealt with. Some will be straight forward and others may be more complicated and need further investigation by the Respondent. This case is a relatively straight forward case. The limbo period may well be longer than 8 weeks but I find that there is nothing to support that it will be as long as suggested by the FOI. I take into account what the Upper Tribunal said in Muslija that there are limits to the utility of as assessment of the length of the limbo period in the absence of some other factor and that the mere fact of exposure to even a lengthy limbo period without more is unlikely to be of dispositive relevance. I do not find that there is “more” in this case.
43. I do not find that the reasonably foreseeable consequences deprivation are nearly as bleak as that suggested by the Appellant. Despite the difficulties that the Appellant will face, I find that the deprivation of British citizenship is proportionate. Dealing with the case of Laci on which the Appellant relies, the circumstances for Mr Laci are very different to those of the Appellant. There was lengthy inaction by the state of nine years. Mr Laci disclosed his own deception in 2009 and he did not hear from the respondent until 2016. Mr Bader made the point about the length of time that the Appellant has been in the UK. He said that this is a material consideration as it was in Laci. While the Court of Appeal referred to this a factor which the First-tier Tribunal took into account and Underhill LJ made no criticism of this, the context is very different to this case. It was a reference to the EB (Kosovo) point that there had been an egregious delay by the respondent which reduces the weight of the public interest. The way in which length of residence could support an Appellant’s case in so far as the longer they stay in the country the more likely they are to develop a private life is an argument that is relevant to removal which is not the issue in this case (see [75] and [76]). Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Harris when setting aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was correct to say that length of residence is not a relevant consideration in the context of deprivation. Moreover, the length that the Appellant has remained in the UK is as a result of deception. She has enjoyed rights entitlements due to British citizens which were fraudulently secured.
44. In this case there was no delay by the Respondent. There was no disclosure by the Appellant of deception. She admitted it once she had been caught. I take into account what Underhill LJ said about the real significance of the loss of immigration status on the Appellant’s ability to work (see [70]). The observation that was made in this context concerning the effects of unsettled status, are fact specific. Mr Laci was employed by the council and it was a risk that he would lose his job. The Appellant has not advanced her case on this basis. From her evidence of not working throughout the school holidays, it maybe that she is not employed but works on a self-employed basis. I appreciate the Appellant will not have leave and will be committing a criminal offence should she work when she has not leave to do so (s.24B Immigration Act 1971). However, the analogy with Balajigari v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673 is misconceived. Whether a deprivation decision interferes with the Appellant’s Article 8 rights thus giving her statutory rights of appeal is not an issue. She is not exposed to the hostile environment and subject to removal before consideration of her human rights appeal.
45. While Mr Badar contends that there is under funding and speculates about delays, in my view it is reasonable to infer that the local authority will exercise its duty under s.17 of the Children Act. The Appellant’s children are British citizens. In the light of this there is no evidence to support that they will not receive such help as they need to remain in their home or that they will not be housed. Mr Badar contended that it was not in the public interest to burden the local authority which is already stretched. This submission is misconceived. The public interest in deprivation is in maintaining the integrity of the system by which foreign national are naturalized and permitted to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship. This is not undermined by the lack of resources of the local authority. In any event, I am not in a position to speculate about the local authorities allocation of resources and priorities. I attach weight their statutory obligations. I find that the family will receive the support it needs to meet its basic costs. I do not find that they will become destitute.
46. I appreciate that the family’s position will be uncertain. The limbo period will be difficult. I appreciate that the Appellant’s children are not culpable. I take into account their best interests. I remind myself that this is not a removal or deportation case and that any hardship will be for a limited period only. I cannot speculate whether the Appellant will be granted leave at some stage. The children’s best interest are a primary but not paramount consideration. There is heavy weight to be placed on the public interest in deprivation cases. Moreover, I did not find that the evidence supports that the impact of deprivation will be as extreme as suggested by the Appellant.
47. Mr Badar asked me to take into account the circumstances relating to the fraudulent behaviour and that the Appellant was coerced. There has never been a finding that the Appellant was coerced so that she is not responsible for the deception. I rely on the preserved findings of Judge Saini.
48. I take into account that the Appellant takes citalopram and suffers from depression. There was no medical evidence. There are pictures of boxes of medication. These are not up to date, but I accept the Appellant’s daughter’s evidence about her mother’s mental health. However this factor is not sufficient to tip the balance in the Appellant’s favour.
49. I find that the decision to deprive the Appellant of British citizenship is proportionate to the public interest.
Notice of Decision
50. The appeal is dismissed under Article 8 ECHR

Joanna McWilliam

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 August 2025